

Partners



Parks

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Cover: Community members assess the condition of a resource use trail in Mt Elgon forest, Uganda. Photo: Sean White.

The chairman of the resource use committee in Kapkwai, also in Mt Elgon, makes a point about the use of tree bark in traditional medicine. Photo: Sean White.

Maasai people from Tsavo-Amboseli (Kenya) – key stakeholders of the local protected areas. Photo: Brian Peart.

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Editorial

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TREVOR SANDWITH



From 'guns and fences' to paternalism to partnerships: the slow disentangling of Africa's protected areas

THE ASTONISHING DIVERSITY of the African continent encompasses species-rich tropical forests, great savannas and grasslands, deserts, coral reefs, mountains, and coastal and freshwater ecosystems. From the most distant past until just a few centuries ago, the overall impact of African people on their environment remained, in all likelihood, inconspicuous. The one possible exception is the use of fire, which could have favoured the modification of woody and other ecosystems. The abundance and variety of wildlife, however, appears to have been only marginally affected by the African autochthonous hunters, with ancient extinction phenomena taking place only for climatic reasons. The European explorers, colonists and missionaries who travelled *en masse* to Africa in the last centuries sent back amazed reports: they found dense and unscathed forests and pristine landscapes, teeming with wildlife.

Relatively little is known about African pre-colonial conservation practices. Low population densities, highly adapted agricultural and hunting practices, and the general mobility of the population are likely to have promoted adaptive patterns of resource use. When resources came under pressure from increased human populations or economic activity, a likely response was to move to new and more resource-abundant areas or to develop technological innovations, such as pastoralism, slash and burn agriculture, water harvesting, and the development of institutional regulation of resource use. Cultural responses, including ritual, myths, taboos, social stratification and social rules regarding sacred spaces and species, survive to the present and must have been an important component of autochthonous natural resource management systems through time.

Colonialism created entirely new conditions and issues. Historians have only recently begun analysing the role that wild animals, besides other natural resources, played in subsidising the nascent settler economies of African colonies. Ivory was a primary object of the chase involving hunters, missionaries, adventurers and engineers, but ostrich feathers, rhino horn, hippo teeth, meat and hides, and the collection of specimens for sale to natural museums and zoological gardens in Europe also took their toll. Hunting, using high precision rifles, was mostly done to subsidise the new settlers, but progressively also became a way to protect the growing cattle industry. It was believed that, since diseases were transmitted by wild animals to cattle, wild animals had to be reduced in number and confined. Carnivores also needed to be reduced, to prevent their predation of domestic animals. In some parts of the continent, notably southern Africa, these practices literally decimated wildlife. This went as far as the extinction of certain species—in the Cape Colony of South Africa, the blue buck (*Hippotragus leucophaeus*) was extinct by 1800, and the quagga (*Equus quagga*) by 1883. As a reaction, game legislation ensued.

This was not the only response. Some African rulers also took action and set up permit and levy systems for European hunters, as well as game reserves for the local kings. The white settlers, however, soon got the upper hand when they established, in a large part of the continent, a rough tripartite division of land use: land for the whites, land for the blacks and land for game. This division was imposed by force, and such colonial force, indeed, was the primary means by which the new protectionist regimes for the 'conservation of nature' were



*Women mapping and discussing the traditional uses of forest resources around Mt Kilum (Cameroon).
Photo: Grazia Borrini-Feyerabend.*

established in many countries. A net separation between the authorities, local communities and wildlife was imposed, glossing over any kind of responsibility about early wildlife depletion and severing any sense of community ownership or responsibility for natural resources. With this went the increasing perception that hunting was a 'marker of class'. Initially it was reserved for the whites, and then only to the whites of higher status or influence. The hunting reserves for the elites were established close to the land destined for the game to recover – the early 'protected areas'. Meanwhile, resident local communities were expelled from both.

This brief recollection of elements of recent history in the African continent merely gives us a glimpse of the socio-political events intertwined with conservation issues throughout the continent. Today, both the enterprise for conservation and the enterprise for exploitation of African natural resources and wildlife are complex phenomena, closely related with one another and affected, among others, by the patterns of global trade and the insidious effects of war and conflict. Obviously, among the phenomena that contribute to their on-going evolution and change are the processes of independence from colonial powers and the birth of new political regimes, as in the recent peaceful transition to democracy in South Africa.

African voices for a new social order, responsive to the needs of people and seeking the democratisation of the state and society, have not been lacking. And yet, the patterns of control over natural resources, be they for conservation or exploitation, find it difficult to disentangle themselves from the legacy of colonialism and the 'guns and fences' operations of the not-so-distant past. A first rather common step is to abandon the letter but not the substance of the control through some form of more or less benevolent paternalism. The managers in power agree that the communities eking a living at the borders of protected areas should be 'consulted' on decisions, should receive 'some benefits' and, if things go far, should even be 'compensated' from the on-going damages they suffer because of wildlife incursions in their villages (the paper on Tanzania in this issue of *Parks* talks in a matter-of-fact vein of 200 people per year being casualties

of wildlife throughout the country). Are those examples of real 'partnerships' and has the journey ended? Or is real partnership something else? Could it possibly be that real partnerships demand a rethinking of the whole relationship between the state, the national and international elites, the local communities and the natural resources? Could it possibly be that partnership implies no less than a serious process of social communication, dialogue, shared assessment of problems and opportunities, fair negotiation of decisions and actions, and setting in place pluralist management institutions capable of learning through time?

The papers in this volume offer a glimpse of the historical 'disentangling' of African protected areas from the old protectionist approach into a more 'open' and collaborative management style. The readers will judge how far these cases have managed to advance along the road to real partnerships. The cases do not pretend to do justice to the astonishing variety of situations and challenges that exist among the protected areas in the continent. The papers have been submitted by their authors to illustrate their work in progress and to provide all of us with an opportunity to reflect on emergent trends and patterns of conservation practices. In the lead-up to the IUCN World Parks Congress in September 2003, being held for the first time in Africa, there will be a spotlight on conservation in Africa. These papers are helping us to advance our comprehension of this complex, changing phenomenon.

The term 'partnership' is rather loosely applied in all sorts of contexts. Here, we will use it to imply a collective, voluntary process and state of affairs by which a number of partners fairly share among themselves the functions, rights and responsibilities for the conservation of a protected area and/or related territories and resources. This understanding of 'partnership' is far from idealised and can merely represent a complex interplay of interests. It is, however, fundamental in spelling out the broad understanding that conservation, today, cannot afford to remain a top-down affair and, on the contrary, needs the concurrence and support of a variety of actors in society. The six case studies in this volume deal with 'partnership' arrangements where biodiversity conservation and sustainable use of natural resources are a common thread. Here are some broad reflections we derived:

Partners – the case studies illustrate a large variety of partners in conservation – from local communities to district authorities, from state agencies to private entrepreneurs, from NGOs to donors. Issues ultimately being raised are: 'Who possesses a social legitimacy to participate in managing the protected area and related natural resources? Who has the appropriate characteristics to convene and facilitate such a management partnership?' In recent decades, the gulf between legality and legitimacy has appeared to many as more a part of the problem than anything else. Increasingly, social actors are seen as justified in claiming a management role on the basis of customary law, direct dependency on the natural resources for subsistence and cultural survival, historical and spiritual relationships with the concerned territory, unique knowledge and ability to manage it, proximity to the resources, loss and damage suffered, and so on. Inclusion, rather than exclusion, becomes the approach of choice, and the triage of serious versus non-serious candidates is taken care of by time, and by the onerous requirements to contribute. Equity, however, remains a powerful concern, as the actors with the most capacity to participate and make themselves heard are not necessarily the ones most entitled or deserving. In addition, the recognition of customary rights and other types of non-legally based claims is still an uphill battle in most African countries, with the recent exception of South Africa. Fortunately, external agencies are becoming more capable of fostering and nourishing partnership processes (see, for instance, the article on Takiéta, Niger) and more conscious of the need to nurture equity and sustainability from their onset.

Occasions – in many of the case studies collected in this issue of *Parks*, the immediate occasion to develop a new, partnership-based management system has been an external project, as for

Conkouati, Takiéta, Kibale, Mt Elgon or the Selous Game Reserve. In others, such as KwaZulu-Natal, the occasion has been a new piece of legislation. Most of the projects or legislation, however, were prompted by existing conflicts over natural resources (competition for control or use) and/or a perceived threat, such as poaching or patterns of unsustainable use. Paradoxically, the weakness of state institutions may be a main reason for the scarcity of effective partnership experiences in Africa. Weak institutions tend to 'grab' power via centralised laws and are plagued by the lack of transparency and accountability over the allocation and regulation of state-sanctioned extraction rights. In turn, lack of transparency and accountability does not sit well with partnerships, and prefers straight top-down decision-making patterns.

Roles – strategic partnerships capitalise on multiplicity and diversity and involve partners in complementary roles and functions. These should not be identified *a priori* but within the negotiation process, and on the basis of each partner's entitlements, capacities and comparative advantages. In this context equity does not mean equality, as different entitlements and capacities should result in different management roles and weight in decision-making. Equity requires that a partnership is not dictated from above, but developed through a negotiated, joint decision-making approach. As a matter of fact, equity and fairness demand some degree of power-sharing among all concerned parties and the willingness of all of them to be flexible, mediate conflicts and work towards a consensus position. Seen in this light, the cases of Selous Game Reserve and Tsavo and Amboseli National Parks could be questioned as genuine partnerships, as local communities were offered a predetermined package of privileges, which they have not truly been able to negotiate. It is to be hoped that more openness will come in the future, fostered by the need to follow a concerted, adaptive management approach.

Rationale – a lasting partnership provides a continuous, effective rationale for all parties to remain within it. In other words, all partners should make their own assessment that the overall result of the collaboration is beneficial to them and outweighs their costs. In addition, the distribution of benefits among all partners should be fair. The most sustainable partnerships, in this sense, stand on a close and perceptible link between management benefits and costs, rights and responsibilities to the lowest possible level. We cannot judge whether the situations described in the papers in this issue are fair. This is a task for all the involved parties, in full consideration of a variety of issues and conditions, both local and non-local. We can affirm, however, that generally there is still a way to go to make sure that benefits are garnered by those most deserving them, such as those making the most effort or bearing most of the costs of conservation. A balanced relationship between such benefits and costs is a condition for sustainability. It is also a continuous struggle, and a healthy one in the life of any social partnership.

Scope and duration – the papers in this issue of *Parks* illustrate a range of situations, including local communities taking responsibility for their own resources and effectively creating a 'Community Conserved Area'; authorities grudgingly conferring responsibilities on local actors; local actors struggling to remain on board in decision making; and, as in KwaZulu-Natal, law-codified partnerships where local boards make rightful decisions regarding resource management within state-run protected areas. Some of the partnerships are forged for temporary, sectoral and limited purposes, such as setting in operation a tourism business that will ultimately be handed over to one of the parties. Others deal with the privileges and rules in the peripheral zones of a protected area. Still others, with the management objectives and activities of the protected area itself. From a broad point of view, the cases described all have a logical 'next step': a landscape management approach, demanding a close cooperation among actors at various levels, throughout time, on broad regional land use questions.

Agreements, institutions and commitments – there exist two typical products of a management partnership. The first are agreements detailing the management purpose and the roles, rights and responsibilities of the parties (as in the case of Mt Elgon and Kibale, in Uganda), often on a contractual basis. The second are pluralist management organisations, including representatives from all major parties, developed to remain in charge of decisions through time (as in the case of Takiéta, in Niger). Partnerships are always unique and, as they need to be tailored to the context, they all imply some sort of social experimentation. Throughout the world, an important distinction is beginning to be made between decision-making bodies acting by voting or by consensus. In the first case, the critical factor is the number of voting members assigned to given parties. In the second, the procedures can be much more sophisticated and embed incentives towards equitable and sustainable decisions. In all cases, newly established partnerships are likely to be vulnerable and, as demonstrated in the case of Conkouati (Congo), they critically depend on a political commitment to resolve issues and on a continuity of support until the agreements and institutions mature, and take on a life on their own.

Learning by doing – management partnerships are processes requiring on-going review and improvement, rather than the strict application of a set of established rules. Their most important result is their own capacity of responding to varying needs in an effective and flexible way. For the Local Management Structure of the Takiéta forest in Niger, for instance, the proof of success resides in being able to say no to certain donors, as well as to resolve internal conflicts and take valuable decisions. As for the management agreements in Kibale and Mt Elgon, a good amount of flexibility appears to have been built into the agreements themselves. A time dedicated to facilitating the transition to a new *modus operandi*, putting to test the agreement and ‘learning by doing’ generally leads towards a better recognition of the needs and opportunities in each specific context. An adaptive learning approach, based on careful monitoring and evaluation against the rationale and objectives of the partnership itself, is a crucial requirement.

The case studies in this volume are limited in scope and representation of conservation partnerships across Africa. Other initiatives that move beyond the protected area level to operate across a whole biome, such as the Cape Floristic Region, demand an extraordinary collaboration among national and provincial agencies across all sectors, statutory bodies, NGOs, international organisations, districts and municipalities, local communities and community-based organisations, as well as the private sector. Regional and trans-boundary conservation programmes, such as the Park W shared among Burkina Faso, Niger and Bénin introduce yet further levels of complexity. These programmes are the way of the future and it will be wise to build on experiences such as the ones reported in this volume, examining carefully the rationale, processes and outcomes of these crucial experiments in conservation ‘partnerships’.

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The experience of Local Boards in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

SIDNEY LUCKETT, KHULANI MKHIZE AND DEREK POTTER

This paper traces the initiatives taken by Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, the nature conservation service in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, to involve communities neighbouring protected areas as full decision-making partners in the management of nature conservation. Against the backdrop of significant socio-political transformation in South Africa, the development and role of statutory Local Boards is highlighted. Despite important progress, the initiative remains fragile, as may be expected in a complex and ever-changing political environment. The future of the Local Boards remains largely dependent on decisions about policies and resource allocation that are outside the control of Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife. This paper tells the 'story' of the developing Local Boards and reflects on both the successes and the difficulties encountered. It is hoped that the lessons learned in this process will contribute to the future involvement of resource-poor communities in nature conservation.

EZEMVELO KZN WILDLIFE (EKZNW) is a parastatal nature conservation agency in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. It was formed in 1997 through a merger of the Natal Parks Board (NPB) and the KwaZulu Directorate of Nature Conservation (DNC) following the advent of the democratic Constitution of South Africa.

This paper traces the initiatives taken by EKZNW and its predecessors to involve neighbouring communities and other stakeholders directly in the management of protected areas. The most recent of these initiatives is the introduction of statutory Local Boards in terms of the KwaZulu-Natal Nature Conservation Management Act (1997). In this paper we tell the 'story' of these Local Boards and reflect both on their successes and their difficulties, as an emergent partnership for conservation in a period of political and social transition.

Nature conservation in KwaZulu-Natal: a brief historical background

People have inhabited the area known as the province of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) for at least 5,000 years. These first inhabitants, the San, lived as hunter-gatherers and signs of their occupation can still be seen in the rock paintings scattered throughout the province, most notably in the Ukahlamba-Drakensberg mountain range. Iron-age farmers and pastoralists, from whom the Nguni people (which include the modern amaZulu) are descended, migrated from the great lakes region of Central Africa and had already been living in the area for about 1,000 years by the time the Portuguese navigator Vasco da Gama sailed along the coast in 1497.

Even though the Nguni hunted to supplement their livelihoods, this practice had probably had a negligible impact on the wildlife of the area. Early restrictions on hunting were introduced by the amaXhosi (chiefs) of the various Nguni clans as early as the beginning of the 19th Century (Hughes 2002). During his chieftainship of the amaZulu from 1819 to 1828, Shaka kept a tight control on hunting, decreeing that certain animal trophies, such as leopard skins, lion claws and crane feathers, could be worn only by royalty. He also set aside an area at the confluence of the Black and White Mfolozi rivers, in what is now the Hluhluwe-Umfolozzi Park, for ceremonial hunts.

The first protected areas (game reserves) to be established by the British Colony of Natal were the Umfolozi, Hluhluwe, Mdletshe and St Lucia Reserves in 1895. The latter is now part of the Greater St Lucia Wetland Park, a World Heritage Site. Giant's Castle Game Reserve, now part of the Ukahlamba-Drakenberg World Heritage Site followed in 1903 and in 1912, two years after the foundation of the Union of South Africa, the Mkhuze Game Reserve was proclaimed. In the succeeding 80 years more than 70 protected areas were added.

By far the most important threat to biodiversity during the first half of the 20th Century was the attempt by the authorities to eradicate nagana (*trypanosomiasis*), a cattle disease borne by the tsetse fly, which also causes sleeping sickness in humans. In spite of the dangers that nagana posed to domestic cattle, soldiers returning from the First World War were allocated land for cattle ranching adjacent to the Umfolozi, Hluhluwe and Mkhuzi reserves and within a very short space of time cattle were dying of nagana. Led by these commercial farmers, a concerted campaign was launched by the South African government to eradicate tsetse flies by killing off their hosts, the wildlife.

The campaigns to exterminate herbivores and the later aerial spraying of DDT and BHC achieved the objective of eradicating tsetse fly but also had a severe impact on both biodiversity and human settlements inside and outside the protected areas of north-eastern KZN. One consequence was that people and cattle were deemed unable to coexist with wildlife. The protected areas were established and fenced to separate people and cattle from wildlife, to prevent infection of domestic cattle from wildlife-borne diseases, to avoid human-wildlife conflicts and to bring a halt to hunting. In the period that followed, vigorous efforts were put in place to secure the protected areas against human encroachment and use.

This approach to conservation, characterised by Wells as the 'fences and fines' approach (Wells *et al.* 1992), dominated conservation thinking throughout the colonial period, and has created the lasting impression that protected areas are of little value to local communities. In post-independence Africa, there has been an increasing trend to involve local communities in decisions regarding the use of protected area resources. (Pimbert and Pretty 1995).

Figure 1. Map of South Africa.



In South Africa, independence from Britain was replaced by a system in which whites retained political power. Because of the racial discrimination practised during the Apartheid era, state and parastatal conservation bodies (such as the NPB) were not permitted to involve black people in policy setting or management; but, in those areas of the country designated as 'homelands' (such as KwaZulu) this was not the case. As a result, the policy trajectories of the NPB and the DNC differed with regard to the involvement of neighbouring communities. These are discussed in the next section.

Strategies and structures for community conservation in KwaZulu-Natal

Despite the different legal frameworks within which the two organisations operated, both the NPB and DNC independently realised that the 'fences and fines' approach was unsustainable. Because of the high levels of poverty of the communities on the borders of the protected areas managed by these organisations, the cost of patrolling protected area boundaries with increasingly hostile neighbours was becoming untenable. Even more importantly, the emerging realisation that the bulk of the indigenous biological diversity of the province lies outside of the protected areas has convinced the conservation authorities of the importance of engaging the people of the province in conservation.

In 1982, the forerunner to the DNC took the position that conservation and the development needs of rural communities went hand-in-hand. This position later developed into a 'Policy of Sharing', which established the principle of "encouraging rural communities to use the natural resources within the game reserves and proclaimed lands through the use of traditional means of harvesting" (Department of Nature Conservation 1994). Under this policy, reeds were harvested from some of the reserves under its control, e.g. the Tembe Elephant Reserve and Amatikulu Reserve. Using traditional fish traps as well as gillnets, fish were harvested in the Coastal Forest Reserve, now a part of the Greater St Lucia Wetland Park.

Fishtraps at the Coastal Forest Reserve. Photo: Scotty Kyle, EKZNW.



The harvesting component of the policy continues to benefit communities although there are questions regarding the sustainability of some programmes. The fish harvesting is a cause for concern, as commercial interests have become apparent. Much more contentious is the policy of sharing tourist revenue from the protected areas. The policy that was applied was that traditional authorities neighbouring the protected areas would be provided with 25% of the gross revenues of tourism in the protected area. This policy was dependent on the willingness of the KwaZulu government to provide this benefit in the form of an increased subsidy to the DNC, as many tourism operations were not profitable. The policy continued until the merger of KwaZulu with Natal to form the new province of KwaZulu-Natal, and the formation of the new parastatal EKZNW.

The NPB followed different strategies. The extension services of the NPB had, since the mid-1960s, promoted the sustainable use of indigenous flora and fauna, particularly game ranching and conservancies amongst mainly white commercial farmers. Resource harvesting was also permitted and groups from local (black) communities were allowed to collect thatch grass and reeds from these protected areas on a harvest sharing basis. In 1991, the NPB formally implemented a 'Neighbour Relations Policy'. This policy aimed to encourage neighbour participation in protected area management and planning, to foster the economic and social development of neighbouring communities and to enhance the environmental awareness of protected area neighbours (Natal Parks Board 1992). Wide-ranging strategies were developed to implement the policy. These included the provision of controlled free access, wildlife resource harvesting programmes, the discussion of boundary and land issues and, arguably the most radical of all, the encouragement of neighbour participation in the management of protected areas. The latter was accomplished through formal Neighbour Liaison Forums, implemented by the officers-in-charge of the protected areas. However, as a broad generalisation, the agenda of these forums was mostly around community development issues rather than the management of protected areas. Only in some cases the officers-in-charge attempted to involve community representatives in the management of parks by inviting them to attend annual management meetings. In practice, however, the involvement of the community representatives amounted to receiving information about management actions, i.e., 'passive participation' (Pimbert and Pretty 1995). There were some forums which could be characterised as being 'consultative' or even 'functional' on Pimbert and Pretty's scale, but such situations came about as a result of the people involved: highly motivated officers-in-charge and charismatic traditional and community leaders (Hughes 2002).

Local Boards: issues, successes and challenges

After the first democratic elections in 1994 the formation of EKZNW was achieved in terms of the KwaZulu-Natal Nature Conservation Management Act (NCMA) of 1997. It is governed by a publicly accountable board, the KZN Nature Conservation Board (hereinafter referred to simply as the 'Board'). This Act also gives the Minister the powers to establish publicly accountable Local Boards for protected areas or groups of protected areas. The idea of such legally mandated boards emerged from a landmark 'Parks and People' symposium in 1995 convened by the Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa (WESSA). For the first time, there was a legal basis governing the relationship between protected areas and the surrounding communities.

Since 1997 the neighbour relations strategy of EKZNW has been based on both the Local Boards and a Community Levy Fund where the Local Board plays a significant role in decision-making. The Community Levy Fund is built up from levies charged to visitors to the protected areas, destined for disbursement to development projects identified by the beneficiary communities. It is a capital fund, where 10% is retained in the fund for growth and for distribution to areas and projects where tourism is not a major economic activity, and where 90%

Box 1. Typology of Participation (after Pimbert and Pretty, 1995)

Type	Components
Passive participation	Information given to the people. No responses expected or welcomed.
Participation in information giving	People participate by responding to questions posed by researchers. They have no role in influencing the proceedings e.g. by checking the interpretation of the findings.
Participation by consultation	People are consulted and their views are taken into account. They do not have any role in decision-making.
Participation for material incentives	People participate by providing labour and other local resources in exchange for material incentives. They are not involved in a process of learning.
Functional participation	People participate by getting involved in activities to meet objectives of externally determined projects. The objectives normally involve the social and economic upliftment of the people.
Interactive participation	People participate in formulation of research and action plans. The participation is normally based on interdisciplinary methodologies that seek multiple perspectives and involve learning processes. Local groups take control over local decisions giving the people a stake in action plans and structures to support these.
Self-mobilisation	People take initiatives independent of any external agency. This self-initiated action sometimes challenges existing distributions of wealth and power.

is disbursed to projects identified by the immediate neighbours of the protected areas. Although the fund is of interest, the focus in this paper is on the development and role of the Local Boards and their responsibilities regarding the use of the Community Levy.

The Local Boards are constituted by sectoral representatives (of traditional authorities, regional councils, business sector, formal agriculture, regional tourism and special interest groups). The 15 member boards possess far-reaching responsibilities including the responsibility to compile and monitor the implementation of the management plans for protected areas, subject to the approval of the Board. These management plans are expected to, *inter alia*, promote the development of protected area neighbours, promote conservation education and determine local policies with regard to resource protection and management and eco-tourism.

It fell to EKZMW to initiate the implementation of this policy, which it was agreed should be in phases. EKZMW identified four protected areas for the first phase of the establishment of Local Boards and the first meeting of a Steering Committee to set up the Local Boards was held in June 1999. A major publicity campaign, involving meetings with different groupings in the neighbouring communities as well as with other sectors to be represented on the Local Boards, was conducted by EKZMW to explain the purpose of the boards and to seek nominations from these groupings. The public nomination process was concluded with the appointment of Local Boards by the provincial Minister of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs, and the Local Boards were finally inaugurated in October 2000.

Successes

Given that the idea of Local Boards, with statutory powers, was first mooted in 1995 at the WESSA symposium and that the Local Boards were only inaugurated in October 2000, some remarkable successes can be claimed for this initiative.

In itself, the statutory recognition of neighbour involvement in the compilation of management plans is a radical departure from the previous practice of liaison forums where the participation of neighbours was dependent on the willingness of the protected area management for establishing meaningful relationships with local people. However, it should be noted that where such relationships had been established, the task of setting up working Local Boards was made easier.

Arguably the greatest impact that the institution of the Local Boards has had thus far is on the empowerment and attitude of the amaKhosi and other community leaders. Members of Local Boards have been empowered through skills and capacity-building workshops which included conflict management, communication, adult learning and teaching, needs analysis, project planning and evaluation. These workshops together with the experience of participating in the meetings of the Local Boards, not only developed the skills but also increased the confidence of the members.

In many cases where local people were suspicious of, and even antagonistic towards, EKZNW, relationships of trust have developed. In turn, where trust now exists, issues are being dealt with rationally rather than emotionally. This trust relationship is mostly dependent on conservation service officials acting upon decisions taken at Local Board meetings.

One of the successes of the Community Levy Fund is an interesting illustration of the extent to which the authority of a Local Board was recognised by local amaKhosi. Community levies were being collected, and the Community Levy Fund had grown considerably before the Local Boards were inaugurated. It was always EKZNW's intention to involve the Local Boards in the identification and prioritisation of projects to be funded. However, because it took longer than planned to establish the boards, EKZNW decided to proceed with a process to allocate funds because local communities were becoming disillusioned with the promise that they would benefit from protected areas.

At the Hluhluwe-Umfolozi Park, it was decided to ask the amaKhosi of the neighbouring traditional authorities to decide on how to allocate the accumulated funds. The ten amaKhosi unanimously decided to spend the funds on the development of a new tourist lodge in the protected area and in so doing, to develop a share in the future income stream for projects in their areas. This was an important decision, being the first of its kind in South Africa, and it was a significant achievement of the neighbour relations strategy of EKZNW. However, when the Local Board for Umfolozi-Hluhluwe was established, the members challenged this allocation of funds. Interestingly, four of the amaKhosi were represented on the Local Board and they accepted the Local Board's right to review the decision. A compromise was reached whereby half the funds were retained for investment in the lodge and the other half allocated to projects such as schools and clinics.

Problems and issues

In the process of establishing operational Local Boards, a number of problems have had to be dealt with. The main problems have centred on finances. These problems threatened to derail the Local Boards even before they became fully functional. From the very beginning, members of Local Boards demanded to be paid for their services as members. However, the Board felt that they should only be compensated for actual expenses in attending Local Board meetings. Proceedings were held up for some time as a result of this dispute and some members of one of the Local Boards went so far as to refuse to participate in any meetings until they were paid. The matter was finally resolved by offering members compensation for their direct expenses plus payment for attending meetings.

Arguably, the most difficult issue for the Local Boards of the Coastal Forest and the TembeNdumo protected areas was the 25% share of the tourism gross revenues that the traditional authorities felt was due to them in terms of the 'Policy of Sharing' established by the former DNC. This provision was excluded from the new KZN Nature Conservation Management Act because

it was felt that this policy was not sustainable. The traditional authorities were angered at the revoking of this policy. Instead the neighbouring communities were only entitled to 90% of the Community Levy for development projects, which worked out to be substantially less for specific protected areas than 25% of gross revenue. There were two issues here: the considerable difference in the size of the allocation, and the fact that the funds were now destined to community development projects rather than to traditional authorities. The matter was only resolved at the end of 2001 through the intervention of two provincial cabinet ministers and the payment of funds outstanding before the promulgation of KZN Nature Conservation Management Act.

Other problems have been encountered but none of them so serious that they have jeopardised the functioning of the Local Boards. The problems concern the extent of the jurisdiction of the Local Boards vis-à-vis other institutions of authority. Some of those municipalities whose area of jurisdiction borders on the protected areas have accused EKZNW of ignoring their development priorities as set out in their Integrated Development Plans (IDPs). This criticism has had the effect of delaying the disbursement of funds from the Community Levy Fund.

The amaKhosi are other significant institutions of authority in rural areas – perhaps even more so than the democratically elected municipal and regional authorities. We have seen how in one case the amaKhosi accepted the jurisdiction of the Local Boards in the allocation of Community Levy funds. A second case that illustrates this issue of the extent of the jurisdiction of Local Boards was the introduction of lions into Tembe by EKZNW. This was done with the consent of the amaKhosi. The reason for the introduction was to attract tourists into the area. However, the Local Board was not consulted and voiced their concern over this decision, even though the amaKhosi are represented on the Local Board. Some members were concerned that because local people were harvesting reeds in Tembe under a controlled harvesting programme, the lives of those people would be jeopardised by the introduction of lions. In terms of the Act it is clear that the Local Board should have been involved in this decision, but the practice established by the old DNC has been to consult only the amaKhosi. This case illustrates the fragility of the statutory powers of the Local Boards in those areas where the traditional power of the amaKhosi is still strong. The authority of the Local Boards with regard to decision-making concerning the allocation of protected area resources is dependent on the goodwill of the

A meeting between agency officials and the members of a local community. Photo: Jean Harris, EKZNW.



amaKhosi. There are many other contradictions of this nature, and they must be regarded as features of an emerging democracy.

Challenges

Three major challenges to the idea and functioning of Local Boards are discussed below.

Community representation

In EKZNW's neighbour relations policy, the representative role of the amaKhosi is acknowledged though the structure of the Local Boards. However, they are not regarded as the sole representatives of neighbouring communities. Business people, farmers, regional and local councillors and community workers are also included in the Local Boards as community representatives.

This raises an issue around community representation, namely what exactly is meant by the term 'community'? Many advocates of community involvement in conservation and natural resource management assume a simple model of community: that it is a relatively small group of people with a more-or-less homogenous social structure and set of values who live in a geographically identifiable area. With this model of community, representation is a simple matter; the community members democratically elect their representatives. This model of community and its representation has been challenged by Agrawal and Gibson (1999). They argue that the focus should rather be on the "divergent interests of multiple actors within communities, the interactions or politics through which these interests emerge ... and the institutions that influence the outcomes of ... the processes" (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). The Local Boards have not gone the simple 'community representation' route but rather constitute an attempt to accommodate the different interests in the neighbour communities. However, because of their limited size (15 people), there is the danger that the voices of small local groups, e.g., women's groups, youth groups, and resource user groups (craft cooperatives, fishermen etc.) are not being heard. The challenge to EKZNW is to find ways of ensuring that the interests and needs of these groups emerge through the Local Board processes. At the same time, these institutions seeking to establish a partnership between the protected area and the community are not intended to replace either the traditional authorities or the legitimate political representation in local government structures.

Disbursement of Community Levy funds

As we have seen, some municipalities have criticised the process of disbursing Community Levy funds, because it has not taken the Integrated Development Plans into consideration. This criticism may be valid, but it cannot be accepted without qualification. It is the responsibility of the Local Boards to identify and prioritise projects in communities neighbouring on the protected areas and, given the vast areas and diverse sectors for which the municipalities are responsible, there is no guarantee that municipal processes will adequately take into account the needs of the protected area neighbours (whom the Community Levy is supposed to benefit). Furthermore, in order to promote the perception that the protected areas are of direct benefit to the neighbouring communities, EKZNW needs to be able to demonstrate that the protected areas generate funds for tangible projects. A way needs to be found of integrating the priorities identified by the Local Boards into the district planning process.

Land claims

Soon after the 1994 democratic elections, the South African parliament passed a Restitution of Land Rights Act. Under this Act, individuals and communities that had been forcibly removed from their traditional (or privately owned) land owing to racially discriminatory laws after 1913 could claim restitution for land rights which they had lost. Many of the protected areas of KZN are affected by such claims.

Many staff in EKZNW have perceived these claims to be an opportunity for developing meaningful conservation strategies with the claimant communities rather than as a threat to biodiversity conservation in the province. Together, EKZNW and South African National Parks recommended an important principle to the Land Claims Commission. In terms of this principle, the title deeds to the land are returned to the (legitimate) claimants but the land use remains that of nature conservation. The implication is that joint management agreements are negotiated between EKZNW and the claimants. These agreements retain the responsibility for biodiversity conservation in the hands of EKZNW and the Local Boards, where applicable, whilst the management and rewards of tourism investment in eco-tourist ventures are negotiable.

However, in many cases, the communities or sections of the communities become disillusioned with the negotiated settlement or its slow progress and simply occupy the land. To date, the Local Boards have played no role in negotiating these settlements nor have they intervened in situations where there have been illegal occupations of the land. However, because some members are part of the affected communities or represent the interests of these communities on the Local Boards, the boards are well placed to become involved in the negotiations and/or the conflicts. This would indeed test the maturity of the Local Boards.

Conclusions

The key issue this paper attempted to illustrate is that of community participation in the management of protected areas, including the prickly aspect of the allocation of funds. The following are some key conclusions.

Firstly, the concept of 'community participation' is often simplistically applied in the literature on biodiversity conservation and resource management. This paper suggests that both 'community' and 'participation' need to be unpacked. 'Community' needs to be disaggregated into the different groups and interests that comprise any community, several voices need to be heard in each community, and appropriate representatives need to be identified to stand for them. Failure to do this results in domination by the powerful voices as illustrated in the case studies above, for example, those of the amaKhosi and the municipalities. In structuring its Local

Figure 2. Protected areas and sites of Local Boards in KwaZulu-Natal. Map: EKZNW.



Figure 3. Land claims (indicated in dark grey) on protected areas in KwaZulu-Natal. Map: EKZNW.



Boards, EKZNW adopted the principle of sectoral representation. This appears to have worked relatively well, but there are still grassroots community voices that remain unheard. 'Participation' can mean different things and can occur at different levels, as conceptualised by Pimbert and Pretty (1995). The extent or depth of the development of participatory democracy in the new South Africa should not be assumed. This paper suggests that in developing contexts, the implementation of policies that effectively promote participatory democracy is slow and painful. Effort, time and goodwill on all sides are required if those representing local communities are to become sufficiently empowered to engage in effective participation.

Secondly, success in the implementation of new policies, such as the introduction of community participation, seems to depend on the attitudes and commitment of those individuals involved. Where Local Boards have operated with some success, there appears to have been a willingness and commitment on the part of all involved, including those representing the protected area authorities and those representing the neighbouring communities. Mutual trust and understanding has been built up slowly and cannot be legislated into existence.

Thirdly, this paper represents a process evaluation of the four pilot Local Boards that have been established, and such an evaluation is all that has been possible at this early stage of their development. A full outcomes evaluation will need to be conducted once the implementation has been taken to scale. Such an evaluation could address the socio-political impact of the Local Boards and their effectiveness as partners in the management of protected areas. It is expected that such an evaluation will inform policy. It is, however, important to be aware that the literature on policy implementation suggests that policy is seldom implemented as intended by the policy-makers. Instead, it gets re-written in the process of implementation. The re-writing of the policy on EKZNW's community participation is a process that will be informed by the ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the impact of the Local Boards partnership arrangement.

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Developing a Community Conserved Area in Niger

BACHIR AMADOU, GILL VOGT AND KEES VOGT

This article describes a process by which local communities and other concerned actors organised themselves and negotiated with the State the exclusive rights to manage the Takiéta Forest Reserve in Niger. In this they created *de jure* and *de facto* their own Community Conserved Area, with its specific management institutions and rules, today fully recognised by the State. The lessons learned in this process and, in particular, the lessons learned for external agencies willing to support similar initiatives elsewhere, are illustrated in the paper at some length. These lessons can be confidently applied in other protected area management situations affecting, and affected by, local actors. Whatever the context, in fact, the key challenge is to create an enabling environment in which the local communities themselves take responsibility and act.

IN THE FIELD of natural resource management (NRM), the shared management of common property resources presents an alluring development challenge for governments, donors and development agencies alike, linking as it does ‘people’ and ‘poverty-alleviation’ and the ‘sustainable management of the natural resources’ on which they depend. However, despite the interest, investment, rhetoric and the general acceptance of participatory development theory, concrete examples of successful shared management of common property resources remain relatively few and all too often little remains at the end of what were apparently sensational (not to mention costly) initiatives.

Are the advocates of the old centralist school of resource management right that local people are incapable of rationally managing natural resources? Or does the answer lie elsewhere? This article attempts to look at why shared management situations remain a major challenge and argues that the answer, indeed, lies ‘elsewhere’. The fault is not so much with local actors as with the external support agencies, which too often treat collaborative management as a simple technical issue rather than the complex social endeavour it really is. We believe that a serious rethink is needed about what NRM and sound local governance really mean in the context of decentralisation. We propose that this has much to do with effective social communication systems.

In recent history, peoples’ ability to manage their resource base has been hampered by centralised state management systems, which effectively divorced them from their management rights and responsibilities but failed to provide a viable alternative, thus creating a vacuum. Now the cycle has turned again, and decentralised NRM is in vogue. Decentralised NRM means transferring power and rights to manage from the centre outwards. But transferring to whom, and how? The problem is that the cycle has taken time to turn, time during which the resources and the pressures have changed the actors in terms of their behaviour, expectations and relations. The change, often drastic, takes place while the overall management stakes increase. In addition, ‘transferring power’ means that someone has to give up or share that power. Equally, receiving power (having recognised rights and wishing to exercise them) means accepting additional responsibilities. Today, despite affirmative government policies, not all actors are automatically enthusiastic about transferring (losing) their power to others and not all the others are entirely sure that they are ready and able to accept it given the current situation. Fundamental changes of perceptions, roles and relations may be necessary before the cycle can indeed be allowed to turn.

Rethinking roles and relationships is particularly necessary in relation to common property resources, which are too often considered as management grey areas. Due to scarcity of resources

and changing land tenure issues, common property resources have often become an arena for competition for access and control among multiple user/interest groups. The very concept of common property recognises that there are multiple users and uses involved, all of which have some social validity. The resource is shared between these users and cannot be said to belong to one group more than another. In this context, management decision-making, if it is to be equitable also has to be inclusive: the result of collaboration and partnership, recognising rights and sharing responsibilities between different interest groups. It should be based on people: their needs, their objectives, their motivation, their investment, their relations and their organisation for the sustainable management of their own resource base. Without people at the heart of decision-making, technical options will never be enough to make management work.

A (too) typical ‘participatory management’ scenario today

1. The initiative (usually a project involving external partners) is introduced with pre-conceived logic, approach and activities.
2. Initial communication is with the (often) sedentary population and there may be a (more or less) participatory diagnostic. Committees (of one sort or another) are established according to criteria set by the project. Sometimes the local ‘partners’ may understand the project’s objectives, and the function of the Committee, but sometimes not. The election of representatives to the Committee may be distorted by the prospect of allowances.
3. The project may or may not provide training for certain community/Committee members in subjects that the project has defined (more or less) independently of any needs analysis with the community. Study tours are popular but the relevance or impact of the visits may be debatable.
4. Once the Committee has been ‘groomed’ for management, the project can then present them with ‘the management plan’ that has been prepared (more or less exclusively) by ‘the technicians’, (more or less) taking into account the technician’s understanding of the ‘social’ aspects in the local context, *if* there is a sociologist on the team. The plan will be discussed with the new ‘managers’ and hopefully understood by them. The Committee will then (maybe, try to) execute the plan.
5. The project ‘supports’ the Committee in managing the resource according to the plan.
6. The project (i.e. external partners) finally leaves.
7. The Committee struggle on for a while but:
 - Is the plan actually designed to meet the needs of the different users?
 - Does the plan recognise all the users/uses?
 - Have they discussed what their common vision and objectives are?
 - Would the Committee know how to adapt the plan? Do the members know if they are allowed to?
 - Bereft of project ‘support’, will the Committee and the plan have legitimacy in the eyes of the resources stakeholders?
 - Does the Committee have the will, flexibility and organisational capacity to adapt the plan?
8. The Committee hits its first problem (often socio-organisational) and doesn’t know how to react now that the real ‘decision-makers’ have gone.
9. Now officially ‘orphaned’ it is open to a number of different ‘informal arrangements’ (old scores are settled, influence is exerted, benefits are ‘shared’ and sabotage is not uncommon), which become increasingly unpleasant in relation to the volume of goods and finances that the project (is thought to have) left in the Committee’s hands.
10. The management Committee collapses (though theoretically it may still exist).
11. All the partners say, “Just goes to show (yet again) that people can’t really manage natural resources despite all the good support and training they were given.”

The population becomes disillusioned about its capacity to develop itself. The experience confirms the inequity of the system, it reinforces the perception of local incapacity... the situation is worse than before... and, of course, the natural resources are far from being rationally managed.

In the sense mentioned above, the management of common property natural resources (including the resources under state property, which is a form of common property) should be a long term, flexible and evolutionary process driven by people ('the managers'), in which the inclusion of stakeholders is assured at the level they chose. Such a process should first recognise and capitalise on existing local knowledge and skills and then build on them through a process of joint reflection, analysis and learning through experience. New technical information could then come in as required. Effective systems of social communication are needed to enable this process to take place, not only in order to equitably and rationally manage the resource, but also to counteract the realities of social inequity, sabotage, and power-play by groups who perceive organisation and decision-making at the base as a threat to their own interests.

The experience at Takiéta, Niger

We will describe an on-going experience of local stakeholders successfully working together towards shared management of a strategic common property resource. This experience does not offer a management model but illustrates well the complexity of the socio-political environment in which shared management usually needs to take place and the kind of issues that it may stir. It highlights the need to create enabling environments in which effective, decentralised and equitable local management can take place. And it shows how crucial it is to invest in the long-term viability of local collaborative management through appropriate social communication strategies.

Takiéta Forest Reserve is located in the agro-pastoral zone of the department of Zinder, Niger (Figure 1). The area is typically Sahelian with a highly variable annual rainfall of between 250–

Figure 1. Location of the Takiéta Forest Reserve.




400 mm. Covering an area of 6,720 ha, the Forest Reserve represents the largest non-cultivated area in the region and is regarded by both resident and non-resident users as an important silvo-pastoral resource in a zone where land is otherwise entirely occupied by agricultural fields (it is rare to find a few square metres of idle land).

Created in the 1950s and theoretically owned, managed and protected by the State, the Reserve soon became subject to uncontrolled and destructive exploitation by local people and outsiders, with unchecked and rapidly expanding agricultural clearance taking place both at the boundaries of the forest and in the forest itself. In addition, pressure on the rapidly dwindling and degraded pastoral resources within the reserve progressively increased as sedentary communities diversified into livestock production (which brought them into increased competition with transhumant pastoral groups). Despite its degraded state, the resource continued to play a strategic role in local production systems, but was also threatened by an influential local 'de-reservation' lobby that aimed to convert what was a *de facto* common property resource (through absence of management/presence of the State) into private land.

The Takiéta Joint Forest Management Project (TJFMP) was set up by SOS Sahel UK in 1995, at the request of the Government of Niger. Its mandate was to promote a process towards the sustainable decentralised management of the Takiéta Forest Reserve, taking into appropriate account all different user groups. The project's intervention strategy was the result of the project analysis of several 'participatory' NRM experiences from the Sahel that strongly highlighted the influence of project approaches in enabling or disabling effective management by local stakeholders in the post-project period.

From lessons learned, the project formulated a number of dynamic and evolving Guiding Principles that determined the approach to be taken in the field. These principles are summarised below:

Figure 2. Takiéta Joint Forest Management Project Process.



- Promote inclusive processes, in which all groups have a legitimate place at the negotiation table and the capacities of the weakest groups are supported to make their voices heard and to ensure that what is invisible becomes visible.
- Recognise that management is a long-term, evolving process in which external organisations are only temporary partners and should not be active in decision-making.
- Be sincere in the belief in and respect for peoples' rights and capacities to decide for themselves in an informed way throughout the management process.
- Invest the time necessary to facilitate the emergence and establishment of strong locally-driven processes: give people time to reflect and make informed decisions.
- Understand that 'facilitating' (unlike 'manipulating') means refraining from directing or controlling the process, striving to be neutral and supporting frameworks where the actors themselves negotiate, where nothing is preconceived and where everything is discovered collectively.
- Aim at reinforcing independent local capacity to manage by starting with what people know, their joint analysis of the situation, options open to them and collective needs; by stressing the value of learning by experience before providing formal training; by appreciating mistakes as well as successes as positive learning experiences as long as they are analysed and action is taken.

The project strictly limited its role to that of 'facilitating' a process in the sense described above, meaning that it too became a learner in the process and that its timetable was that of the stakeholders. Such a hands-off approach is not the easiest option, particularly in a project context. However, SOS Sahel believed that the capacity of actors to negotiate and manage could only be demonstrated via a suitably enabling environment in which they effectively owned the process.

In practice, the activities carried out in the process towards local collaborative management can be characterised into the following three main types:

1. Challenging traditional concepts and behaviour relating to resource management and promoting participation in decision-making processes.
2. Encouraging dynamic communication systems for information exchange, collaboration and negotiation between actors.
3. Defining new roles and inclusive and representative structures compatible with local management objectives for the resource.

The key steps in the process are listed below:


- a) **Stakeholder identification** – clear identification of the natural resources at stake, and their limits, and identification of all direct and indirect actors affecting and affected by the management decisions.
- b) **Information, analysis and discussion at the individual 'actor' level** – this involved an analysis by each group of the natural resources at stake and the role they play in their system of production. It covered historical NRM strategies/roles, the current situation, decentralisation, including stakes and perspectives for local management, and changing roles and relations.
- c) **Sharing information between actors** – the collated and unmodified information from the different groups was shared among all the actors, exposing each actor to the analysis made by others.
- d) **Organising a series of stakeholder workshops** – three workshops were held where 180–200 representatives debated subjects as varied as: the situation, their joint interest and commitment to doing something about it and how it should be done. Collective decisions were formalised as written recommendations of the workshops.

- e) **Election of delegates/ members of the local management structure (LMS)** – this was carried out internally within each stakeholder group, according to the criteria and modalities agreed in the stakeholder workshops.
- f) **Preliminary meetings of all the delegates to the LMS** – these meetings served to allow delegates to get to know one another, share information about the resources to be managed, retrace the process leading to the creation of the LMS, discuss and reach agreement on the LMS’ structure and proposed function, determine internal roles and relationships as well as rules and regulations, define what ‘management’ means to the LMS and the people it represents, elect an Executive Committee from amongst the delegates, and formally present the LMS Executive Committee members to the local and regional administrative and traditional authorities, which had also been present at stakeholder workshops. The meetings thus included:
 - planning and programming activities;
 - sharing experiences with other LMSs (inter-structure exchange); and
 - finalising the Internal Rules and Regulations for the structure and presenting them to the communities at the base for comments and ratification.
- g) **Meetings concerning the natural resources and how to manage them** – at this juncture, information regarding the natural resources and their potential, including an inventory and base maps, was collected, analysed and shared; all known users were listed and uses analysed. On this basis, an analysis of the resources and their trends was developed, actual and potential conflicts were examined, a vision of the desired future for the resources was developed and basic rules of good governance were progressively drafted. Options for improving the resources over time were explored. A proposed management document was drafted.
- h) **Establishing relations and communication systems** – links were established between the LMS and the authorities, government services and other partners including pastoral associations from Nigeria.
- i) **Official recognition of the status of the association** – the LMS was formally recognised by the State as the Association Kou Tayani, i.e. it acquired legal recognition.
- j) **Stakeholder review workshop** – the proposed management document was presented to all stakeholders for review, discussion and final amendment.
- k) **Official submission to local regional authorities** – the management document was presented to the local regional authorities asking for a legal recognition of the Association’s right to implement their management plan.
- l) **Autonomous management** – for six months, autonomous management by the LMS went on before the closure of the support project.
- m) **Participatory evaluation of project** – a participatory evaluation of the project including both process and results was conducted.
- n) **Project closure and continuation of the management process.**

The consultative process amongst stakeholders concerning the shared management of the resource started with the first major workshop in early 1997. In November 1998, the LMS delegates gathered for the first time. Approximately 12 months later the LMS had become a functional and legally recognised Association of local stakeholders sharing the collective aim of rational management of the forest resource for the benefit of all the users groups, with its own internal rules and regulations and a locally defined and sanctioned management plan, and, last but not least, regarded as legitimate by both the user groups that created it and the State.

Though the preparatory work by the project and initial round of collaboration involved a serious investment of time and effort, the resulting structure, once created, was quick to organise itself and produce encouraging results. The Association was in communication with, and

Figure 3. The Local Management Structure. Note: The SUPRA Committee is composed of 18 elected and three non-elected members.



answerable to, the resource users at the grassroots and recognised as an actor in dialogue with the local and national authorities. The Association was treated with curiosity by outsiders, with pride by the communities involved, and tolerated but feared by certain groups within the local socio-political environment, unaccustomed to large scale collaborative, powerful initiatives from the base.

At the end of the project, the Forestry Service, as key State partner of the Association, signed an agreement clearly outlining its support for and obligations concerning the Association and the participatory management process. The agreement formally stated the mutual roles and relations and the support to be provided. The final evaluation of the project explored the local perceptions of the process leading to the establishment of the LMS Association, it evaluated it critically and looked into future directions. The evaluation process had the atmosphere of a 'general assembly' and strategically underlined the relations and communication necessary between the Association, the resource users at the grassroots and other stakeholders.

The Association Kou Tayani after two-and-a-half years of autonomy

Three months after the end of the project, the Association Kou Tayani was granted a Prefectoral Decree according to the right to autonomously manage the Forest Reserve of Takiéta according to its own locally defined and agreed management plan. This makes it *de jure* and *de facto* a Community Conserved Area¹. In the following two-and-a-half years (up to the writing of this article), members continued to hold regular meetings, make decisions, plan, budget and carry out numerous activities in the area (such as guarding the resources, producing seedlings,

¹ A Community Conserved Area can be defined as "a natural and/or modified ecosystem including significant biodiversity, ecological services and cultural values, voluntarily conserved by the concerned indigenous and local communities through customary laws or other effective means".

planting, improving the pasture, carrying out soil and water conservation works). This was done together with the help of local people, who mobilised themselves on a purely voluntary basis. Some initiatives to develop the natural resources (honey production, fishing, creation of rural fuel-wood lots, etc.) also took place. In short, the local stakeholders through their Association have been more effective in a two-year period than the Forest Department has been in forty.

Yet, this is still the beginning of the collaborative management process and many aspects of the organisational challenge of sharing management authority and responsibility among multiple stakeholders have to be resolved. Some of the positive and negative experiences of the Association in this recent period are noted below, as well as some of the key lessons learned (highlighted in italics).

Positive experiences related to the internal functioning of the structure

- The replacement of particularly inadequate delegates by their own communities or groups. This improved the internal capacity of the structure and the circulation of information. *The quality and role of delegates is the foundation of good communication and management.*
- The organisation by the Association of its own study visits, links with partners and training in various skills and techniques such as honey production, fuel woodlot management, monitoring and evaluation, and conflict management. *It is important to know what support/skills are needed and how to acquire them.*
- Local groups exercised their rights to examine the Association's accounts. On a specific occasion a demonstration was orchestrated concerning the proposed application of a by-law previously agreed by the Association. *Feedback mechanisms and the flexibility to respond need to be built into the system.*
- The first General Assembly of Stakeholders was held after 18 months of autonomy. Initially the Association had underestimated the importance of this forum but the experience reinforced the relations between the structure and the individual resource users as well as providing quality, binding solutions to problems beyond the authority of the management structure alone. *Bringing actors together to discuss issues and make collective recommendations is an extremely powerful tool.*
- The Forestry Service as an institution, despite initial reservations, now recognises the credibility of the Association as a result of its proven capacity to organise physical improvement of the resource on a large scale as well as rationally controlling exploitation. *Actions speak louder than words.*

Negative experiences related to the internal functioning of the structure

- The original two-tiered structure involving geographical sub-committees as intermediate decision-making forums was never established, and this has meant that decision-making has not always been able to take place at the right level or on time. *Subsidiarity in decision-making means that problems can be solved more effectively.*
- The members of the Executive Committee have tended to allocate (financially) interesting posts and activities to themselves rather than to ordinary members, which would be strategically more appropriate for reinforcing local links and relations. *While profiting from a position is generally bad practice, it needs to be recognised that there are limits to voluntary work.*
- In cases where communication has been too weak, information has circulated by rumour and has presented problems for the Association. One experience laid the Association open to unsubstantiated claims of financial irregularities, which the Association's detractors were quick to exploit. *Credibility is easily damaged even by false information; it follows that good communication systems are essential.*

Positive experiences related to the external environment

- Over and above management costs, a percentage of revenue gained from the exploitation of the resource is reinvested in local development initiatives. This encourages people to support continued management by the Association. ***Direct and indirect benefit sharing by stakeholders should be an integral component of the management system.***
- Through visits made and received, the Association has learned how to present itself and its work, profited from exchanges with others and made friends and allies. ***Institutions need to build up and maintain their own support network.***

Bororo girls in the vicinity of Takiéta. Photo: Gill and Kees Vogt.



- The Association has learnt how to deal with difficult authorities and politicians, and has become increasingly capable of defending itself against local power-play. *Local organisations need to be strong and confident enough to defend their rights as well as the interests of those they represent.*
- The Association successfully refused to entertain a national level project that sought to become involved and ‘support’ the Association. The risk was that the new project would try to replace the management approach with a top-down, formulaic model of forest management. Negotiations took place and the new project agreed to the Association’s conditions of partnership, and quietly incorporated the new strategy it had learned into its work elsewhere. *Knowing who you are, what your role is and that you have popular support gives the strength and confidence necessary to assert yourself in the face of pressure.*

Negative experiences related to the external environment

- The Association was subject to abuse of power and trust when Forestry Service agents extorted money on the pretext of paying for made up services carried out apparently in the Forestry Service’s name. This experience was also negative internally as it meant that the Association had let itself be pushed into not respecting its own financial and decision-making procedures just because the matter concerned ‘a figure of influence’. Finally, however, the learning experience was positive because, in resolving the situation the Association used its partners for moral support/advice and subsequently resolved the issue with the Regional Director of Forests. *Local institutions need mechanisms that help them avoid abuse by influential people. These include sound financial procedures and the habit of always asking for second opinions.*
- The Forestry Service failed, initially, to provide technical and monitoring support when requested due to lack of interest by individual agents, compounded by the institutional weakness of the service. *It is important for organisations to know their partners and recognise that they too have weaknesses.*
- Projects with ‘too much money’ have been attracted to the Association and in trying to provide ‘support’ have in fact tended to distract it from its real function. Easy money encourages ‘donor chasing’ which distracts from the real issues and is completely negative in terms of real local development. *Money can be useful but it can also very easily distract from real management and development objectives.*

General lessons learnt

This concluding section draws out some of the lessons learnt from the experience at Takiéta that might serve as aspects to be considered or points for debate in situations where shared or communal management partnership are concerned. A number of important themes have emerged.

Social communication

Effective social communication is the framework for good local governance and the oil that lubricates the workings of the participatory management machine. Inclusive processes and effective social communication are prerequisites to facilitating the resolution of potential conflict situations inherent in shared management. Social communication helps ensure:

- transparency and the exchange of information;
- the creation/reinforcement of constructive relations between actors;
- inclusion rather than exclusion of actors;
- consensual decisions and choices;
- that learning from experience is valued (taking risks and making mistakes are regarded as positive);
- that flexibility and capacity to adapt are inherent in the management system;

- that socio-political realities are taken into account and addressed; and
- that people take control of their own development.

Respectful facilitation

The specific understanding and approach towards participatory management utilised by outside agencies contributes strongly to success or failure of initiatives. Facilitating but not leading/driving/manipulating means:

- believing in and respecting the capacity of people to develop themselves and bring about constructive change together;
- having strong principles and ‘sang-froid’;
- being open, frank and sincere;
- being ready to pose the necessary questions and promote local analysis and reflection;
- making time for informed discussion and decision-making, and allowing time for people to reflect;
- creating the conditions in which actors themselves decide what the stakes are as well as their own level of commitment to a common process;
- being convinced of the principles and values implicit in the approach; and
- operating in a flexible participatory working environment which recognises and applies the principles.

What the project knows or understands is not as important as what people know and the quality of the analysis they are capable of carrying out. It is important not to distance the management institution from the local reality: too much money and ‘support’ can be a distraction rather than a facilitating agent. A little support/money well placed is more effective than ‘throwing the package’ all at once.

Enough time

If one is not willing or able to invest the time necessary to allow people to control the decision-making process, then it is best not to start. The process will take the time it takes, but time invested at the beginning will facilitate the process later on.

Actors as partners

If the inclusion of all concerned actors is sincerely promoted, then even the most negative or reluctant will nearly always voluntarily go with the process, even if it is against some of their immediate to long term personal interests (persuasion by inclusion and popular demand).

The local legitimacy of decision-making processes, management structures and rules and regulations are more important than their legality. It must also be understood that people are human. Therefore:

- the behaviour and attitude of actors will change with their perception of the stakes at any given time;
- contradictory behaviour by certain actors is to be expected given the complexity of the socio-political environment and the multiple spheres of influence in which they operate; and
- institutions (stakeholder or partner) taking part in shared management processes and the people who represent them, often have their own weaknesses which can impact negatively on the process.

Capitalising and institutionalising the results of collective decision-making is important in linking the words to the act with certain actors. Indicators of progress and success need to be particularly supple and subtle when analysing process approaches (i.e. behaviour changes, adoption of an idea, mechanisms being used and working etc.).

Local management institutions

Given the importance of the wider socio-political environment in which shared management takes place, outside agencies should not:

- impose preconceived structures and forms of management organisation (outsiders are very badly placed to understand the subtle power relations that exist between actors and the safeguards that need to be built into the system);
- promote either 'old existing' or 'new' structures (existing, modified or new institutions are all possible: the actors themselves are best placed to collectively decide which option is most appropriate for the shared management context); or
- start by identifying a shared management structure/institution (this should rather be the result of an inclusive, informed and collective reflection and discussion process).

In all, the Takiéta experience shows that local partnerships in natural resource management are possible, and can lead towards the establishment of effective Community Conserved Areas. External agents willing to promote and support such partnership processes need to clarify their own approaches. A number of clear lessons have been learnt and can be used to promote successful action.

SAI DA KAF A KE YIN AMINAI

'To have friends you have to use your feet.'

(Hausa Proverb)

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Community resource use in Kibale and Mt Elgon National Parks, Uganda

PURNA CHHETRI, ARTHUR MUGISHA AND SEAN WHITE

Kibale and Mt Elgon are two National Parks in Uganda valued for their biodiversity and tourism potential as well as for the ecosystem service they provide for neighbouring communities (e.g. as water reservoirs). As with many other parks in Uganda and elsewhere, Kibale and Mt Elgon have been confronted with conflicts with their neighbouring communities, which have posed serious conservation challenges. In the last decade, some new conservation strategies have been adopted at Kibale and Mt Elgon to address those conflicts through partnerships between the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA), the neighbouring communities and the local government administrations. This paper describes the experience of UWA in implementing such an innovative, collaborative approach to conservation. The initial observations suggest that the approach is effective, that it addresses the real conflicts by providing a package of options and that it brings benefits to both local people and conservation. The paper discusses the components of the new approach as well as emerging issues and concerns.

NATIONAL PARKS can be important sources of income through tourism, but for people living around these protected areas, conservation often spells problems. Loss of traditional access to in-park resources or crop damage caused by wild animals can be a constant source of conflict between National Park authorities and the people neighbouring them.

This paper highlights the management strategies developed by Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) for Kibale and Mt Elgon National Parks, in partnership with neighbouring communities and local government administrations. UWA is one of the few protected area authorities which has permitted extractive resource use in Category II Protected Areas (IUCN 1994). UWA has also developed and tested a range of innovative conservation initiatives aimed at addressing conflicts between protected area managers and neighbouring communities, including an institutional framework for community participation in conservation. The strategies developed, the insights gained and the lessons learned from that experience are discussed.

Conservation in Uganda – the past fifty years

Modern conservation began in Uganda in 1952 with the proclamation of three National Parks – Murchison Falls, Queen Elizabeth and Kidepo Valley. The Golden Jubilee of Uganda's National Parks took place in 2002, and celebrations were held to popularise the importance of National Parks in conserving biodiversity, and their role in economic development in Uganda. The number of Parks has risen from only three in 1952 to ten National Parks and ten Wildlife Reserves today. Yet this history has been varied and has seen a dramatic change in the fortunes of Uganda's protected areas. Between the 1950s and 1970s the parks prospered, with abundant wildlife surrounded by low human populations. The biggest threat was subsistence hunting, but with minimal effects on the National Parks. In fact, the main function of the game department of this period was to protect farmers' crops by shooting trespassing animals. However the 1970s and early 1980s saw lawlessness, internally displaced people, and increasing human populations. These circumstances, coupled with a deteriorating economy, had a negative effect on wildlife management in Uganda, and the killing of wild animals continued unabated under the game control programme and through illegal commercial and state-supported hunting.

With the coming of a new government regime in 1986, the need to consider the human dimension in wildlife management was recognised. The confrontational approach to wildlife

management was questioned, and dialogue was initiated with people whose lives were affected by wildlife management practices and policies. In 1988, conservation programmes that involved people were initiated in the newly formed Bwindi Impenetrable National Park and concerted efforts were made to minimise conflicts between the people and National Parks. In 1996 the institutional arrangements for wildlife management were reviewed. As a result, the Game Department and Uganda National Parks were merged to create the Uganda Wildlife Authority. This move ended extensive duplication of human and financial resources.

Fifty years of wildlife conservation in Uganda has revealed the following important realities:

1. without the participation of affected communities, conservation initiatives can neither be effective nor equitable;
2. a negative attitude of local communities towards protected areas still prevails;
3. many rural Ugandans still depend on in-park resources for their subsistence; and
4. benefits (income) from conservation must be shared with those who are negatively impacted by them.

The legal, policy and institutional framework for protected area management in Uganda has been modified progressively since the mid-1990s to take into account these realities and to forge partnerships with local communities for the conservation of protected areas. The Wildlife Statute (UWA 1996) makes provision for local communities to harvest resources in protected areas, and to be involved in the management of those areas. Another measure introduced in the Statute makes provision for the sharing 20% of gate receipts from National Parks with local communities. In an effort to address the problem of crop raiding by wildlife, a range of animals including bush pigs, baboons and velvet monkeys, were declared vermin, and can now be legally destroyed by farmers if found raiding crops.

These measures are helping to reorientate protected area management from traditional protectionist models which alienate rural people, to a partnership model which puts people at the centre of conservation policies and practice. This aspiration is clearly expressed in the new mission statement of UWA “to conserve and sustainably manage the wildlife and protected areas of Uganda *in partnership with neighbouring communities and other stakeholders for the benefit of the people of Uganda and the global community.*”

But progress in developing these partnerships is slow. A negative attitude to conservation persists and conflicts with local communities in several National Parks are still a major concern for UWA. New approaches are being developed and tested aimed at overcoming these conflicts and changing attitudes to conservation. In the case of Kibale and Mt Elgon National Parks, UWA has been working in conjunction with IUCN to develop strategic partnerships with local communities as a means of reducing conflict and improving protected area protection and management. The strategic approach developed in these two National Parks and lessons learned are discussed in the following sections.

Developing strategic partnerships

Both Kibale and Mt Elgon National Parks are known for their rich biodiversity (Howard 1991). But they are very different in terms of their ecological, socio-economic, demographic and agro-ecological conditions. Kibale National Park (KNP) is a tropical rainforest in western Uganda at the foot of the Rwenzori Mountains, conserved largely for its biodiversity including its rare chimpanzee and forest elephant populations. Mt Elgon, in eastern Uganda on the border with Kenya, is the fifth highest mountain in Africa (4,321 m) and is conserved partly for its afro-alpine ecology and its rare endemic species, but also for its valuable forests and its water catchment functions.

Both Parks are surrounded by rich agricultural lands and have dense neighbouring populations, ranging from 96 to 133 persons/km² at Kibale, and from 120 to over 700

persons/km² at Mt Elgon National Park. Twenty-seven parishes surround Kibale National Park while Mt Elgon has 62. Many of these communities have traditionally used the forests for a wide variety of subsistence, commercial, medicinal and cultural needs. With the creation of the National Parks, access to the forests was restricted and resource harvesting was prohibited. At Mt Elgon, where the population density around the forest is very high, rainfall is reliable and soils are fertile, the forest was extensively encroached for agriculture during the period of weak governance in the 1970s and 1980s. When the new government began to restore the integrity of the National Parks in the 1990s and evict agricultural encroachers, these evictions were a major source of conflict between people and the park authorities. In Kibale, crop damage by wild animals and the loss of traditional access to forest resources were the main sources of conflict. A further cause of conflict in both Parks was the lack of a clearly-defined park boundary.

These conflicts have acted as a catalyst for developing a conservation strategy based on partnerships with local people, district authorities, and civil society. UWA recognised that no one single community conservation strategy would resolve these conflicts. As a result the approach consisted of various combinations of the following:

- **Strategy 1** – allow local communities to harvest and manage selected park resources through collaborative resource management arrangements.
- **Strategy 2** – develop and test deterrents to keep wild animals from entering crop fields.
- **Strategy 3** – clearly-delineate park boundaries and enter into agreements with neighbouring communities to utilise boundary trees in return for protection of the boundary.
- **Strategy 4** – reduce pressures on the protected areas by collaborating with district authorities and NGOs in promoting environmentally sustainable development outside the protected areas.
- **Strategy 5** – sensitise and raise awareness regarding the importance of conservation, with a particular emphasis on environment education for school children.

Strategy 1 – allowing local people access to park resources

Collaboration between management authorities and local people has been seen as a tool in facilitating biodiversity conservation (Borrini-Feyerabend 1996; Bennett 1999; Barrow *et al.* 2000). Failure to do so has resulted in a lack of local interest in conservation, therefore hindering its implementation (Davey 1999). The underlying principle of collaborative resource management is that benefits, responsibilities and decision-making powers are shared, to varying extent and through a range of approaches, among some or all of the stakeholders in resource conservation (Scott 1998). Models have been developed for collaborative resource management (CRM) which allow people access to selected resources under certain conditions. In return the resource users undertake to monitor and regulate resource harvesting levels and to protect the resource use areas. It is a 'rights for responsibilities' arrangement which empowers resource users to manage the resources on which they themselves depend. Formal agreements are negotiated and signed by UWA and by the resource user representatives.

Between 1996 and 1998 a number of agreements were developed and tested in both Mt Elgon and Kibale and a process for CRM was developed. Kibale National Park has entered into eight agreements, involving 29% of surrounding parishes. Of these, three agreements were for harvesting wild coffee in the park by people in Mbale, Kabirizi and Nyakarongo parishes (each parish consists of about 10 villages), one agreement allowed extraction of multiple resources such as papyrus, craft materials, medicinal plants, grass for thatching and access to crater lakes for fishing at Nyabweya, and four agreements allowed placement of beehives inside the Park.

Mt Elgon National Park has entered into three agreements that provide access to a wide range of subsistence resources such as firewood, and an additional 21 agreements are awaiting



A woman collects firewood in Mt Elgon National Park. Photo: Sean White.

approval by UWA. With this, Mt Elgon National Park will have involved 20% of its surrounding parishes including over 10,000 households in collaborative resource management agreements.

As it was new and innovative, the process of negotiating agreements has also been slow. It was necessary to train park staff to conduct the CRM process, including group dynamics, participatory resource assessment and negotiation skills. Numerous meetings were required to identify all resource users, gain their trust, familiarise them with the concept of CRM and help them to negotiate the terms of resource-use agreements. These early agreements took approximately two years to negotiate but currently the process is reduced to about six months as the staff is better skilled. Resource management agreements for single resources, such as the putting on site of beehives, are less complex than those for multiple resources and take less time.

Initial impact of CRM

The agreements have enabled local communities to gain access to much needed resources, but the real measure of success is how well the communities have responded by fulfilling their responsibilities to protect the area and regulate resource harvesting. In both Parks the resource use committees have shown initial enthusiasm in undertaking their responsibilities. At Mt Elgon for example, the resource use committee at Tangwen Parish devised a system of monthly permits to regulate entry to the forest by their members, and to control the quantities of resources harvested. They carry out regular forest walks to check on the status of the forest and to ensure members are complying with the terms of the agreement. However, the communities do need the support of the UWA rangers especially in the early stages of implementation.

At Kibale, local communities have been cooperating with park rangers in protecting the forest. They reported over twenty illegal incidents to park management (Box 1). In some cases, the users have arrested the poachers, confiscated their tools and handed the offenders over to local council and park management. Local communities have also removed several snares and put out fires in the park. Such actions on the part of local communities were unheard of before the agreements, and have contributed to reduced park management costs in CRM sites.

Box 1. Sample letters received by Kibale Chief Warden from CRM groups on illegal activities

"This is to tell you that when we went in the Park we saw four people pit sawing timber around Lake Kiribwato. We are therefore calling you to come and patrol the area. The resource users reported to me of that illegal activity."

General Secretary, LC II, Nyabweya Parish, June 6, 2000

"There are five people who are in the Park hunting. We saw them while we were checking coffee areas. Bring Rangers and we will arrange to catch them. Come quickly before they come out of the forest."

Resource User, Nyakarongo Parish, March 2, 2000

"Madam, we are informing you that people are burning charcoal in the Park. Please arrange to send Rangers for patrolling. We shall guide you to show the areas and the people involved."

LC II Office, Kiziba Parish, November 8, 2000

"I hereby inform you that after Mweya coordination meeting we patrolled the Park and found that pit sawyers had split a tree in the Park but upon seeing us they ran away. So, we collected their tools and handed them over to the office of LC II. We have in our possession two machetes, one rope and one file for sharpening. We wanted them to come so that we may get them to your office. But they never showed up."

User Group Member, Kakooga

"We do not run away or hide from Park Rangers as we did in the past. Now, we work together to stop poaching and illegal activities such as pit sawing or unauthorised resource collection."

A resident neighbouring Mt Elgon NP

Empowering local communities to manage selected park resources has engendered a sense of responsibility, thereby boosting their image and status. Furthermore, with the formation of specific resource user groups, there has been an increase in interaction among the members. Resource use meetings have provided a forum to discuss issues related to both resource use and other social matters. The protected areas have benefited through improved community relations, reduced law enforcement effort, and a reduction in poaching and illegal use. Thus, CRM has also contributed to building social capital in neighbouring communities.

Strategy 2 – problem-animal management

In Kibale, the loss of crops to park animals is perhaps the biggest source of conflict between local communities and protected area managers. The problem is less severe in Mt Elgon but is still a cause for concern.

In Kibale, UWA in collaboration with local communities, tested a number of deterrents to keep the park animals from entering the farmers fields. They included digging a trench, live fencing with Mauritius Thorn (*Caesalpinia decapetala*), placing sharp objects, scare-shooting and growing buffer crops such as tea and soybean that are not easily eaten by wild animals. Of these, the trench and Mauritius Thorn fencing were found to be the most effective measures to deter bush pigs and elephants. The placement of sharp objects (stones and sticks) was found to be impractical and expensive. Scare-shooting to deter animals was discouraged as this could cause panic among people already plagued by periodic rebel activity. In November 2001, local communities, with the help of KNP, dug a 7.5 km long trench. The community contributed 30% of the cost in the form of labour. This initiative, in which UWA and the residents along the boundary worked together to tackle the problem animal issue, has noticeably improved park – people relationships, and reduced the amount of crop raiding by elephants.

Strategy 3 – demarcate park boundaries through boundary agreements

Poorly-defined park boundaries are a major source of conflict between parks and people. The problem was particularly extreme in Mt Elgon where the boundary was obliterated by past agricultural encroachment. The high density population and fertile soils ensured that disputed areas were hotly contested. During a resurveying exercise in 2000, when the true boundary was found to be outside the existing boundary (i.e. in farmers' fields), the resulting conflict was extreme and resulted in a number of court cases. Similar cases arose in Kibale and other National Parks, and this prompted UWA to undertake a major review of park boundaries nationally resulting in the de-gazetting of some disputed areas in 2001.

At Mt Elgon, UWA has entered into partnerships with some five communities adjoining the park to protect and manage the boundary which consists of five lines of *Eucalyptus* trees planted at 2 m spacing. This is done through formal boundary management agreements that allow people to plant crops under the boundary trees, periodically harvest rows of boundary trees, and manage the coppice re-growth. The agreements have provided an incentive to people to protect the boundary and have brought benefits to both local livelihoods and to conservation.

Building an elephant trench outside Kibale National Park. Photo: Purna Chhetri.



Strategy 4 – partnerships to reduce pressures on protected areas

In both Kibale and Mt Elgon, UWA is working in partnership with IUCN and the neighbouring district authorities to promote sustainable development in parishes neighbouring the parks. These projects, which are also working with local NGOs, have helped to reduce pressures on the parks by promoting the growing of alternatives and substitutes for park resources and by promoting revenue-generating enterprises based on the parks such as beekeeping and local tourism. The main activities being promoted are:

- agroforestry to reduce pressure on the parks for firewood, poles and timber and other tree products;
- beekeeping (honey production) which helps to reduce the incidence of forest fires from wild honey hunting;
- improved farming systems including soil fertility management;
- domestic pig farming to generate income, provide meat for household consumption and to provide a readily available substitute for bush meat in Kibale;
- growing coffee for cash income around Kibale National Park; and
- fruit growing for cash income and household consumption surrounding both Kibale and Mt Elgon National Parks.

Unsustainable development outside the Parks forces people, especially during times of environmental stress, to resort to Park resources for food, subsistence products and even to generate cash income. By collaborating with the district authorities to promote environmentally sustainable development outside the Parks, UWA is helping to reduce pressures on the Parks, and is contributing to livelihood security and improvement. The integrated conservation and development projects around Kibale and Mt Elgon National Parks (funded by the Dutch Government and NORAD respectively) are also supporting the districts to develop their environmental planning and management capacity and to incorporate environmental concerns into development planning. These measures to support environmentally sustainable development are targeted specifically at supporting conservation through reducing pressures on the Parks.

Strategy 5 – sensitisation

The education and sensitisation of local communities regarding environment and conservation issues was given a high priority by both Parks.

Regular dialogue with local communities and their political representatives was undertaken to explain the wildlife management policies and laws and to explain and discuss Park management actions which impact on the communities. Indeed, when developing the long-term management plan for Mt Elgon National Park in 1999, an extensive series of consultative meetings were held with communities neighbouring the Park. It has been found that regular dialogue also provides a forum in which to discuss potential conflict issues and can also act as an important conflict-mitigation measure.

In addition, methods such as community workshops, radio broadcasts, posters and road shows were used to spread conservation messages to communities. At Mt Elgon, a residential environmental education centre was set up in cooperation with IUCN, and this has provided very successful short courses for school children on environmental issues, educating a new generation on the value of conservation.

Emerging issues and challenges

The experience in Kibale and Mt Elgon has shown that local communities can take on the responsibility for protection and regulation of resource-use areas and that collaborative resource management does bring significant benefits to local people living around protected areas while

improving local attitudes to conservation. However, there are still problems, with implementation that need to be resolved and the processes themselves are still evolving.

Developing the agreements is a long and costly process involving training of ranger staff, collection of data on resource users, sensitisation of resource users and negotiation of terms and conditions of agreements. To date this has been achieved through technical and financial support from IUCN and donors. It remains to be seen if this can be sustainable in the long-term.

Collaborative resource management

Observations from both Kibale and Mt Elgon suggest that ranger interest fades once agreements have been signed, and that the back-up support to resource use committees which is critical in the first months, is inadequate. This may be partly because community conservation rangers are few in number, and are constantly under pressure from local communities and UWA to negotiate and sign new agreements. Collaborative resource management (CRM) necessitates the provision of adequate financial and human resources, which at the moment are not prioritised in National Park budgets. Indeed, the Park's community collaboration unit remains with inadequate human and financial resources to carry out its expanding duties. In the early stages of implementation the Resource Use Committees, despite their enthusiasm, lack experience and do not have the capacity to effectively undertake their responsibilities to regulate and protect the resource use areas. If they are not closely monitored and supported by community conservation rangers, there is a danger that they will get disillusioned by problems they are unable to solve, and consequently lose interest.

At Mt Elgon, only about 20% of communities have access to resources through agreements (including those which are now ready for signing). There is a strong demand from the remaining communities to develop agreements quickly so that they too can have access to

The Chairman of the Resource Use Committee of Kapkwai (Mt Elgon) makes a point about the use of tree bark in traditional medicine. Photo: Sean White.



the Park. The shortage of community conservation rangers is delaying this process, leading to frustration in communities. There is a tendency on the part of the rangers to rush the negotiation process and to develop agreements too quickly without the necessary degree of consultation and sensitisation.

UWA is gradually moving towards a more partnership-based approach. Mt Elgon has 57 law enforcement rangers and nine community conservation rangers, whereas Kibale has 30 law enforcement and five community collaboration staff. This current deployment of staff is an indication of the higher priority still given to protection compared to developing local partnerships. The number of community conservation rangers is inadequate to cater for the support needed to implement existing agreements and to negotiate new agreements, which local people are demanding. In addition, rangers receive para-military training that prepares them for law enforcement duties, but not for community conservation. It is now necessary to reassess human resource requirements. Community conservation is more demanding in terms of skills and staff capacity than law enforcement, and more importance needs to be placed on training staff in community conservation skills.

Crop raiding by problem animals

In terms of problem animals, the institutional responsibility for their control is still unclear. Although the UWA Statute (1996) clearly delegates the task of tackling problem animals outside the parks to local government, there is a lack of expertise or capacity to take action. Local people feel that it is the government's responsibility to manage wild animals, because the UWA Statute stipulates that all wildlife belongs to the state, or because people know that killing wildlife is an offence. However, in reality local people have taken it upon themselves to kill animals such as baboons and bush pigs to save their crops.

In Kibale, elephants cause widespread crop damage while chimpanzees are a danger to humans, in particular children. Their high conservation status means that neither animal can be designated as vermin, and UWA needs to be responsible for their management. This also raises the issue of compensation for the damage such animals cause. At present, UWA policy does not allow compensation for crop losses from Park animals. One option is to redirect a proportion of the income from chimpanzee tracking to compensation for crop damage, or UWA could lobby local authorities to provide tax rebates to communities that suffer from crop losses by wild animals.

Destruction of natural resources outside the Parks

Another conservation threat is unsustainable land use outside protected areas. Current conservation initiatives are mainly directed to protected areas with little being done to conserve forest fragments that survive beyond the boundaries. Once such remnants are destroyed, pressure on resources within protected areas will increase. It is important that protected area managers try to adopt a more holistic approach to conservation by establishing links enabling them to work together with other relevant institutions. For example, more formal relationships could be made with other institutions responsible for land use, aimed at implementing a more holistic approach to conservation and land use at the landscape level.

Revenue sharing

UWA's policy of allocating 20% of the entrance fees to surrounding local authorities is a good example of sharing benefits from conservation. However, the actual amounts shared are small, as they are limited to gate fees only and do not include a wide range of other sources of revenues such as trekking fees, camping fees etc. For example, KNP earned a total of USD 116,300 in the year 2002 but only USD 7,800 was given to adjoining communities. In 2001, the amount was even less due to prevailing insecurity. As can be seen from Table 1 tourism numbers are still not

Table 1. Revenue sharing: Kibale and Mt Elgon National Parks.

Year	Kibale National Park			Mt Elgon National Park		
	Visitors	Total revenue (USD)	Revenue shared (20% of gate fee)	Visitors	Total revenue	Revenue shared
1999	815	79,988	269	1,278	66,022	0
2000	1,156	34,930	865	1,928	127,255	2,857
2001	1,824	52,499	1,617	2,028	255,492	4,571
2002	?	130,900	11,050	3,234	322,499	3,885

adequate to yield a significant income to surrounding communities. An additional concern is whether this money will actually benefit those directly affected by conservation along the Park boundaries. A difficulty with this type of measure is that the benefits target the community level, whereas losses due to problem animals are incurred at an individual level (Mugisha 2002). It is recognised there is a need to increase the amount under this scheme to yield tangible benefits, and to focus the benefits where the problem lies.

Conclusions

The strategies that have been developed at Kibale and Mt Elgon to address conflicts between UWA Park management and the people living around the Parks are bringing benefits to both local people, and to conservation. These benefits have been achieved through the partnerships which UWA has developed with the people neighbouring the Parks and with local government administrations.

The lessons from the experience in Kibale and Mt Elgon are:

- strategic partnerships with people neighbouring the Parks, developed through collaborative resource management arrangements, help to reduce conflicts and improve Park/people relationships;
- partnerships with district local government to promote environmentally sustainable development outside the Parks, help to reduce people-pressure on the Parks;
- negative impacts of Parks on local people such as crop-raiding by wild animals must be addressed through prevention or compensation; and
- revenue-sharing is a good mechanism for sharing the benefits of Parks with local people but the focus and scale needs to be revised.

The new models for CRM offer an exciting prospect of neighbouring communities actively conserving National Parks, and taking responsibility for managing their margins or buffer zones. UWA has recognised that although the authority to manage protected area resources lies with the agency, the ultimate success of its conservation efforts depends on the support and positive attitude on the part of the people who live on the boundaries of the protected areas.

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An impressive yet vulnerable comanagement partnership in Congo

MARCEL TATY, CHRISTIAN CHATELAIN AND GRAZIA BORRINI-FEYERABEND

The Conkouati-Douli National Park, Congo, offers a rich example of how a successful management partnership can be developed even while facing some of the most challenging conditions in the world. The paper illustrates a number of practical lessons in the process and describes the concrete results achieved. Despite the enthusiasm and hard work of the involved parties, however, these results remain vulnerable. Too much power is still in the hands of external actors who can readily decide to reverse the participatory approach and adopt counter-productive forms of 'repression' of illegal activities. A clear national policy in support of participatory management settings is needed, as well as renewed, coherent and relatively-long term support to the field initiatives that, like in Conkouati-Douli, are opening the way to real management partnerships.


THE TERRITORY that today comprises the National Park of Conkouati-Douli, Congo, (see Figure 1) hosts a magnificent natural wealth, encompassing multiple and interdependent ecosystems at altitudes ranging from zero to eight hundred metres. Its innumerable flora and fauna species render it not only rich, but include a high degree of endemism, featuring new taxa for the flora of Congo and numerous protected mammals (primates, elephants, manatees), several marine turtle species and very numerous species of fish (marine, freshwater and estuarine).

The territory is home to a dozen communities—totally dependent on the use of local natural resources and surviving through a traditional lifestyle—who possess both an intimate knowledge of their environment and unique skills which ensure their livelihoods. The local residents know every corner of the land and coast as well as the local fauna and flora. They relate to them through their social customs, including traditional rules of use and some magical taboos. In contrast with their integration into the local environment, the communities of Conkouati consider themselves abandoned by the state, and are waiting impatiently for recognition and support. At times this can be poorly expressed, or expressed with violence. In fact, we can find in Conkouati an abundance of energy in the local community... an energy that can well be employed either to build or to destroy. This energy represents a potential wealth of ideas and capacities for the management of the territory and its resources, but it needs to be nurtured and channelled.

A difficult national context and a critical local context

In 1992, when the basic documents of the national programme for the management of natural resources in Congo were finally ready, a climate of strong socio-political tensions and violent clashes characterised the country, which was just emerging from the one-party communist state regime. The country has scant experience in terms of civil society associations and 'projects' and its notions of collaborative management amount to what was discussed within the triad 'technical experts-party-unions'. The protection of nature and the sustainable use of natural resources are far from being national priorities. The Project for the Management and Conservation of the Protected Areas in the country (PROGECAP) of the Global Environment Fund (GEF-CONGO) established at Rio in 1992 finally came into being in Brazzaville in 1994. It has already accumulated a number of delays and is victim to a widespread lack of political will and creative ambition. The five national protected areas (PAs) that are beneficiaries of the GEF grant are entangled in endless conflicts over who has power over whom or what. One of these PAs, the then Faunistic Reserve of Conkouati, is plagued the most by these conflicts, as the area sits within the jurisdiction of the political opposition to the government administration in charge at the time.

Figure 1. Location of Conkouati-Douli National Park.



In Conkouati, tensions are possibly even higher than in Brazzaville itself. The local communities perceive themselves as completely abandoned by the state. There is no administrative authority in place, nor a system of police. There are no communication facilities, nor means of transportation deserving of this name. There are no schools, no health services and no agricultural services. The Faunistic Reserve of Conkouati has never been visited by Water and Forests Ministry staff, who are located less than 100 km away. There is no protected area manager (Conservateur) nor any warden patrol or surveillance. The reasons for the creation of this protected area of 300,000 ha, in 1980, were actually void of any environmental considerations. The aim, at the time, was to protect the border with neighbouring Gabon. Indeed, in 1989 the protected area was reduced to half of its original size under the pressure of timber exploiters and oil prospectors. Each modification was conceived and executed by distant authorities, without even minimal involvement of the local residents.

The key actors misunderstand and distrust each other

In 1994, the World Conservation Union (IUCN), the organisation chosen by PROGECAP to promote the sustainable management of Conkouati's natural resources, arrived to confirm a critical state of affairs. To the external eye, the protected area appears as a place of anarchy, a kingdom of poachers. Besides some 'heavy' and ineffective Village Committees set up by the old administrative system of the one-party state, the official village organisations seem insignificant. Local clans gradually restore their original powers and try to reinstate themselves, and the social fabric is severely damaged. Certain villages are almost completely abandoned, with 90% of their people living in the heart of the forest, where it is easier to exploit the wildlife resources.

The central government is not keen to see any improvement in the situation in Conkouati, basically because it does not wish to offer any help to its political opposition in the area. On the other hand, the local political parties do not have any particular reason to promote the conservation initiative either, as they receive benefits from the already well-established logging companies. The local administration, lacking finances, is at times susceptible to corruption and is certainly envious of the international conservation organisations and their means. Indeed,

An inner lake of Conkouati-Douli National Park. Photo: Christian Chatelain.



they are struggling to survive, and are not in the least interested in Conkouati – a sparsely-inhabited territory, virtually cut off from all normal means of communication. In all, the communities of Conkouati are purely and simply abandoned. They have only themselves and their survival skills to rely on in a socio-economically hostile environment.

In this situation, the arrival on site of the IUCN component of the PROGECAP GEF-CONGO had little effect. The resident people believe that ‘the project’ has come to forbid hunting and fishing, to resettle the villages outside of the protected area, to build fences and barriers, and so on. Their first reactions are at the level of their fears, and included roadblocks, personal threats and even the sequestration of the Chief Technical Advisor for a few days.

Organising and negotiating towards a management partnership

Promoting an environment favourable for dialogue

From the beginning participatory management is taken as the desired setting for the protected area and, as a first step towards it, a large emphasis is given to social communication activities. The IUCN staff recognises the importance of traditional systems of resource management and the need to offer a minimum of social support to destitute communities. These are crucial decisions. In addition, two other decisions are significant – the first is the recruitment of a person native to the region, with good communication skills, who becomes the ‘face’ of the project for the communities in the protected area. The second is to invest time and resources in analysing in detail the beliefs, preconceptions and practices of the local residents with the help of an anthropologist, also native to the region. The need to continue this dialogue will remain throughout the process, but these key choices in social communication are vital in determining a new partnership climate between the main actors.

Promoting a better comprehension among the actors

The social communication process gradually creates some new and positive perceptions of the social actors with respect to one another. The ‘project’ becomes to local eyes a set of resources and opportunities, including the opportunity to control external access to their local territory. Gradually, former enemies discover that they had interests in common and can become allies; the fear of exclusion was transformed into collaboration for improved management of natural resources. Thus, while the local actors and resource users in Conkouati understand the intentions of the project staff, the latter understands that the natural resources are being ‘appropriated’ at different levels and by different institutions. The agents of the state, which at the beginning of the initiative had perceived the local residents as a group of environmental predators and irresponsible poachers, begin to change their mind. At the same time, the local residents, who had not considered the state as anything more than an institution to forbid, repress and steal, moderate their opinions. Slowly, a mutual trust starts to develop between the project and the local residents. More in-depth work can begin, engaging the parties vis-à-vis one another so that they become ‘partners’, who work together for mutual benefit. The ‘command and control’ approach of the state and the ‘laziness’ of the local people face one another over the negotiating table. The parties are obliged to find solutions together – not as police and robbers but as social actors sharing an interest to maintain the abundance of natural resources in the reserve.

Helping the parties to perceive the natural resources as a common patrimony

The people of Conkouati have norms, rules and perceptions with respect to their forests, lagoons, wildlife and fisheries. These are very different from those of the Water and Forests Administration. In fact, they represent for every actor a set of strategic tools, to be deployed according to the circumstances. The system of reference is continuously changed and manipulated according to the social position of actors and the interests at play. By recognising such norms – deploying the rules, understanding the perceptions, studying in detail who has rights over what and by virtue

of what entitlements and means – it is realised that at least three levels of ownership lay claim to the same natural resources. The first is the level of the lineage, defining the clan rules of appropriation over the land. The second is the level of the village, which presides over the rules of resource management. The third is the level of the state, which, through its agents, attempts to impose the body of prevailing law. With the arrival of the IUCN project, a fourth level suddenly materialises before the local eyes, a level potentially powerful, more or less allied to the state and with the capacity of destabilising the whole system and appropriating for itself all of its values. That the clans, the villages and the state can dispute among themselves the access to the resources is still conceivable but that is unthinkable for an external project. An external project cannot and must not touch the local patrimony, as it has no entitlements over it. This reaction is very positive. It is in fact to the local patrimony that the project needs to pay attention, and the project engages in what at times is referred to as ‘patrimonial mediation’.

Negotiating participatory management agreements

The patrimonial mediation work, essentially a work of conflict management on the basis of the common interests to maintain the local patrimony of natural resources, is long and complex. It is often a case of one step forward and two back. The process begins by identifying all entitled actors, and with them making a preliminary evaluation of the status of the natural resources. Everyone realises that they are all threatened, and that they all wish to maintain the abundance of the natural resources. From there, each group of actors (or ‘stakeholders’) develops a proposition for the management of those resources, basically a voluntary form of zoning, with each zone having different rules of resource protection and /or use. At first, the propositions may seem at odds, but the project staff discusses with the relevant stakeholders the pros and cons of each perspective and develops a compromise solution that is progressively refined and finally accepted by all. A comanagement institution, the Comité de Gestion des Ressources Naturelles de Conkouati (COGEREN) is then formally established. It includes representatives of the local

One of the many meetings in Conkouati during the early efforts at establishing a climate of mutual trust and dialogue. Photo: Christian Chatelain.



communities, of the state administration, the NGOs locally active in environment and development issues and some locally elected officials. The legitimisation of the institution and its deliberations are accomplished through the signing of a Comanagement Charter by the national and local authorities and in a number of social rituals by which the local chiefs are publicly engaged. A real partnership is born.

Partnership results

The partnership established at Conkouati emerged from hard work through a long and complex process¹. Behind it was neither the simple application of a methodology nor the carrying out of a set of neat activities orderly listed in a project document. Rather, the partnership was the fruit of a common learning process by which all involved parties managed to judiciously combine their knowledge and skills, their energy and wisdom.

Five institutional agreements

1. A Zoning Plan, defining an eco-development zone, a temporary protection zone and a strict protection zone.
2. A Comanagement Charter signed by the local representatives of the three major authorities with responsibilities for the protected area (the Regional Director for the Ministry of Forest Economy, the Head of District for the Prefect, and the Chief of the Nzambi Village for the resident communities).
3. The Comité de Gestion des Ressources Naturelles de Conkouati (COGEREN) uniting representatives of the administration, the communities and the NGOs dedicated to development and environment as well as some locally elected officials. COGEREN has further established a Steering Committee and an Arbitration Committee.
4. A Management Plan, elaborated on the basis of the zoning plan and progressively including three Special Agreements on the manatees, the marine turtles and rattan.
5. A Decree, classifying the protected area as the Conkouati-Douli National Park.

Three special agreements for the protection of endangered species

COGEREN developed three specific agreements that were realistic and promising for the intelligent protection of resources estimated to be endangered and/or particularly valuable. These agreements are simple: each is summarised in a few pages plus a map, but carry the strength of the consensus among various parties, from the administration to the chiefs, to the local associations of resource users. They are tailored agreements, developed through long and difficult negotiations of mutual rights and responsibilities, which required the preliminary effort of all parties just to be discussed. Specifically, the agreements prescribe the following:

Marine turtles – all species of marine turtles found along the coast of Conkouati (*Dermochelys coriacea*, *Lepidochelys olivacea*, *Chelonia mydas*, *Eretmochelys imbricate* and *Caretta caretta*) are protected by the Washington Convention (CITES) and the Bonn Convention (Convention on Migratory Species). However, no text in Congolese law refers directly to them and they were customarily subject to poaching that could at times claim 75% of eggs deposited (the eggs are consumed locally). The COGEREN agreement defines some Zones of Strict Protection (no killing, no capture, no collection of eggs) along the coast and other Zones of Partial Protection (see Figure 2) where some rules of collection are to be respected by the local residents. The local residents are the only ones allowed to collect eggs (for local consumption only, according to

1. For more information on this process see: <http://nrm.massey.ac.nz/changelinks/cmnr.html>. The Conkouati process benefited from support in 'learning by doing' and exchanges within a learning partnership (supported by GTZ and the IUCN) comprising several sites pursuing comanagement settings in the Congo basin.

quotas set by the Park management). Even in the Zones of Partial Protection, the capture and killing of turtles is strictly forbidden. Only turtles accidentally captured and found dead in the fishing nets can be consumed locally. Turtles captured alive have to be freed. Turtle eggs and carapaces cannot be sold. It is even forbidden to carry lamps on beaches at night. Specific sanctions are applied to anyone breaking these rules.


Manatees – the manatee is listed in Appendix 1A of the CITES Convention and is protected by Congolese law. The last specimens in the country (*Trichechus senegalensis*) are found in Conkouati-Douli National Park. The COGEREN agreement takes into account the fact that this animal is perceived by many local residents as sacred. The agreement reinforces the law, forbidding or limiting certain types of fishing practices that disturb the animal in its habitat (for instance the practice known as ‘tapping-tapping’, by which the fishermen cause fish to concentrate in a part of the lagoon by making a tapping noise on the water). The agreement also includes the establishment of several strictly protected zones including manatee habitat (see Figure 3); the prohibition of netting at the confluence of the arms of the lagoon; the determination of an open and closed season for certain types of fishing practices; a system of sanctions for the infringements of these rules; and a manatee monitoring system.

Rattan – besides its natural role in the ecosystem, rattan (*Eremospatha* sp.) plays an important part in the socio-economic life of Conkouati. It is the raw material for many artefacts, such as chairs, beds, baskets, nets, it is also a roofing material, and is utilised by more than 80% of local residents. The objective of the COGEREN agreement is to prevent the over-exploitation of this resource by the adoption of rules that forbid cutting it in the Zones of Strict and Partial Protection and totally exclude its commercial use, in accordance with National Park rules. The utilisation for local purposes is authorised only for the rattan found within the zones of eco-development, and even there only according to quotas fixed by an ad-hoc management body at village level. Sanctions are established in case of rule infringement, graded according to the status of the resources.

Figure 2. Marine turtle management coastal zoning in Conkouati-Douli National Park. This zoning is the result of negotiations among local communities, Park Management and Forestry Administration.



Figure 3. Location of Zone A under participatory management for the protection of the manatee in Conkouati-Douli National Park.



Sharing power and enhancing sustainable livelihoods

The process that developed the participatory management institutions had two other major, if perhaps unintentional, results. The first is a certain restoration of moral standing between the state (manager) and the residents (poachers/predators) in Conkouati. The second is an effective step towards improved local options for sustainable livelihoods.

Ten years ago the Conkouati residents lived in a disconcerting and anxious state of limbo. They were closed to innovation, lacked interest in organising themselves and were basically unaware of the opportunities they could have grasped to pursue the very changes to which they aspired. At that time the forest service was squarely set in a centralist mode of management, focused solely on timber and wildlife and employed only repressive means to 'ensure' conservation. The process that led towards setting up the participatory management institutions in Conkouati is unique in Congo, and quite revolutionary, in the sense that it is the first example in which power-sharing has occurred between the Water and Forestry Administration and local communities. Besides opening avenues for mutual recognition and respect, this also contributed to a new sense of local identity and self-respect for the local residents, a re-evaluation of their moral standing vis-à-vis the rest of the country.

Regarding the strengthening of local livelihoods, it needs to be acknowledged that an enormous disparity exists between the immense natural wealth of the protected area and the great poverty of the people who live in its heart – a phenomenon all too common in Africa. For several decades the territory of Conkouati attracted waves of business operators and state agencies, all interested in exploiting timber and oil. Little or no return 'trickled down' to local level, and there has been little overall communication or social support. The economic poverty of the area has always been related to local apathy and a lack of social organisation. This is revealed by the scarcity of local associations, the absence of collaborative systems to secure food or means of livelihood in difficult times, the lack of places where people can regularly communicate, exchange ideas and negotiate common solutions, the absence of community representatives in decision-making regarding the exploitation of natural resources, local ignorance of the real issues determining both the rules and practices of that exploitation, the isolation of the communities, the passive acceptance of external pressures over local resources and the very poor knowledge of ways in which the local environment can support livelihoods. Comanagement, and the related processes of self-awareness, organising, negotiating and learning by doing, opened a door for the resident communities to improve their chance of sharing control over their resources and, indeed, benefiting from their sustainable use. This has been an essential step for them towards a fulfilling and secure economic future.

Some impressive results ... yet vulnerable and under threat

The participatory management results in Conkouati form a coherent, inter-related body and find their institutional strength in two fundamental tenets: the communication and dialogue among all concerned social actors and the assumption of responsibilities by them towards the conservation and sustainable use of the natural resources. The signing, at the highest state level, of documents developed by a large number of actors at the local level, is proof of the power of a local dialogue and a sharing of responsibilities. In the field, the fact that new forest exploitations have been decided on the basis of the advice of local communities, and their terms of reference discussed with community representatives is another encouraging sign. The specific agreements for the protection of manatees, marine turtles and rattan, and the application of the spirit of these agreements prior to their actual signature, can be regarded as further success.

Most of all, the communities of Conkouati have gained a new understanding about their land, the National Park now being central to their identity and livelihood, and a sense of pride and ownership is engendered. This result is impressive when seen in the perspective of the beginning of the process, when the lack of communication and social organisation rendered the future of



A fisherman returning home to his village inside Conkouati-Douli National Park. Photo: Christian Chatelain.

the protected area extremely precarious. In those days, the IUCN project could only ‘hope’ for the engagement of local actors in management. A few years later, the members of the COGEREN and the residents of Conkouati developed a patrimonial vision of their natural resources and began talking about their own comanagement setting with understandable pride – a major achievement.

The comanagement results in Conkouati, arresting and impressive as they are, remain vulnerable and are, even now, under various forms of external threat. It is true that a participatory management system is an evolving process, which can hardly ever be considered ‘finished’, which needs to adjust to ongoing constraints and which must adapt to the changing interests and realities of the parties concerned. It is also true, on the other hand, that some influential interests, basically opposed to the sharing of power with the resident communities, are capable of sabotaging participatory management in a variety of direct or subversive ways.

With regard to the comanagement institutional arrangements, further improvements are needed to achieve the effective inclusion of some important actors who, until now, have only been ‘watching from outside’. These include business operators (timber companies, oil companies, transport companies) and certain state agencies and services (fishing, tourism, environment).

Surprisingly, however, another major improvement regards the role played by a major conservation NGO that came into the area after the end of the IUCN project. The Park management would improve immensely if a more sophisticated understanding and appreciation of the local participatory setting could be encouraged by this NGO. Unfortunately, instead of valuing the advantages of the situation it found in place, the personnel of the NGO chose to follow a more conventional and outdated ‘protectionist’ and ‘repressive’ approach. In Conkouati, given the experience before and after the development of the comanagement partnership, such an approach is clearly inappropriate and bound to be ineffective. Indeed, it is undermining hard-won mutual trust and comanagement arrangements, and consequently having a negative impact on local biodiversity.

The IUCN project concluded its work in 1999. From then until 2001 COGEREN activities continued with the financial support of the Netherlands Committee of the IUCN (it was at this time that the specific agreements for the manatee, the marine turtles and the rattan were fully developed). Subsequently, experts from the new conservation NGO and a new Park Manager

(who was non-native to the area) entirely changed the management style. This has so far prevented both the official signature and the application of the agreements—in particular the agreement for the protection of marine turtles—a bizarre result when one considers that one of the objectives of the relevant NGO is the protection of this very animal. Even more worryingly, the efforts of the Park management have been re-focused entirely on the armed repression of poaching, introducing into the area a new level of ‘appropriation’ over the resources: the one of the armed forces called in to carry out the repression. The wisdom of involving in conservation a poorly-paid, armed militia in a country just out of civil war is to be queried. Far from eliminating poaching, it appears that this ‘repression’ has actually increased it. The armed forces have simply become a new layer in the system, taxing each poached animal that gets out of the Park, and encouraging the poachers to hunt more than before. In fact, a sort of quasi-alliance has been established between the armed police and the poachers (who are not members of the local communities and come from outside the Park) with the first becoming the taxing protectors of the second: a great result indeed! Understandably, the sudden change of approach has resulted in reduced enthusiasm from the local communities, previously accustomed to maintaining close links with COGEREN. It would be truly unforgivable if they were made to lose interest altogether after the long process that managed to involve them effectively and sincerely in conservation.

In November 2002 the newly-elected representatives of the constituencies that compose COGEREN (the mandate of the preceding ones had expired) gathered for a general meeting. They elected a new Steering Committee and a new Arbitration Committee and adopted an action plan dedicated to maintaining the achievement of comanagement in Conkouati, to strengthening their own institutional capacity and to pursuing both the local conservation engagements and some new initiatives to diffuse information and capitalise on the achievements of the past. Hopefully, COGEREN will receive increased support in the future and will be allowed to continue its pioneering work in the country. Ultimately, only a clear national policy in support of participatory management of protected areas will be able to assure its future, but it is significant and highly encouraging that, even in the absence of such

A river path through the forest in Conkouati-Douli National Park. Photo: Christian Chatelain.



a policy and while facing counter-productive management decisions and new threats, COGEREN is still alive.

The experience of the Conkouati-Douli National Park demonstrates that a participatory management arrangement is possible and can be successful even when facing some of the most challenging conditions in the world. It also demonstrates, however, that in the absence of specific policy-backing and continuity of support for the time it takes to adequately gain a strong foothold, such a comanagement partnership remains vulnerable to external threats. The conservation advocates interested in preserving the natural wealth of the area have a clear path to follow: restore as soon as possible a more effective and sensible management approach, and regain the trust and cooperation of the local communities.

We believe that the experience of Conkouati deserves to be widely advertised. On the one hand such transparency will help to give it its due credit and to attract further badly-needed support. On the other, it will also convey important lessons, and a concrete example to other protected areas willing to adopt a participatory approach towards more effective, equitable and sustainable management.

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Seeking conservation partnerships in the Selous Game Reserve, Tanzania

ROLF BALDUS, BENSON KIBONDE AND LUDWIG SIEGE

During the 1980s a rapid increase in poaching led to a significant drop in elephant numbers in the Selous Game Reserve, one of Africa's oldest and largest protected areas. Since 1987, the Governments of Tanzania and Germany have cooperated there in a joint 'Selous Conservation Programme' to rehabilitate the reserve. Other agencies subsequently joined in a seldom-achieved partnership between donors. The programme managed to significantly reduce poaching and enhance management capacity. Income from safari-hunting (90% of the total) and photographic tourism greatly increased. A 'retention fund scheme' has been established, whereby half of the income generated remains with the reserve for management and investment purposes (around US\$ 1.8 million per annum). Consequently, the reserve stands on its own feet financially, although complementary outside assistance is continuing. Collaborative arrangements with private sector investors have been developed as well as with local authorities and 51 communities in the buffer zones, which now manage their own wildlife areas and have a share in the conservation benefits. This experience of 'Community-based Conservation' has largely served as a model for Tanzania's new wildlife policy, now incorporated into the national Wildlife Act.

THE SELOUS GAME RESERVE (SGR) with an area of approximately 48,000 km²—representing more than 5% of Tanzania's land surface—is the largest uninhabited protected area in Africa. Founded in 1896, it is also one of the oldest. It is a biodiversity hotspot, comprising miombo woodlands (70%) as well as open grasslands, riverine forests and acacia bush. The SGR contains some of the largest and most important populations of elephants, buffaloes, antelopes, cats and wild dogs in Africa.

The late 1980s in Tanzania were characterised by widespread elephant and rhino poaching. The SGR, holding around 60% of Tanzania's elephant population, was hardest hit. Its elephant population was estimated to be at 110,000 in 1976. Ten years later the numbers had dropped to approximately 55,000. Government investment in the SGR was at an all-time low and the game scout force was ill-equipped, unmotivated and ineffective. The immense poaching had its roots in political and business circles, in the villages bordering the SGR and partly within the conservation system itself. During this time the plight of the African elephant became an international issue. Although the SGR was home to one of the largest elephant populations, it remained largely unknown despite a rapidly deteriorating conservation situation.

A partnership for the rehabilitation of a World Heritage Site

The Tanzanian Government commissioned the Frankfurt Zoological Society (FZS), a German NGO, to propose an emergency programme. This study confirmed that the SGR was in "imminent danger of losing its rhino and elephant" (Stephenson 1987) and Tanzania consequently approached the international community for assistance. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany responded, and the jointly implemented 'Selous Conservation Programme' (SCP) was included into the official development cooperation between the two countries starting at the end of 1987. The SCP was established as a partnership comprising the Wildlife Division and donors.

Wildlife conservation and support for protected areas were relatively new topics for governmental development assistance. So far they had been regarded mainly as typical non-governmental tasks, e.g. Bernhard Grzimek's 'Help for Threatened Animals'. There were three arguments why wildlife conservation was accepted for development aid: firstly, maintaining biodiversity internationally became a political objective (United Nations 1992); secondly,



The dance of the traditional hunters (murumba) ceremonially declares the onset of the hunting season during the annual wildlife budget planning of a village assembly in the southern buffer-zone of Selous Game Reserve.
Photo: Rudolf Hahn.

wildlife was increasingly seen as a natural resource with a potential for sustainable use; and thirdly, new concepts combined nature conservation with people-based development strategies. For German development policy, the SCP represented a break-through and similar projects were to follow. Wildlife conservation also became more important for other bilateral and multi-lateral donors.

The cooperation between the two countries in the SGR was based on bilateral agreements and regular joint planning meetings were held at which all the major government stakeholders were represented. Foreign assistance was limited to an advisory capacity whereas the Tanzanian authorities remained in the driver's seat. There was an expectation on the side of the donors that the Tanzanian Government would adapt the framework conditions (organisational structures, legislature) to the new challenges. This finally contributed to a new Wildlife Policy (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism 1998) in Tanzania, which contains elements of deregulation, decentralisation and privatisation of the wildlife sector.

Technical assistance is usually targeted at capacity-building, the transfer of know-how and structural reform, and normally has a personnel component. This was useful in the case of the SGR as its key problems were structural and management related. The simple provision of funds would not have resolved the fundamental issues at stake 15 years ago. Since 1987, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), which executed the project on behalf of the German Government, has assigned one to two advisors to work with the SGR's administration and with the communities and district authorities in the buffer zones. In recent years, advisory services to the SGR have decreased to about four man-months per year which reflects the increased capacity of the SGR administration. Consequent to the greatly improved self-financing ability of the SGR, the provision of materials, infrastructure and services by GTZ was correspondingly reduced. It is expected that the German component of the SCP support to the SGR will expire at the end of 2003. GTZ will, however, continue to support Community Based Conservation (CBC) in the buffer zone. Since subsidiary legislation for CBC was introduced in early 2003, this programme has a legal basis and can serve as a pilot area for other parts of the country.

The German Bank for Reconstruction and Development (KfW) has provided further financial resources, and has since 1996, complemented the work of GTZ by financing crucial access and trunk roads in the northern tourist sector, a Geographical Information System including

mapping of the SGR, and 1,000 km of boundary demarcation. In the late 1990s, the African Development Bank, a multilateral donor, also provided a loan for construction purposes, training and CBC.

Donor coordination: often proclaimed and finally achieved

The Stephenson Report (1987) proposed a multi-donor approach, which was adopted by all parties concerned, including the Wildlife Division. FZS supported the SGR with equipment and in particular, an aircraft and road-building machinery. The African Wildlife Foundation assigned a mechanic, equipped with a mobile workshop in the SGR's headquarters in order to help with the maintenance of the growing vehicle fleet and machinery. The Worldwide Fund for Nature provided an elephant and rhino biologist. Together with the Wildlife Division the four donors jointly planned the necessary activities and implemented them in a coordinated and coherent way. In retrospect it can be said that this partnership venture led to a fast but thorough rehabilitation of the SGR and contributed greatly to the tremendous anti-poaching success within a three-year period. In 1999 the European Union joined the partnership by supporting the 'Selous Rhino Trust', a Tanzanian NGO. Mainly for administrative reasons GTZ became the facilitating agency for this aspect.

Donor coordination has been a constant theme of international development assistance in recent decades, but nevertheless has often left a lot to be desired. The SGR emergency programme was a rare example of a conflict-free and equal partnership between donors of differing backgrounds and vastly different budgets. One of the reasons for this was the high level of commitment to a shared and ambitious programme.

Board members and village game scouts of Jukumu Society—a community-based organisation managing the Wildlife Management Area of 21 villages in the northern buffer zone of the Selous Game Reserve—during the opening of its offices, scout station and campsite. Photo: Rudolf Hahn.



Hands-on intervention: rehabilitation, infrastructure development and capacity-building

The objectives of the SCP were defined in a joint planning process as follows:

1. to safeguard the existence and ecological integrity of the SGR as a conservation area; and
2. to significantly reduce conflicts between the SGR and the local population by implementing a programme of sustainable wildlife utilisation by local villages.

To achieve these objectives, the SCP focused on assisting in the rehabilitation and management of the SGR, and establishing, in cooperation with local villagers, a programme of sustainable wildlife utilisation in buffer zones adjacent to the SGR.

In the beginning poaching was by far the biggest problem (the elephant population fell under 30,000 in 1989) and the rehabilitation programme started with strengthening the anti-poaching efforts. As no time was to be wasted, an unbureaucratic 'hands-on' approach was followed concentrating on clear conservation priorities. Later a Management Plan was introduced to base all activities on professional procedures and on agreements between the different parties concerned. Coordination processes were complex due to the multitude of stakeholders from the governmental and private sectors. During the rehabilitation phase, the SCP concentrated on the following fields:

- equipping, training and motivating the ranger force;
- extending stations and new outposts;
- improving the standard of living of scouts and their health and social conditions;
- extending and maintaining a basic road system (from 1,700 km to 15,000 km);
- improving communications (HF/VHF radio system) and transport (from three to 47 vehicles and lorries);
- supporting general management, including finance and business aspects;
- planning for tourism; and
- monitoring ecological indicators (including regular aerial counts).

General research was not part of the initial priorities but gained some importance in recent years after the rehabilitation process had been concluded.

The road towards financial sustainability

The SCP was started with the clear understanding between all partners that external assistance would in time be phased out and that the SGR in the long run would have to become self-sustaining. The SGR's budget in 1987 was funded entirely from the Government Treasury and amounted to approximately US\$ 3.00/km². After difficult negotiation processes with the Ministry of Finance it was finally agreed in 1992 that the SGR should be allowed to retain 50% of its income (referred to hereafter as the retention fund). This became effective two years later and since then the SGR's management has had a strong incentive to increase the income from photographic and safari tourism.

Revenue generated from photographic tourism has increased 15-fold over 15 years and now contributes to 10% of overall income and 20% of the retention fund income (Table 1). Hunting revenue has trebled and accounts for approximately 90% of income and 80% of the retention fund income. To maintain sustainability of the hunting revenue, there will be a need to improve the revenue collection system while maintaining hunting quotas at the same level of off-take.

Quotas are set by the Ministry on the basis of aerial counts and available ecological information. They are mostly conservative (well under or at sustainable off-take levels), but growing demand might create pressure to increase quotas. Common species to be hunted are buffalo, antelopes, leopard and lion as well as up to 50 elephants per year. Trophy exports are in line with CITES-regulations.

Table 1. Tourism, hunting and revenue growth from 1991–2001.

Year	Number of Tourists	Number of Hunters	Tourist Revenue ,000 \$US	Hunting Revenue ,000 \$US	Hunting Retention ,000 \$US	Total Income SGR ,000 \$US
1991	1,150	115	22	1,245		22
1992	1,784	163	40	1,655		40
1993	2,135	198	53	1,831		53
1994	2,415	174	100	1,656	828	928
1995	3,473	168	160	1,706	853	1,013
1996	4,661	325	209	2,674	1,337	1,546
1997	5,455	346	249	2,909	1,454	1,703
1998	4,596	436	285	3,541	1,770	2,055
1999	5,501	343	303	2,718	1,359	1,662
2000	5,267	431	320	3,245	1,623	1,943
2001	4,802	482	299	3,621	1,811	2,110

Source: SGR statistics

It is recognised that Tanzania does not have the resources to adequately manage its extensive network of protected areas (covering 25% of the country). Whereas the National Parks fall under a financially independent para-statal institution, the Game Reserves depend on allocations from the central budget. They are generally greatly under-financed and because of this cannot be properly managed. The SGR is an exception, due to its ability to retain revenues from tourism and the financially successful hunting industry. The SGR currently spends US\$ 2.8 million or approximately US\$ 58.00/km² (excluding investment but including salaries). This is exceptional by Tanzanian standards, but still low when benchmarked internationally.

As far as the long-term financial status of the SGR is concerned there are two scenarios:

Scenario 1 – basic management on self-finance basis

The basic functions of management (e.g. anti-poaching, administration of the tourism industry, maintaining the necessary infrastructure, minimal ecological monitoring) can be maintained with the retention fund. This does not, however, allow for an expansion of infrastructure, the provision of services to neighbouring communities or activities like research. This scenario assumes no changes in the present high tourist demand, and this is not an unrealistic assumption as safari hunting tourism is generally more stable than the other types of international tourism.


Scenario 2 – some permanent outside support

In order to attain higher expenditures/km², and consequently a higher level of management, it will be necessary to receive outside assistance on a permanent basis. While maintaining self-sufficiency for general management purposes, the management will seek limited assistance for expensive infrastructure, specific conservation projects (e.g. rhinos), research, sophisticated monitoring and CBC-programmes.

Such permanent support could be justified by the fact that the SGR is a World Heritage Site and consequently the international community should share the obligations. On the other side this refers to the wildlife of Tanzania as a whole, and there are many other important protected areas in the country with significantly lower finance levels.

The important issue, and one that has been aptly demonstrated in the case of the SGR, is that the development of these management options has been the result of an effective partnership

Duthumi Village along the Ruvu River was awarded a hunting quota for crocodiles after 11 people were killed by crocodiles in less than two years. Photo: Rolf D. Baldus.



maintained over a long period between various agencies with the will to resolve problems and seek solutions. But is this partnership only about government and donors?

The role of the private sector: public-private partnerships and carefully regulated competition

In line with Tanzania's formerly socialist orientation, the tourism industry, including safari hunting in the 1980s, was largely in the hands of the government. The trend, however, was towards privatisation, as the failure of a state-run economy was particularly obvious in this industry. The SCP greatly supported this trend and encouraged private sector investment rather than state-run businesses as the future source of funding for the SGR. In the case of the SGR, the private sector is represented by the safari hunting companies and a number of photographic tourism investors.

A good number of them were greatly interested in the recovery of the SGR, not least in their own business interest. A protected area with dwindling animal numbers and carcasses strewn all over the place cannot remain a tourist destination. Before the retention fund was in place, funding was sub-optimal. Many essential activities required external support, and a partnership was developed with those companies who were willing to providing funds or in-kind support, e.g. for grading roads or building airstrips.

Over the years the revenues have expanded, partly through higher fees or improved fee structures and partly through increased utilisation. Presently six tourist camps are operational in the northern sector of the SGR and around 20 hunting companies in the 44 hunting blocks of the SGR. Demand and consequently pressure for more intensive tourism threatens to compromise ecologically-justified restrictions for photographic and hunting tourism as laid down in the management plan. It proved difficult to convince the private sector to accept restrictions on business activities. Whereas the idea of a voluntary partnership sufficed for achieving the purpose of the emergency rehabilitation programme, it was idealistic to assume that this level of engagement could govern the relations between the administration and investors in the long term.

The question remains whether and how the administration can best guarantee optimal participation of the private sector. Tourist and hunting companies are concerned with profits in the first instance, and their support for conservation objectives is secondary, and quite naturally so. The strongest tool to force private investors to be efficient might be strong competition, since in a competitive environment investors must be successful in order to survive and to maintain their right to operate in the SGR.

In Tanzania the Ministry reserves the right to allocate user rights in the protected areas. There are presently no competitive bidding procedures in place, but instead a committee distributes the hunting blocks. Blocks cost a flat fee of US\$ 7,500 per year although some are sub-let for much higher amounts, indicating their true market value. The Ministry tries to secure good performance through a set of regulations (e.g. minimum use of quotas by hunting companies) that have to be adhered to and which are expected to allow evaluation of success. A more effective tool, however, might be the allocation of user rights, in particular the use of hunting blocks or campsites, through strict tendering processes. In these public-private partnerships, carefully regulated competition becomes a necessary ingredient for a successful, sustainable relationship.

The communities are also involved

The involvement of neighbouring villages was a fundamental part of the original SCP concept. At the outset, the objectives were to reduce conflict with the community and to address the problem of poaching. At the same time, there was a need to ensure that villagers could benefit legally from the sustainable use of wildlife. The SCP was one of the earliest examples of

practically implementing people-oriented wildlife conservation in Africa. Since then, libraries have been filled with papers containing conflicting opinions on these issues. While taking note of this ongoing debate, the SCP had no alternative in the complex social situation of the SGR than to try out some practical solutions as fast as possible.

Hostility marked the relationship between the communities and the SGR staff and shortly after the start of the SCP, a countrywide joint operation between the Wildlife Department, Army and Police Force, called 'Operation Uhai' or 'Life' was conducted. It helped to bring poaching temporarily under control, but fuelled the conflict. As an initial door-opener, the SCP supported various self-help projects on a 50% subsidy basis, gradually developing some level of cooperation between wildlife staff and villagers. More than 250 self-help projects were carried out in the first seven years. They helped in capacity building, and were gradually phased out after mutual trust had been established.

The SGR staff never intended to introduce joint management of the protected area. Instead the communities were to be given management and user rights over wildlife on their own land, a right that was previously withheld although they suffer important wildlife-related damages. Protected areas in Tanzania are unfenced and local residents suffer loss of life (estimated at 200 casualties per annum country-wide) as well as crop damage.

As CBC was developed by trial and error in the context of the SGR, some basic steps were followed. These included villages carrying out a survey and identifying future Wildlife Management Areas; the establishment of democratically elected Natural Resources Committees for the local management of wildlife and forests; the identification of village game scouts to protect and monitor the natural resources and to carry out the legal harvest of wildlife products. The Wildlife Division supported this by allocating a sustainable annual hunting quota for some common species like buffalo and wildebeest and in some areas also eland, waterbuck, warthog and impala. Quotas are set unilaterally by the Ministry. Villages, however, provide population data, which are collected by village scouts, and can appeal in case of disagreement on a quota. Training for community-based wildlife management is also carried out at all levels at the CBC-Training Centre in Likuyu/ Selous.

Large variations in organisational structures and procedures exist among the villages due to differences in culture, the nature of the resource base, and the quality of leadership at different levels. However, all have elected wildlife committees as part of their village government institutions, where wildlife-related issues are decided. Major issues like the distribution of benefits are decided by the village assembly, in most cases in a transparent and democratic way. The quota set by the Wildlife Division is very conservative and is essentially for local consumption. Bush meat is the major source of animal protein, as livestock is rare due to tsetse flies, and the off-take is presently less than 50 tons of meat per year. As a result of logistical problems and limited purchasing power, villages harvest only 30% to 80% of their quota. Meat is always sold, but for social reasons the wildlife committees keep the prices normally under market levels. The revenue forms part of their income which is used for administration, management and anti-poaching. Profits are saved in the bank or used for community projects.

The share of income from other sources is on the increase and presently amounts to 60% of the total. Several villages joined to form a secondary organisation and have a lucrative lease contract with a tourist lodge. Others sell part of their quota to resident hunters. Fees for fishing and lumbering are charged and voluntary payments from hunting companies are received. Tourist hunting is the most lucrative way to use wildlife in the remote *miombo* wilderness areas around the SGR. After the entry into operation of the new subsidiary CBC legislation, the villages will be able to receive a major share of the revenue generated by such hunting on their land. In order to fully develop their resources, the communities will need to establish partnerships or joint ventures with private investors, district administrations, local NGOs and, last but not least, the nearby SGR administration.

The number of villages engaged in CBC facilitated by the SCP increased from 15 villages in 1990 to 51 villages in five districts in 2001. More villages have expressed their intention to join and have requested advisory services. The proposed Wildlife Management Areas of all villages enclose a total area of approximately 8,600 km². These buffer zones bordering the SGR are patrolled by 300 village game scouts.

The SGR and district administrations as partners: an engine for rural development?

Productive partnerships have developed between the Wildlife Division through the SGR and the surrounding district administrations. The SGR has successfully carried out infrastructure projects in partnership with these districts. This is voluntary and not required by law. Some important major roads have been built or rehabilitated, connecting outlying villages to district capitals. Schools have been constructed and infrastructure put in place. From 1999–2002, a total of US\$ 890,000, or 11% of the total retention fund, has been committed for this purpose. As soon as the requirement for significant investment inside the SGR is reduced, the percentage of support to the communities will be further increased. Communication between the SGR administration and the villages are mostly ad hoc and on a one-to-one basis. The SGR is, however, invited to all relevant district meetings.

Figure 1. Map of the Selous Game Reserve and Village Wildlife Management Areas.





Village Scouts register impounded elephant tusks, Likuyu, Southern Selous. Photo: Cassian Mahundi.

The voluntary benefit-sharing between the SGR and the communities is complemented by a statutory allocation of a share in hunting revenue (effectively less than 10% of total revenues) from the Treasury, which is paid to the districts. In fact, poverty alleviation is one of the objectives of the national Wildlife Policy and the SGR administration feels that supporting the communities in these development activities will contribute. At the same time it reciprocates the goodwill and physical response of the communities to conservation of wildlife and wilderness of the SGR. The SGR has clearly become a focus for a more cooperative and coordinated set of interventions that create a variety of benefits.

Communities and conservation: partnership or participation?

In Tanzania, as in other African countries, villagers have since colonial times been alienated from wildlife use by restrictive legislation. The prevailing attitude of authorities during this period was that every villager was a potential poacher. On the other hand, local communities widely regarded conservation as a tool of oppression. The government seemed to believe that it was in control of the natural resources and was able to efficiently manage and protect it countrywide. The reality, however, was quite different. Whereas the protection of wildlife inside the parks and reserves was to a certain extent successful, very little effective law enforcement took place outside these protected areas. As a result the wildlife resources were, and increasingly are today, suffering major depletion.

Out of the wide range of 'people-oriented conservation' approaches neither joint management of the SGR nor mere benefit-sharing models were regarded as effective when the SCP started. To distribute only some share in revenue on a voluntary basis, as is now practiced by the 'Community Conservation' concept of the National Parks in Tanzania may be useful, but it does not result in a sufficiently strong motivation to actively conserve. The model finally chosen was one that allows the villages to manage the wildlife on their land in their own economic interest. Conservation success directly influences the benefits accruing to them. Some benefit sharing from the protected area is being practised, but this is only complementary to the main strategic approach.

It has taken time for the government to finally codify the procedures for CBC. The state still retains ownership of wildlife, and neither the degree of autonomy of the communities nor their share in revenue from wildlife has finally been decided. This shows that the process remains complicated and that there is still a long way to go. However, a major policy and legislative reform process is underway, which is likely to change the conservation and wildlife management regime.

Against this background it would be naïve to assume that a partnership between the communities and the conservation authorities is functioning today or will be developed in the near future. In the best case, the conflicts arising from differences in interest have been turned into issues which can be solved by negotiation and collaboration. The process of devolution of power is a lengthy one, not only in the field of natural resources. However, it is possible to foresee that the rural communities and the SGR will increasingly collaborate in conservation initiatives.

Where do we stand in 2003?

The 'retention fund scheme' has allowed the SGR to stand financially on its own feet. Scouts are now well remunerated in comparison with the Tanzanian standard, but staff levels in the Game Reserve have been reduced in the past 10 years due to the combined effects of a government policy that limited staff numbers, and suffered drop outs and transfers. There is still some illegal harvesting of wildlife, but at a level that does not negatively affect the population status. Poaching of elephants was 3,000 to 5,000 cases per year in the 1980s. Confirmed numbers in recent years have been between 30 and 50 annually. In 2002 only one poached elephant has been found inside the reserve, while poaching in other parts of the country is still taking place. Elephant numbers in the ecosystem are well over 60,000 again according to last year's aerial census.

The introduction of the new approach to CBC, now a part of the new Wildlife Policy of Tanzania, centres on the introduction of Wildlife Management Areas, which allow villages to manage and use wildlife on their land on a sustainable basis. Subsidiary legislation to regulate CBC became effective in 2003 and now forms a basis to consolidate the participation of communities in conservation in the coming years.

After 15 years of effort by different partners to conserve one of Africa's greatest wilderness and wildlife areas, the time might be ripe to begin a new chapter, the one of international partnerships. During the last three years game movement patterns between the southern SGR and the Niassa Game Reserve in Mozambique have been studied, partly with the help of satellite tracking. The Tanzanian Government has decided to go ahead with the establishment of a conservation corridor, which will be based on village Wildlife Management Areas. It is hoped that, eventually, this will safeguard the gene flow between two of Africa's most important and the world's largest, elephant ranges which are at present divided by an international boundary.

In summary, the SGR illustrates many types and levels of collaboration and 'partnerships'. Most likely, it will continue to develop new and appropriate means to engage a variety of stakeholders in conserving wildlife.

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Maasai community wildlife sanctuaries in Tsavo-Amboseli, Kenya

MOSES OKELLO, SIMON OLE SENO AND BOBBY WISHITEMI

This paper describes the establishment of community wildlife sanctuaries around the Tsavo and Amboseli National Parks and explores the conditions for their successful implementation. Most Maasai communities support the initiative, but they wish to manage the sanctuaries themselves and do not want to hand over authority to tourist investors. They want access to natural resources guaranteed through transparent, accountable and professional management, as well as equitable distribution of tourism revenues. And yet, the conditions for successful tourism also include access to areas of high large mammal density and diversity in order to attract and maintain the interest of tourists. Developing effective partnerships with other stakeholders such as community leaders, the Kenya Wildlife Service, local conservation organisations, tour companies and tourists is critical for the success of the Maasai wildlife sanctuary.

WILDLIFE IN KENYA is under threat from human encroachment, poaching for commercial and subsistence purposes, encroachment of incompatible land uses, loss of migration and dispersal areas, and increasing human-wildlife conflicts. Wildlife-induced damage to human property and life are neither controlled nor compensated – bringing losses to local people, rather than benefits – and leading to strong negative attitudes towards wildlife conservation (Okello and Megquier 1999; Okello and Conner 2000; Okello and Hadas 2000). In contrast, the Kenyan government and other foreign investors continue to draw large amounts of foreign income from protected areas through the lucrative tourism industry. For decades, local communities such as the Maasai in the Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem felt that their value as stakeholders, their lives, livelihoods and aspirations were conveniently ignored. Today, the establishment of ‘community wildlife sanctuaries’, which confer to communities the rights to manage and benefit from wildlife and contribute to wildlife conservation in dispersal areas adjacent to protected areas, is beginning to address these disparities.

The Tsavo and Amboseli National Parks are Maasai traditional lands that were taken away from them without compensation or consultation. As international tourists enter and exit their backyard, all the Maasai can do is to sell carvings, sing traditional songs and dance for meagre returns while others capture the major benefits (Okello and Hull 2001; Okello and Nippert 2001). Clearly, this situation has to be reversed to ensure that the community benefits accrue from effective wildlife conservation and tourism. This must be seen in the light of current events, which include changes in land use practices (e.g. the development of Group Ranches, which are communal land holdings, usually managed cooperatively by the community), corruption and lack of transparency within Group Ranch leadership, lack of local skills or stewardship of natural resources, and, in general, the widespread consideration of wildlife as merely a burden to local livelihoods.


Several options have been identified for transforming wildlife into an economically useful resource and bridging the gap between community interests and wildlife conservation (Sindiga 1995). These include:

- providing consumption user rights to the local community;
- designing a proper land use plan to allow multiple land uses that maximise community benefits;
- establishing a conservation fund to lease ranges for wildlife (alongside pastoralism) from the Maasai at current market prices; and/or

- encouraging communities to tap into the lucrative tourism industry by establishing their own community wildlife sanctuaries.

The establishment of community wildlife sanctuaries has gained support from conservation organisations, tourism investors and government. In 1996, the Kimana Group Ranch became the first formally established community wildlife sanctuary in Kenya. Other Group Ranches are now voluntarily following this example, with high expectations of converting disenfranchised local communities into legitimate stakeholders and partners in wildlife conservation. This paper examines the conditions necessary for the successful development of these sanctuaries, and uses the Kuku Community Conservation Area (KCCA) as a case study. In KCCA, the following three lessons were documented:

Local communities are key stakeholders and the real owners of wildlife in most African countries. For the Tsavo-Amboseli Ecosystem the Maasai are also a cultural attraction for tourists. Photo: Brian Peart.



1. the views of the local community must be acknowledged and respected in the ongoing planning and management of the sanctuary;
2. the potential for revenue generation from tourism depends on the area's ecological and physical endowments as well as its socio-cultural and economic context; and
3. a partnership among all stakeholders needs to be skilfully woven and maintained.

Respecting the community views and ensuring community ownership

The KCCA was jointly promoted and developed by the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) and the Maasai community, who expressed a strong desire to be involved in and benefit from wildlife conservation. The first and critical step towards the establishment of the sanctuary proved to be the effective consultation among all parties, with particular reference to the local communities and the expression of their needs and aspirations. For the proposed KCCA, pertinent information and insights were gathered from the local community. For example, survey results indicated a trend away from pastoralism to agriculture and it emerged that community members strongly supported agricultural expansion (Table 1). Most of the people surveyed believe that agriculture is more beneficial than wildlife conservation (Okello and Hull 2001; Okello and Nippert 2001). More people in the Group Ranch support Group Ranch sub-division, despite recognising the potential negative effects of land sub-division on pastoralism and wildlife. These findings confirm the disillusionment of the local community with non-beneficial wildlife conservation and declining pastoralism and their embracing of agriculture as an alternative means of livelihood. This is a major threat to the future of wildlife conservation in the ecosystem as agriculture takes over wildlife range and fuels human/wildlife conflicts. Fortunately, despite the tendency to shift their livelihood base towards agriculture, the Maasai tolerance for wildlife and their expectations of potential benefits from wildlife conservation are still evident. The majority of them still believe that wildlife conservation is important, and do not mind wildlife roaming freely on their land (Table 1).

Ensuring community ownership versus Group Ranch sub-division

Support for a wildlife sanctuary is dependent upon securing community ownership, benefits and responsibility. In the interviews we carried out as part of our study, a majority of local community members supported the establishment of community wildlife sanctuaries (we cannot exclude the possibility that this was in appreciation of their potential economic benefits rather than because of a genuine concern for conservation). Furthermore, the majority of local people wanted the sanctuaries established before the Group Ranch sub-division took place (Okello and Hull 2001; Okello and Nippert 2001). This is important, as the wildlife sanctuary initiatives should retain community ownership, with benefits spread to the entire community. Establishing it after Group Ranch sub-division would confine ownership and benefits to the few landowners willing to establish the sanctuary, and conflicts regarding compensation of wildlife damages from the sanctuary to the rest of the community would likely ensue.

Offsetting human-wildlife related costs

Linked to the support for the establishment of a community wildlife sanctuary must be an understanding of the nature of the benefits desired by the community, whether general to the community or specific to an individual household. Currently, losses due to human/wildlife conflicts are generally being solved through fencing and translocation, although a small proportion of respondents indicate that a community wildlife sanctuary would be an option (Table 1). This implies a desire for 'separation' of wildlife from local people in order to manage the wildlife-related damage. At the household level, a key ingredient towards supporting conservation initiatives would be to address these wildlife-related damages.

Establishing a tourism industry within the wildlife sanctuary

To achieve conservation goals and to target tourists, the ecological and physical endowments of the community wildlife sanctuary must be appropriate. Unfortunately, many community wildlife sanctuaries are based on the model of a National Park (IUCN Category II) (MacKinnon *et al.* 1986) nested within a lived-in landscape with similar characteristics to a protected landscape (IUCN Category V) (Beresford and Phillips 2000). This 'imitation' of a National Park does not conform to the realities and needs of the communities. The lack of consideration of alternative models that allow a landscape level conservation of resources as well as retaining human presence and activities may lead to future failure and difficulties in establishing community wildlife sanctuaries.

In considering the suitability of the KCCA, two aspects in particular were investigated:

1. **Size of the area** – community wildlife sanctuaries are usually too small in area to be viable conservation units or to meaningfully contribute to the conservation of the larger dispersal

Table 1. Summary of results from interviews with local community members regarding a wildlife sanctuary and interactions with wildlife.

Key information sought	Possible Responses	Data for April 2001		Data for November 2001	
		Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Effect of Group Ranch sub – division	Will have an effect on wildlife	50	74.63	41	74.55
	Will have an effect on livestock	52	77.61	44	77.19
Means of earning a living using various land use practices	Practice only agriculture	0	0.0	1	1.82
	Practice only pastoralism	8	11.6	5	9.09
	Practice both agric. and pastor.	61	88.4	49	89.09
	Support agricultural expansion	65	94.2	54	96.43
	Against agricultural expansion	4	5.8	2	3.57
Group ranch subdivision	Support sub-division	43	62.3	49	85.96
	Against sub-division	24	34.8	8	14.04
About wildlife roaming freely on the ranch	Wildlife roaming freely is good	41	59.4	39	61.90
	Wildlife roaming freely is bad	22	31.9	23	36.51
Suggested solutions to human-wildlife conflict	Fencing	50	72.5	27	42.19
	Culling	3	4.3	4	6.35
	Translocation	25	36.2	21	32.81
	Establishment of wildlife sanctuary	11	15.9	4	6.25
Attitudes toward wildlife conservation	Wildlife conservation important	56	81.2	53	92.98
	Wildlife conservation not important	13	18.8	4	7.02
	Agriculture more beneficial	56	84.8	41	73.21
	Wildlife more beneficial	10	15.2	9	16.07
Support for wildlife sanctuary	Support sanctuary in Kuku	46	68.7	42	77.78
	Against sanctuary in Kuku	21	31.3	8	14.81
	Establish it before sub-division	46	68.66	32	66.67
Natural resources the community need access to for the proposed KCCA	Dry season grazing	49	73.1	50	87.72
	Water	27	40.3	30	52.67
	Firewood	24	35.8	27	47.37

area. They represent a fragment of the entire ecosystem and violate good design approaches based on principles of island biogeography (Western and Ssemakula 1981). When these community wildlife sanctuaries are established in isolation and without corridors they are unlikely to be viable conservation units. It was clear that KCCA would benefit by being linked to the adjacent National Park but that the National Park would equally benefit by being buffered by the adjacent dispersal area. However, the size of the sanctuaries are constrained by the land the community is willing to give up. The proposed sites must have limited human settlement to prevent human/wildlife conflicts but must not necessarily exclude it altogether. A landscape approach (Beresford and Phillips 2000) and the interconnection of community wildlife sanctuaries and existing National Parks would benefit both, and provide a larger area for conservation.

- 2. Location of the area** – assessments of animal distribution and numbers, as well as the identification of a diversity of species, including unique and rare species, were undertaken. It was also necessary to examine options for linkages with other areas and particularly the protected areas, so that home ranges and critical habitats were included. From a tourism perspective it was necessary to consider the presence of species that are highly attractive to tourists and areas where sightability (the likelihood of the species being viewed by tourists) was optimum. To this end, animal counts have been done during various seasons to establish the ecological endowment and the key physical features. The number, density and diversity of species need to be compared with those of existing National Parks. The animal counts establish which unique and rare animals could be promoted as special attractions for the sanctuary and give an estimate of their sightability. Once a highly-endowed area has been selected, a viable and used corridor linking it with other protected areas in the ecosystem must be provided. The size of both the proposed wildlife sanctuary and corridor must be large enough to include wildlife home ranges and critical habitats. As before, the size of the sanctuary is however constrained by the land the community is willing to give up. The proposed site must have limited human settlement to prevent human/wildlife conflicts but must not necessarily exclude it altogether. These considerations and findings for the KCCA are described in detail in Okello and Hull (2001); Okello and Nippert (2001); Okello and Adams (2002); and Okello and Garnett (2002).

Understanding the tourist market

Community wildlife sanctuaries target tourists as clients. Creating a viable tourist industry within the sanctuary requires that: the biological, physical and cultural attractions that can be effectively marketed are identified; the provision of infrastructure and services, including accommodation that caters for tourist needs are ensured; a reliable communications-network is provided. In addition partnerships with tour companies as well as other tourism investors are critical for the community wildlife sanctuary, especially at the beginning when attracting tourists to the sanctuary. Estimates have to be made on the projected revenues from tourism, both to attract investors and convince decision-makers that the proposals are viable. For the proposed KCCA, all the tourists using the Tsavo-Amboseli access road were considered to be potential clients (Table 2). A correction factor based on the percentage likely to visit a sanctuary and incorporating a saturation factor (as tourists will not visit all available protected areas) modified the estimates. The net revenue for KCCA was estimated at Ksh. 9,066,740 (US\$ 116,240) per year. This revenue was much higher than any existing community venture in the ecosystem, except for Amboseli National Park that earns Ksh.150 million.

Marketing the community wildlife sanctuary

Successful marketing requires an understanding of the target market. To this end a survey was undertaken to identify the opinions of potential tourists to the proposed KCCA. Overall tourist

Table 2. Projected annual tourist revenue of the proposed Kuku Community Conservation Area (KCCA) based on actual tourist numbers in the Tsavo-Amboseli Ecosystem (November 2001–March 2002).

	Conservation Area (CA)			
	Amboseli NP		Tsavo West NP	Proposed KCCA
	Iremito Gate	Kimana Gate	Chyulu Gate	(Kimana & Chyulu Gates–double counted)
Mean number of non-resident tourist visitors per month	717.8	859.6	1,093.8	1,528.55
Potential number of tourists (based on 65.28% willing to visit community-owned CA)	–	–	–	997.84
Tourism saturation factor (56.5% of potential)	–	–	–	563.78
Adult non-resident (96.1% admissions)	US\$ 27/ 2,106 Ksh.	US\$ 27/ 2,106 Ksh.	US\$25/ 1,950 Ksh.	US\$ 25/ 1,950 Ksh.
Children/discounted price (3.9% of admissions)	US\$ 13.50/ 1,053 Ksh.	US\$ 13.50/ 1,053 Ksh.	US\$ 12.50/ 975 Ksh.	US\$ 12.50/ 975 Ksh.
Estimated monthly tourism revenue (Ksh.)	–	–	–	1,077,932.50
Estimated annual revenue for the proposed KCCA (Ksh.)	–	–	–	12,935,190.01 (US\$ 166,066.54)

opinions of the initiative were positive with indications that they would be willing to visit the KCCA (Table 3). The KCCA's advantage is that it is located in an established area including the Tsavo and Amboseli National Parks, and would benefit from this association and proximity to an existing tourism market.

The majority of tourists come to the Tsavo-Amboseli area to see wildlife as the primary attraction (Okello and Nippert 2001; Okello and Adams 2002; Okello and Garnett 2002). In addition to these wildlife attractions, some tourists indicated that they also visit the area for its scenic beauty and culture. A majority of tourists coming to the ecosystem indicated that they would be willing to visit a community-owned wildlife sanctuary, preferring that a portion of the fees they pay would directly benefit the local people and contribute to conservation (Table 3).

Currently, most tourists erroneously think that local communities are already benefiting from wildlife. Many tourists want local communities to benefit from their revenue as a way of rewarding their stewardship of the wildlife. They recognise wildlife as a local community heritage that should be used to uplift a community's socio-economic livelihood. From these surveys it is evident that any marketing strategy for attracting tourists to the KCCA must exploit the uniqueness of seeing local people living alongside wildlife as well as the notion of community ownership of the wildlife sanctuaries and its direct impact on community development and wildlife conservation. For this to succeed, ongoing education of tourists about the role of communities in conservation is required.


Table 3. Assessment of tourist opinions in regards to the proposed KCCA and other conservation issues in Tsavo-Amboseli Ecosystem, Kenya.

Main information sought	Responses from tourists	%	%	%
		Nov. 2001 (n = 80)	April 2002 (n = 98)	Nov. 2002 (n = 92)
Reason for visiting Tsavo-Amboseli area	Pleasure	97.00	88.71	91.95
	Business	3.00	11.29	8.05
The number one tourist attraction sought	Wildlife	68.80	70.79	56.67
	Multiple attractions	25.60	17.98	33.33
	Culture	18.20	7.87	5.56
	Physical features	7.80%	2.25	3.33
Souvenirs preferred for purchase by tourists	Wood carvings	55.70	44.83	54.55
	Multiple souvenirs	21.50	24.14	15.58
	Jewelry	24.40	17.24	10.39
	Clothing/attire	13.50	10.34	3.90
	Tools/weapons	6.40	3.45	1.30
Party responsible for travel arrangements of tourists	Tour company	85.50	31.18	82.56
	Personal/self	14.50	68.18	17.44
Types of accommodations used by tourists while visiting Tsavo-Amboseli area	Lodge	88.70	87.23	88.51
	Camping	9.20	11.57	5.75
	Both of above	2.10	1.20	5.75
Advertisement channels that tourists came to learn of the Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem as a tourist destination in Kenya	Travel literature	25.50	23.75	28.26
	Travel agent	20.40	21.25	18.48
	Multiple sources	18.80	18.75	17.39
	Television	15.50	3.75	14.13
	Personal comm.	10.40	21.25	9.78
	Internet	9.40	1.25	3.26
On whether tourism revenue should benefit the local community	Yes	87.70	59.46	70.37
	No	12.30	32.43	22.22
On whether tourists are informed of local communities role in conservation	No	88.60	73.91	54.55
	Yes	11.40	26.09	45.45
On whether the tourists think that the local communities are benefiting from tourism	Yes	65.30	60.32	57.69
	No	22.30	28.45	28.21
	Do not know	12.40	12.22	14.10
On whether tourists have visited a local Maasai cultural manyatta	No	67.70	63.74	54.43
	Yes	32.30	36.26	45.57
Willingness of tourists to visit a community-owned wildlife sanctuary just as they would for a NP	Yes	82.50	65.28	74.36
	No	13.20	8.88	20.51
	Do not know	4.30	22.22	5.13
Opinion of tourists on how and on what the most revenue from tourism should be spent	Conservation	75.70	70.49	49.25
	National pool	15.90	22.95	38.80
	Do not know	9.40	6.56	10.45

Avoiding competition with the National Parks through market segmentation

Having established the willingness of tourists to visit the sanctuary, there is a need to avoid potential competition with the adjacent National Parks. Solutions to this are approached by considering a diverse set of activities for the sanctuary, investigating the provision of complementary activities to the National Parks and exploring specific niche markets through market segmentation. Among such 'diversified activities' are bird hunting, walking safaris, camel and horse safaris as well as marketing the area as a cultural attraction. A partnership arrangement with the National Parks has been considered, which had potential for marketing the entire ecosystem as a package. There is potential for tourism activities to be diversified and the increased tourism revenue shared between the National Parks and the adjacent sanctuary.

The spectacular scenery and landscape of Group Ranches in Tsavo-Amboseli Ecosystem are popular with tourists. Within view of each other are Mt Kilimanjaro and Chyulu Hills. Photo: Noah Cardeira.



An examination of the profile of tourists coming to the area, indicated that most are foreign tourists and in older age categories. There is clearly a potential to consider targeting a completely different market segment, by including younger visitors, backpackers and domestic visitors. (Table 2).

Developing partnerships with existing tour companies

The success of community wildlife sanctuaries can be enhanced by entering into negotiations and partnerships with existing tour companies that attract tourists from abroad (Okello and Garnett 2002). This would require that the sanctuaries address the concerns of tour companies regarding such partnerships. These concerns (Table 4) include insecurity and unpredictable institutional arrangements in Group Ranches. The survey indicated that all tour companies are prepared to assist with the marketing of the local community sanctuaries, and even to form partnerships with them to enhance their marketability.

Involving stakeholders

A number of stakeholders influence the success and viability of any community wildlife sanctuary. Key among them are the community elders and leaders, who hold powerful social positions and provide guidance on important decisions. Their support and opinions are critical.

A second group of key stakeholders are the members of the elected committees legally recognised as being in charge of the Maasai Group Ranches. They usually explain new initiatives using culturally acceptable language and approaches, and build consensus regarding these initiatives. Their insights are critical in understanding subtle community socio-economic constraints and attitudes. A critical first step is to have new initiatives to pass through these committees and any other formal and informal community institutions.

The third key stakeholder is KWS. In Kenya, all wildlife belongs to the state, and is managed by KWS. Their support and technical advice for the establishment of community wildlife sanctuaries is vital, and they have supported the KCCA because the initiative meets two complementary goals, namely securing wildlife range and dispersal areas, and ensuring the protection, through community involvement and benefit, of wildlife in community lands. In this area, during the dry season most wildlife concentrates in the National Parks, (especially Amboseli) but disperses into the Group Ranches during the wet season, when water and fresh pasture are not a limiting factor. KWS offers support for training rangers to establish the community wildlife sanctuaries and ensure the security of wildlife and the tourists (Okello and Adams 2002).

A further group of key stakeholders are the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) involved in conservation who supplement the efforts of the government and communities by providing support, technical advice, implementation funds and research expertise. Local Maasai conservation NGOs support the establishment of the community wildlife sanctuary as one way of diversifying the income of the local community. Further, partnership with environmental research institutions (such as the globally-oriented School for Field Studies and national public universities) help provide socio-economic and ecological research information needed for decision-making.

Managing access to resources, tourism and the distribution of benefits

The Maasai are rural people, whose livelihoods depend entirely on natural resources (Seno and Shaw 2000). They wish to establish wildlife sanctuaries that guarantee them access to resources such as water, pasture, plant resources and land for settlement, especially in the event of severe scarcity. For the proposed KCCA, few community members (less than 2%) want their land leased to foreign investors (Okello and Hull 2001; Okello and Nippert 2001) because these investors may not appreciate the Maasai culture or allow them access to natural resources. On

Table 4. Tour company perspectives on tourism activities and community wildlife sanctuaries in the Tsavo-Amboseli Ecosystem, Kenya.

Information sought	Response of tour companies	Frequency of response	Total number of respondents	%
Clients nationality	North America	7	19	36.84
	Europe	7	19	36.84
	Asia/Middle East	3	19	15.78
	Africa	2	19	10.52
Travel into and around Tsavo-Amboseli Ecosystem	Use Tsavo-Amboseli road:			
	Yes	6	9	66.67
	No	3	9	33.33
	Fly tourists into the ecosystem:			
Yes	7	9	77.78	
No	2	9	22.22	
Visited community-owned wildlife sanctuary	Yes	6	9	66.67
	No	3	9	33.33
Tour companies can help market	Yes	9	9	100.00
Marketing can be done in partnerships with sanctuaries	Potential of forming partnership:			
	Yes	7	9	77.78
	No	2	9	22.22
	Willing to form partnership:			
Yes	5	9	55.56	
No	4	9	44.44	
Reasons for not forming marketing partnerships with Community Wildlife Sanctuaries	Don't want to be involved	1	5	20.00
	Logistical complications	1	5	20.00
	Poor security in some sanctuaries	1	5	20.00
	Poor road infrastructure	1	5	20.00
	Lack of technical management	1	5	20.00
Community sanctuaries competition with NPs	Yes	7	10	70.00
	No	3	10	30.00
Constraints to success of community sanctuaries	Management/security	2	4	50.00
	Poor road infrastructure	1	4	25.00
	Poor marketing	1	4	25.00
Marketing methods used by tour companies	Travel brochures	4	13	30.77
	Personal communication	4	13	30.77
	Media	3	13	23.08
	E-mail/Internet	2	13	15.38
Importance of marketing	Yes	7	10	70.00
Maasai culture	No	3	10	30.00
Difficulties in marketing Kenya	Money/too expensive	6	16	37.50
	Political instability	4	16	25.00
	Lack of security	4	16	25.00
	Poor infrastructure	2	16	12.50
Solutions to marketing problems	Improve security	4	14	28.57
	Improve infrastructure	3	14	21.43
	Government involvement	2	14	14.29
	Increase funding for tourism industry	2	14	14.29
Domestic tourism can help during the low season	Yes	9	10	90.00
	Possibly	1	10	10.00

the other hand, tourism revenue is needed to supplement household income, educational, health and pastoralism services. In this sense, it is essential that the community wildlife sanctuary allows for multiple land uses and maintains decision-making within the community. The Group Ranch members indicated that they wanted a new professional, transparent and accountable local committee to handle the wildlife sanctuary and ensure equitable revenue sharing. This contrasts with the experience of the local management of the Kimana Community Wildlife Sanctuary, where revenue sharing was not achieved, and the sanctuary is now leased to a tourism investor.

Key to establishing a management structure and identifying human resource requirements is the need to bridge the tension between local aspirations and the practical realities of managing a wildlife sanctuary. For the proposed KCCA, community leaders support the initiative (Table 5)

The Tsavo-Amboseli Ecosystem is a hub of tourism in Kenya because of the leading attraction: wildlife in their natural habitat. Density, diversity and the probability of seeing large mammals is important to tourists.
Photo: Noah Cardeira.




Table 5. Opinions of Kuku Group Ranch officials regarding the establishment of Kuku Community Conservation Area (KCCA) in Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem, Kenya.

Information sought	Kuku A Group Ranch	Kuku B Group Ranch
Support for the establishment of the proposed KCCA	Does not support Fear government stealing of land if turned into a CA Community not educated about conservation Support dependent on investor funding to start implementation	Supports Tourism from wildlife will lead to direct benefits for the community Will benefit community Wildlife is a valuable resource
Groups that would oppose establishment of KCCA	Agriculturalists who want to cultivate Pastoralists will not want to lose grazing access	Pastoralists will not want to lose grazing access. Agriculturists who want to cultivate
Tourism potential for KCCA	Chyulu Hills have tourism potential because of their scenery Lots of wildlife in area will be key attraction The interesting world-famous Maasai culture will be an attraction	Lots of wildlife in area Serves as wildlife corridor between Amboseli and Tsavo National Parks But successful implementation needs extensive marketing
Other ways Maasai can benefit from tourism	Walking safaris Bush camps Cultural manyattas and cultural centres	Campsites. Handicrafts. Cultural manyattas
Importance of investors in helping the community sanctuaries to succeed economically	Needs to manage KCCA for unskilled community Important for external funding and marketing	Not necessary as they do not understand needs or culture of the community Though their skills and funding is desired, they also exploit the community Outside income-source helpful
Investor-community arrangements to include Maasai	Investor comanagement with community Should not lease land to the investors Investors help with setup and marketing	Comanagement between community and investors Management solely by community
Maasai benefits from conservation versus benefits from pastoralism	Tourism industry more stable than livestock industry Conservation can provide more benefits to the community Conservation provides long-term benefits	Wildlife provides more benefits than pastoralism Inflation hurting livestock industry Livestock industry unprofitable Tourism can provide more benefits
Factors that would cause KCCA to fail	Poor management by the community. Legal status of conservation within Group Ranch system not understood. Lack of cooperation between investors and community Lack of community involvement in KCAA Poor marketing	Selling land to outsiders Subdivision of Kuku Group Ranch Lack of significant economic benefits to the community Lack of local skilled management Poor marketing Funding to start KCCA
Access to resources in the KCCA	Allowed access to: – water sources; – grazing for livestock; – dry season grazing; – medicinal plants	Allowed access to: – water sources; – dry season grazing; – no access needed as this leads – to over-utilization of resources

under the conditions that community interests, such as resource access, user rights and economic benefits, are safeguarded (Okello and Garnett 2002). The elders wanted sanctuary management to involve local participation through community ownership or comanagement with a tourism investor. Despite strong dislike for foreign investors (because of fears of exploitation, disrespect to cultural values or hindrance to resource access), the elders acknowledge that the investors bring capital, skills and marketing contacts necessary to make the community sanctuaries economically profitable. In seeking middle ground, comanagement arrangements are proposed where the investors' experience and resources may complement the local knowledge and community involvement in management (Okello and Garnett 2002). It is also envisaged that the investors help to develop local manpower in ecological and tourism management to effect a future hand-over.

For the KCCA, the proposed management structure includes a board of directors representing all stakeholders (Okello and Nippert 2001; Okello and Adams 2002). Reporting to the board is the Sanctuary Manager and a team of staff who deal with financial matters and ecological management.

Looking to the future

An aspect that so far has not yet been dealt with sufficiently, is the fear of the Maasai of a possible loss of the community sanctuaries to the government. This feeds on the Maasai anger over the systematic loss of their land to protected areas and other tribes before and during independence. Since wildlife belongs to the government and communities have no user rights, they fear that the government may seize any land (public or private) wherever wildlife exists. Although this is unlikely due to heightened awareness of community rights, such concerns can still inhibit establishment and management of community wildlife sanctuaries.

Added to this concern is that community wildlife sanctuaries lack a clear legal status. Group ranches are recognised in Kenyan law and their management institutions have legal status. With impending Group Ranch sub-division, members will have individually-owned parcels of land with all user rights. Any community wildlife sanctuary within this Group Ranches will be left without legal status providing an opportunity for some community elites or foreigners to 'grab' sanctuaries as individual property. This is an important potential constraint to the establishment of community wildlife sanctuaries (Okello and Garnett 2002). A potential solution is to establish sanctuaries as community welfare organisations whose membership is the entire membership of the former Group Ranch. Its board of directors and management would then be installed or changed based on the law that governs NGOs.

The development of the KCCA indicates the complexity of the emerging situation where communities become involved as partners of the state in wildlife management and revenue generation. It illustrates the need for cooperation of a wide range of stakeholders with very different perspectives, but building on a common vision. The case study demonstrates that these changes must be brought about in an inclusive way, and that there are many fundamental issues that emerge that must be dealt with in parallel, such as the widely divergent policies and laws which govern tenure and access to natural resources, in order to put in place a new institutional framework that achieves the vision but also meets the aspirations of both the community, state and investors.

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Résumés

L'expérience des Conseils d'Administration Locaux au KwaZulu-Natal, Afrique du Sud

SIDNEY LUCKETT, KHULANI MKHIZE ET DEREK POTTER

Cet article relate les initiatives prises par Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, le département pour la conservation de la faune et de la flore au KwaZulu-Natal, en Afrique du Sud, pour impliquer les communautés voisines d'aires protégées, en les considérant comme des partenaires et des décideurs à part entière de la gestion de la conservation de la nature. Cet article souligne le développement et le rôle joué par les Conseils d'Administration Locaux, sur fond de transformations sociopolitiques importantes en Afrique du Sud. Malgré des progrès importants, l'initiative demeure fragile, comme on peut s'y attendre dans ce contexte politique complexe et en évolution constante. L'avenir des Conseils d'Administration Locaux dépend en grande partie de décisions concernant les choix politiques et la répartition des ressources qui échappent au contrôle du Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife. Cet article raconte « l'histoire » du développement des Conseils d'Administration Locaux et évoque aussi bien les succès obtenus que les difficultés rencontrées. Les auteurs espèrent que les enseignements tirés de ce processus amèneront les communautés disposant de peu de ressources à participer à la conservation de la nature.

La démarche d'une Aire de Conservation Communautaire au Niger

BACHIR AMADOU, GILL VOGT ET KEES VOGT

Cet article décrit un processus par lequel des communautés locales et d'autres acteurs concernés se sont organisés et ont négocié avec l'Etat le droit exclusif de gérer la Réserve de la forêt de Takiéta au Niger. Ce faisant, ils ont créé *de jure* et *de facto* leur propre Aire de Conservation Communautaire, comprenant des institutions de gestion et des règles particulières qui sont aujourd'hui entièrement reconnues par l'Etat. Cet article s'étend longuement sur les enseignements qui sont à tirer de ce processus, en particulier pour les agences extérieures souhaitant soutenir des initiatives similaires ailleurs. Ces enseignements peuvent certainement être appliqués dans des situations similaires de gestion des aires protégées, lorsque ces situations affectent et sont affectées par des acteurs locaux. En fait, quel que soit le contexte, le défi principal à relever est de réussir à créer un environnement dans lequel les communautés locales elles-mêmes peuvent se responsabiliser et agir.

L'utilisation des ressources naturelles par les communautés dans les Parcs Nationaux de Kibale et Mont Elgon, Ouganda

PURNA CHHETRI, ARTHUR MUGISHA ET SEAN WHITE

Kibale et le Mont Elgon sont deux Parcs Nationaux en Ouganda, appréciés pour leur biodiversité et leur potentiel touristique, ainsi que pour le rôle d'écosystème qu'ils jouent pour les communautés voisines (en servant de réservoirs d'eau par exemple). Comme beaucoup d'autres parcs en Ouganda et ailleurs, Kibale et le Mont Elgon ont été confrontés à des conflits avec les communautés voisines, qui ont eu pour conséquence de poser de sérieux problèmes en matière de conservation. Au cours de la décennie passée, de nouvelles stratégies de conservation ont été adoptées à Kibale et au Mont Elgon pour tenter de résoudre ces conflits au travers de la mise en place de partenariats entre l'Autorité ougandaise pour la faune et la flore (Uganda Wildlife Authority ou UWA), les communautés voisines et les administrations des gouvernements locaux. Cet article rend compte de l'expérience vécue par l'UWA lorsqu'elle a mis en oeuvre une telle approche de la conservation, centrée sur l'innovation et la collaboration. Les premières observations semblent indiquer que ce type d'approche est efficace, qu'il permet de résoudre les vrais conflits en proposant un ensemble d'options, et qu'il est avantageux aussi bien pour les populations locales que pour la conservation. Cet article examine les composantes de la nouvelle approche, ainsi que les questions et les problèmes qui sont soulevés.

Un partenariat de co-gestion au Congo : impressionnant mais encore vulnérable

MARCEL TATY, CHRISTIAN CHATELAIN ET GRAZIA BORRINI-FEYERABEND

Le Parc National du Konkouati-Douli, Congo nous offre un exemple riche d'enseignements en ce qui concerne la façon dont un partenariat de gestion réussi peut être mis en place alors même qu'il se trouve confronté à des conditions parmi les plus difficiles au monde. Cet article en tire des enseignements pratiques et présente les résultats concrets qui ont été obtenus. Malgré l'enthousiasme et le travail acharné des divers participants, ces résultats demeurent vulnérables. Certains acteurs extérieurs ont

encore trop de pouvoir. Ces derniers peuvent facilement renoncer à l'approche participative et adopter des méthodes « répressives » contre les activités illégales, qui s'avèrent contreproductives. Il faut une politique nationale claire défendant les paramètres d'un mode de gestion participatif, ainsi qu'un soutien renouvelé, cohérent et qui s'inscrit sur le long terme, aux initiatives de terrain. Car ce sont celles-ci, à l'instar du Konkouati-Douli, qui ouvrent la voie des partenariats de gestion véritables.

Le développement des partenariats pour la conservation dans la Réserve de Gibier du Selous, Tanzanie

ROLF BALDUS, BENSON KIBONDE ET LUDWIG SIEGE

Pendant les années 80, des activités de braconnage de plus en plus intenses ont amené une forte réduction du nombre des éléphants de la Réserve de gibier du Selous, l'une des aires protégées les plus anciennes et les plus étendues en Afrique. Depuis 1987, les gouvernements de la Tanzanie et de l'Allemagne y coopèrent dans le cadre d'un programme commun de conservation du Selous ayant pour but de réhabiliter la réserve. D'autres agences se sont ensuite ajoutées au programme, formant ainsi un partenariat quasiment unique entre bailleurs de fonds. Grâce à ce programme, le braconnage a considérablement diminué et les capacités de gestion ont été renforcées. Les revenus tirés de l'organisation de safaris (90% des revenus) et du tourisme photographique ont fortement augmenté. Un « système de rétention des fonds » a été mis en place. Celui-ci prévoit que la moitié des revenus générés restent dans la réserve pour couvrir les frais de gestion et pour réaliser des investissements (environ 1,8 million de dollars US par an). En conséquence, la réserve subvient à ses propres besoins financiers, ce qui ne l'empêche pas de bénéficier encore d'aides extérieures complémentaires. Des accords de collaboration ont été mis en place avec des investisseurs du secteur privé, avec les autorités locales et 51 communautés dans les zones tampons, qui gèrent maintenant leurs propres réserves de faune et ont droit à une part des bénéfices tirés de la conservation. Cette expérience de « Conservation communautaire » a en grande partie servi de modèle pour le développement de la nouvelle politique de conservation de la faune et de la flore en Tanzanie, maintenant incorporée dans la Loi nationale sur la faune et la flore.

Des sanctuaires de gibier des communautés Maasai autour de Tsavo et Amboseli, Kenya

MOSES OKELLO, SIMON OLE SENO ET BOBBY WISHITEMI

Cet article décrit la mise en place de sanctuaires de gibier communautaires autour des Parcs Nationaux Tsavo et Amboseli, et explore les conditions d'une mise en oeuvre réussie. La plupart des communautés Maasai soutiennent cette initiative, mais souhaitent gérer elles-mêmes ces sanctuaires et ne veulent pas céder le pouvoir à des investisseurs touristiques. Elles demandent que l'accès aux ressources naturelles soit garanti par un système de gestion transparent, redevable et professionnel, et que les revenus du tourisme soient distribués équitablement. Cependant, le développement d'un tourisme prospère passe en particulier par l'accès à des zones où il y a une forte densité et diversité de mammifères de grande taille, afin d'éveiller et d'entretenir l'intérêt des touristes. Les sanctuaires de gibier Maasai ne pourront être une réussite que si de réels partenariats sont développés avec d'autres parties prenantes comme les dirigeants communautaires, le Département pour la faune et la flore du Kenya, les organisations de conservation locales, les tour-opérateurs et les touristes.

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Resúmenes

La experiencia de los Comités Locales, KwaZulu-Natal, África del Sur

SIDNEY LUCKETT, KHULANI MKHIZE Y DEREK POTTER

Este artículo detalla las iniciativas tomadas por Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, el servicio de conservación de la naturaleza en KwaZulu-Natal, África del Sur, para incorporar las comunidades alrededor de áreas protegidas como asociadas totales en la toma de decisiones para el manejo de la conservación de la naturaleza. Con el telón de fondo de la significativa transformación sociopolítica de Sudáfrica, se subraya el papel de los Comités Locales establecidos. A pesar del importante progreso, la iniciativa permanece frágil, como es de esperar en un ambiente político complejo y siempre cambiante. El futuro de los Comités Locales permanece dependiente, en gran medida, de las decisiones políticas y de la asignación de recursos que están fuera del control de Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife. Este informe cuenta la historia de los Comités Locales en vías de desarrollo y reflexiona tanto en los éxitos como en las dificultades encontradas. Es de esperar que las lecciones aprendidas en este proceso contribuirán al futuro involucramiento de las comunidades de escasos recursos en la conservación de la naturaleza.

El desarrollo de una Área de Conservación Comunitaria en Niger

BACHIR AMADOU, GILL VOGT Y KEES VOGT

Este artículo describe el proceso por el cual las comunidades locales y otros actores interesados se organizaron ellos mismos y negociaron con el estado el derecho exclusivo de administrar la Reserva Forestal Takiéta en Niger. En esto ellos crearon *de jure* y *de facto* su propia Área de Conservación Comunitaria, con sus reglas e instituciones administrativas específicas, que hoy en día son totalmente reconocidas por el estado. Las lecciones aprendidas en este proceso y en particular las lecciones aprendidas para las agencias exteriores que desean dar soporte a iniciativas similares en otros lugares, están ilustradas en este informe bastante extensamente. Estas lecciones se pueden aplicar con confianza a otras situaciones de manejo de áreas protegidas que afectan y son afectadas por actores locales. Cualquiera que sea el contexto, de hecho el desafío clave es el de crear un entorno en el que se permita a las comunidades locales mismas tomar la responsabilidad y actuar.

El uso de los recursos naturales por las comunidades en los Parques Nacionales de Kibale y Monte Elgon, Uganda

PURNA CHHETRI, ARTHUR MUGISHA Y SEAN WHITE

Kibale y Mount Elgon son dos Parques Nacionales en Uganda, valiosos por su biodiversidad y el potencial turístico así como por la provisión de su servicio de ecosistemas a las comunidades vecinas (por ejemplo: embalses de agua). Al igual que muchos de los otros parques en Uganda y otros lugares, Kibale y Mount Elgon se han visto enfrentados en conflictos con sus comunidades vecinas, lo que ha resultado en serios desafíos a la conservación. En la última década se han adoptado algunas estrategias nuevas de conservación en Kibale y Mount Elgon para atender a esos conflictos a través de asociaciones entre la autoridad de la Fauna y Flora en Uganda (UWA), las comunidades vecinas y las administraciones gubernamentales locales. Este artículo describe la experiencia de la UWA y la implementación de una aproximación innovadora y colaborativa a la conservación. Las observaciones preliminares sugieren que la aproximación es efectiva, que toma en cuenta los conflictos reales a través de la provisión de un paquete de opciones y que brinda beneficios tanto a la población local como a la conservación. El artículo habla de los componentes de este nuevo enfoque y también de las cuestiones y preocupaciones que surgen.

Una experiencia de co-manejo en el Congo: sorprendente pero vulnerable

MARCEL TATY, CHRISTIAN CHATELAIN Y GRAZIA BORRINI-FEYERABEND

El Parque Nacional de Conkouati-Douli, Congo ofrece un rico ejemplo de como se puede desarrollar una experiencia exitosa de co-manejo, aún cuando deba enfrentar algunas de las más desafiantes condiciones del mundo. Este artículo ilustra un número de lecciones prácticas en el proceso y describe los resultados concretos obtenidos. A pesar del trabajo duro y del entusiasmo de las partes interesadas, estos resultados permanecen vulnerables. Demasiado poder está todavía en las manos de los actores externos que pueden decidir volverse atrás en la aproximación de participación y adoptar formas contraproducentes de "represión" de las actividades ilegales. Se necesita una política nacional clara que apoye los marcos de administración de

participación, así como un apoyo coherente, renovado y de relativo largo plazo de las iniciativas en el campo que, como en Konkouati-Douli, están abriendo paso a asociaciones de administración real.

En busca de asociaciones para la conservación en la Reserva de Fauna du Selous, Tanzania

ROLF BALDUS, BENSON KIBONDE Y LUDWIG SIEGE

Durante la década de los ochenta el rápido aumento de la caza furtiva acarrió una baja significativa en el número de elefantes del Coto Selous, una de las áreas protegidas más grandes y antiguas de África. Desde 1987, los gobiernos de Tanzania y Alemania han cooperado allí en conjunto en un Programa de Conservación de Selous con el propósito de rehabilitar la reserva. Otras agencias se unieron posteriormente en una asociación muy raramente lograda entre donantes. El programa consiguió reducir la caza furtiva de manera significativa y mejoró la capacidad administrativa. Los ingresos de la cacería en los safaris (90 % del total) y la fotografía turística aumentaron considerablemente. Se ha establecido un sistema de "retención de fondos", por medio del cual la mitad del ingreso generado permanece en la reserva para ser usado en administración y en inversión (alrededor de \$US 1.8 millones por año). Como consecuencia, la reserva se mantiene a sí misma financieramente, aún cuando la asistencia exterior complementaria continúa. Se han desarrollado acuerdos de colaboración con inversores del sector privado y también con las comunidades locales y 51 unidades en las zonas amortiguadoras y éstos ahora administran sus propias áreas de fauna y flora y tienen participación en los beneficios de la conservación. Esta experiencia de la "Conservación basada en la Comunidad" ha servido, en buena parte, como modelo para la nueva política de la fauna y flora de Tanzania que ahora ha sido incorporada dentro del Acto Nacional de la Fauna y de la Flora.

Los santuarios de fauna de las comunidades Maasai alrededor de Tsavo-Amboseli, Kenia

MOSES OKELLO, SIMON OLE SENO Y BOBBY WISHITEMI

Este artículo describe el establecimiento de santuarios comunitarios de fauna alrededor de los Parques Nacionales de Tsavo y Amboseli y explora las condiciones para su implementación exitosa. La mayoría de las comunidades Maasai soportan la iniciativa pero desean administrar los santuarios ellos mismos y no quieren entregar la autoridad a los inversores en turismo. Quieren acceso garantido a los recursos naturales a través de una administración transparente que rinda cuentas y que maneje todo profesionalmente, así como también una distribución igualitaria de los ingresos del turismo. Para que los santuarios de fauna de las comunidades Maasai tengan éxito es crítico que se desarrolle una asociación efectiva con otros interesados tales como los líderes de la comunidad, el Servicio de la Fauna y de la Flora de Kenia, las organizaciones locales de conservación, las compañías de excursiones y los turistas.

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