


# CONSERVATION STRATEGY OF ETHIOPIA

## PHASE III PROJECT

**(1996-2001)**

## FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

### VOLUME ONE



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**October 2001**

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## ABBREVIATIONS

AAU	Addis Ababa University
ADLI	Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation
BoA	Bureau of Agriculture (region)
BoPED	Bureau of Planning and Economic Development (region)
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CSE	Conservation Strategy of Ethiopia
CSE III	Conservation Strategy of Ethiopia, Phase III Project
CTA	Chief Technical Advisor
EARO	Eastern Africa Regional Office, IUCN
EG	Ethiopian Government
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EIS	Environmental information system
EPA	Environmental Protection Authority
EPB	Environmental Protection Bureau (region)
EPC	Environmental Protection Council
EPE	Environment Policy for Ethiopia
EPRDF	Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front
EPU	Environmental Planning Unit (in MEDaC)
IUCN	The World Conservation Union
M&A	Monitoring and assessment
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MEDaC	Ministry of Economic Development and Co-operation
MoNRDEP Protection	Ministry of Natural Resource Development and Environmental
MoPED	Ministry of Planning and Economic Development
NCS	National Conservation Strategy
NEAP	National Environmental Action Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation
NPC	National Project Co-ordinator
ODA	Overseas Development Administration (UK government)
ONCCP	Office of the National Committee for Central Planning
PA	Peasant Association
RCS	Regional Conservation Strategy
RECC	Regional Environmental Co-ordinating Committee
SCSE	Secretariat for the Conservation Strategy of Ethiopia
SIDA	Swedish International Development Authority
SNNPRS	Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State
TA	Technical Advisor
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNSO	United Nations Sudano-Sahelian Office
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
VAP	Village Action Plan
WB	The World Bank
WECC	Wereda Environmental Co-ordinating Committee
WPP	Wereda Pilot Project
WSDP	Wereda Sustainable Development Strategies
ZECC	Zonal Environmental Co-ordinating Committee

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

The members of the Evaluation Team wish to record their appreciation to the various people who assisted them in their work. First we would record our thanks to those who gave us their time to respond to detailed questioning through formal or informal interviewing. Many people were very frank about their experiences and we particularly appreciate those contributions and trust that our text maintains their anonymity. Without the contributions of all of these people this report would not exist. Secondly we would like to thank all those who helped with organising the mission, especially the CSE III project staff in Ethiopia, especially the Project Director, Dr Tewolde Berhan Gebre Egziabher, and the IUCN Technical Advisor, Gedion Asfaw. Without their support and guidance the work would have been much more difficult. IUCN staff in Nairobi also supported the mission in various ways and their assistance in providing access to materials, offering comments and advice when requested, and providing guidance is greatly appreciated. In particular the collaboration of IUCN's Monitoring and Evaluation Team is recorded with thanks as they helped guide the team in developing its methodology. A reflection on that advice and the mission's experience has been provided to that IUCN Team in order to support their on-going work.

The Evaluation Team is also grateful to the various partners in the CSE III for facilitating their work and making arrangements for access to information and to persons connected with the Project. Comments on the draft report have been received from IUCN and from the IUCN Technical Advisor. Unfortunately, after four months there have been no comments provided by EPA, while MEDaC has stated that it does not have any comments at all on the report. This lack of dialogue is regretted after so many years of project activity.

Finally the evaluators would like to record that they felt privileged to have had the opportunity to study the CSE III given its particular characteristics and to benefit themselves by learning lessons from its experience. As we state in our report the Conservation Strategy of Ethiopia is an especially long-running process and it has been involved in many unique experiences for a conservation strategy project. It is essential that we all learn from this.

### **The Evaluation Team**

#### Note to Readers

This is a long report. This is because the CSE III Project was multi-dimensional, and involved a large number of activities, stakeholders and interactions. Further the Project is unique in many ways (see Chapter 1) and there are many lessons to learn from this new experience. In particular, as there had been no previous survey of the regional conservation strategy experience, the summary data from our work in the regions has been included in Annex 6. Further, in line with IUCN's move to more explicit information about its evaluation and monitoring processes, Annex 3 provides details of the methods used by the Evaluation Team. It is hoped that this material helps those concerned with understanding more about this Project and evaluation.

The use of a capital P in Project has been used to denote the CSE Project.



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### **Project Nature (Chapters 1 & 3)**

The Third Phase of the Conservation Strategy of Ethiopia (CSE III) ran for five years and seven months from December 1995 to June 2001. The Project was implemented by two federal level partners in Ethiopia, the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) and the Ministry of Economic Development and Co-operation (MEDaC). The Project was funded by NORAD and executed by IUCN's East Africa Regional Office.

The Project's main goal was to develop capacity, and develop an enabling environment for the implementation of the federal level CSE and the eleven Regional Conservation Strategies (RCSs). Specific activities included support for: obtaining approval of the CSE and the Environmental Policy of Ethiopia (EPE) from the federal level Council of Ministers, launching the CSE and EPE as the guiding documents for environmental policy and management in Ethiopia, developing federal level guidance for the integration of environment into development planning, undertaking the regional conservation strategy (RCS) processes, developing a communications and awareness raising programme, implementing the Wereda Pilot Project (WPP) to test the use of the CSE, and involving Ethiopian environmental planners in an Africa-wide network.

The Project involved supporting the Secretariat for the CSE (SCSE), which is located in EPA and the Environmental Planning Unit (EPU) in MEDaC. Two IUCN employed T.A.s were appointed to the Project, one being based in each partner institution – the CTA being in EPU. Between 11 and 18 experts, mostly seconded from the government partners, were involved in the Project. All were based at the federal level.

The total expenditure of the Project was approximately Swiss Fr 5.6 million to December 2000.

The Project had a number of distinguishing characteristics. These included being:

- one of the longest running conservation strategy processes (12 years)
- well-integrated into the established Ethiopian government system
- owned by the Ethiopian government and not subject to donor pressures
- able to adapt to political, administrative and economic changes in Ethiopia
- involved with a “regions to centre and back to regions” flow of information
- designed to have a dual approach through two government agencies
- involved with cross-sectoral integration of environmental issues, and
- closely linked to the rationalisation / decentralisation process

### **The Evaluation (Chapter 2)**

This was a partners' evaluation, with the evaluation requested by the Ethiopian partners in the Project and IUCN. This involved approval of the Evaluation Team and their Terms of Reference by the partners. The aims of the evaluation were to assess the project achievements and impacts, and to identify lessons for best practice with respect to environmental strategy work.

The Evaluation Team consisted of Adrian Wood, proposed by IUCN, and Kifle Lemma, proposed by the Ethiopian partners. They were supported by an additional,

locally recruited consultant, Alemayehu Konde, to focus on the regional work. The Team had just under three weeks in Ethiopia. Given the range of regional and federal level work, and in the absence of studies of diverse project components, the Team was pressured in its work, and the regional studies had to continue for two further weeks.

The team benefited from advice from IUCN's Monitoring and Evaluation Team about methodology and the Team Leader has fed back information into that process. Checklists were used as much as possible to try to ensure the collection of quantitative data from the 107 stakeholders at the federal and regional levels and the project staff who were interviewed. Access to key informants at the higher levels of the federal government and in the regions was affected by the political debates on rectification, which preoccupied many people at the time of the mission.

Specific aspects of the Project studied by the Evaluation Team included relevance and awareness, impact and achievements, project design and operation, partners performance, regional work, Wereda Pilot Project and future prospects.

#### **General Project Findings (Chapter 4)**

From the survey of federal level stakeholders it was found that :

- the Project's work is regarded as highly relevant given the state of the environment in Ethiopia today and also given the pressures to increase agricultural production in the short-term without consideration of long-term sustainability;
- a high level of relevance was noted especially in terms of enhancing attitudinal change, building capacity, creating relevant institutions and ensuring a gender focus in environmental issues;
- awareness of the Project and its activities is high amongst federal level stakeholders, especially NGOs and secondly government officials;
- the donor representatives knew least about the CSE and its activities;
- the approach by the CSE III was regarded as adequately consultative, but the level of success in promoting stakeholder participation was seen as less satisfactory;
- the EPE and CSE documents are seen as vital reference sources and the basis for project / policy planning and appraisal.

Concern about limited relevance was expressed most with respect to:

- the failure of the CSE to focus enough on turning policy into practical solutions for addressing environmental problems;
- the limited policy development to date in related key areas, such as land use, which affects environmental management;
- the slow progress in integrating the CSE strategies and proposed actions into planning and field activities by government and other agencies and at all levels;
- limited development of institutional structures, especially at the regional level, to support the implementation of the CSE / RCSs.

#### **Project Impact and Achievements (Chapter 5)**

Measured against eight key project goals, the assessment by stakeholders produced the following conclusions:

##### CSE / RCS Formulation and Implementation Strengthened

The CSE and EPE were approved and publicly launched in early 1997. Almost 1000 people from federal and regional agencies, and a few NGOs, have been trained in nine different subjects relevant to CSE work. Guidance for the RCS process was developed and the 11 regions supported in their work through training and support visits. Five RCSs have been approved and the other six are finalised and in the process of being

approved. Regional environmental agencies have been set up in two regions and in two others these are planned. There remain concerns about the limited use of these outputs to address environmental issues in the country.

#### Supply of Equipment and Materials

All regions have been supported in their RCS work through the provision of office equipment (50 computers, six vehicles, 15 photocopiers, 12 fax machines and one office building). In addition Regional Resource Centres have been set up with between 50 and 100 books and other materials for public use. Both EPA and MEDaC have received assistance in terms of vehicles, equipment and books, with EPA now hosting a CSE Documentation Centre, which includes the documents produced by the CSE in all three phases. EPA has also benefited from equipment for publishing CSE materials and this will help ensure the continued production of environmentally relevant material in Ethiopia. As far as the Evaluation Team could judge these items are being used for their envisaged purpose, despite the current resource shortages.

#### Integration of Environmental Concerns into the Development Process

This is mainly seen by project staff and interviewees to have been achieved through the training programmes referred to above. In addition a set of guidelines on integrating environment into development projects was prepared by the last CTA and this is awaiting approval and dissemination. Links with other federal ministries have been developed, but as yet focal points for environment in them have not been established. Legislation for strengthening EPA and for the use of EIA have been prepared and are in the process of approval and implementation. The base has been prepared for implementation, which must now follow.

#### Communications Capacity and Environmental Awareness

The Communications Unit established by the CSE III has produced a bilingual newsletter of a high quality to disseminate information about the CSE and other environmental work in Ethiopia. It has also helped all regions develop communications strategies and trained 363 persons. More than 2000 persons took part in environmental awareness workshops. These skills have been little used by the regions to date and represent an untapped potential which must be used to ensure the RCSs are understood and used.

#### Regions Assisted to Implement RCS Priority Areas.

Sixteen local environmental projects, with a range of civil society organisations and using participatory methods, have been supported by the CSE III since 1999. There was no monitoring of these to assess their impacts, but some positive experiences were obtained. The Wereda Pilot Project was the major local level initiative working with communities in Ankober Wereda. This was dominated by data collection and external planning and failed to develop local momentum for implementing CSE guidance. As a result the guidance generated by the Project for practical implementation of the CSE and RCS has been limited.

#### Women's Participation

A gender strategy has been produced for increasing the involvement of women in environmental management. Workshops to raise awareness of this have been held in all regions with almost 500 participants. The strategy was only completed in the last few months of the Project and now needs to be implemented.

### Capacity Strengthening in MEDaC and EPA to facilitate CSE / RCS process

EPA and MEDaC have benefited from capacity building through training and the provision of equipment, while EPA has been restructured in part to reflect the needs identified by the CSE. Staff turnover in MEDaC has seriously reduced the benefits of this but this is less of a problem in EPA. Evidence on whether EPA has the resources to use these staff fully was contradictory.

### Monitoring and Assessment System for CSE / RCS

Proposals for an M&A system have been made twice during the Project but never applied. Annual monitoring against targets has been applied and used in reporting.

### **CSE III Staff and Federal Stakeholders Perceptions of the Project (Chapter 5)**

The strongest perceptions at the federal level concerning the CSE are that it has:

- Created important guiding documents (CSE and EPE)
- Raised awareness and changed attitudes
- Developed relevant capacity
- Created appropriate institutions, and
- Emphasised gender issues in environmental management.

It is widely recognised that the CSE has introduced new ideas into planning and project development, and has led to changes in government policies and programmes. While many individual cases of changes in attitudes towards the environment were reported, mostly in urban areas, there has been insignificant impact in terms of popularisation at the grassroots level and in the rural areas. There has also been a failure to generate meaningful awareness of environmental issues and environmental linkages among the highest-level political elite and government officials concerned with investment decisions. A need remains for simplified awareness raising materials for use in villages and for appropriate documents to generate political support.

Some important institutional developments have resulted from the CSE, notably EPA, the Regional Environmental Co-ordinating Committees (RECCs), and the four regional environmental agencies at different stages of establishment. However, the RECCs meet irregularly are not very effective, creating little overall co-ordination. Some dynamism at the wereda and community level was noted with Wereda Environmental Co-ordinating Committees (WECCs) operative in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa.

Capacity development has been especially important at the regional level. Besides formal training of 974 persons (687 in the regions), a lot of staff have benefited from process learning – i.e. through the RCS work and contact there with CSE staff. Staff turnover (especially in the non-urban regions) has limited the benefits of training while there are concerns about loss of skills if the gap between training and use is extended.

### **Project Design and Operations (Chapter 6)**

The CSE III was appropriately designed and timely because of its major regional component. However, the involvement of two lead agencies was seen as problematic and not appropriate to the Ethiopian situation. Having a single lead agency and specifying more clearly the roles for a wider range of institutions was seen as better in helping get environment integrated more widely. Some parts of the project document were unclear, notably the Wereda Pilot Project and the ways to turn the CSE guidance into action. This led to the project team engaging in lengthy debates and planning

meetings. The project's timetable was over-optimistic which led to it being continually behind schedule.

Project management was in general seen as satisfactory, although there were problems with the lack of an overview perspective caused by having two lead agencies. The discontinuation of full staff meetings half way through the Project was not appropriate as decisions were then taken at high-level management meetings.

Financial management through the Ethiopian government system was adequate, although it was seen as "opaque" by the second CTA who refused to take responsibility for it. In general the Project seemed to ensure it obtained value for money, but the weak consultancy services for the Wereda Pilot Project suggested that the Evaluation Team should have reviewed more of the consultancy inputs.

While there were two mid-term reviews, one internal and one external, and annual reporting against targets, there was no formal monitoring and assessment system and no regular reviews of the various project elements in this multi-component project.

The Project had adequate financial resources but was seen to be lacking in technical expertise. This was partly due to the administrative responsibilities which one of the T.A.s undertook, the absence of a CTA for one and a half years, the resignation of seconded staff in MEDaC and the failure of the Project to recruit local specialists in a number of areas, including gender.

The failure of the Project to keep up to schedule, while partly due to over-optimistic planning, was primarily a result of the process nature of the Project where many influences upon performance were outside the Project's control. In particular political priorities on other matters meant that the regional work progressed slowly. There were also delays in expenditure in MEDaC, which may have been caused by a view that the CSE's environmental concerns might slow economic development.

The Project developed good relationships with the regional government staff with whom it worked, although some concerns about dependence and top-down relations were noted. Good relations were developed with many NGOs, but links with federal agencies were less good and with donors and the private sector virtually non-existent.

### **Partner Relationships (Chapter 7)**

The relationship between IUCN and the Ethiopian partners was affected by competing claims to ownership over the Project, IUCN seeing it as an "IUCN project" and the Ethiopian agencies seeing it as an "Ethiopian project". This led to conflicts over the management of the T.A.s and in project management where the Ethiopian partners did not expect IUCN to have any say, even though it was the executing agency. IUCN backstopping to the Project was seen by some project staff as essential for ensuring the Project did not become subject to bureaucratic procedures and local perspectives. However, IUCN failed according to these staff to keep the Project focused on its main objectives and stop it from evolving in response to local pressures. During the Project IUCN's role changed from one of a partner offering technical support to one of supervisor and monitor. This was due in part to the problems of keeping up to schedule. Backstopping also suffered from a turnover of staff, lack of technical expertise in some cases, and some irregularity in visits.

A conflict developed between MEDaC and EPA and this reduced the co-operation between these two agencies and led to a waste of time and energy. The relationship

between the two partners was also affected by the resignation, during the third year, of most of the MEDaC staff seconded to the Project and the delays in replacing them.

With respect to NORAD policy, the Project has shown close adherence to ten principles, which are identified in the strategy for 2000-2005. Local ownership of the Project has been clearly demonstrated with capacity and institutional development supported to ensure the sustainability of the project's initiatives.

The Project has been a source of support for one of the countries in IUCN's Eastern Africa region, which has greatest need for improved environmental management. It has allowed some further initiatives to be prepared in forestry and wetland management but as yet these have not reached the project implementation stage.

#### Regional Conservation Strategy Work (Chapter 8)

The RCS work was pioneering and unique, involving the decentralisation of a national conservation strategy to regions at the very time they were being established.

The RCSs were not prepared and approved as was foreseen in the project document. Because of this and various delays, RCS preparation became a major task throughout the CSE III. However, the end result were documents which reflected local priorities.

The first drafts of the RCSs were produced quickly, in about one year, despite difficult conditions. They were reviewed in a consultative manner at RCS conferences where membership was wide ranging, although lacking in private sector representation. Delays then occurred due to problems in finalising the document, translating and summarising it, reduced support from the CSE III, and problems in achieving political approval. A problem with this may have come from the use of English in the RCS documents and their size, usually of several hundred pages.

The RECCs have found it difficult to meet regularly and drive forward the RCS process. This is partly due to a lack of political interest in the RCS process, and possibly due to the fact that the RECCs are not legal entities. Further because the RCSs are not linked to funding for projects this discourages bureaux from being involved. As a result, only five of the 11 RCSs were approved by the end of the Project. In the peripheral regions, which have less bureaucratic history the RECCs have seen better co-operation between the different agencies.

Because in most regions there was a need for formal Regional Council approval prior to use of the RCS, implementation has been delayed. Addis Ababa has been an exception where, having set up an Environmental Bureau, use of the RCS has progressed in several areas without formal approval of that document. However, there has been a tendency for this work to be narrowly environmental, and not integrated across all sectors. This is in part because the RECC is non-operative in this region.

Informal use of RCSs is on-going elsewhere guiding the development of projects and policies in government agencies and NGOs. In addition the RCSs have been used by most regions in preparing their recent five year plans.

Despite the delays in the RCS process, these are still seen as timely by regional stakeholders given the needs perceived at that level. On the other hand there are concerns that repeatedly working at the regional level for different aspects of the CSE and RCSs (since 1992) has led to fatigue and disenchantment. In particular the delays since the RCS conferences have led to loss of momentum and the continued delays in

obtaining political approval are undermining the RCS process. This situation is made worse by the document-focus, rather than practice-focus, of the RCS work.

Analysis of the RCS situations shows that the CSE III should have given more political support to these processes to speed political approval and should have pushed for regional awareness campaigns to keep interest in the RCS initiatives. Maybe an alternative route should have been considered creating regional environmental institutions and providing them with some financial support so that they could push for RCS approval themselves and encourage unofficial implementation in the interim.

### **Wereda Pilot Project (WPP) (Chapter 9)**

The WPP in Ankober Wereda was designed to test the implementation of the CSE at the community level. This was foreseen as providing guidance for the whole country.

The three-year project was delayed due to repeated discussions to clarify what should be undertaken and in what manner. The project management team had difficulties operationalising this aspect of the Project. Links to NGOs were considered but rejected. In the end the implementation was undertaken through the wereda council and agricultural office with a seconded government field staff member as the co-ordinator and a private consulting company undertaking much of the work. Only a two year project was possible during 1999 and 2000.

The consultancy company which was responsible for facilitating the development of community environmental plans, was recruited only part way through the first year and did not produce its final plans until the end of the second year leaving the project with no time to apply them. There were further problems with the plans as they were top-down in nature and had not involved the communities in problem identification and the development of solutions. The resulting recommendations were very dependent upon external expertise and inputs and were not replicable. Indeed the consultancy company appeared to have failed to meet its TORs and it is doubtful whether it should have been paid in full by the Project.

The WPP did not link in well into the rest of the CSE III and did not build on its lessons, such as using a communication strategy, identifying community level institutions to have local ownership, or requiring participation. As a result the iterative learning process between the CSE III and this local level WPP was completely lost, as was any opportunity to test the CSE ideas and work of the consultancy company.

### **Conclusions (Chapter 10)**

The CSE III has achieved a large number of empirical outputs in terms of documents, training and institutional developments. There have also been some achievements in terms of awareness and changes in attitudes. However many outstanding tasks remain. These are in the areas of turning the CSE and RCSs into action at the local level, disseminating knowledge and awareness more widely, developing environmental responsibility amongst all sectors through appropriate procedures and environmental focal points, and establishing institutions to take the RCS work forward.

There are also concerns about the sustainability of the CSE work. These included the capacity and resources in EPA and MEDaC to undertake CSE follow-up activities, the lack of practical actions in the CSE and RCSs to ensure interest is retained, and the low level of government commitment at federal and regional levels. In addition the Evaluation Team has concerns about institutional rivalry, bureaucratic hurdles and lack of funding for specific applications of CSE and RCS ideas.

The way ahead is seen as requiring recognition of two routes, a government route and a civil society route. The former has been dominant to date. The suggestion is that the civil society route requires much more attention in the future in order to set the ideas of the CSE and RCSs free from the constraints of the government system and to achieve more rapid implementation. Specific actions along each route and common to each are proposed and, in the light of these, some key elements for follow-up activities are identified. These would include developing a generic process of problem identification and solution development using the CSE and RCS materials. This would be best tested in three different types of regions, an urban one, an established region and a new region. Activities and support would be provided at four levels, the region, one zone, one wereda and several communities in the chosen wereda. Emphasis would be at the lowest level to ensure ideas are turned into practice on the ground. The activities would involve both the government and civil society routes, with a national co-ordination unit operating with independent management.

There are many specific lessons identified towards best practice in Conservation Strategy (CS) work, and five key areas, which need wider debate. These are:

- The need for a cross-sectoral integration of environment, rather than the creation of an isolated environmental initiative
- A process approach with flexibility to ensure that CS initiatives are driven by local needs and priorities and that local ownership at all levels is achieved
- The need to critique government ownership of CS initiatives because of problems with centralising and bureaucratic views and procedures being imposed
- The need for wider dissemination of CS ideas and greater participation to ensure that CS ideas are set free in the communities where they can be applied, and
- The sustainability of CS processes should be achieved not through institutional development alone, or primarily, but through the outputs of these processes being of value to communities.



# **PART ONE**

## **CONTEXT FOR THE STUDY**

### **CHAPTER 1**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

This report evaluates the Third Phase of the Conservation Strategy of Ethiopia (CSE III). This ran from December 1995 to June 2001. This is a unique conservation strategy process in many ways and at the outset it is worth pointing out some of the unusual characteristics of this process. These should be noted as they offer opportunities to learn special lessons for the process of environmental policy formulation and planning in developing countries. Seven specific points are noted here.

At its termination in 2001 the CSE process had been operating for more than 12 years. This makes it one of the longest-running national conservation strategy processes in the world, run in collaboration with IUCN, the World Conservation Union, which developed the concept.

The CSE has been fully integrated into the Ethiopian government system and since its inception has been the main source of guidance and support for developing environmental management structures, decisions and capacity building in Ethiopia.

The CSE process has been effectively owned by the government and has not been subject to donor or other external influences. In particular it has not been subject to the pressures and demands associated with the World Bank's initiatives with National Environmental Action Plans (NEAPs) (Falloux & Talbot, 1993).

The CSE process has survived and adjusted to major alterations in economic and administrative policy in Ethiopia. These include the 1991 change of government and liberalisation of the economy, and the two decentralisation processes, one under the Derg regime in 1990 and the other in 1992 by the present government which regionalised the country along ethnic lines.

The CSE process has involved a remarkable formulation process with a "regions to national and back to the regions" flow of information, strategy development and implementation. This involved the national level Conservation Strategy of Ethiopia (CSE) (EG, 1997a) being built up from environmental reviews in the 28 regions which existed in the country at the end of the Derg period. Once the national or federal policy was approved, Regional Conservation Strategies (RCSs) were developed for the 9 regions and 2 urban administrations (hereafter referred to as 11 regions) based on the national strategy, but with appropriate adjustments.

A dual approach has been followed developing and applying the CSE through two institutions – the Ministry of Economic Development and Co-operation (MEDaC) and the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA). These have undertaken several joint activities, such as supporting the RCS process, but have also undertaken separate, although mutually supporting activities, including environmental protection based in

EPA and environmental management within the national development planning process in MEDaC. This has sought to integrate environment as a cross cutting issue across all aspects of the country's development (CSE, 1999c).

Finally, this third phase of the CSE has specifically involved the decentralisation of the CSE and the associated Environmental Policy of Ethiopia (EPE) (EG, 1997b) to the eleven regions and attempts to implement these regional strategies at zonal and wereda levels.

The evaluators have been assisted in their work by two mid-term reviews, one internal (Wood and Arnesen, 1997) and one external (Arnesen et al, 1999). These raised a number of issues which contributed to CSE III's development and provided stimulus for this evaluation.

This report is divided into four parts which respectively address the context for the study, the general project findings about the CSE III, the specific findings on particular elements of the Project, and conclusions and prospects. The individual chapters in the first of these parts address the Terms of Reference and methods of the evaluation, the Project's aims and history. The second part on the overall findings includes two chapters which address the relevance of the Project and its achievements and impacts. The third part considers project design and management, partners performance in the CSE III, the regional activities and the Wereda Pilot Project. The final part reflects on the CSE III experience as a whole and then considers ways to take this work forward.

## CHAPTER 2

### TERMS OF REFERENCE, METHODS AND PRACTICALITIES

#### 2.1 Partners' Evaluation

This evaluation was undertaken as a ‘partners’ evaluation’; in other words an evaluation requested by the partners involved in this Project. In this case the partners were MEDaC and EPA on the Ethiopian government side as implementing agencies and IUCN as the executing agency. As such all three partners agreed to the Terms of Reference (TOR) and the composition of the evaluation team and it is to them, rather than the funding agency (NORAD), that this report is addressed.

#### 2.2 Terms of Reference

The TOR for the evaluation are given in Annex 1. They stress two purposes for the work:

- Learning and improvement, especially to produce feedback from which best practice can be identified, and
- Accountability, to show to IUCN’s members, partners and donors how resources are being used.

The major aims of the evaluation are to:

- Assess the effectiveness, efficiency and timeliness of the project’s implementation
- Evaluate the impact of the project’s activities and related outputs
- Determine the relevance of Phase III of the project for the current environmental management needs of Ethiopia and to the core objectives of NORAD and IUCN
- Assess long term sustainability of the actions initiated and now handed over to federal and regional institutions for implementation,
- Identify lessons learned about project design, management and implementation, and
- Identify potential areas and specific activities, whenever possible, for future collaboration in further implementation of CSE/RCSs and supporting environmental / biodiversity management in Ethiopia.

The detailed discussion of these specific aims in the later part of the TOR focus upon a number of typical project operation criteria for evaluation such as:

- Effectiveness
- Efficiency
- Relevancy
- Impact
- Lessons
- Sustainability, and
- Future collaboration.

For each of these a number of questions are raised in the TOR, which have to be explored.

Finally the TOR make some comments about methodology, where the need for a participatory approach is identified. This was interpreted as requiring the active involvement of the partners and stakeholders.

### **2.3 Reflecting on the TOR and Adjusting the Schedule and Staffing**

At the briefing for the evaluation at IUCN's East Africa Regional Office (IUCN-EARO) in Nairobi, the initial or core team of two (Wood and Kifle Lemma) expressed their concern about the comprehensive and rather daunting nature of the TOR. This concern was based on the facts that the Team had less than three weeks in the country and there had been no time prior to the mission to undertake a desk study to get to grips with such a major project (See Figure 3.1) . This concern was expressed despite the fact that both evaluators knew the CSE to some extent (Dr Wood as a reviewer and Kifle Lemma as a past Director), and the fact that there was a more realistic and understanding perspective on the TOR expressed verbally to the Team by the evaluators employers, IUCN.

The Team's concern was reinforced on arrival in Ethiopia when it was found that much of the data required for the evaluation of the overall project activities was not compiled or not up to date. (Much of it in fact only became available after the fieldwork was completed.) This situation reinforced the team's concern about the lack of an initial desk study to provide a factual basis within which to frame the evaluation and plan the mission and its operations.

A further concern was the draft schedule of visits proposed in advance of the mission. This suggested that the Team should spend all but three weekdays outside Addis Ababa and should study primarily the RCS process in only five of the eleven regions. While this emphasised the importance of the RCS process for the evaluation, which the team recognised, it did this on the basis of a small sample which the Team questioned given the reported diversity of the regional experience. More importantly, this proposed schedule failed to provide time for addressing the various stakeholders in the CSE process at the federal level and the staff who had been involved in the Project and its operations, both of whom were felt to be important sources of information.

Another aspect of the proposed schedule was the lack of attention to the full range of project activities. Given that this was a final evaluation, and that the TOR focused on the overall project performance, it was felt by the initial team that they should try to address all of the project activities to some degree, and not just the RCS element. As a result it was clear that more time would have to be spent with the federal level stakeholders and the project staff involved in the different activities, while more regions would need to be visited to understand the range and diversity of experience.

In order to address this situation, the initial team members requested additional staffing for the evaluation, specifically to improve the regional coverage, in the light of the schedule changes they proposed. This was agreed to by IUCN at the initial briefing meeting in Nairobi and subsequently by the partners in Ethiopia. As a result a 30 day contract (see Annex 2) for a third team member was obtained and an appropriate senior local consultant was identified through the efforts of the Team Leader. This addition allowed the fall team to undertake a study of one RCS together in order to test and refine the regional methodology, which was then applied by the two initial team members in one other region each and by the new team member in five other regions. This meant that in total eight out of the eleven regions were visited

and assessed for their RCS experience, while the initial team of two were able to spend about half their time in Addis Ababa with project staff and federal level stakeholders.

One other concern which the team had when reflecting on the TOR was the absence of reference to the range of project activities which would have to be understood in order to come to overall conclusions for the evaluation. This, combined with the fact that there were only 16 working days in Ethiopia (due to travelling and debriefing), led the team to focus immediately upon sources of data for the overall project assessment, i.e. the stakeholders and the project staff. This rush to interview, which is not untypical of evaluations (Lindahl, 2001), was also caused by the absence of time for what is now seen as an essential data analysis and preparation period for an evaluation team (Wood et al 2001). As a result the team failed to study some of the specific project activities until rather late in the mission – and then found that because these had no specific internal or mid-term evaluations which could assist the mission, there was a shortage of resources to study them fully.

## **2.4 Methods**

This evaluation was informed and assisted by documentation from the on-going process within IUCN to develop more transparent and rigorous evaluation methodology (IUCN, 2000). It was also assisted by members of IUCN's Monitoring and Evaluation Team who kindly provided a framework analysis of the TOR which is seen as a step towards operationalising these into specific data collection methods.

One of the key emphases of the evolving IUCN methodology work is that data should be available to back up the findings of the evaluation and support subjective judgements. With this in mind the team drew up two checklists of questions to be asked respectively to the federal level stakeholders and to the project staff. In addition, a checklist of topics and a report guide were produced for use in the regional studies (see Annex 3). These checklists provided the material which has been used in the tables in this report and which support the evaluators conclusions about the Project. In addition to the interviews using these checklists, the team undertook a number of other interviews with the National Project Co-ordinator and with the remaining IUCN Technical Advisor. (For a full list of the persons interviewed and the schedule of visits by the team members see Annex 4).

The team was required to apply a participatory methodology. This was interpreted as requiring consultations with the partners both for interviews and to agree the activities proposed for the evaluation. This followed on the initial discussions by all three partners (IUNC, MEDaC and EPA) on the TOR and the membership of the evaluation team. The participatory method also involved interviewing a wide range of stakeholders and persons involved in the Project in order to obtain their understanding of particular issues within the TOR of the evaluation. While participatory evaluations can involve group meetings of stakeholders to determine common views on issues in an evaluation, in this case the team decided that individual meetings would be better as they would allow the diversity of views to be expressed and any conflicting opinions to be understood. The feedback of the mission's findings is one final part of the participatory process still to be undertaken to ensure that the evaluation is not just an extractive process. So far in the debriefing the mission has responded to critical comments from partners about a previous CSE review debriefing and provided the level of information which is expected. However, a more creative form of feedback to

all of the partners is proposed later in this report along with ideas for taking the work forward (Chapter 10).

The team decided to explore the areas of relevance, effectiveness and impact primarily through interviewing a cross-section sample of the various stakeholders who could be contacted at the federal level. This was undertaken by Kifle Lemma as it was not appropriate for him to undertake the other part of the federal level work with the project team and associated actors, having been the director of the Project for the first three years of CSE III. A list of potential stakeholders was drawn up jointly by the two initial team members to include representation from a wide range of organisations with varying levels of interaction with the Project. This was reduced to a manageable size whilst making sure it included an equal number from government agencies, donors and NGOs, although in the end this balance was not quite maintained due to the problems of obtaining appointments. A checklist was developed building on the framework analysis from the TOR and this was used in all interviews, although it proved of varying relevance depending on the experience of the interviewee (see Annex 3a).

The questions about project operations, management and efficiency were explored by Adrian Wood who interviewed all of the project staff who were still in post and a number of the staff in the two government partner organisations who had been involved in the project operations in different ways. This involved the use of another checklist of questions (see Annex 3b)

The regional work to explore the RCS process was undertaken in two phases. Initially the three team members visited Awassa, the capital of the Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS), for three days in order to explore how the regional processes could be investigated. While this was the opportunity to collect the information on this region, it was exploratory in many ways as it involved testing the checklist (see Annex 3c) and methodology, as well as reviewing the practicalities of what the team sought to undertake, and the structure proposed for the regional reports (see Annex 3d). Despite difficulties (see 2.5), this visit showed that a reasonable amount of information about the RCS process could be obtained through such a visit and provide a basis for assessing this part of the Project. This methodology was applied subsequently by each of the team members on their own, with the additional locally recruited consultant continuing this work for over two weeks after the fieldwork by the other team members was completed.

In addition, Adrian Wood visited the Wereda Pilot Project (WPP) and studied the documentation on this. This involved a one day field visit to the wereda site with a member of the Biodynamics company which had been involved in some related activities there but was not connected to the Metafeira consulting company which had undertaken the resource assessment and planning process for the WPP. Although limited time in the fields meant that discussion with farmers and wereda staff were very brief, the field visit did lead to the identification of a key review meeting for this part of the Project which has been held in Debre Birhan, the documentary record of which was eventually obtained and translated to assist in this work.

## **2.5 Practicalities**

As with all missions, the practical arrangements and the specific and general situations in which the evaluation team was operating affected its work. In May 2001 Ethiopia was undergoing a difficult period of internal political debate within the ruling party. This involved a process of rectification to correct past errors made in the

first ten years of rule by the EPRDF (Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary and Democratic Front) and led to a serious split in the governing political group. This had serious implications for this mission in terms of access to many key informants in government. For instance interviews with the Chairman of the Environmental Protection Council (EPC), who is responsible for EPA, and the Vice Minister of MEDaC, responsible for the CSE, were impossible. Within the federal and regional governments most heads of Bureaus and Departments were involved in the rectification meetings and so were not available for interview. In particular this meant that none of the Regional Environmental Co-ordinating Committee (RECC) chairpersons and very few of the RECC members were interviewed, a very serious omission given the general criticism of the operation of these institutions. People who were acting in place of those with whom interviews had been sought were often not directly involved in the CSE/RCS activities and were not knowledgeable about the progress and experience to date.

Communication problems and lack of advanced planning for meetings made it difficult to interview key people. Often they were in the field because they had not been warned in advance about the mission. In the case of the manager for the WPP he was beyond telephone contact for the three weeks of the mission and, with no advance warning that he would be needed, he could only be interviewed after the team member, responsible for the WPP assessment, had left the country.

The team also faced a problem due to government staff turnover during the last five years. During this time, for political, economic and restructuring reasons, many people have left government employment or so could no longer be found in the agencies where they had been involved in CSE or RCS activities.

These three problems led the team to a concern that their findings were to some extent influenced by whom they were able to interview. Despite this influence, the team believes that its findings are a reasonably accurate assessment of the CSE III Project, which would be only more detailed, rather than different in conclusion, had the "missing" persons been interviewed.

A few other points should be made about the operational context of the mission. The most important of these was the timing of the evaluation which was so late in the project period that some of the project staff had left and were difficult to trace. In addition, few resources remained with which to support the mission, especially for transport in Addis Ababa and for the preparation of data. The problems with data availability also relate to the changed scheduling of this final evaluation in relation to the preparation of the final report for the Project. The final report was originally envisaged as being prepared before the evaluation so that the requisite data would be available for review. This was changed in late 2000, when the work of the evaluation mission was seen as feeding into the final report. While this is acceptable, the final evaluation certainly needs access to much of the data which would be in a final report. This was not available and so the mission was constrained by the absence of this and by waiting for summary tables to be produced after the fieldwork was completed. This meant that the mission was not able to build up a quick overview of the Project from this data and use that in planning its work.

A further practical issue was the use of the checklists in order to meet IUCN's concern for quantitative data. These checklists were prepared using the Terms of Reference and the framework document provided by the members of IUCN's Monitoring and Evaluation Team. This led to a very long list of questions, with 45 to

50 main questions for each interviewee. The result was that an interview took over two hours to complete, when all the sections in the checklist were relevant. Because of the diversity of the respondents and their experience with the CSE III there was considerable adjustment required of these checklists from person to person as not all the questions were relevant. In other cases where most of the questions were relevant, use of the full checklist led to respondent fatigue and a major loss of opportunity to explore related issues in depth. In one case two sessions, each of around 100 minutes, were necessary to complete an interview with a particularly thoughtful and informative respondent who had observed the CSE III throughout.

Triangulation, from the various interviews, in order to reach a consensus on a particular issue proved difficult on many occasions. This was partly because of the different levels of involvement with the CSE III by the interviewees, but was also due to staff having vested interests and the competition between agencies and even sections therein. As a result the views expressed to the evaluation team were often conflicting and influenced by the perspectives and circumstances of the interviewee. This has meant that some interpretations of the results have been necessary by the evaluation team, rather than simply summing up the number of different responses to a question.

Tables were produced from the responses to the checklist questions in the interviews and have been used in this report where appropriate. However, the open-ended nature of the questions, which was necessary given the diversity of the people being interviewed and their experience of the CSE, led to a wide range of responses which made it difficult to produce meaningful tables. This was especially true with the responses from the staff in the Project and the partner agencies who had very different and complex views and in several cases had major experiences and strong opinions to report, rather than simple answers to a question.

Finally a comment should be made about the documentation. While serious efforts were clearly being made to classify this so that the documentation centre in EPA could take over the project material, no up-to-date list of all the project-produced documents was available during the mission. While most key documents were available and were presented to the Team, there was no opportunity to go through a complete list and select items. Further when some specific documents were sought they were unavailable – notably the report of the Regional Conservation Strategy workshop from the SNNPRS. Further, some documents relating to the WPP were not available in English. The reports by the project manager were in Amharic, which is understandable given the training of this staff member. However, summaries in English, the Project's reporting language, should have been made as they were necessary to ensure full communication within the Project with the non-Ethiopian CTA and also with the project backstoppers from IUCN-EARO. Further the problems encountered in finding a copy of the report of the WPP review workshop in Debre Birhan is of some concern, especially when it was extremely critical of the performance of this element of the Project. The fact that this was in Amharic is also a concern as this workshop was a key aspect of the WPP part of the Project which should have provided examples of how to apply the CSE in the field.

Follow-up on specific elements of the Project was also undertaken through additional interviews with the staff responsible for specific activities where they were still present. The depth of analysis of these activities, such as environmental planning, environmental education, and training activities, was limited by the time available and by the lack of any interim evaluations of these activities. A longer field period for this



mission, the availability of interim evaluations, and the earlier timing of this mission to meet staff in their posts when activities were still on-going would have assisted in ensuring a more thorough evaluation.

Despite these various difficulties, the Team was able to complete to a reasonable level of satisfaction most of the elements of its TOR and in general is satisfied that the findings from its work represent a fair and accurate evaluation of the CSE III.

## CHAPTER 3

### PROJECT HISTORY AND OBJECTIVES OF PHASE III

#### 3.1 Project Origins and Phases

The Conservation Strategy of Ethiopia (CSE) Project commenced in 1989 under the Office of the National Committee for Central Planning (ONCCP), later renamed the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development (MoPED), and more recently the Ministry of Economic Development and Co-operation (MEDaC). In 1990, a Secretariat for the CSE (SCSE) was established in MoPED to co-ordinate the process. In 1993, when the Ministry of Natural Resource Development and Environmental Protection (MoNRDEP) was established, the Secretariat was relocated to this new ministry and it operated there until 1994 when the ministry was dissolved. The responsibility for overseeing the formulation of the CSE was then handed over to the newly established Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) and the Secretariat has been located there ever since.

The CSE has passed through three phases. Phase I (1989-1990) identified the important environmental issues for Ethiopia and formulated the conceptual framework for the CSE. This Phase was supported by SIDA. Phase II (1990-1994) saw the formulation of the sectoral and cross-sectoral policy framework, which included the strategy, the action plan and the investment programme as well as the institutional framework for the CSE. Funding for this phase was provided by ODA (UK) and UNSO. Phase III (1996-2001) carried out activities designed to facilitate the regional implementation of the CSE through Regional Conservation Strategies (RCSs), a Wereda Pilot Project and measures to integrate environment into development planning (see Section 3.3 for further details). NORAD funded this third phase. All project phases were carried out with the IUCN as the executing agency and the Ethiopian Government as the implementing agency. All phases of the Project have been led from the federal level and this has been undertaken by the SCSE for Phases II and III (Kifle Lemma et al, 1997).

The CSE Project has lasted for over twelve years. It has survived a number of major challenges. In 1991 there was a change of government by military means which led to a shift in economic policy from a Marxist central planning approach to a more liberal and mixed economy approach. In 1992 a radical reorganisation of the country's administration took place on ethnic lines, creating completely new regions and decentralising power to these regions. In 1994 the CSE faced a challenge from the World Bank (WB) which tried to sideline it and impose a National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) on the country in order to meet the requirements for IDA funding. This was resisted and in the end the WB fielded a mission which approved the CSE as a NEAP equivalent.

#### 3.2 Operational Arrangements for the CSE Phase III Project

During the CSE Phase III Project (hereafter CSE III), the Project has operated through two units, the SCSE within EPA and an Environmental Protection Unit (EPU) in the Natural Resources Team under the Department of Agriculture in MEDaC.

This dual structure reflects the different responsibilities of the EPA and MEDaC. The project document outlines a division of labour between these two units for project implementation. The EPU within MEDaC was considered necessary for purposes of


facilitating the integration of the environment into the federal and regional planning systems through horizontal and vertical co-ordination, especially the co-ordination of different government agencies at various levels. It was envisaged that the SCSE in EPA would provide technical support for the CSE/RCS process in terms of the development of guidelines, including EIA, as well as the overall environmental policy formulation in the country.

It should be noted that except for the two IUCN technical advisors and two communications specialists, the CSE III staff were seconded from within their government organisations and they continued to function in their full-time posts. The four technical staff involved in the Project in EPU were all seconded from the Natural Resources Team. Three of the staff involved in the CSE III in EPA were seconded from within that organisation, while two others based in the SCSE were locally recruited specifically to run the Communications Team. The Project was supported by two advisors recruited by IUCN, the executing agency. The Chief Technical Advisor, an expatriate was located in EPU and the Technical Advisor, an Ethiopian, was based in EPA. The TA was the same person throughout the Project, while there were two CTAs with a one year gap between the first and the second. The latter left the Project seven months before its end and was not replaced. During the life of the Project the number of experts, both seconded and full time, has varied between 11 and 18.

In each region the arrangements for the RCS work, and proposed by the SCSE, consist of an inter-bureau Regional Environment Co-ordinating Committee (RECC), its Secretariat and a technical Task Force. The RECCs were established to provide the co-ordination and oversight required not only during the formulation of the RCSs but also in their implementation, once they are completed and approved. The RECC chairpersons are usually the heads of the Economic Sector within the Regional Executive Committees of the Regional Council (or parliament). It was hoped that having chairpersons from such a high level would ensure political support for the RCS process. The Secretariats were expected to help execute RECC decisions, while the Task Forces were to use their technical know-how in the formulation of the RCSs. The Secretariats are in most cases the Bureaus of Planning and Economic Development (BoPED), although in two regions it was decided that the RECC Secretariats should be in the Bureaus of Agriculture. These Secretariats, of one or two seconded persons, are expected to carry out CSE/RCS responsibilities in addition to their regular duties.

The CSE III project document also envisaged the establishment of Zonal (ZECCs) and Woreda (WECCs) Environmental Co-ordinating Committees as well as their Secretariats at these lower levels ( See EG, 1997a, Vol. II- Institutional Framework).

At the wereda level in one pilot wereda a structure was established to test the implementation of the CSE through a field activity based in the wereda agricultural office and managed by a person seconded from his agriculture post, working under project guidance and in collaboration with the wereda council. (The structure of the Project and its main activities can be seen in the following diagram, Figure 3.1.)



**Figure 3.1 : CSE Project Structure and Activities**

### **3.3 CSE III Project Goal**

The project document for Phase III, entitled “National Conservation Strategy, Phase III - National and Regional Management Support Project, Ethiopia” (IUCN, 1995), dated 1995, reflects the new regional administration of the country since the implementation of Phase II.

The goal of the Project was stated as:

*“Carrying out training, capacity building and action-oriented planning at national, regional, zonal and wereda levels that will ensure the implementation of the environmental management projects and activities identified through the first two phases of the CSE process.” (IUCN, 1995, 11)*

Towards attaining this goal, four areas of activity were identified at national, regional, and wereda levels in Ethiopia and through a regional network of African environmental planners. The following objectives were specified for these four areas of activity:

#### ***National level objectives***

- to institutionalise and strengthen the capacity of the CSE Secretariat in EPA to support the regional, zonal and wereda activities
- to assist in maintaining the momentum of the CSE process
- to provide technical support for the CSE process
- to institutionalise and strengthen the capacity of the EPU in MEDaC to support the regional, zonal and wereda environmental planning processes
- to provide communications training and tools for the CSE process; and
- to provide co-ordination among EPA, MEDaC, and other key institutions in supporting regional, zonal and wereda strategic environmental planning and implementation of activities.

#### ***Regional and zonal level objectives***

- To assist in institutionalising the RECCs and the ZECCs
- To strengthen the RECCs through provision of:
  - Technical skills
  - Basic field equipment,
  - Training in environmental planning, and
  - Communications training and the development of communication tools
- To assist in implementing regional and zonal environmental action plans and investment plans.

#### ***Wereda level objectives***

- To assist in bringing about a participatory sustainable rural development process of planning and implementation
- To provide technical support for realising the sustainable rural development process of planning and implementation
- To provide training in environmental management and planning to the wereda project staff as required
- To develop a local environmental strategy and action plan at the wereda level; and
- To assist in implementing the environmental strategy and action plan.

### ***Strategy network objectives***

- To provide opportunities for Ethiopian strategy staff to participate in consultative meetings of the African strategy network
- To provide opportunities for intra-regional exchanges with other strategy teams in African countries to benefit from shared experience; and
- To provide short-term training within Africa on strategy methods.

### **3.4 Revisions of the CSE III Goals, Objectives and Timeframe**

After Project implementation commenced the reality of implementation required a number of adjustments to be made to the goals of the Project. These were as follows.

#### **a) Goal for Phase III in 1997 (Work Plan and Budget 1997-1998)**

The original estimate that the RCS formulation, commenced under Phase II, would take only *one year* to be completed and approved proved wrong for many reasons. As a result it was found to be impossible to start implementing the RCS investment programmes in the following year as planned. When the Project started it was found that the new regions were still organising themselves, while their institutions had not started to function properly. As a result the RCS formulation process was only just beginning. In addition, the decentralisation process in the country was so radical that the Project Office, based in the SCSE at the federal level, had to use negotiations and a consensus building approach to get things going in the regions. These conditions had not been envisaged in the project design.

In the light of this situation the project staff decided early in the Project's implementation that it was necessary to have a more detailed and realistic implementation plan that took into account the situation described above. Hence during the workshop to develop the 1997-1988 work-plan and budget in August 1997 a rudimentary log frame exercise was undertaken and in the process the original goal was modified. The adjustments were as follows:

**Project goal:** *More sustainable management of environmental and natural resources.*

**Project sub-goal:** *Implementation of the CSE and the RCSs.*

**Project purpose:** *Increased capacity of the RECC institutions.*

Unfortunately, because of the nature of the log frame process, indicators for many of the outputs listed were not identified.

#### **b) Goal for Phase III in the Revised Two Year Work Plan 1998-1999**

The goal of the Project was once again adjusted at another planning workshop held in June 1998 when the project management took into consideration the practical experience and the internal review (Wood and Arnesen, 1997). At this workshop a ten-year vision for the Project was developed as follows:

**The vision:** *The state of the environment improved and sustainable development enhanced through the wise use and participatory conservation of environment and natural resources at all levels.*

This meeting also considered the problems with the RCSs and RECCs and the limitations upon what the CSE III could realistically be expected to achieve. As a result the project's goal and objective were also amended as follows:

**The goal:**

*To enhance the enabling environment for effective implementation of the CSE and the RCSs*

**The objective:**

*To increase the capacity of the RECCs and supporting institutions to implement the CSE and RCSs*

As a means of achieving the objective the following eight outputs were identified:

- CSE/RCS formulation and implementation process strengthened
- Integration of environmental concerns into the development process initiated
- Communications capacity developed and environmental awareness at all levels
- Regions assisted to implement RCS priority areas
- Women's participation in the formulation and implementation of RCSs increased
- Capacity of EPA and MEDaC strengthened to facilitate the CSE/RCS Process
- M&A system for CSE/RCS process initiated
- CSE Documentation Centre and Regional Resource Centre established / strengthened

c) Recommendations of the 1999 Mid-term Review

After having reviewed the achievements of the Project up to 1999 the mid-term external Review Team (Arnesen et al, 1999) recommended (p. 46) that in 1999 and 2000 the Project develop strategic actions towards the following objectives:

- a) Give priority to the completion of the RCSs in most regions by 1999
- b) Re-allocate resources or secure donor funding to enable regions to establish exploratory pilot local planning projects
- c) Prepare a project proposal for further support to one or two regions by May 2000, at the latest, so the momentum will not be lost

d) Timeframe

The Project was initially given a three year period of operation, from late 1995 to late 1998, with the funds released in two tranches. Some confusion over the arrangements for the release of the second tranche led to uncertainty in 1997 over the continuation of the Project and this may account for the one-year gap between the two CTAs and for other delays in implementation, as with the Wereda Pilot Project. This disruption, along with the slow progress in some aspects of the Project, especially the regional work led to requests for no-cost extensions which were approved and led to the Project only terminating in June 2001, after five and a half years.

**3.5 Reflections**

It should be noted that this evolution of the project's goals and objectives was in response to the problems faced in moving forward the CSE and RCS processes given the institutional constraints faced, especially at the regional level. There was a major debate about the extent to which the Project should be doing things itself or whether it should only be assisting others to implement. The problems of keeping to a schedule suggested the need for a more

interventionist approach, but the need to ensure ownership and understanding among the actors made it clear that the level of project staff involvement and the degree of pressures that could be placed on the regional and federal level government staff had to be kept to a minimum. Following this process approach has meant that the CSE III has experienced slow disbursement and needed no-cost extensions totalling one and a half years.



## **PART TWO**

### **GENERAL PROJECT FINDINGS**

#### **CHAPTER 4**

#### **RELEVANCE OF THE CSE PHASE III PROJECT IN THE ETHIOPIAN SITUATION**

##### **4.1 National Context**

In Ethiopia, which is predominately inhabited by peasant farmers and pastoralists (85%), sustainable management of natural resources is vital. Concern for the appropriate management of natural resources has been increasing in recent decades and identifying the extent of the environmental problems in the country has been a major preoccupation of governments since the mid 1970s. Analysis of Ethiopia's major environmental problems has made it clear that they emanate from the state of underdevelopment of the country and the poverty of its burgeoning natural resources-dependent population (EG, 1997a - Volume II; Wood, 1990).

Deforestation to create agricultural land, and to provide fuel and construction wood has led to the depletion of the country's forests to less than 4% of their original extent (Reusing, 1998). Such deforestation and other forms of removing biomass, such as the burning of dung, have created a biomass disequilibrium and left soils weakened and without protection (IUCN, 1986). Consequently serious sheet and gully erosion occurs and soil nutrient depletion has become a major problem. About 80 per cent of the crop losses in the country result from land degradation occurring because of breaks in the nutrient cycle. Loss of bio-diversity is no less serious. Deforestation has reduced the country's gene pool besides creating an energy crisis in a country that relies almost totally on fuelwood (EG, 1997a - Volume II).

Social, cultural, historical, economic and political conditions have played a major exacerbating role in the process of environmental degradation and depletion. Poverty, lack of alternative livelihoods, poor government policies – especially on land tenure, and lack of stability and peace caused by civil wars have been major contributors to environmental problems (Hutchinson, 1991).

Since 1991, the government has taken introduced decentralisation in order to devolve political power to the newly established regional states. This decentralisation of power has been accompanied by policies that emphasise local level decision-making on social and economic matters and a participatory approach to development. The CSE III has been conceptualised and developed with these changes in mind.

At the macro policy level the government has elaborated a National Economic Policy which is known as the Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation (ADLI) (EG, 1993). Central to this economic policy is increasing the productivity of peasant agriculture by initially improving existing crop husbandry practices and techniques, developing irrigation, providing fertilisers and agro-chemicals, as well as increasing farm sizes and making them more suitable for mechanisation. It is expected that increased industrialisation will come by using labour intensive systems and local materials in the production of goods required by the domestic

market, the major portion of which is rural. On the other hand, as industrialisation expands it will absorb more and more people from the rural areas in to non-agricultural activities. Currently the government's development plan emphasises increased agricultural production for food security and poverty alleviation as an initial step in improving the rural conditions towards the ADLI goal. Donor assistance, in which the World Bank and the European Community are two major contributors, is mainly geared to supporting these programmes.

#### 4.2 Awareness and Relevance Assessment among Stakeholders

An assessment of the views of the stakeholders at the federal level was made by the Evaluation Team to determine their opinions on the relevance of the CSE process as a whole and the CSE III Project in particular. Three groups of respondents, representing federal government agencies, NGOs and donors, were interviewed as representative samples of the stakeholders. This section reports their assessments with statistical data and summaries of their verbal statements. The overall assessment of the Evaluation Team is provided in the concluding section of this chapter.

##### a) Awareness of the CSE Process

Part of the interview was conducted to assess the awareness of the stakeholders about the CSE process, the CSE III Project, the CSE III Project's activities and outputs. (See Table 4.1).

**Table 4.1: Awareness of CSE Process, Project, Outputs and Activities**

Question 2.1	Donors (4)			NGOs (5)			Government (5)		
	Y	N	DN	Y	N	DN	Y	N	DN
A CSE Phase III Project	3	1		5			5		
B 5 Vols of CSE	3	1		5			5		
C Envi. Policy of Ethiopia	3	1		5			5		
D Regional CSs	1	3		4	1		1	4	
E RECCs	1	3		3	2		1	4	
F Awareness workshops	2	2		5			2	2	
G Training and Study Tours	1	3		4	1		1	3	
H Quarterly Newsletter	1	3		5			2	3	
I Wereda Pilot Project	1	3		2,	2		1	4	
J Comm Strat & Action Plans of Regns	1	3		1L	3		1	4	
K Gender Strategy	1	3		2	3		1	4	
L Collaboration with AA University	1	3		5			1	4	
M Local Environmental Initiatives	1	3		2	3			5	

Y = yes; N = no; DN = do not know; L = limited

The findings are that awareness about the CSE in its various aspects is very high in most groups. Awareness about the CSE III Project was highest amongst the NGOs and Government organisations. However, donors knew little about the Project (except the UNDP respondent, who had been in contact with the Project since Phase II). There was a particularly high level of awareness about the efforts of the CSE III Project and its outputs among the NGOs, probably because they had all been involved in some CSE III activities. All groups knew

about the Environmental Policy of Ethiopia (EPE) and the CSE documents. The NGOs also knew about many of the other outputs, but the government agencies were only aware of a few additional outputs. The donors (apart from the UNDP respondent) did not know of any of the other outputs from the CSE beyond the EPE and CSE documents.

**b) Relevance of the CSE to Ethiopia**

The interviews revealed that, in the majority of cases, the CSE is seen as a most relevant process which, if implemented, will help the country meet the environmental challenges it is facing (Table 4.2).

**Table 4.2: Relevance of the CSE to Ethiopia**

Question 1.1	Donors			NGOs			Government		
	Y	N	DN	Y	N	DN	Y	N	DN
A. Approp identify problems & opps	2		2	5			5		
B. Involve Stakeholders in Identification	1		3	4	1		3		2
C. Provide app. Framework	2		2	5			5		

All of the NGOs and Government organisations knew enough about the environmental situation in the country as well as the Project to consider the CSE relevant. As opposed to the NGOs who considered many of the project activities and outputs relevant, the donors knew little about the activities and outputs of the Project. As a result their relevance rating was lower.

According to the majority of the interviewees the major environmental problems identified during the CSE process are still valid. Environmental degradation is still one of the most serious problems facing Ethiopia today. As an agriculturally-based country Ethiopia must ensure that its agriculture is conservation-oriented if it is to be sustainable. Any food security programme cannot be successful without conservation. There is also a need to understand the nature of the environment in the country and the problems related thereto. According to most respondents, the problems have been identified very well in the CSE Project. The CSE has done well in integrating information as there was no such comprehensive analysis in the past and the information, which existed, was fragmented. The Project prepared the CSE at the right time, i.e. at a time when the environmental damage in the country was at its peak and required urgent attention.

The CSE was also considered relevant by respondents because of its approach of involving stakeholders in the identification of environmental problems and opportunities. The approach was considered adequately consultative involving diverse stakeholders, particularly in the regional and national conferences. This judgement was based both on direct and indirect knowledge of the process by the respondents. Involvement may not have been direct for everyone, but respondents felt that the process had been as participatory as could be expected given the circumstances of political turmoil, change of government, restructuring of institutions and changes in the regional administration. (The Evaluation Team would point out that one hundred per cent participation is easier said than done in the Ethiopian situation). Although the CSE process was started at the top, consultations were carried out to include regional and local views and opinions during the problem identification stage. Given the circumstances this was seen as a great achievement which helped ensure that the identified problems and opportunities accurately reflect the reality which the stakeholders face. The

Table also reveals that, while recognising and appreciating the CSE process's efforts to promote participation, stakeholders were less satisfied about this area of achievement.

The CSE Project's efforts are seen as relevant in terms of providing an appropriate framework at least at the conceptual level. Ethiopia has always lacked a comprehensive policy and strategy framework for environmental management and the institutional basis for such management was never clearly defined. The CSE was seen to have created a very good opportunity for everybody to be involved in planning in the environmental area because of its very comprehensive and holistic approach. The CSE is recognised as the appropriate vehicle for translating the EPE into concrete actions.

### c) Relevance of the CSE III Initiatives

Regarding the relevance of CSE Project initiatives (defined as "efforts" in the checklist) the least knowledgeable are again donors while the most knowledgeable are NGOs. The knowledge of government agencies is variable and in general their knowledge can be deemed to be not very high, although significantly better than that of the donors. Table 4.3 below shows the high level of interest of NGOs in the CSE Project and their exposure to it.

**Table 4.3: Relevance of the CSE III Initiatives**

Q 1.2	Donors			NGOs			Government		
	Y	N	DN	Y	N	DN	Y	N	DN
A Integrate envi into devt planning	1L		3	3L		2	1		4
B Capacity building for CSE	1		3	3		2	2		3
C Capacity building for RCSs	1		3	3		2	1		4
D Facilitating envi mangt project	1L		3			5	1		4
E Enhance individual envi awareness	1		3	4		1	3		2
F Change institutional attitudes to envi	1L		3	1		4	3		2
G Stakeholders involved in CSE Project	1L		3	1, 2L		2	2		3
H Integrate gender into envi planning	1		3	5			1		4
I Communications strats for CSE / RCS			4	4		1			5

L=Limited in some way, note completely satisfactory

Note that one donor representative answering these questions had formerly worked for the CSE

Besides the low environmental awareness, lack of skilled human power, equipment and materials would have acted as constraints in the formulation and implementation of the CSE and RCSs. Hence, the various efforts of the CSE III to bring about environmental awareness and attitudinal changes, to enhance the capacity required for the formulation and implementation of the CSE and RCSs, and particularly at the regional level to create appropriate institutions and to emphasise a gender focus, were recognised by respondents as having been particularly relevant.

### d) Relevance of the CSE III and its Activities and Outputs to Respondents' Organisations

All respondents reported using the EPE and the CSE documents both as vital reference material as well as a basis for planning and the formulation/ appraisal of relevant projects in

their work. This is a very good indicator of the relevance of the CSE outputs. In a few cases even changes in an organisation's objectives and / or structures appear to have occurred among NGOs and government institutions as a result of being influenced by the CSE.

**Table 4.4 : Relevance of the CSE III and its Activities and Outputs to the Respondents' Organisations**

Q 1.3 Changes due to CSE	Donors			NGOs			Government		
	Y	N	DN	Y	N	DN	Y	N	DN
C In orgnzn's objectivess due to CSE		4		2,3 s			1	4	
D In orgnzn's capacity dues to CSE		4			5			5	
E In orgnzn's structure due to CSE		4		2	3			5	
F In orgnzn's awareness due to CSE	4			5			5		

### 4.3 Stakeholder Concerns

Despite the overall positive views about the relevance of the CSE stakeholders raised a number of issues which need to be addressed to make it more relevant and more likely to have a long-term impact on the environmental situation in Ethiopia.

A first concern is that the solutions to Ethiopia's environmental problems, which are proposed in the CSE, have not been made practical. There are still no tools for implementing the solutions to Ethiopia's environmental problems, which can be developed from the CSE. The fact that there is still no land use policy was mentioned as one example. Respondents felt that there was a weakness in integrating the CSE identified strategies and actions into the planning processes at all levels of government. The institutional machinery should be able to do this but it does not yet have the capacity and there is a need to streamline institutions at the regional level.

A related concern is the delay in the measures to establish the institutional structures required for implementing the CSE. The slowness in this regard may be due to a lack of commitment on the part of the government. The RCS effort is in some cases under Bureaus of Agriculture and in other cases under Bureaus of Planning. This is not good according to some observers. The institutional structures proposed by the CSE must be established properly, while those already established appear to need strengthening.

Thirdly, at the moment the RECCs seem to be weak (see Chapter 8), although together with the Focal Points at the regional level they have served important purposes. Government at all levels should take steps to further refine these institutions and strengthen them in various forms. The Environmental Protection Council (EPC) and the RECCs have each to start playing their role as envisaged in the CSE. Environmental programmes and projects should pass through and be vetted by them. The RECCs and similar institutions at lower levels require legal and formal recognition to avoid being seen as temporary.

### 4.4 Conclusions

Reflecting on the stakeholders' views, the Evaluation Team is of the view that, in the Ethiopian situation, the CSE is not just clearly relevant, but also absolutely critical. Its policies and proposals are vital for maintaining the natural resource base of the country which supports

the rural people and for starting a process of raising productivity. Indeed the CSE's emphasis upon sustainable development and sustainable use of natural resources is especially important in the light of the emphasis in government policy upon immediate output, rather than long-term sustainable production. It is also clear that the CSE is correct to go beyond a preservationist approach and explore how natural resources can be used more productively whilst maintaining their integrity. Hence the attention which is given in the CSE to social and economic considerations, and not just the biophysical dimensions of environmental management, is essential. However, the CSE approach needs to be adopted and used, and this requires publicity, training and institutionalisation, all of which have been important parts of the CSE III.

This evaluation team would agree with the statement of the mid-term Internal Review of 1999, which concluded that:

*“The CSE is still highly relevant to the challenges facing Ethiopia. The timing seems right, but the lack of progress in getting the RCSs approved should be acknowledged as something more than lack of resources. The CSE and the RCSs will have to reflect the general political and economic development of the country and cannot exist in isolation. This is the only realistic approach and this makes the CSE so challenging.”* (Arnesen et al, 1999, p. 21)

The Team also sees the CSE as important and relevant for developing policies and strategies, prioritising the actions required and identifying the directions for moving forward. It is an umbrella framework, which has a systematic approach e.g. from policy to strategy, and on to action programme. The CSE action plan provides potential users with opportunities to come up with projects of the right kind. Any institution can now use the CSE to prepare programmes and projects to provide appropriate solutions and responses. Everything is in there in a way that anyone can easily relate to.

The institutional framework proposed by the CSE is seen by the Team as conceptually valid and appropriate. The establishment of institutions such as EPC, EPA, and the RECCs was prompted by the influence of the CSE. However, the effort to make a reality of this framework must be intensified and the role of the different actors, especially NGOs and communities need to be clarified. The conservation strategies are relevant to civil society and the government institutions. Everybody should play their part but they must not go their own way. There is a need for co-ordination to ensure effective implementation.

## CHAPTER 5

### PROJECT IMPACT AND ACHIEVEMENTS

#### 5.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the impact and achievements of the CSE III Project. It considers the aims of the Project and identifies eight key project goals by which achievements can be measured. These are used first by the Evaluation Team to identify the empirical evidence of achievement (Section 5.3). Two perception studies of the project achievement, the first by stakeholders at the federal level and the second by staff involved in the Project and the partner agencies follow this section. The chapter concludes (Section 5.6) with an assessment of the project's impact and achievement and a discussion of a number of points which are raised by these various assessments.

#### 5.2 Project Aims

The goal stated in the project document, even when modified and refined from time to time, emphasises capacity building at all levels for ensuring the implementation of environmental projects and activities identified in the CSE/RCSs. Whether the goal, after refinement, was expressed as “*More sustainable management of environmental and natural resources*” (goal) through “*the implementation of the CSE/RCSs*” (sub-goal) by “*increasing the capacity of the RECC institutions*” (purpose), or as the enhancement of “*... the enabling environment for effective implementation of the CSE and the RCSs*”, capacity building remained central. (See Chapter 3 for further details).

The goal stated in the project document mentions “action-oriented planning at national, zonal and wereda levels”. This aspect of the project goal was de-emphasised during the Workshop for the 1997-1988 work-plan and budget held in August 1997, and it can be said that this activity was practically ignored for sometime thereafter. This state of affairs was mainly due to the fact that the rate of completion of the RCSs had been slow and so there was little basis on which action-oriented planning could be undertaken until quite late in the project period.

After the Workshop for the 1998-99 work-plan and budget in June 1998 action-oriented planning started to be emphasised again. This second planning session laid down a framework and basic guidelines for revising the 1998-1999 work-plan and budget. The framework emphasised cross-cutting issues such as institutional support, sustainability, replicability, awareness and gender sensitivity. The areas of focus identified for the Project at that time were:

- More emphasis on the Regions
- Integration of environmental concerns into the development process and related activities such as implementation of RCS priority areas
- Enhanced stakeholder involvement
- Local Level Environmental Initiatives / Local Environmental Projects, and
- Legislative/regulatory framework at the macro level

The workshop in June 1998 took into account the framework and the Project's goal was once again adjusted. Although action-oriented planning was not explicitly mentioned in the further refined goal it is clear that some attention was to be given to supporting the regions in

planning and implementing projects. This was demonstrated by the fact that among the eight planned outputs for the years 1998-1999 one output, “regions assisted to implement RCS priority areas”, deals directly with action-oriented planning and implementation. The eight objectives identified at that time were:

- a) CSE / RCS formulation and implementation process strengthened
- b) Equipment and materials supplied
- c) Environmental concerns integrated into the development process
- d) Communications capacity and environmental awareness improved at all levels
- e) Regions assisted to implement RCS priority areas
- f) Women’s participation in the formulation and implementation of RCSs
- g) Capacity of EPA and MEDaC strengthened to facilitate the CSE/RCS process
- h) Monitoring and Assessment system for CSE / RCS process initiated.

An additional aspect of the second objective has been identified, this being the establishment of CSE Documentation and Regional Resource Centres.

The review of 1999 further re-emphasised the need for the Project to re-allocate resources or secure additional donor funding so that assistance could be provided to the regions in the establishment of “exploratory pilot local planning projects”. These projects were expected to be based on ‘Wereda Sustainable Development Strategies’ reflecting the RCSs and ‘Village Action Plans’ (VAPs), with the actual planning carried out with the farmers in the field. The undertaking was to be supported by capacity building efforts regarding local level planning.

### **5.3 Achievements by Project Objective**

The eight outputs or objectives identified in the 1998-99 work-plan preparation workshop have been used since then by the Project as the basis for planning and monitoring. Consequently, they are used here to assess the achievements of the Project.

#### **a) CSE/RCS Formulation and Implementation Process Strengthened**

The five volumes of the CSE had been completed when CSE III started. However, there remained a major task for the Project to have these approved and the CSE officially accepted as the guiding policy on environment for the country. This process took much of the first year and a half of the Project with many discussions necessary to achieve government approval. The size of the CSE volumes (EG, 1997a) caused the Council of Ministers concern and they required the SCSE to produce a shorter Environmental Policy of Ethiopia (EG, 1997b), which they reviewed and finally approved in early 1997. Thus it was not until June 1997 that the CSE was finally launched through a series of public meetings on World Environment Day that year.

To enhance capacity to apply the CSE and EPE and to formulate the RCSs, the Project has provided regional staff (primarily government employees) with training on strategic planning preparation as well as organising general environmental and CSE awareness workshops for regional people. In total in-country training for over 970 participants took place covering nine different subject areas (see Table 5.1).



**Table 5.1: Regional and Federal Personnel Trained by CSE III, 1996-2000**

Regions (Total)	CT	EI A	PPP	PRA	ER	SPP	EE	GE	EM
Tigray (79)	51	5	5	4	2	2	4	2	4
Afar (31)	4	5	2	3	3	3	4	3	4
Amhara (68)	35	5	2	8	3	3	4	4	4
Oromia (72)	42	7	2	6	2	2	4	3	4
Somali (14)	2	3	2	1	-	2	2	-	2
Benishangul (67)	45	5	2	4	-	2	3	2	4
SNNPR (67)	40	5	2	6	2	1	4	3	4
Gambela (30)	3	5	2	4	4	2	4	2	4
Harari (63)	35	5	2	4	3	3	4	3	4
Dire Dawa (75)	44	5	2	4	4	3	4	5	4
Addis Abeba (73)	44	6	1	4	4	3	4	3	4
Woreda pilot (48)	-	-	-	38	-	3	-	7	-
Federal (254)	14	82	8	2	18	-	82	38	10
NGOS (28)	4	-	-	-	1	-	-	23	-
Int. Organizations (5)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-
Total (974)	363	138	32	88	46	29	123	103	52

**Note:**

**CT**= communications training  
**PPP**= project proposal preparation  
**ER**= environmental reporting  
**EE**= environmental economics,  
**EM**= environmental management

**EIA**= environmental impact assessment  
**PRA**= participatory rural appraisal  
**SPP**= strategic planning preparation  
**GE**= gender training/workshop

**Source: SCSE**

RCS preparation guidelines were also prepared and disseminated. After the preparation of guidelines regarding the establishment and functions of the RECCS, the Project facilitated their establishment in the regions. As a result at the sub-national level all nine regions and two city administrations (hereafter referred to jointly as the regions) have produced final draft RCSs. They have all been submitted to the regional councils for approval and five RCSs have been approved (Table 5.2).

**Table 5.2: Regional Conservation Strategy Formulation and Approval Status**

RCS Status	Regions	Estimated Completion Date
RCS documents approved	Afar, Dire Dawa, Harari, Amhara, Oromia	Completed
RCS documents finalised but awaiting approval	Tigray, Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP), Benishangul Gumuz, Addis Ababa, Somali and Gambella	During 2001 and beyond

Source: SCSE

The Project has also assisted the regions in the design of regional environmental agencies (EPA-like bodies) to act as the institution, which will take forward the RCS and have legal responsibility at the regional level for environmental issues. Already the Amhara Region and the city of Addis Ababa have created such institutions. SNNPR and Oromia have also prepared draft laws for the establishment of such bodies.

Study tours abroad were organised for political level national and regional officials to secure or improve the level of political commitment to the CSE / RCS process and to raise awareness of environmental issues in general. Similar study tours were organised for focal point bureau heads to familiarise them with CSE-like strategic planning exercises in other countries and with gender involvement in environmental issues (Table 5.3).

**Table 5.3: International Study Tours**

No	Country Visited	Date	No. of Participants
1	Kenya and Tanzania	Oct. 1997	10
2	Zimbabwe	Nov. 1997	10
3	India	Jan. 1998	10
4	Kenya	Aug, 1999	8

An in-country inter-regional experience-sharing programme with visits for 60 participants has also been organised for the purpose of visiting community/farmer initiated resource management activities in the different regions of the country (Table 5.4).

**Table 5.4: Experience-Sharing Visits Conducted in the Ethiopian Regions**

No	Regions Visited	Date	No. of Participants
1	Dembecha (Amhara Region)	Dec.3-7, 2000	10
2	Tigray	Dec.5-8, 2000	14
3	Dire Dawa	Jan. 2-5, 2001	18
4	Northern Shoa, (Ankober and Guassa – Amhara Region)	Jan.2-5, 2001	18

This shows that some considerable progress towards building capacity for the implementation of the CSE and RCS was achieved by the Project, with the basic documentation prepared. However, actual implementation has been much less successful (see later in this Chapter and also Chapters 8 and 9).

**b) Supply of Equipment and Materials and Regional Resource Centres Established**

The Project has supplied both the regions and the federal level partners, EPA and MEDaC, as well as Addis Ababa University with various equipment and materials to build their capacity to carryout project activities. The table below shows that a total of 50 computers, 34 printers, 15 photocopiers, 13 duplicating machines, 24 typewriters, 14 overhead projectors, 12 binding machines, 12 fax machines and six vehicles have been supplied throughout the project period (Table 5.5). In addition, the Project has supported the construction of a small office building for use by the Woreda Pilot Project. The CSE III has also assisted the libraries / documentation centers at EPA, MEDaC and in the regions to become Resource Centres for with reference materials on environmental issues. To this end a total of 821 books have been ordered. (Some 452 books were still to be delivered and distributed at the time of the mission). The distribution of already delivered books among the various regions as well as EPA is indicated in the table below.

**Table 5.5: Equipment and Materials Provided by CSE III**

ITEMS	Cmp	Print	PCp	Dup	Type	OHP	Bind	Fax	Veh	Bldg	Bks
EPA	12	7	1	1		1	1	1	4		171
MEDaC	7	3	1						2		
WPP	1	1	1		2					1	
AAU	6	1	1	1		2					
Tigray	2	2	1	1	2	1	1	1			49
Afar	2	2	1	1	2	1	1	1			70
Amhara	2	2	1	1	2	1	1	1			71
Oromia	2	2	1	1	2	1	1	1			72
Gambella	2	2	1	1	2	1	1	1			49
Beni-sh.G	2	2	1	1	2	1	1	1			49
SNNPR	2	2	1	1	2	1	1	1			77
Somali	2	2	1	1	2	1	1	1			49
Harari	2	2	1	1	2	1	1	1			59
Dire Dawa	2	2	1	1	2	1	1	1			49
AddisA.	2	2	1	1	2	1	1	1			56
Total	50	34	15	13	24	24	12	12	6	1	821*

Key: Cmp = computer, Print = printer, PCp = photocopier, Dup = duplicating machine, Type = typewriter, OHP = overhead projector, Bind = binding machine, Fax = fax machine, Veh = vehicle, Bldg = office building, Bks = books.

\* Includes books not yet delivered

### c) Integration of Environmental Concerns into the Development Process

The Project has provided training in environmental economics (EE), environmental impact assessment (EIA) and project proposal preparation (PPP) to develop capacity, which can enhance the integration of environmental concerns into the development planning process. There were 123, 138 and 32 participants, respectively, in these training workshops (see Table 5.1). There was an emphasis upon federal level participants in the EIA and environmental economics workshop, while regional level participants dominated the PPP training. The Project has also provided two courses, each of two months, on environmental management in collaboration with Addis Ababa University (AAU). The number of participants who completed these two courses was 52 of whom 10 were from the federal level. There were no NGO participants in any of these five training programmes, although there were some on the other training programmes concerned with communications and gender strategy (see below).

In addition a major initiative in MEDaC was developed through the CSE Project and the work of one of the C.T.A.s. This led to the drafting of a set of guidelines for integrating environmental concerns into development projects (CSE 2000d, 2000). This links to somewhat less successful initiatives by the Project to develop environmental awareness in all federal ministries, with the original intention being to establish environmental focal points in all ministries to ensure this awareness.

These various activities have provided a basis from which environment can be integrated into the development process, although there has been no formal progress in establishing environmental focal points in the federal and regional bureaus and agencies to support this. There has also not been any follow-up to assess how the trainees are using the skills they gained and the regional studies by this Evaluation Team were able to find only some evidence of use of these skills but little of this was in cross-sectoral work. Similarly use of the guidelines on integrating environment into development projects is still held up awaiting approval of the document by MEDaC.

d) Communications Capacity and Environmental Awareness at All Levels, including the Regions

The Project has established a Communications Unit in the SCSE through which the CSE has been publicised. Of particular note is the enhancement of environmental awareness by the Project through the preparation and dissemination of environmental promotional materials. These include the bilingual quarterly newsletter on the environment, *Tefetro*, which is distributed to over 300 organisations, government, donor and NGO.

The Project has assisted nine of the 11 regions in the formulation of RCS communications strategies and action plans. The Project has provided communications training to 363 participants out of whom 14 were federal personnel, four were from NGOs, and the vast majority from regional government offices. Training on environmental reporting was also provided to 46 participants out of whom 18 were from the federal government and one from an NGO. More than 2000 people have also participated in environmental awareness workshops organised by the Project. Regrettably none of the regions, with the exception of Addis Ababa, have applied the ideas from the communications training workshops as they have been awaiting approval of the RCSs before starting their communications initiatives.

e) Regions Assisted to Implement RCS Priority Areas

Support for local level initiated environment-related projects has been an element in the CSE III Project since 1999. These local level environmental initiatives have included activities such as seedling production and tree planting in schools and urban areas, forest management plans, protected area development, watershed development, and environmental awareness raising workshops. In total sixteen such projects have been supported. (Eighteen other projects earmarked for support out of the total of over 70 submissions failed to request the financial assistance from the Project in time and had to be cancelled. See Table 5.6)

**Table 5.6: List of Approved Local Environmental Projects**

<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Support for Bole Secondary School Environment Club to plant fruit, shade and ornamental trees in the school compound through provision of hand tools and purchase of seedlings; students providing labour and management of planted trees (SFr. 6,000)</li><li>• Support for Menelik Secondary School Environmental Club: as above (SFr. 3,000)</li><li>• Support for Keficho Zone of SNNP for preparing video films of tourist attraction places for public relations and awareness raising purposes (SFr. 3,400: not disbursed)</li><li>• Support for EPA to conduct a biosafety workshop: partial support (SFr. 10,000)</li><li>• Support to Ethiopian society of Mechanical Engineers to conduct a study on motor vehicle pollution (SFr. 2,400)</li><li>• Support to Somali Region Women's group to recycle plastics into durable bags and other goods (SFr. 10,000: not disbursed)</li><li>• Support to St. George Orphan Plaza Pilot Project to initiate a neighbourhood clean up project in the capital city (SFr. 7,400)</li><li>• Support to Addis Ababa Environmental Protection Bureau to draft environmental regulations (SFr. 8,600)</li><li>• Support for Oromia region to conduct EIA on two leather factories (SFr. 10,000: not disbursed)</li><li>• Support for Biological Society of Ethiopia to conduct a workshop on the conduct of environment friendly investment projects (SFr. 8,000)</li><li>• Support for the Federal Police to conduct environmental awareness workshop for Police Officers (SFr. 6,000)</li><li>• Support for setting up the Addis Ababa Environmental Laboratory (SFr. 10,000: not disbursed)</li><li>• Support for Ogaden Development Association to conserve a local plant, which has a multipurpose use (SFr. 6,400)</li><li>• Support for Dire Dawa Conservation Project to plant trees on the major roads of the city &amp; neighborhoods including awareness raising for communities (SFr. 30,000, SFr. 20,000)</li><li>• Support for management plan studies for Benishangul-Gumuz Region (SFr. 30,000: not disbursed)</li><li>• Support for EPA in Environmental Education and Public awareness (SFr. 50,000: not disbursed)</li></ul> <p><b>(Total Approved SFr. 201,200 out of which SFr. 77,800 is disbursed)</b></p>
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**Source:** CSE Project

The Wereda Pilot Project was designed to assist in implementation of the CSE and RCSs in one wereda in order to develop a model for applying the ideas and policies in these strategic documents. Unfortunately only one such pilot project was developed and this proved unsatisfactory (see Chapter 9). As a result the guidance promised by the Project for practical implementation of the CSE and RCSs has been very limited.

**f) Women's Participation in the Formulation and Implementation of RCSs**

The Project has assisted the formulation of a strategy to help mainstream gender in the CSE/RCS process. Stakeholder groups provided inputs for the formulation of the strategy through a workshop organised for this purpose. This strategy was finalised in the last weeks of

the Project and its formal use will occur after the Project, although informal use has occurred during the Project as a result of awareness-raising.

Gender training has been undertaken in all regions through workshops run by the communications unit, which have focused on the relationship between women and the environment (Table 5.7). In total almost 500 participants were involved in these workshops. In addition at the federal level a number of workshops have been held to develop the gender strategy and raise awareness of it. In these 103 persons were involved of whom 38 were from federal government agencies and 23 were from NGOs. One all- women group and one mixed group of men and women participated in study tours to gain experience about women's participation in environmental management. One of these study tours was overseas.

**Table 5.7: Women and the Environment Workshops**

No.	Region	Date	Location	No. of Participants
1	SNNPRS	August 4-6, 1998	Awassa	49
2	Harari	Dec.30, 1998 -Jan.1, 1999	Harar	55
3	Amhara	Nov.25-27, 1998	Bahir Dar	48
4	Benshangul Gumuz	May 20-22, 1999	Asosa	45
5	Oromia	July 7-9, 1999	Nazareth	52
6	Dire Dawa	July 20-23, 1999	Dire Dawa	60
7	Tigray	Sept.21-23, 1999, Sept. 25-27,1999	Mekele Axum	46 44
8	Somali	December 7-9, 1999	Jiggiga	35
9	Addis Ababa	December20-31, 1999	Addis Ababa	45
10	Gambella	Nov.20-22, 2000	Gambella	35
11	Afar	March 17-18, 2001	Aysaita	44

g) Capacity of EPA and MEDaC Strengthened to Facilitate the CSE/RCS Process

EPA and MEDaC have benefited from the capacity building activities of the Project. Staff from the two institutions have participated in all the training programmes and account for most of the federal level participants identified in Table 5.1. They have also been supplied with equipment and materials to generally support their performance. EPA has also benefited from project support in the areas of environmental information system (EIS), monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems for monitoring and reporting on the state of the environment, as well as the preparation of environmental impact assessment (EIA) guidelines and legislation. Such support has helped facilitate the preparation process of such systems. Environmental related books have been supplied to both institutions.

h) Monitoring and Assessment System for CSE/RCS Process Initiated

Attempts to develop a monitoring and assessment system for the CSE process have been going on since the first year of the Project with little success. The latest effort in this area was the Project's submission in 2000 to EARO of a brief proposal on how to go about initiating and completing such a system. The proposal was still under consideration at the time of the mission.

#### 5.4 Federal Level Stakeholders' Perceptions regarding CSE III Impact

In general, the majority of NGOs and a lesser share of the government organizations knew enough about the project activities and outputs to speak of their impacts. Donors did not know enough of project activities and outputs to speak about their impacts. The findings regarding impacts are presented in Table 5.8 and are discussed below with comments from the stakeholders.

**Table 5.8 : Stakeholders' Views of the CSE III Project Impacts**

Question 2.2	Donors			NGOs			Government		
	Y	N	DN	Y	N	DN	Y	N	DN
A Awareness creation on environmental problems	1		3	5			3, 1S		1
B Awareness of the CSE and CSE process	1		3	4		1	2, 2S		1
C Awareness of the RCSs	1		3	4		1	1, 2S		2
D Bringing about changes to address environmental problems at federal level	1		3	4		1	3		2
E Bringing about changes to address environmental problems at regional level	1		3	4		1	3		2
F Bringing about changes in individual attitudes	1		3	4		1	2, 1S		2
G Bringing about changes in attitudes in government institutions	1		3	3, 1S		1	2S	1	2
H Streamlining govt institutions for environmental actions	1		3	2, 2S		1	1, 1S		3
I Integ'n of envi into dev't planning	1L		3		2	3	1S		4
J Human resource capacity dev't for SCSE	1		3	4		1	1S		4
K Human resource capacity dev't for RCSs	1		3	4		1	1S		4
L Equipment supply at federal level	1		3	3		2	1		4
M Equipment supply at regional level	1		3	3		2			5

**Note:** L = little, S = some

##### a) Awareness about the Environmental Problems in Ethiopia

Regarding environmental awareness a large number of interviewees agreed there was an impact from the Project, although one respondent thought this was limited. Some even considered the impact very high when it comes to particular individuals and institutions in government. One of the interviewees considered that the most important impact of the Project was in the areas of awareness creation about the environmental problems of the country.

##### b) Awareness about the CSE and the CSE Process

A large majority of respondents felt that the CSE III Project's communication effort had led to significant awareness about the CSE and the RCSs, although such awareness appears to be strong within limited stakeholder groups only, such as selected NGOs and several government ministries. It was reported that people now understand and have been influenced by the new concepts and guiding principles contained in the CSE. However, respondents felt that the

Project's effort to popularize the policy among the people at the grass roots level was insignificant.

#### c) Changes in Policy, Strategy and Programmes at the Federal and Regional Levels

A majority of respondents agreed that the Project's efforts have brought about changes in government policy, strategy and programmes. The EPE and the CSE documents are always referred to and are seen to be influencing sectoral policy and strategy development in the country. Sectoral policies such as the biodiversity policy, the draft forestry policy and the water resources development policy all claim that they have been developed with due regard to the CSE as an umbrella framework. The development of the RCSs in the regions was considered one of the outstanding examples of such changes at the regional level.

#### d) Streamlining / Strengthening existing Government Institutional Structures

The majority of the stakeholder respondents acknowledged that there has been an impact here. The ratings ranged from very high to only partial. The examples pointed out were the EPA type organisations, the RECCs and the focal points at the regional level. The only federal level structure identified was the EPA. Respondents found it encouraging that the regions have shown interest in strengthening the institutional set up for the management of their environment, including establishing EPA-like institutions. They expressed the view that, although some regions have even gone down further to the zonal level and below, this development will be limited by budgetary constraints.

#### e) Changes in Individual and Institutional Attitudes

A majority felt that there is better perception of the environment because of the CSE. Some said there might be other influences also, but the CSE III would be the most important because it is the main advocate of the concepts and principles of environmental management as contained in the CSE documents. Measuring exactly the degree of impact was considered difficult. Reading the CSE documents has particularly helped to change the attitudes of many who had this opportunity. One of the interviewees, however, wondered if all the changes were due to the CSE. All interviewees agreed there was some impact from the Project. The ratings varied from very high to some impact only. Some emphasised that the impact was very high, mostly in individuals in government institutions. However, their perception as regards institutional changes in attitude resulting from the CSE III's efforts within governmental institutions was variable. Some did not observe any attitudinal changes while some others felt there was varying impact, ranging from very high to limited impact. A minority felt that it is difficult to measure the degree to which the change is due to the Project's efforts alone.

#### f) Integration of Environment into Development Planning

The majority of interviewees did not know of any impacts resulting from Project efforts as regards the integration of environment into development. There was, however, a minority feeling that because of the training provided by the Project in environmental economics, EIA, and other subjects, people are now discussing about putting values on forests as economic resources and including environment in national accounting. This, they felt, would eventually lead to the realisation of such systems in the country.

#### g) Capacity Building

The capacity building efforts of the Project are well known among NGOs and to some extent among the government organisations, and they all agreed that there was a considerable impact.



Regarding the human resource development efforts of the Project some considered that there was an impact. Examples mentioned were the fact that trainees have been instrumental in the development of the RCSs. However, not much was known about the impact of the study tours.

The majority of respondents also knew about the Project’s efforts to build institutional capacity through the supply of equipment and materials at the federal and, particularly, at the regional levels. Examples mentioned were the computers provided to the Addis Ababa University’s Department of Biology to facilitate the environmental management training undertaken in collaboration with the Project, as well as the various equipment and materials supplied to the regions.

In general NGO and government organization stakeholders considered that the major impacts, which have resulted from, the efforts of the Project were:

- Production of CSE and RCSs and approval of EPE
- Awareness building and attitudinal changes
- Capacity building
- Creation of appropriate institutions, and
- Emphasising a gender focus.

### 5.5 Project Achievements – Staff Views

From the interviews with the project staff further information was obtained about the achievements and impacts of the Project. Despite the problems which have been faced and the critical perspectives of some of those interviewed, all respondents felt that the Project had made some major achievements and that these would last beyond the Project.

Most people felt that the major achievement was the approval of the Environmental Policy and by implication the CSE. The Project has provided an overall design for environmental management both nationally and regionally although these are both still incomplete. Raising awareness and developing capacity in government were seen as the other major outcomes from the Project with examples quoted of environmental awareness at a variety of levels from Parliament to rural communities in relatively remote locations. Half of the respondents also reported changes in behaviour and quoted examples (See Table 5.9).

**Table 5.9: Staff Views of the Major Achievements of the CSE Process by Rank**

<b>Achievement</b>	<b>1st</b>	<b>2nd</b>	<b>3rd</b>
Environmental Policy of Ethiopia	3	1	2
CSE Five volumes	1	1	
Awareness	1	3	3
Regional Conservation Strategy	2	1	1
Environmental Protection Authority	1	1	
Capacity development	2	1	2

For two respondents the CSE III had been a major factor facilitating the establishment of EPA and for helping EPA establish good relations with the regions. Overall the CSE III was seen to have been very productive, given the evolving Ethiopian situation at the time, and very good at adapting to the changing situation. Wider benefits from the Project were also pointed out

especially the links to policies being developed by the Ministry of Water, Mines and Energy, and the forthcoming land use policy of the Ministry of Agriculture.

The impact of the training provided by the Project was seen to be positive, with many respondents reporting that they knew of cases where the training was being used. However, the general perception was that training has been far more effective at the regional level than for the federal institutions and it was felt by 40% of the respondents that the federal skills levels for addressing environmental issues were less adequate than that in the regions. Some of this perception was probably the result of EPA staff feeling they needed better training to take on the responsibilities of following up the CSE III. However, some may also have been influenced by what they felt was unfairness in the training provision and neglect of them or their section in EPA.

Some limitation to the Project's achievements were also noted by the staff respondents. These included the failure to generate meaningful awareness of environmental issues amongst government officials and the public, especially investors, with a general lack of recognition of the interactions and linkages which exist in environmental systems and between them and the societal system. Further, it was reported that the improved environmental awareness in government has not reached the highest levels so that environment was rarely an issued raised by senior ministers, unlike food security. The communication unit reported that while it has a good response to its publications and workshops, it found it hard to stimulate momentum amongst public interest groups, even journalists who might be expected to have a vested interest in holding environmental discussion meetings. Above all there was a general concern that the Project had got few activities taking place at the local / sub-wereda level. The lack of major pilot projects in each region, such as WPPs, which are of some greater significance than the local environmental projects, was a concern as these were seen as the way to show how the CSE could be used.

## **5.6 Reflections by the Evaluation Team on the Project's Progress and Impact**

To conclude this discussion on achievement and impact, the views reported are evaluated and a number of issues raised which need to be given consideration in future CSE Project activities and more widely in this type of project.

### **a) Application of Training**

The capacity building efforts of the Project rendered in terms of training both in-country and abroad, including the study tours, have transmitted relevant skills and knowledge. The trainees have used a number of these skills individually or as groups. For instance, the RCS Task Forces have used their training in strategic planning in the production of the RCSs. The information available to the Evaluation Team also suggests that training in the area of project formulation and preparation are being used by a number of trainees to create specific project proposals. However, it is obvious that some of the training provided, for instance in the areas of environmental economics, environmental impact assessment, and environmental management, have not been used due to the fact that the opportunity to use such skills is not there at the moment. However, there is a possibility that this sort of training will be used in the near future. For example, there are efforts being made by EPA and the Addis Ababa City Administration's Bureau of Environmental Protection to establish EIA systems and these may come to fruition soon, as draft legislation for these now exists. The environmental management training given by the Project in collaboration with the AAU will certainly be useful when the implementation of the CSE and RCSs commences. If, however, a

considerable gap occurs between the time that training is provided and the opportunity to apply it, there is a danger that trainees may have lost all or some of their skills and knowledge acquired in the training.

#### b) Resource Centres as Focal Points

One of the long-term benefits of the Project is the creation and strengthening of the Resource Centres. These will certainly help trainees keep their knowledge and skills sharpened by having access to the environmental books supplied by the Project. The importance of the Resource Centres is of course not limited only to helping project trainees. The purpose of creating these centres is to provide technical professional personnel working within and outside government with relevant materials, which can be used as reference materials, as well as to promote learning by reading. The fact that these Resource Centres are open to the public has meant that researchers, students and other interested people have been able to use them thus getting the opportunity to study recent concepts, ideas, and schools of thought regarding environment management. Of course materials in the Resource Centres must be regularly updated. This is a continuous task. What the Project has done is initiated the development of these centres with the supply of current materials. The key question now is how will they be used and sustained so that they have a lasting impact.

#### c) Widening the Environmental Debate

There appears to be also another kind of impact that has resulted from some of the training efforts. Training in Environmental Economics and EIA has, apparently, made people realize the need to have a national accounting system which values natural resources and a system of EIA which will ensure that development programmes and projects do not have a negative impact on the environment. Initiatives toward legally enforceable EIA are in place and proposals for new approaches to national accounting are being developed.

#### d) Process Learning

Experts, particularly at the regional level have gained skills and knowledge not only through the specific training that they have been provided with, but also through the technical assistance that the project staff have provided. Obviously this has had an impact because the technical staff involved in developing the RCSs have in most cases appreciated such technical assistance as one way in which staff capacity has been enhanced through the transfer of skills.

#### e) Staff Turnover

The issue of staff turnover is something that must be mentioned here in view of the information obtained that a number of trained personnel have left their original positions and moved to other departments within the same bureau, to other bureaus or totally left government. Since a system for tracking trainees does not exist it is impossible to provide data on this. The turnover situation differs from region to region. For example while all trainees in the Addis Ababa City administration appear to still be in post, a number of trainees in the SNPPR have moved to other posts mainly within the departments of the same bureau or to other bureaus.

Turnover in government personnel in developing countries, such as Ethiopia, is a persistent problem. In the Ethiopian context it is exacerbated by the fact that the country has been going through radical political changes, which entailed reorganising the country into a federal state and creating institutions required for the functioning of the new regional states. However, in those cases where trainees have left government service, the fact that they could be using

their newly acquired skills somewhere else within the country can be considered a benefit from the Project.

#### f) Awareness Raising

Besides the considerable impact of the training programmes on specific subject areas, it is clear that the awareness raising activities of the Project have also had an impact. There is significant change in attitude towards the environment among certain sectors of the Ethiopian society. This change in attitude is probably most obvious among individuals working in government and NGOs who have been in some way or the other in contact with the Project and other environmental initiatives in the country. This could be through attending awareness raising workshops, receiving training, reading the newsletter *Tefetro*, reading the EPE or the CSE documents as well as draft RCSs documents. To these can be added events such as the launching of the EPE and the annual World Environment Day Celebrations in which the Project was actively participating by providing financial assistance and distributing relevant awareness materials. However, the largest section of Ethiopian society, the peasants, have hardly been reached by the Project's efforts in enhancing environmental awareness and attitudinal changes. This is something that requires doing. It is absolutely naïve to expect the CSE process to move smoothly and have the desired outcomes without the participation of the majority group in Ethiopian society. Besides being the majority of the population, they are the vast majority of the natural resource managers and users in the country. It was probably too big an undertaking for the Project to achieve improved awareness amongst the mass of the rural population given the scale of the effort required to reach such a large body adequately. However, a beginning could have been made by the Project had it managed to publish simplified local language and simplified versions of the CSE and the RCSs for dissemination. NGOs and mass / peoples' organisations could have been used for disseminating such easy to read versions.

#### g) Equipment Provision

The capacity building in terms of provision of equipment and materials has facilitated the RCS formulation process. Given the fact that, at the beginning of the Project, items such as computers, printers and photocopiers hardly existed in the regional bureaus, the impact of the supplied equipment and materials in terms of facilitating RCS formulation has certainly been high.

#### h) Institutional Development

An area where the project efforts have had impact, but of a limited nature, is institutional development for environmental management in the context of the CSE/RCSs. The Environmental Protection Council (EPC) at the federal level and Regional Environmental Co-ordinating Committee (RECCs) in all regions have been established. Regions such as SNNPR have established Zonal ECCs (ZECCs) while city administrations such as Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa have established Wereda ECCs (WECCs). The idea of creating a regional institution responsible for environmental affairs, including guiding the implementation of the RCSs, is gaining ground. For example while Addis Ababa and the Amhara regions have established such an institution other regions, such as SNNPR and Oromia, have prepared draft laws to enable the establishment of such institutions.

Information gained through interviews reveal that, in most instances, the RECCs and ZECCs (where they have been established) have not functioned as they were expected to do. The RECCs have a most disappointing record despite the fact that they are chaired by high-level government officials who should have been able to muster political support and respect for this body. In reality, however, these

chairpersons ended up not giving much attention to the RECCs. A number of reasons are given for this failure. The first is that the RECC chairpersons, and indeed all regional executive committee members, being at such a high level, are usually occupied with more pressing regional and national issues and cannot give attention to the RCSs process. The second is that line bureau RECC members are not very much interested in the RECCs' co-ordinating functions because they regard their own bureau tasks as more important and overall co-ordination as a waste of time and probably something that may end up encroaching on their area of mandate.

The same problems seem to be faced by the EPC, which is meant to oversee the work of EPA and co-ordinate actions between federal ministries with respect to environmental matters. This has met only once or twice in its four year existence and there are now proposals to change it to have lower level staff on it, not ministers, and to widen public representation.

However, lower level ECCs have in some instances been demonstrably functional and effective. Community ECCs in the case of Dire Dawa administration and WECCs in the case of the Addis Ababa City Administration have been quite active in identifying, formulating and implementing RCS type projects. This is encouraging. There could be a number of factors behind this positive situation, all of which reinforce each other. These include the establishment of an institution responsible for environmental matters, the size of the region / city administration and individual commitment and drive in the focal point bureaus. The most important factor, though, maybe that co-ordination at lower levels becomes more effective as the people faced with the problems of day to day environmental management (or lack of it) become participants.

On the other hand the ZECCs established by SNNPR, the only region to do so, have been totally inactive. It is difficult to state precisely why the ZECCs have failed to function. It may be reasonable to assume, however, that some or all the factors mentioned above may not have been working in their favour. In addition, the fact that zones are there simply as convenient administrative units created for purposes of administrative facilitation may have resulted in the weakness of these ZECCs. This is reinforced by the fact that in the Addis Ababa City Administration the zones have simply been ignored as irrelevant.

There is no simple and easy solution for the problems that the RECCs are faced with. In spite of the fact that suggestions have been made that providing legislative backing for the RECCs will help them, this alone will certainly not do the trick. There are examples of other co-ordinating bodies established by law whose performance is dismal. Thus, in addition to providing the backing of the law to the RECCs, attention should be given to instil into people the importance of the CSE / RCSs for the sustainable development of Ethiopia and the well-being of the its people and the role of the RECCs in these.

#### i) Integrating Environment into Development Planning

One area where the Project's achievement has been insignificant is that of integrating environmental concerns into development planning. It is not surprising that almost all stakeholder groups interviewed by the Evaluation Team did not know of Project efforts in this area. The failure appears to be connected with changes in CTAs at EPU and indecisiveness on the part of MEDaC on how to proceed. All is not lost in this area as the last CTA did produce a set of guidelines which apparently have been well received in MECaC and are not waiting for approval before implementation (CSE 2000d, 2000).

#### j) Local Environmental Projects

An area where it is too early to expect impact is the community initiated local environmental projects. These were initiated in 1999 in response to a recommendation in the mid-term review which suggested these as a way of taking the CSE to the implementation level more widely than was being achieved through the Wereda Pilot Project. It took some time to work out the guidelines and financial control mechanisms for these projects and so invitations to submit projects were not circulated to the regions until mid / late 1999. Then, because of the need to complete implementation and reporting within the project period no proposals were considered after early / mid 2000.

CSE Project sources indicate that 34 project proposals were approved for funding, several were rejected for not being participatory in nature, and only 16 were actually funded since the other proposers failed to take advantage of the financial assistance offered before funding had to stop (Status Report- July, 2000). (Table 5.6) Out of the total estimated cost of SFr 201,200 only SFr 78,000 was actually disbursed by the Project by mid 2000. The support provided in this area can be said to be rather too little, too late to achieve meaningful impacts.

While this is an interesting initiative to widen participation in the CSE work, it is questionable whether some of the projects approved are appropriate, especially as they were supposed to be community initiatives. (See for example Projects 4 & 12 in the Table 5.6).

## **5.7 Conclusions**

The CSE III has undertaken a considerable amount of work in terms of supporting the CSE process. The analysis and documentation part is complete at the Federal level and in almost all of the regions, while training and capacity development has been undertaken, and awareness has been raised in some sections of Ethiopian society, although not among the rural majority. This work has included sensitive aspects in terms of trying to follow a process approach and develop local ownership of the RCSs as well as developing a gender strategy to ensure due attention to women in environmental work. However, with the exception of some work in Addis Ababa and in Dire Dawa, the Project has not seen the CSE ideas widely used and turned into action on the ground with rural and urban communities. The base has been laid, but the utilisation has been limited. The reasons for this are partly due to bureaucratic problems, which have been faced (see Chapters 8 and 9) or are associated with project design and operation (see Chapter 6, 7 and 8). These issues are explored as part of the more specific analysis chapters, which follow in Section Three.

PART THREE  
SPECIFIC FINDINGS ON PROJECT ELEMENTS

**CHAPTER 6**

**PROJECT DESIGN AND OPERATION**

Based on the interviews with ten staff from the CSE III Project and from the two partner agencies involved, this section identifies a number of lessons, which can be drawn about the project design, management and operations. While the discussion here is based on these opinions, the Evaluation Team has been careful to ensure that these have been interrogated carefully to ensure that a balanced view is expressed which is based on evidence presented in the interviews. The findings from the interviews are presented in the main body of this chapter, while the assessment by the Evaluation Team is presented at the end of the chapter in the conclusions.

**6.1 Project Design**

There was a general consensus that there were both strengths and weaknesses in the design of the Project and that these affected the Project's performance.

In the first instance, all respondents pointed out that the Project had been appropriately designed by including a major regional component in its work. At the time of the project design (1994/95) the regionalisation process was just becoming established in Ethiopia and so the CSE III was the first countrywide project to provide support to the regions in one aspect of their development. However, it was also pointed out that the design process did not involve anyone from the regional level, a major failing, even though such inputs might have been tentative given the state of progress in regionalisation. This input could have been important in helping to ensure a realistic design, which would have recognised the difficult relationship between the regions and the federal level, and the time delays likely in getting environmental issues onto the agendas of the new regions.

Another uniform response across staff in both partner agencies, and a very strident one, was that the Project was badly designed by involving two different government agencies, MEDaC and EPA. While some respondents recognised that in theory the dual approach of the CSE could be a strength, with synergy created between the two agencies (CSE, 1999c), most people pointed out that with their own mandates and responsibilities, the two institutions were bound to come into conflict at some stage. In particular, it was noted that responsibilities within the Project were not clearly separated and that some joint operations were involved with overlapping responsibilities, which would certainly create tensions. Several respondents noted that things do not get done in Ethiopia through co-operation and committees, but rather by clear decisions and instructions. The structure of the Project did lead to a considerable degree of competition between the two partners and emphasis upon the narrow interests of each agency. It also led to continued debates over ownership of the Project, which led to a waste of time and resources (see Chapter 7). Hence two separate projects were proposed by one respondent as a better design for the CSE III activities given these realities on the ground.

(Indeed, after a time, the joint activities were stopped and the responsibilities more clearly divided between the two partner organisations.)

A second concern with the project design was the range of institutions involved. On the one hand some respondents noted the over-emphasis in the project design upon the government agencies, and the lack of involvement of NGOs and the private sector. In contrast, other respondents focused on the way the project document emphasised only the two implementing partner agencies in the Project and suggested that more ministries and government agencies, which are directly and indirectly involved in environmental issues, should have been specifically named and given their roles in the CSE III to use the ideas the CSE has generated. In particular, these respondents felt that other agencies such as Agriculture, Water Affairs, and Investment, should have been specifically involved in the design of the Project and named, as this might have been a way of ensuring closer co-operation during the Project and support for it. In particular, it was pointed out that this might have helped speed the project activities, which sought to get federal agencies to incorporate environment considerations into their day-to-day activities.

A third problem raised by two respondents was the time pressures, which the Project faced, even by 2001, after five years of operations. Project staff involved with the training and capacity-building activities noted that a longer period of training provision should have been envisaged in order to train more people at the federal and regional levels. This referred in part to the need to build up a critical mass of trained people, but also the need to follow up their experience to ensure that people are using their new skills in their jobs. There was also concern about the way in which staff turnover has affected the availability of people trained by the Project. This pointed to the need for on-going training to be established within government agencies and for these not to be dependent on the Project.

The staff in the two partner agencies, at least those remaining at the end of the Project, had different views about the project design and structure. Those in EPA saw that working from EPA had a major advantage for making regional contacts in the period after the creation of the new regions when the federal ministries, including MEDaC, had very tense, and in some cases negligible, contacts with the new Regional Ministries (called Bureaus). On the other hand the staff in MEDaC believed they had a special relationship with the regions through the capital budget process and links to the Planning Bureaus and so saw EPU as the correct place for the regional work to be based. This led to some conflicting views about how the regional work should have been approached, with EPA staff critical of the direct links made by EPU with the regional Planning Bureaus and suggesting that a higher level approach to the Regional Council should have been pursued by EPA which might have helped speed up the regional work and the RCS approval processes (see Chapter 8). Even at the end of the Project the precise role of the EPU in MEDaC as part of the Project was not clear to many of the EPA staff interviewed who saw the CSE III as solely an EPA project. This suggests that the project design remained confusing to project staff even after five years of operation.

In terms of project outputs and activities, as specified in the project document, little concern was reported about lack of clarity, although this has been a major theme throughout the Project and the cause of some re-interpretation of the project goals and objectives on at least two occasions (see Chapter 3). However, the Wereda Pilot Project was identified by most respondents as one of the most unclear activities in the project document which required much discussion to achieve a consensus. This seems to link to a general concern, expressed in different ways by many people interviewed, that the project document failed to provide



adequate guidance about how to turn the CSE and RCSs into implementation activities on the ground, beyond the list of action plan projects which were quickly out of date and beyond the financial means of the Project.

## **6.2 Project Management**

### a) Management in General

While these staff respondents in general reported the management of the Project to be satisfactory, half of them had some reservations about some specific aspects. Often a respondent noted several problems. The first group of reservations concerned the delays in completing project activities and the associated need for project extensions. This was seen as a failure of management to motivate staff and ensure that the Project kept to schedule. (On the other hand the need for a process approach – see below, was recognised as a partial explanation of this.) The other group of reservations concerned specific aspects about the project management and project leadership. Issues raised here included the limited involvement of the National Project Co-ordinator (NPC) due to his other commitments and absence from the country, as well as his close personal association with the Project. It was also felt that his influence when exerted was not neutral because of his other responsibilities to one of the partner agencies in the Project (EPA). A further concern expressed was the dominance in management of a perspective from EPA, where the NPC was located, and the narrow interests expressed by both EPA and MEDaC staff in project management discussions. Most importantly there clearly seems to have been a lack of an overview perspective in the project management because of these competing views of the two partners. Other issues, perhaps rather personal perceptions, included selectivity, or bias, in a number of aspects, such as staff secondment in EPA and levels of support to regions, over-firm or weak leadership by specific Project Directors in EPA and EPU, and variable relations between the Project and the regions or other organisations, such as Addis Ababa University.

A major concern of two of the three staff interviewed, who had been directly involved in the Project throughout its five years, was the change in the project's internal management system in early 1998. While the Project had operated in a relatively inclusive manner during the first two years, with regular meetings of all staff and a fairly open form of management, in April 1998 the full staff meetings were discontinued and all major decisions were taken at restricted high-level management meetings involving only a few senior staff. As a result decision-making became less transparent, indeed almost secret, and the technical staff felt left out without an understanding of the project's direction. This reduced their sense of identity with the Project and contributed to a reported decline in morale at about that time.

This change in management arrangements was caused by the misuse of staff meetings by technical staff seeking personal benefits from the Project, according to senior staff. On the other hand technical staff reported that it was due to increased conflicts in these meetings between MEDaC and EPA staff, as the tension between these two organisations increased. This tension seems to have had a number of possible origins according on the respondents' reports. Some suggested it was due to a change of leadership for the Project in MEDaC that caused a conflict over the use of the top-up system for government staff seconded to the Project, which MEDaC felt had been erroneously extended beyond a six month period. Others suggested it was due to concerns about EPA taking unilateral decisions. Yet others pointed to personalities at the management level at that time with one person having a strong dislike of large committees to undertake planning and management. Whatever the cause of the tension it

should have been addressed directly and not allowed to affect the way the Project was managed and reduce the inclusiveness, which had previously existed.

#### b) Financial Management

On the financial management side of the Project there were no concerns from any respondents about the financial probity. The Ethiopian government's financial control system has been applied to this Project and its procedures are seen as being adequate for ensuring that funds are not misused. The one area of concern about project funds supporting a small EPA-related activity, which was reported in an IUCN backstopping reports, was not raised by any respondent. This would seem to be an issue that is hard to condemn given the need for many of the project activities to integrate into EPA on termination of the Project.

There were only three concerns expressed over financial matters. One was the way in which having the project's external financial relations based in EPA caused some delays in obtaining replenishment of funds for EPU. This arrangement had originally been requested by EPU but the practicalities of this eventually caused a change of opinion. The second was the way in which the government procedures delayed placing orders for things such as re-printing the CSE volumes. In this case the tender board members in EPA seem to have become averse to the Project for some reason and as a result delayed decisions. The third concern was the way in which the project's financial management was operated out of EPA in a manner which was reportedly "opaque" to the second CTA who was nominally responsible for this. As a result he refused to accept any responsibility for this part of his contractual responsibilities.

#### c) Value for Money

The tendering arrangements were seen by most respondents to have ensured value for money, although one person did express a concern that the Project had at times not taken sufficient care in this area. In terms of value for money for training and consultants some evidence was seen by the Team. This was varied, but generally positive, with the exception of the consultants for the Wereda Pilot Project (Chapter 9). The reports about training were generally that this was good or very good and only in one case was a course, the first one at Addis Ababa University, seen as rather less than satisfactory. However, it should be noted that this did provide a vast saving over the previously used course at Cape Town (\$1,361 per person per week in Cape Town v \$88 per person per week in Addis Ababa.)

In terms of consultants' reports these were studied only in detail with respect to the Wereda Pilot Project where the experience was clearly unsatisfactory (see Chapter 9). This, together with comments from one respondent do raise some concerns that further investigation should have been made into the quality of consultants' reports by the Evaluation Team.

#### d) Monitoring and Assessment

A major area of shortfall in the Project identified by the majority of the respondents and the Evaluation Team was the lack of internal monitoring and assessment. While annual and more frequent project reporting had been undertaken, with achievements reviewed against project goals, the Project had no formal monitoring and assessment procedure. This was considered through a consultancy early in the Project but the consultants report was rejected by the project management and thereafter the issue seems to have been sensitive and generally avoided. As a result, although on a number of occasions the project management did discuss this, progress was not made and it was then felt to be too late to introduce such measures. In the end, proposals for this were introduced via another consultancy in the last year of the Project (2001) but these were never brought into operation. This is an omission, which the

project management and IUCN recognise and which should have been pointed out earlier by the project management, IUCN or the mid-term reviews when they considered project operation. One respondent suggested that concerns over the slow rate of project expenditure dominated the management meetings to such an extent that systematic monitoring and assessment was seen as almost irrelevant.

### **6.3 Project Resources**

All respondents agreed that the Project had adequate financial resources. Indeed some respondents felt that it had more than enough funds and that disbursement was at times an over-riding goal rather than adherence to the project document. It was pointed out that the late addition of the local environmental projects could be seen not only as an attempt to apply the CSE principles in local settings, but also to help use up the funds which were not being disbursed – a view rejected by the project management.

The plentiful financial resources meant that the Project was faced with a number of pressures given that it was located in resource scarce institutions. In particular, the other sections in EPA saw the Project as a major source from which support could be obtained, especially given that they were expected to take over many CSE operations, such as communications and regional support, once the Project terminated. The regions also expected generous support through the local environmental projects. In both cases these transfers of funds did not occur early enough in the Project and at the rate expected. As a result criticisms were raised of the Project in these interviews as well as in the minutes of the meetings of the regional focal points (CSE, 2000b & 2000c).

In terms of technical skills the Project was seen by most (80%) of the respondents to be under-resourced to an extent that this impacted upon its performance. The absence of a CTA for a full year and the view that some work by the two CTAs was unsatisfactory were noted as problems in this respect. (The CTA issue is explored further in the Partners' Section of this report – Chapter 7). It should be noted here that the criticisms of the CTAs varied from issues of quality, focus on the Project and ways of working - a wish by staff to have a CTA who would work alongside them in one case, and produce more technical discussion papers in another case. Other respondents suggested that the Project had adequate technical skills, but that the TA and CTA were blocked from fulfilling their roles by administrative responsibilities which occupied the TA for much of his time, or by bureaucratic reasons such as the requirement for the second CTA to work only on producing the document on environmental guidelines for development projects which MEDaC required (CSE 2000d, 2000).

The Project was reported to be short-staffed in other areas, notably project administration, regional support work, gender expertise, and in terms of needing an additional driver, secretary and accountant. Indeed the under-provision in terms of administrative support almost certainly accounts for the perceived shortage of technical skills reported above as the TA in EPA did a considerable amount of administrative work. This view was eventually accepted by the project management in the last two years and the appointment of an administrator was made to help relieve the T.A. in EPA from a heavy administrative burden. However, one of the communications staff had to double as the gender specialist throughout the Project, which hardly seems desirable, and other appointments to assist in the regional work were never made despite this shortage of staff being raised in the internal review in 1997 (Wood & Arnesen, 1997). A particular staffing shortage also occurred in EPU after the loss of

staff in 1989/90 and there were considerable delays, up to the end of the Project, in obtaining replacements.

#### **6.4 Project Implementation and Operational Realities**

The operational realities for this Project have been difficult in several ways, in addition to the staffing problems and the conflicts between the two Ethiopian partners involved (see also Chapter 7).

The major operational problem identified by the majority of the respondents was the problem of keeping the outputs up to the schedule planned in the project document and the workplans created from this. To a considerable extent the causes of such slippage were beyond the control of the Project. On the one hand some of this problem was caused by an over-optimistic project document – which had expected the CSE to be approved before the Project started and expected the RCSs to be completed and approved within the first year – there are still only five RCSs approved now after five years. On the other hand, the Project had to work with the field partners over whom it had no control, such as central and regional governments. These partners found other more pressing issues than the CSE and RCS requiring their attention during the early years of the new administrative and political arrangements in the country and this was a major factor in the slippage of the CSE III programme.

One internal cause of the slippage problem which was identified by several respondents was the slow rate of expenditure by the EPU in MEDaC. This was always a much smaller percentage of the planned expenditure than what was achieved in EPA and it seems that there was some aversion to spending CSE funds in MEDaC in contrast to the efforts made in EPA to keep to schedule. The precise cause of this throttling back on expenditure could not be ascertained during the mission but it may have been related to MEDaC's view that there could be delays to development efforts if major environmental assessments were required of all activities.

The Project also faced a number of uncertainties over funding in 1997/98 and over the no-cost extension in 2000, which made project planning somewhat difficult for several months. The absence of a CTA for two spells, and the tensions which surrounded that post and the persons in it, were also not conducive to the effective operation of the Project, although the impact of this will have been reduced by the fact that through the project period activities were increasingly undertaken from the SCSE in EPA.

Other problems reported by the majority of the respondents to have affected operations were the difficulties encountered in coming to grips with the project document and its operational requirements. This was affected to some degree by the mismatch between the project document and the realities on the ground – such as a non-approved CSE at the start and the slow pace of the RCS process. This problem of interpreting the project document will be explored later with respect to the Wereda Pilot Project (see Chapter 9), but it is also seen to some degree in the lengthy debates over the two internal reviews and the revision or re-adjustment of the project objectives outlined in Chapter 3. Indeed two respondents stated that an unusually long period of time was spent in planning meetings for this project in the early / middle years of operation. The decisions of these meetings were also reported to be subject to personal interpretation of the project document and institutional interests, with senior managers interpreting the project aims and objectives in the light of their personal preferences

rather than in the light of their professional judgement and the advice provided by the internal and external reviews or by IUCN.

A key factor in project operation was the conflict between MEDaC and EPA. This seems to have started in the early years of the Project when there was a lack of co-operation by the Project Director in EPU and a critical view of the first CTA placed in MEDaC. The matter was made worse by the top-up problem, and by the loss of staff in EPU, which led to many of the project activities being relocated to EPA. The conflicts in MEDaC over the second CTA further added to the negative view of the Project in that agency. The shifting of project activity from EPU to EPA due to the staffing shortages in EPU worsened the conflict between the two agencies as MEDaC felt EPA was extending activities beyond its mandate. The conflict has obviously led to wasted energy and has not helped relations with the regions when there have been conflicts over responsibilities for supporting them. It was reported that there had also been arguments over responsibilities for environmental economics, while the environmental assessment of government policies, which should have been undertaken in the Project, was apparently prevented by senior managers in MEDaC. Further, and perhaps most importantly, these senior managers in MEDaC seem to have had developed major concerns about the way environmental considerations could slow economic development and this influenced their views of the Project in a negative way. This, in the end, was reported to be the major area of contention over the Project in MEDaC.

Two other issues about project operation must be raised here as they were mentioned directly or indirectly by a number of respondents. The system of top-ups to seconded staff proved problematic, not least because of the way in which it contributed to the tension between MEDaC and EPA. In addition, the creation of a financial elite of seconded staff in EPA was also reported to have been the cause of some jealousy and “separateness” of the Project from the rest of EPA. This led to some “lack of co-operation” in the tender-board and also during the final stage of the Project when responsibilities from the Project had been handed over from CSE III to EPA. The impacts on sustainability are yet to be seen.

Secondly, the Project faced a number of operational challenges or unexpected developments such as the staff loss in MEDaC, mentioned above, staff losses in the regions where there has been much staff turnover, and additional requests for assistance, especially from EPA, because the CSE III has been, for most of the last five years, the only major environmental project in the country. These all placed stain on the Project.

## **6.5 Project Relationships**

The staff interviewed generally had positive views of the relationships which the Project had established, especially with the regional governments, but also with NGOs and with the public. However, concern was expressed about the nature of the relationship with the federal government agencies, the private sector and the donors. The donors were identified as a clearly neglected group and the private sector as only slightly less neglected. Neglect of the former was apparently the result of a project management decision to not target donors with CSE information, the reason for which is not known. This is a serious matter as it means that future CSE and RCS related activities will start from a lower point of communication with donors than would otherwise have been the case. The federal ministries were seen as only somewhat neglected but still in need of more attention. This may have resulted from a concern expressed in EPA about the danger of a problematic relationship developing if the CSE III expressed too much interest in the activities and policies of the ministries.

Concern was reported because the CSE III had been providing too much support for the regions and that this relationship had become top-down in nature and rather fragile. In particular, it was noted that the rapport with the regions was beginning to weaken towards the end of the Project because of the limited support provided for the local environmental projects which had been put forward mostly via the regions - only 16 out of the 70 proposals received funding.

Finally it might be noted that in EPA and MEDaC the CSE III had some difficult relations, with the non-seconded staff jealous of those who were seconded. This has made handing over project activities difficult in some cases and raises questions about sustainability.

## **6.6 Conclusions**

The Evaluation Team would conclude that the Project encountered a number of difficulties, which were the result of both design and operational failings. The project designers were at fault in proposing two lead agencies as this led to the problems of conflict, which occurred, between MEDaC and EPA. They might also have specified the involvement and role for the other agencies more explicitly in the project proposal so that, without being too top-down, there would have been greater clarity about the breadth of participation at the federal level. The project document also needed to be clearer with respect to the WPP and also the ways by which to implement the CSE in order to speed implementation.

These design problems were perhaps the result of a lack of local participation in the design process and a reliance on external project designers. While the administrative situation was evolving in 1995 when the Project was prepared some greater input from the Ethiopian staff of the CSE II might have helped produce a design less prone to problems and better grounded in local realities.

On the other hand, the Project would seem to the Evaluation Team to have been well designed in terms of the regional component taking the CSE down to the regions, zones and weredas, and the idea of the WPP, which was intended to test implementation of the CSE. While the former was recognised by many respondents, no stakeholders reported the WPP as a good design point, this probably being a result of the problems, which it has encountered.

In terms of operational design the Evaluation Team is of the view that the use of seconded staff for the Project and especially its management was wrong. Seconded staff have other responsibilities and with the two agencies involved in the Project this led to some lack of identity with the CSE III. Secondment also limited the range of skills which the Project had access to, and while some additional communication staff were employed directly, there remained a number of specialist and administrative staffing gaps which were not filled.

In actual operational arrangements the Team is most critical of the failure of the Project to have a specific monitoring and assessment procedure. The problems with the first mission to design this should have been addressed immediately and an acceptable system developed, rather than the problem being avoided and annual monitoring with a limited log frame used. An equally surprising and more worrying aspect is the lack of concern expressed by staff about the absence of internally generated reviews on the various project activities. Such reviews would have helped the project management and the project partners fine-tune their activities within the Project. For instance, there was never any assessment of the communication

programme and the follow-up on the training programme was aborted due to a lack of response from the regions. Some concerns about an absence of review procedures for the performance of the local environmental projects was expressed but not about any of the larger elements of the Project. While staffing shortages may have contributed to the limited efforts in this area of internal review, awareness of the role of such reviews seems to have been low amongst project staff.

The other major concern is the time-slippage with implementation. This is a difficult situation on which to draw firm conclusions as there is the argument between keeping to a blueprint time schedule and the importance of a process approach to ensure local ownership. There is also a concern about to what extent unrealistic project design contributed to this problem, especially in expecting all regions to progress at the same rate, a politically desirable aim but practically impossible to fulfil. Indeed the project management had to be very careful because if it concentrated support on the progressing regions it would lead to charges of favouritism, some of which were made, while to concentrate support on the lagging regions would be seen as doing the job for them and undermining local ownership. The Evaluation Team is of the view that the project management struck an appropriate balance between pushing the regional work and taking ownership for this away from the regions, although more astute awareness of the political situation in the regions could have led to earlier political pressure from the NPC to speed up the RCS processes. At the federal level again a somewhat more proactive role might have been justified building on the support from the Council of Ministers at the time of the CSE approval.

In terms of resource management, the Evaluation Team finds that the project management was careful, ensuring that resources were not diverted into other parts of the resource scarce government system in which the Project operated. Indeed resource management was in some areas too careful with the refusal to appoint additional staff in areas of expertise needed, such as management and gender. The general quality of work was of acceptable standards on the whole, although the quality of one consultancy was of concern and raises questions not able to follow up.

Finally greater attention to the integration of the project work into the partner agencies seems to have been needed, as although this was a concern of the T.A.s for some considerable time concerns about this still existed at the time of this evaluation.

## CHAPTER 7

### PARTNER RELATIONSHIPS

This chapter reviews the performance of the partners in the Project, namely EPA, MEDaC and IUCN. In making this assessment it must first be made clear that this is an area of the Project which demands a detailed study in its own right. That has not been possible within the time available for this mission. Nonetheless a number of points appear to be fairly clear from the information available on this topic and they are reviewed here. There is also discussion in this chapter about the relationship with NORAD, the funding agency, and especially the congruence of the Project with NORAD policy. The material presented here is drawn from the interviews with project staff and the views with conclusions of the Evaluation Team included in each section.

#### 7.1 The Contextual Situation

##### a) Partners and their Responsibilities

The first point to recognise about the context for this Project is that there are four partners and that they have different relations with the Project and hence different responsibilities. On the one hand there are two Ethiopian partners, the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) and the Ministry of Economic Development and Co-operation (MEDaC), who are jointly the implementing agencies and responsible to IUCN. IUCN is the executing agency which itself has responsibilities both to the implementing agencies in Ethiopia and to NORAD, the funding agency and fourth partner. MEDaC is regarded as one of the senior ministries in Ethiopia, a fact recognised by the special pay scales for its staff, while EPA is a newly established authority which, despite its direct reporting to the Prime Minister's office, is generally seen as of lower status than MEDaC.

##### b) Past Relationships

The relationships amongst the partners are complicated by the past relationships which existed in earlier phases of the CSE. Most importantly it should be noted that IUCN had a link with MEDaC and its predecessors from the first two phases of the project when for three of these five years the Project was based in that ministry. In addition, the TA appointed to the post in the EPA had been the NPC for the Project in its first and second phases when it was in MEDaC and in the Ministry of Natural Resource Development and Environmental Protection. Further, the NPC for CSE III had been the CSE Director for all of the second phase and was throughout the CSE III the General Manager for EPA, one of the two implementing partners. As a result some considerable experience, history of involvement and sense of ownership were brought to the CSE III Project by a number of the key actors as well as by the partner organisations. However, in addition to this, there was a considerable amount of "baggage" in terms of personal opinions and expectations, which had been built up. These impacted in some ways upon the partnership relations and upon the smooth running of the CSE III.

##### c) Position of the TAs

Another important contextual issue is the position of the T.A.s who are provided to support the effective operation of the Project in technical areas. Although working within the Ethiopian government implementing agencies, who are partners in the Project, they are employed by IUCN and report directly to IUCN, not to the partner agencies. This situation was complicated by the fact that the TA in EPA was a national and former senior Ethiopia



government official who was well integrated into the government system. The CTA post was filled at different times by two expatriates and there was a one year gap between the two appointees to this post. This CTA post was based in MEDaC, which became the less active partner of the two, while the TA was in the more active project partner, the Secretariat for the CSE in EPA.

Finally it should be mentioned that NORAD as the funding agency has played little or no part in this Project beyond providing funds via IUCN. Obviously NORAD approved the Project when it agreed to fund it, but in line with its policy of giving responsibility to those executing and implementing the Project it has not been actively involved in the Project through its offices in Addis Ababa or Nairobi. The only role, which NORAD played, was organising the mid-term evaluation for which it selected the Team Leader.

## **7.2 Ownership of the Project and the T.A.s**

The relationship between IUCN and its Ethiopian partners has been problematic at times during the course of the Project. This is in most part due to differing perspectives on the Project, which are discussed below.

### **a) IUCN Projects**

IUCN marks itself out amongst agencies involved in environment issues because of its scientific expertise and track record (the World Conservation Strategy, the Red Book of Endangered Species, etc.) and its regional offices. Together, these attributes provide the basis through which IUCN can provide a high level of technical support to its projects.

Backstopping from its regional headquarters and from its global network of expertise gives IUCN projects a considerable “added value”. Because it has no core funding, IUCN has to search for donors to fund projects, which it helps to develop both for and with its members, be they government departments or NGOs. This active involvement by IUCN and its members in project development and in the search for funding gives IUCN a feeling of considerable ownership over what it regards as “IUCN projects”. According to a number of Ethiopian staff of EPA and MEDaC interviewed in this evaluation such a view was reported to exist with respect to the CSE III Project amongst IUCN-EARO staff.

### **b) Ethiopian Projects**

The Ethiopian government and its ministries have held for many decades a fairly sceptical view about the value of foreign aid projects. For many years the general trend in aid projects in Ethiopia has been towards a reduced level of technical assistance and increased emphasis upon support for training and equipment. Aid projects have for long had relatively high profile Ethiopian nationals as the National Project Co-ordinators, and they have played an active role in project management. As such aid projects in Ethiopia have generally been seen as Ethiopian projects, rather than as donor projects, an attitude that predates by many years the recent international trends toward local ownership of aid-funded activities through programme funding and other arrangements.

### **c) Conflicting Perspectives**

As a result of these two perspectives, there was a clash over project ownership with respect to the CSE III. This combined with arguments over the control and management of the T.A.s created a basis for problematic project management. For IUCN its executive role gave it the right to have considerable involvement in the project management, in terms contributions to the annual planning process, control over expenditure and a final say in the recruitment of

local, as well as international, consultants. For the Ethiopian partners IUCN was seen as a source of technical assistance and funding for its project, not as a major player in project management. This tension surfaced at several stages during the Project, most notably when the second CTA was appointed and control over aspects of the project management was to be handed back from the TA, who had one perspective on the Project, to the CTA whose view of the Project was different and more in line with IUCN's. In the end the financial management of the Project remained with the TA and in EPA and the CTA refused to accept any responsibility for this aspect of the Project.

The tension between IUCN and its Ethiopian partners became particularly marked during the last two years of the Project as a result of conflicts over the work and roles of the T.A.s. These staff IUCN regarded as its employees and representatives, and saw their work as set by IUCN in their contracts. In this respect two major problems occurred.

First the second CTA found that MEDaC did not approve of the range of work he was doing for the CSE III despite this having been approved by IUCN and the project management committee. MEDaC required him to stop this work and concentrate on only one activity, producing "Environmental Guidelines for the Planning and Preparation of Development Project", which they required. This he was forced to accept despite major protestations by IUCN and his own analysis that such guidelines would be difficult to make operational in the Ethiopian situation – Denmark was seen as the only country to have tried anything like this before (CSE 2000d, 2000). While this problem was partly a result of the competing claims over the CTAs time, it was also caused by his contract which made him responsible to IUCN's Regional Representative for his work, but also allowed the implementing partners to assign work to him, apparently directly and not via the IUCN Regional Representative in the East Africa Regional Office (EARO). This situation was also made worse by personality conflicts, the CTA being seen by some project staff as far too independent.

The second problem concerned the TA in EPA, whom IUCN felt that was doing too much work for the CSE Secretariat and for EPA and not sufficient for the Project. He had also taken upon himself a heavy administrative load for the Project which involved much liaison with EPA and this meant that he was not able to undertake as much technical support as IUCN expected. This problem was resolved more satisfactorily with the appointment of an administrator to take over much of the administrative work and by IUCN-EARO developing a better understanding about the situation in which the TA was working and his actual activities. However, it was only in the last 18 months of the Project that this issue was resolved.

Both the issues led to major discussions between IUCN and the Ethiopian partners. In these IUCN, as the executing agency, wanted to ensure the Project was completed on time, while the Ethiopian partners wanted to exert their rights over their Project and determine what was to be produced and how that was achieved. Through these discussions, the importance of the process approach was realised as a major influence on the Project's progress, with the federal and regional players in the Project very much determining this.

### **7.3 Backstopping the Partners**

This difficult ownership situation, and the TA problems, made the Project difficult for IUCN to manage from the start and account in part for the way in which the relationship between IUCN and the Ethiopian partners became rather tense. From the staff interviewed the comment came that during the project period IUCN's role changed from being one of a

partner, supporting the Project, to being one of a supervisor policing the finances and activities. This change is to some extent understandable given the way in which the Project fell behind its schedule and hence threatened IUCN's relationship with one of its major donors - NORAD. (The causes for the falling behind were several. They included, over-optimistic planning, bureaucratic delays, and the process approach of the Project.) However, the fact that this change in the apparent behaviour by IUCN became perceived to be so great was almost certainly influenced by the tensions outlined above over the T.As.

A concern should also be noted here that IUCN's pressure to ensure that the Project kept to schedule was interpreted by some respondents as not being driven by professional concerns alone or primarily. Rather it was suggested that the overhead arrangements on the contract, which provide IUCN with its remuneration for executing the Project, were the prime factor behind the concern to get implementation up to schedule.

The change in the nature of IUCN's relationship with the Project was disappointing for some of the project staff who saw the IUCN input as essential for ensuring that this Project was not buried in the normal bureaucratic procedures and local perspectives which often overwhelm other innovative projects in Ethiopia. In many ways this Project did remain innovative, but it was suggested that it could have done more had the IUCN backstopping remained of a technically supportive nature rather than emphasising project planning and administration. This was also a concern among IUCN staff who recognised that addressing the conflicts outlined above (7.2) and to a lesser extent ones discussed below (7.4) diverted backstopping resources from their correct use.

The nature and timing of support visits from IUCN's East African Regional Office (EARO) also played a part in this changing relationship. Visits were reported by interviewees to be rather irregular, with a close relationship between the Project and IUCN developed for a spell and then allowed to drift apart. Records of backstopping visits only go back to late 1997, but they do show some evidence of irregularity, with gaps in the quarterly visits in 1998 and the last half of 1999. However, of probably greater significance is the fact that backstopping has been provided by six different people during the five year project period. Although the most senior of these staff has been consistent for the last four years, there clearly have been problems of continuity in terms of backstopping, especially in the early part of the Project.

Another concern expressed by respondents was the variable skills and relevance of experience amongst the backstoppers, with a tendency to abrasiveness reported in the case of a person seconded to IUCN-EARO. A major concern from one respondent was the failure of some IUCN staff to have read all the relevant documents and for critical comments to be made by backstoppers who did not have a good grasp of the nature of the Project, especially the process aspect. This can also be seen from another angle: that the project management did not make sure that the backstoppers understood its approach.

One other concern, made by two very experienced persons, one in each of the partner organisations, was that IUCN should have fought harder to keep the Project focused on its main activities and not allowed some aspects of the Project to evolve as occurred in the annual planning sessions. These interviews suggested that IUCN should have played a more active role in both the planning process and especially in the review process where a monitoring and assessment procedure should have been established to review the individual elements in this major project.

Finally it should be noted that one element of the Project, which sought to link Ethiopian professionals into the IUCN environmental planning network was not very effective. After the 1996 meeting at Sodere in Ethiopia there were few other activities of that network and so project staff could not be involved. Nonetheless a number of international visits were made by people involved in the Project (Table 5.3), and the CSE experience was reported in the IUCN book based on the Sodere meeting (Wood, 1997).

#### **7.4 Partner Conflicts between EPA and EPU**

As mentioned with respect to project implementation, the last half of the Project has been dominated by the conflict between the two Ethiopian implementing partners. This conflict between MEDaC and EPA has not been fully understood but it did result in a major absence of co-operation between the two implementing agencies for over a year, the loss of all but one staff member in EPU and the transfer of most of the MEDaC-based CSE III activities to EPA.

The conflict seems to have its origins in the early years of the Project when there were the first signs of what became a perpetual unwillingness in EPU to spend Project funds. The reasons for this are not known. However, while this limited the contribution of MEDaC staff to some aspects of the Project it did not cause a major disruption in the regional support. However the problem came to a crisis when a new person was appointed to the post of Head of the MEDaC Department of Agriculture in which the EPU was situated. This led to a major shift in the attitude of MEDaC in the joint management meetings and a much more competitive, or combative, relationship between the two partners. This apparently was not a one-sided issue as EPA was claiming responsibility for an increased number of project activities, some of which were not originally in its remit, such as Environmental Economics. Apart for arguments about responsibilities, and concerns in EPU about independent decision making by the EPA part of the Project, there were also important questions raised by MEDaC about the value of this Project to their mandate. In particular, it was questioned whether the environmental concerns being raised by the Project would lead to a slowing down in development activities and hence retard progress towards things such as food security, that were national priorities. There were also changes in relations within the MEDaC unit responsible for this Project, i.e. the EPU, which led to the departure of most professionals there involved with the Project. These departures may have been partly due to the removal of top-ups at this time (although a similar loss of staff did not occur in EPA), but were probably more due to the change in management and attitudes in MEDaC to the Project.

One result of the loss of staff in MEDaC was that the EPU had insufficient staff to undertake its part of the Project with the result that all of the regional support work moved to EPA, even though this sort of operational work was not within EPA's original responsibility in the Project.

This major conflict has obviously led to wasted energy and has not helped the relations with the regions, especially with the conflicts over responsibilities for supporting the regions. There have also been arguments over the environmental assessment of government policies which it was envisaged would be undertaken by the Project, but which was apparently prevented by senior managers in MEDaC.

## **7.5 Compatibility of the Project with NORAD Policy**

As mentioned in the first section (7.1) NORAD has been little involved in this Project and as such there is nothing to say about this partner relationship, except that a “hands off” approach was followed. However, given that NORAD has been the funding agency it is concerned that the activities it supports are in line with its policy. Hence this section reviews the compatibility, or congruence, of the Project with NORAD’s policy or strategy. This analysis has been made by reviewing the project’s operational arrangements and activities in the light of the NORAD strategy for 2000-2005 (NORAD, 1999). Whilst this review is made against current policy, it should be recognised that the policies in force at the time the Project was approved and during its period of operation may have been slightly different. However, access to these was not possible, and it is recognised that in most respects the policy will not have changed.

The key features of NORAD policy, which are relevant to the CSE III, are that projects should:

- Follow the priorities of developing countries
- Be the responsibility of the recipients of the aid funds
- Have resources use decided by the partner / recipient organisation
- Ensure co-operation across a wide range of areas, not just the government sector
- Recognise human rights and the need for participation
- Give due consideration for gender equality and women’s rights
- Include combating poverty as a major objective
- Ensure sound management of the global environment and include concern for not destroying the natural resource base
- Support local institutional development to ensure continuing local responsibility for project initiated activities, and
- Ensure that initiated activities are sustainable.

In the light of these it is worth pointing out that the Project addressed all these issues at least to some degree and thus can be seen to have been compatible with NORAD policy.

First it should be stressed that, in terms of overall development, the Project has been one that evolved from the needs and priorities expressed by the Ethiopian government. In the mid 1990s it was a key concern of the government to establish EPA, to approve the CSE and to get this process decentralised to the new regions. The Project has been owned from the outset by the Ethiopian partners, and has been implemented by them using mainly their own personnel resources, with limited external Technical Assistance. Indeed it should be noted that one of the T.A.s was an Ethiopian who had been involved with the CSE process from the start and who had considerable experience in natural resource and environmental issues in the country.

The Project has also involved co-operation with a number of different sections of Ethiopian society. While this has been focused on the federal and regional governments and some NGOs, in contrast the RCS conferences, the CSE launch and the communication programme have tried to extend this co-operation to include a wider involvement of Ethiopia society. Although this not reached to the villages as yet, the need for participation in order to have effective conservation strategies is now well recognised in the SCSE, if not fully applied, and

this is a major development given traditional views about natural resource management in the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture.

Concern for women’s participation in the CSE has been explicit with statements in the Environment Policy and in the CSE documents concerning the need for greater participation by women. This has been followed up by the development of a “Strategy for mainstreaming gender and ensuring the effective participation of women in the CSE process” ( CSE, 1999b). This has been supported up by a series of workshops nationally to discuss the strategy and provide sensitisation (Table 7.1) and workshops in all 11 regions to raise awareness of the role of women in environmental issues (Table 5.6), with a total of 723 participants involved between February 1997 and March 2001.

**Table 7.1: Federal Level Gender Workshops**

No.	Workshops	Date	No. of Participants
1	Integration of Gender Issues into the CSE/RCS Process	February 27-28, 1997	15
2	CSE/RCS Gender Sensitisation and Strategy Development	January 20-23, 1999	48
3	Follow-up CSE/RCS Gender Strategy Finalisation Workshop	June 23-24, 1999	57
4	CSE/RCS Gender Strategy Finalisation and Action Planning Workshop	May 8-10, 2001	45

This Project is directly in line with NORAD’s concern that development should not destroy the natural resource base and should help combat poverty. The CSE has provided training for approximately 1000 people in a variety of subject areas and techniques which can help ensure that environment is given due consideration in development (see Table 5.1). Indeed one of the major concerns of the Project has been in different ways to ensure the integration of environment into development planning. As a result EIA procedures and legislation are at an advanced stage of preparation and all investment bureaus in the country include environmental considerations in their checklists – although these are not always effectively applied as yet. Further, in MEDaC there is now a guideline document, awaiting approval, which will integrated environment considerations into project preparation (CSE 2000d, 2000). There is now a much greater level of environmental awareness in the country, and this, while not solely due to this Project, has to a considerable extent been the result of the CSE activities.

The CSE activities are also central to combating poverty in a country such as Ethiopia where natural resource use is the basis of the economy and the well-being of the vast majority of the population. Environmental issues are very much linked to poverty and achieving sustainable natural resource management is essential for ensuring the livelihoods of the present, and future, generations. This is not to say that this Project has produced a series of technical solutions, which can transform overnight unsustainable natural resource use into sustainable use. However, it has set out guidelines through its work, and especially through the environmental policy, which provide guidance for public, private and NGO actors towards sustainable resource management (CSE 2000d, 2000).

Finally it should be recorded that this Project has been instrumental in developing local institutions through which environmental consideration should be given due accord in Ethiopia’s future. While the RECCs, which have been set up, are not very active, the Project

has been critical in stimulating thought at the regional level about how environmental issues will be addressed. This has led to several regions identifying the need for specific environmental agencies and in Amhara Region the Project has provided support for developing the terms of reference for this institution. The Project has also supported the development of the federal level EPA to some extent and this institution will take over many of the functions currently run by the Project.

### **7.6 Compatibility of the Project with IUCN Strategy and Policy**

The CSE work in Ethiopia is in line with IUCN's policy of providing support to strategic and innovative work with respect to environmental planning and natural resource management amongst the countries in the region. This is done in response to requests from IUCN members and other agencies in those countries. In Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Wildlife Conservation Organisation (EWCO) is the government member and through this contact a request was initially received in the late 1980s from the government's planning ministry, ONCCP, for support to develop a strategy for environmental management as an overarching framework for the then on-going reform process in the country. Despite the change of government IUCN managed to maintain a dialogue with the Ethiopian authorities and has supported the CSE for 12 years.

This long period of contact through the Project has led to other initiatives as the need for support for other environmental action has been recognised. Proposals have been made for work on forestry issues following up the Ethiopian Forestry Action Plan and a wetlands initiative following long-term IUCN support to an wetland research project (Wood, 2000). However, these initiatives have not yet been fully developed or implemented. Ethiopia was the venue for the meeting of the Africa Regional Network of Environmental Planners, which IUCN led, in the mid 1990s and from this meeting the Africa volume of a global review of strategies for sustainability was produced (Wood, 1997). However, this network has not remained active and further linkages into the region from Ethiopia have been developed more through IUCN's regular meetings of project staff in the East African region. Ethiopia has for many years been considering becoming a state member of IUCN. This has yet to be completed, although government representatives have attended most IUCN General Assemblies since 1991.

Ethiopia is now firmly part of IUCN's Eastern Africa region and the need for collaboration between IUCN and government and NGO organisations involved in natural resource management, conservation and environmental planning is clear. The experience with the CSE has had both strengths and weaknesses and the lesson from this situation should be reviewed by IUCN's East Africa Regional Office with a view to moving forward in support of Ethiopia, one of the countries in the region where environmental issues need increased attention.

### **7.7 Concluding Remarks**

Overall it may be concluded, while the partnership relations have had their negative as well as positive experiences, the CSE has been an important learning process for all partners involved. While operational difficulties soured relations in the middle, the achievements have remained from this Project in terms of the CSE outputs. Despite the various difficulties the CSE III has kept operating and has kept to the main policy guidance required by NORAD and made some considerable progress toward the CSE III Project goals. This is commendable given the difficult and evolving situation in which the Project operated.

## CHAPTER 8

### REGIONAL AND ZONAL LEVEL ACHIEVEMENTS

#### 8.1 Regional Level Activities in the Project Document

The second major area of activity for the CSE III (after the Federal level CSE approval and the work to integrate environment into development activities), was the work with the newly established regions. According to the project document this involved:

- Providing technical support for the Regional Bureaus in the areas of environmental issues
- Assisting in establishing and institutionalising the regional and zonal environmental co-ordinating committees (RECCs and ZECCs)
- Building capacity for the RECCs and ZECCs
- Undertaking training and capacity building, and
- Assisting in implementing the regional and zonal level action and investment plans.

The CSE III Project document makes no reference to producing and approving the Regional Conservation Strategies (RCSs) amongst the activities to be undertaken as these tasks were expected to have been completed before Phase III commenced.

In reality the situation was very different. No RCSs were completed by the start of the CSE III Project and the initial revised view from the project management, that the first year of CSE III would be enough to ensure that they were completed, proved dramatically wrong. (In fact only five of the eleven RCSs have been approved five and a half years later by the end of the extended CSE III.) In this situation the major focus of the regional work has had to be on the production and approval of the RCSs. Further, because any major implementation of an RCSs or its elements was seen by the CSE III management to depend on approval of the RCS by the Regional Council, implementation of these strategies has been limited. In the end the CSE III became an amalgam of the aims of Phases II and III at the regional level, emphasising preparations for implementation (Phase II) and, to a much lesser degree, implementation (Phase III).

#### 8.2 The RCS Process – The Model

The model RCS process is fairly straightforward. It involves the co-ordinated production of the RCS document by a Task Force of technical experts from the regional bureaus following guidance produced by the SCSE and using the national CSE documents as a model. This should be supervised by the Regional Environmental Co-ordinating Committee (RECC) which has a secretariat / focal point of one or two staff seconded from government bureaus (ministries), usually BoPED, but sometimes BoA. The RECC is composed of the heads of the regional government bureaus whose remit in some way links to CSE issues. The draft RCS should be discussed at a workshop involving wide participation from within the region, with NGOs and private sector organisations present, as well as government staff from all levels. The draft RCS should be revised to incorporate comments from the conference and should then be approved by the RECC before submission to the Regional Council for political approval. This submission may also include recommendations about institutional arrangements for facilitating the implementation of the RCS.



There are a number of points about the RCS process to note. The first, is that this is the last stage in a multi-year consultation process which has involved the collection of environmental material in the previous 28 regions to feed into the national level work on the CSE. Hence the process described above is the return “route” whereby nationally agreed analysis of the environmental situation feeds back into the RCS Task Force’s work. This has meant that at the regional level there has been an on-and-off environmental data collection and analysis process going for nine or ten years. The danger of this is that repeatedly working at a similar stage leads to fatigue and disenchantment with a feeling that little progress is being made.

Secondly, in most cases the RCS process has been focused on political approval and this has been seen as a pre-requisite before any action can be taken on the ground using the RCS. This has had major implications in terms of delays, as will be explained below, and has raised a number of questions about whether all ways of using an RCS had to wait for political approval.

Thirdly, the RCS has been developed in a way involving multi-sectoral co-operation, with similar multi-sectoral co-ordination envisaged for the implementation of the RCS under RECC guidance. This too has had implications for the process and the differences between the theoretical advantages of co-operation and practical problems in achieving it have also led to serious debates.

### **8.3 RCS Process in the Regions – Performance Assessed through the Case Studies**

The following discussion is based on case studies made through visits to eight of the eleven regions and city administrations (all referred to as regions), the reports from which are found in Annex 5. The methods used to collect the data have been outlined in Chapter 2 and the checklists used can be found in Annex 3. The discussion primarily expresses the conclusions of the evaluation team, and does not repeat individual pieces of information reported from the regions, which can be found in Annex 5.

#### **a) RCS Production and Approval**

The RCS process for the most part only started just before the CSE III commenced or during its first year. In most cases quite good progress was made during the first year with the production of the first draft RCS and its discussion at each region’s RCS conference by the end of 1996 or in early 1997 for nine of the 11 regions. The use of a financial incentive, Birr 5,000, to be shared amongst the Task Force members on completion of the draft, appears to have been effective in stimulating this work. (Two major exceptions to this were the Addis Ababa Administration which took three years to complete its draft RCS, while the Beni-Shangul Gumuz Region also took several years to complete its draft RCS).

These RCS first drafts were often produced under very difficult condition, with major staff changes occurring in 1996 and the restructuring of bureaus. In some cases, such as Beni-Shangul Gumuz, the changes were too disruptive and the RCS process was aborted after the production of only one of the three volumes envisaged and it was not started again for a number of years.

The RCS conferences which were held at this time (mostly in 1996/97) were generally quite wide ranging in their membership including all government offices at the regional level, as well as some zonal representatives. Some NGOs working in the region were included as well as religious organisations and representatives of civil society, such as farmers, youths, and women, with one professional society included in the Addis Ababa conference. However, the

involvement of the private sector was very limited with evidence of this found only in Addis Ababa, and that being through the Chamber of Commerce.

While a large number of people, typically around 100, participated in the RCS conferences, they were mainly consultative in nature. By this it is meant that they asked participants for comments and corrections on a pre-circulated draft, rather than providing an opportunity for participants to influence the structure of the RCS process, its activities and outputs. Further in most cases participation was limited by the fact that the RCS draft was in English and was two to three hundred pages in length. Nonetheless, in the Ethiopian situation such meetings were important in making the process public and allowing comments and this was seen by the CSE management as participatory, despite the limitations.

After the RCS conferences, a number of delays were encountered in many regions. The first of these typically concerned revision of the RCS documents into a form suitable for submission to the Regional Council. In several cases this delay was partly because the first draft RCSs were rather badly organised and in poor English. This required a lot of editorial work and rewriting to bring them up to a standard to submit to the RECCs and Regional Councils. Another cause of this delay is a reported reduction in the amount of assistance by the Project at this stage, which led to some Task Forces not being clear about what was required. (This cut back in support may have been due to the reduction in funding which occurred in 1998 when the Project's future was uncertain.) There are two reflections on these Task Force – Project relationships that the Evaluation Team would make. One is that the regions were heavily dependent on support from the Project to complete their work. The second is that this support may not have been adequate in the first year if the first draft RCSs needed so much further work to produce final versions for approval.

Another reason for the delay in the revision work by the RCS Task Force relates to the pressures from other responsibilities faced by the RCS Task Force members as the regions became established and began to operate fully. It must be remembered that all the RCS Task Force members and the staff in the RECC secretariat were seconded government officials who continued to have their formal job responsibilities to fulfil. A further reason for slow progress pointed out in one region, but probably of wider significance, was that by this revision stage it was clear to the Task Force that the RECC was not meeting regularly and that there was a lack of political support for the RCS process at the higher levels. This caused enthusiasm to wane in at least one case.

The next point of delay was, and continues to be in many cases, at the political approval level. This involves two steps: approval by the RECC and then by the Regional Council. A key factor in this is that the RCSs, despite support from the CSE III and indirectly through the Federal Government's adoption of the CSE, have not managed to gain much political clout in their regions. As a result there have been difficulties in getting RCS approval onto the agenda of the Regional Council Meetings, which occur only twice a year. Similarly, even the RECCs have found it difficult to meet on a regular basis to support the RCS process, approve it and push the Council to act on it. Obtaining political attention for environmental issues has been a continual difficulty in the new regions, and this has been particularly severe in recent years with the second round of elections in 2000 and the almost continual rectification meetings for much of the first half of 2001. The CSE III has tried to address this by undertaking high level visits to the regions in 1999 and 2000 with the NPC, Dr Tewolde, holding meetings with senior members of the regional councils. While one such visit was reported to be very effective in Amhara Region, elsewhere the impact has been much less.

There are two further delays, which have been encountered at the political approval level. The first is the request in most regions for the RCSs to be translated into local languages and for a summary to be made. These tasks have often been arranged by the CSE III using consultants they know to have relevant skills. However, this has not been a quick process according to many regions who have raised serious complaints about the delays incurred. The second delay here is the way in which institutional conflicts have been stimulated by the proposals to set up regional environmental agencies to support the RCS implementation. In some regions this has become a major issue and involved more than a year of negotiations. Oromia is a case in point where the BoA is to be completely restructured in the process of setting up this new agency.

Despite these difficulties, the RCS documents which were produced are not simply clones of the national CSE, but do include local adjustment in terms of the number of themes identified, the prioritising of issues and their content and structure. For instance, the Gambella RCS has a major section on wetlands, which is not in the CSE, while the Oromia RCS has a major adjustment in terms of the three volumes it has produced which focus on the issues and problems. There was only one complaint encountered that the CSE III required too much adherence to a particular format and content.

#### b) Timeliness of the RCS

While the RCS process and approval procedures have been long-winded, this has not yet impacted upon their timeliness. Almost universally within the regions people have expressed concern over worsening environmental conditions and identified the need for guidance about how to address these issues and co-ordinate action by the different agencies. As the problems get worse, people begin to see the inter-linkages between different sectors and the actions of different agencies and recognise the appropriateness of the RCS process.

#### c) Use of the RCS and the Need for Approval

There is a general acceptance of normal bureaucratic procedures in Ethiopia with respect to the RCSs. This means that no action with respect to an RCS is possible until it is approved. This is partly a budgetary matter, but it is very much a formal and legal issue as well. While this “waiting for the green light”, or approval, has meant that in general little has been done with the majority of the RCSs that are not approved, there are a number of exceptions where some informal RCS-related activities are going on.

The most significant of these exceptions is in Addis Ababa where Wereda Environmental Co-ordinating Committees (WECCs) have been established and some community based planning for using the RCS has been started. The Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB), which was set up in Addis Ababa shortly after the city administration was established, has also developed and submitted to its Regional Council draft legislation on various aspects of environmental management and has started a budgeting process for its activities, including funding a laboratory to start environmental monitoring in the region. There are also reports of some RCS related actions in Tigray, Gambella, Dire Dawa and Somali (with UNHCR funds) even though the RCSs have not been approved.

The most widespread exception to the “waiting for approval” syndrome is the use of the RCSs to guide the development and submission for funding of project proposals. This was found in all regions visited. In some cases CSE trainees have already obtained funding for projects to address specific environmental problems. In other cases some agencies and NGOs are using the draft RCSs to guide them in policy making or material production, with the Education

Bureau in Oromia using the RCS to design environmental education curricula, and the Water and Mines Bureau in SNNPRS using their RCS to develop a new regional policy.

Since 1999, the CSE III has also encouraged community groups in regions to develop projects for the micro-implementation of the RCS. While over 70 of these local environmental projects have been produced and submitted to the CSE III Project management, many were not truly community-based projects and so could not be approved. As a result, only 30 were approved and in the end only 16 are being implemented with a total commitment of SFr 200,000 (see Table 5.6).

Most regions have ensured that some of the RCS ideas and principles are included in the recently prepared Five Year Development Plans. While this shows a positive recognition of the RCS process, the extent of the text on this and commitment is quite variable, ranging from a very brief mention to a clear wish to integrate environmental considerations across all sectors. The latter is the case in Addis Ababa where the unapproved RCS has been used in the revision of the city's master plan. This no doubt helped raise its profile and ensured it was given due attention in the Five Year Development Plan as well.

#### d) Training Achievements

In the regional visits an attempt was made to assess the training provided to the staff in the different bureaus involved in the RCS work. On the whole it was found that this was relevant and is being used by many of the trainees met, for instance in areas such as project design and environmental assessment. However, some training, such as in environmental economics, is ahead of its time in terms of people not yet having uses for it. This raises questions about the loss of such skills if they are not used. An initial assessment of need was made by the Project, which helped ensure that the training was relevant, but some method of obtaining feedback would have been useful so that the training programme could evolve to meet changing needs. Similarly, some way of linking training to follow-up programmes of activity in the regions could have helped ground the training in the regional reality.

Some guidance was also given to the RECCs and the RCS Task Forces when they were set up, in addition to specific training for individuals. While this was relevant, it does not seem to have been very effective in ensuring the operation of the RECCs (see Section 8.4 below).

#### e) Awareness Raising and Communications

A major concern in CSE III has been to develop methods for disseminating understanding of the RCS/CSE process. To support this, three workshops have been held in each region focusing on Communications Training, Awareness Raising and Women and the Environment. These have been held when regions felt the time was appropriate for them. As a result while four of these workshops were in 1996 and 1997, the majority were in 1998 and 1999, with a few even in 2001. These have been supplemented by some federal level workshops to which some representative from the regions have been invited. (See Table 8.1)

**Table 8.1: Communication and Awareness Workshops**

Region	Communication Date	No. of Participants	Awareness Date	No. of Participants	Locations
Tigray	16-19.06.99	50	??-??.04.97	45	Mekele
Afar	19-21.03.01	73	30-31.08.00	55	Aysaita
Amhara	27-30.08.97	35	01-04.06.98	42	Bahir Dar
Oromia	29.09-2.10.98	35	05-07.06.96?	120	Nazareth
Gambella	23-25.11.00	45	04-07.05.99	83	Gambella
Beni-shangul	17-19.05.99	46	16-18.10.98	40	Assosa
SNNPR	24-26.03.98	35	23-25.04.99	c70	Awassa (YA)
Somali	30.03-1.04.01	44	02-05.11.99	36	Jijiga
Harari	14-16.10.98	32	01-03.06.99	72	Harar
Dire Dawa	??-??.11.97	60	20-23.10.98	58	Dire Dawa
Addis Ababa	29-31.07.98	49	10-12.06.98	57	Addis Ababa
Sidama Zone	-	-	23-25.08.99	70	Yirgalem (YA)

Through these activities and the RCS conferences, the CSE III has had a major impact at the regional level amongst government officials in terms of raising awareness about environmental issues. It was widely reported in the regional visits that such officials do now consider environmental matters in their decision-making. In addition the RCS training has introduced new concepts, such as the polluter pays, and environmental assessment, which have helped increase awareness. Some of this training has also had spin off effects notably in one case where the Women's Bureau, as a new agency, had used RCS materials to help their work.

However, experience in the regional interviews raised questions about the level of awareness beyond the group of government officials directly involved in the RCS process, i.e. the Task Force and Secretariat / Focal Point. One key problem seems to be the lack of dissemination of RCS ideas by the participants within their own bureaus. In only one case was there evidence of attempts to disseminate information by a participant in the RCS process through circulating reports of activities to his colleagues. In most cases bureau representatives in RCS activities seem to keep information about these activities to themselves.

This problem draws attention to the fact that in all regions, except Addis Ababa, there has been no implementation of any communication strategy, despite the regional workshops on this. Some form of communication, either using magazine, newspaper or radio, should have been developed at the regional level to keep people informed about the RCS process and progress. This might have helped keep the RCS more in the local news and helped pressure those involved to finalise and approve it. A newsletter, or even a summary of the RCS draft in the local language would have made the document much more accessible.

This question of the language and length of the RCS document raises a number of strategic questions with respect to the RCS process, which the CSE III management should have addressed with greater care. Was producing the RCS in English and allowing this to be a multi-volume document the right approach? Is this not a rather elitist approach, given the limited use of English at the regional level? Is this not one of the reasons for the slow progress

of the RCS processes? In the end this lesson seems to have been learned with a summary in the appropriate local language produced in several cases, but usually only in response to requests for these from the regional council.

A further communication issue is the cost of producing copies of RCS documents given their length. This has meant in Oromia region that only 6 copies have so far been produced when its RCS was approved in late 2000. In reality over 100 are needed.

While producing copies of the RCS for the government departments is one need, a much greater need is to raise awareness and communicate the RCS down to the wereda and community level. To date there has been no action at this level – except in DireDawa and Addis Ababa city administrations. This grassroots dissemination requires a two way discussion process, not just a top-down handing out of posters and leaflets. Hence, meetings and other interactive fora should have been used to ensure that everyone is aware of the process. A further area of communication necessary is with the business community so that investors can understand and respond to the environmental questions in the investment appraisal forms. Unfortunately, despite having funds in the CSE III Project, which could have been used for these tasks, and some relevant skills in the project's communication unit, these were never done. For the most part this was due to the absence of RCS approval, or the loss of momentum given the delays between the communication workshop and the RCS approval.

#### **8.4 Sustainability Assessment of the RCS Process**

A key question is whether the RCSs will be used. This is essential if they are to survive and have the potential to make a lasting contribution to the environmental management in the regions. Hence, the future of the RCSs depends on people in the region being shown how to use them. It also depends on an appropriate institutional structure being established and working effectively to ensure implementation. While the use of the RCS is partly a question of awareness, in this section the issues of institutional arrangements, staffing and ownership will be addressed.

##### **a) RECCs – weak institutions**

A major concern of the Evaluation Team and many interviewees, given the emphasis on the RECCs in the project document, is the poor operational performance of the RECCs. On the whole the RECCs meet infrequently and irregularly. In the five years of operation only one region (Harari) has seen its RECC meet on average more than once a year. (They should meet twice a year or more frequently if required.) As a result the RECCs have not been very effective at pushing the RCS process either at the Task Force level or the Regional Council. As stated earlier in this section there seems to be a lack of political interest in the RCS process as there are politically more important things to which bureau heads and council members need to give their attention. However, the fault should not all be placed on the side of the RECC members. Instead, the Evaluation Team would suggest that the CSE III has not done enough to support and develop the RECCs, especially in their operational arrangements, assuming such support would have been acceptable and would not have undermined local ownership of the RCS process.

There is much evidence of the lack of importance accorded the RCS process, with RECC chairs not being replaced and attendance at RECC meetings losing out to demands to attend other commitments and committees. This failure to take the RECCs seriously may be due to the fact that the RECCs have no legal status. It may also be due to the failure of the RCSs to

clearly assist in addressing development issues and the lack of any link to funding for major projects. In effect REEC members cannot see anything tangible from the RCS and RECC attendance for their bureaus.

On the operational side, there appear to be some issues which have not been fully addressed. Some respondents in the regions pointed to the political rivalries between the new bureaus as they staked out their territory. This was reported to make it difficult to bring bureaus together in this non-legal RECC. Secondly it was pointed out that in Ethiopia committees do not function well and tend not to get things done. (The committee was suggested to be a western democratic concept, which does not work in Ethiopia.) Thirdly it was pointed out that the RECC will find it hard to reach a decision when all members are of equal status – all heads of bureaus. On the other hand in some of the smaller regions (in population size), and the newer regions without established bureaucratic competition, there are reports that the representatives from the different bureaus have co-operated well in the RECCs, and that this forum for bringing people together from different bureaus was appreciated.

The level at which such environmental co-ordinating committees can operate best was raised on a number of occasions in different regions. It was suggested that the most effective operation would be at the wereda level where interest in the environment and a sense of local ownership is strongest. At zonal and regional levels it is reported that such feeling do not exist. What little experience there is at this level from Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa would confirm this.

It remains to be seen if the RECCs can become operational and be better supported once the RCSs are approved and the new regional environmental agencies established to act as their secretariats. Certainly the problems they have faced have been caused by the lack of political approval of the RCSs and the seconded staff acting as a part-time secretariat. However, whether a new, and politically weak agency can put renewed life into the RECCs is debatable. Further there is the danger that the RECCs could become bureaucratic hurdles for all RCS follow-up activities, and that their co-ordination role could become a major problem in implementation, rather than being helpful.

Recently some RECCs have been expanded in membership to include more government and quasi government organisations as well as NGOs. This wider membership, if it becomes effective, might be one way to create some pressure for action by the RECCs.

#### b) Staffing

There are two points to make about staffing and sustainability: one is continuity and the other is dependence. First, most of the regions, except the urban ones, reported problems with staff turnover in the bureaus concerned with the RCS process. This has caused major problems in preparing the RCSs and in revising them. It was frequently stated that staff do not stay long enough to understand the RCS and get used to it. As a result a critical mass of people who know the RCS does not exist to act as a driving force to push the process forward. This loss of staff is partly for financial and political reasons as people leave government employment for better jobs with NGOs and the private sector or go overseas. This makes it necessary to continually retrain RCS and RECC members, which of course delays progress towards implementation.

Secondly it appears that in many regions, the RCS process was spearheaded by one or two key persons, and not a core group in the way the Nepal NCS was kept going (Carew-Reid et al,

1994). As a result the RCS process has become dependent on certain individuals. If they leave, as is likely for senior people in times of political evolution, then the process may be left without anyone committed to it. This experience suggests the need to have either an understudy, or preferably a core group so that the momentum can be maintained. It is better still, as in Addis Ababa, to have an environmental bureau, which has a vested interest in the success of the RCS process, and for this bureau to be established before the RCS work starts.

### c) Nature of Ownership of the RCS Process

A key issue in much of the regional work in the CSE III has been the question of ownership. Stimulating the RCS process in the new regions has been a delicate matter so that the regions feel some ownership over the process and do not feel it to be a federal imposition from the SCSE. A sense of ownership in the region is essential if the process is to be sustained.

It was difficult to assess what sort of ownership the RCS process has created. In some cases there are reports that the regions are proud of their achievements in creating the RCS documents. This is especially true in peripheral regions where no such co-ordinated body of information ever existed in the past. There are also some positive experiences at the wereda level where RCS use has begun in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. Certainly in Addis Ababa the initiative now seems to be coming from the wereda level and not from above.

One indication of local ownership of the RCS process is the degree of interest in it. In some cases it was reported that NGOs want to have get access to RCS documents and apply them. However, in general it does not seem that people are pressing to have access to the RCS. The reasons for this may relate to the restricted involvement of non-government stakeholders in the RCS process, but may also be because the RCS does not offer bureaus, NGO or others sufficient guidance for use or implementation or access to any source of funding for environmentally-related activities.

There is also an issue within the government structure where ownership of the RCS has been held quite tightly by the secretariat / focal point bureaus, usually BoPED, but sometimes BoA. This has resulted in some jealousy between agencies and has limited the co-operation among RECC members. The causes of this may be the equipment support, which the CSE III provided to the focal point bureaus in each region, or it may be a result of the focal bureaus dominating discussions about the RCS. This has also led to a situation where the other bureaus are waiting for the focal point to tell them what to do, rather than looking to see what in the RCS is of relevance and help to them. However, the situation is not uniform, and there are cases where there is good co-operation between the regional bureaus.

The question of ownership has been a repeated concern for the CSE III over the last two years as sustainability beyond the project period has been considered. In October 2000 there were still concerns by the Project about the failure of the regional political authorities to take ownership of the process (Kifle Lemma, 2000). Certainly it seems that there will be a need for continued efforts by EPA and the regional environmental agencies to encourage the regional political leaders to take responsibility for the environment in their regions and to support the RCS process.

It may be that uncertainty about the future level of political and financial support for the RCS process and the uncertainty about institutional arrangement are reasons why regional bureaus are not expressing clear support for and ownership over the activities the Project has started. Hence a key issue is the development of financial and institutional arrangements with the new



regional environmental agencies. Once this is achieved then ownership may become less of an issue.

Wider interest in the RCSs is also an issue. NGO participation in the RCS processes has been sensitive and the response of the RECCs and Task Forces has varied. Some regions want to keep the RCS process totally within government, whereas others see NGOs as key implementers with skills in participation. Some regions have even allowed selected NGOs to be on the RECC.

The involvement of the civil society in the RCS process has so far been limited to representative groups attending the RCS conferences. However, over the life of the CSE III Project there has been increasing concern about the need to involve the wider community in the CSE and RCS processes. In the most recent report on the regional work (Kifle Lemma, 2000, p.19), there is a clear acknowledgement of the need for this in the light of growing sustainability concerns, although it appears that as yet the message has not been fully taken up in all regions.

This progressive concern about the need for wider involvement in order to generate ownership and support for the RCS process is rather late in the day. A much more interactive process might have been attempted from the start with awareness raising, dissemination of initial ideas and discussions of community views undertaken before formulation of the RCS began, and well before the first draft was presented to the RCS conference. Whether this was feasible in the political situation is perhaps debatable, but certainly more could have been done in that direction if the RCS processes had given some specific roles and opportunities to civil society groups and NGOs.

### **8.5 Project Support for the RCS Process**

An issue that has been explored in each regional visit is the support by the CSE III Project to the region. While this appears to have been standard in terms of the amount of equipment, it has apparently varied in terms of number of visits and their timing. Most regions expressed concern about the volume and timing of the technical support both during the field visits of this mission and in the regular focal point meetings which were run in the later years of the Project (CSE, 2000b and 2000c). (Unfortunately no data could be obtained from the Project on regional support visits.)

In general, it seems that the regions feel they had inadequate support after the RCS conferences when the revisions and finalisation of the RCSs were taking place. In some cases the regions felt that there were delays in receiving comments from the Project or SCSE for finalising their RCSs or there were delays in the Project's support for translation and producing summaries. The most serious problem seems to be a misreading of the approval process by the Project. It appears that once the submission stage was reached the Project expected approval to be rapid and automatic and gave little support. Experience has shown this not to be the case and that support and lobbying should have been provided sooner than the regional visits in 1999 / 2000 by the NPC.

Another concern from the regions is the insufficient duration and volume of training provided by the CSE III. This has also been reported from other recent analyses (Kifle Lemma, 2000, p.13/14). As a result it is argued that an adequate core group of skilled persons has not been built up in each region. This is debatable as between 14 and 79 persons were trained from

each region, although it is recognised that there have been losses of staff after training. However, it could be argued that the Project had done its job and that further training should have been developed and institutionalised by the regions themselves, especially if they want to have such skills developed in some form at the zonal and wereda levels. The Project could not be expected to provide training forever.

If there were gaps in training, the Evaluation Team view is that these were in the areas of fund raising, RCS policy implementation and operationalisation, incorporating environment into planning, and awareness creation and consultative workshops at wereda and zonal levels. The other area of failure is in terms of developing trainers of trainers for each region in subjects of greatest need.

Finally the relation between the Project and some of the regions has been under stress during the last year due to the local environmental projects. These were invited from the regions in 1999 in order to ensure that some field implementation of RCS activities occurred. However, only 16 out of over 70 project proposals have been funded. While timing and lack of community involvement have been cited as reasons for the limited number of projects supported, the regional focal points and RECCs have been upset to see proposals refused which they had approved and forwarded.

### **8.6 Overall Results of the RCS Process and Reflections**

The regional part of the CSE III has achieved a considerable amount despite the various limitations pointed out above. Five RCSs have been approved and institutional arrangement for two regional environmental agencies are in place, with one of these functioning. The RCSs for the other six regions are completed and submitted for approval or nearly at this stage. Through the RCS process a large number of regional government staff and a few representatives in civil society have been made aware of the importance of environment in the development process and the need to integrate these two in order to achieve sustainable development. This has been a completely new area of thinking for most of these people and a period of major transformation for the regional level government offices. However, little has progressed below the regional level to where implementation can take place and to where there is reportedly a much better empirical awareness of environmental issues with which the RCS process should link.

In the light of this experience, a number of questions are raised which will be briefly discussed here in concluding this section.

#### **a) Conceptualisation of the RCS Process**

The RCS process was seen as a fixed set of steps through which all regions would pass at roughly the same rate. This raises two questions. Was it correct to require all regions to follow the same steps? Was it correct to try to keep all regions moving at roughly the same rate? More flexibility in these areas might have been better for operational and ownership reasons, but it was probably not politically acceptable.

The length of the RCS process was considerable, especially when the first stage contributing to the CSE is included. This long time is bound to have periods of activity, but also ones when momentum is lost. Perhaps a shorter process should have been envisaged so that it was easier to maintain the momentum.

The RCS processes, like the CSE one, focused on document production rather than raising awareness, generating political /community support and implementation of the RCSs. A different balance would seem to have been more desirable on reflection.

#### b) Institutionalisation

The Addis Ababa experience suggests that having an environmental agency at the regional level is critical for getting the RCS process moving on the ground. Although the Addis Ababa RCS is still not approved, this region has the greatest amount of RCS activity. This suggests that the Project might have been better to have helped regions develop their own environmental institutions and then leave these to take forward their RCS process with less support from the Project and with more local ownership. These new environmental agencies would have been able to act as secretariats for the REECs and so hopefully would have improved their functioning.

However, the experience of Addis Ababa is not a perfect model as the Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) is operating without an effective RECC, which it has not been able to stimulate into action. As a result the EPB develops its own environmental sector of activities, rather than integrating environmental concerns into the activities of all the different bureaus.

A final question here is whether the new regional environmental agencies, can have any influence as new and politically weak institutions compared to the established line bureaus who will defend their areas from outside scrutiny. This will require considerable negotiating skills from the new agencies so that they do not create conflict situations, and this will require an active and effective RECC.

#### c) Role of Financial Incentives

A key question raised by the regional experience, but also relevant nationally, is whether interest and support for the CSE and RCS processes would have been better if using these documents (i.e. applying the RCSs or CSE) could have been tied to a special fund to support appropriate projects. It is suggested that bureaus need to be able to get something out of the RCS process, otherwise why should they invest their time in it? An RCS fund, jointly provided by central government and donors, and tied to pilot implementation of approved RCS projects, might have been a way to stimulate attention. This would also have provided an opportunity and encouragement for people to be creative about how to use the RCS and its principles. Such funding would also have addressed a concern of some people that the RCSs (and CSE) were telling people what to do, but not giving them the resources to do anything. However, developing this fund in the past, or even now, is a problem given the little attention the CSE III has given to the donors.

#### d) RCS Political Approval Process and Co-ordination Priorities

The experience of delays in the approval of RCSs at various stages, suggests that questions should be raised about following alternative routes for the RCS process. Further, the experience in Addis Ababa, where the RCS has progressed furthest in terms of implementation despite the non-approval of the RCS, also raises doubts about the importance of both the Regional Council approval and the need for a functioning RECC. Taking this analysis further, the question could be raised about whether alternative routes could have been pursued to get the RCSs into use. One suggestion would be that the RCS is seen as a regional technical adjustment of a federal policy and as such does not need regional political approval. In this situation government bureaus and NGOs could be encouraged to pick up projects,

policies and ideas put forward in the RCS and apply them through their own projects and activities. However, this raises the question of which institution would do the encouraging, if that is needed, and more importantly, in terms of the current CSE / RCS thinking, who should do the co-ordination.

It is with respect to institutions that political support is needed. First there is a question of an environmental agency to monitor and encourage appropriate interpretation of the RCS. Such agencies can only be set up with the approval of both the regional and federal governments as it affects government staffing and recurrent costs. Secondly there is the question of whether there is an alternative to the RECC, which would be strong enough to achieve co-ordination between the sectoral bureaus and the private and NGO actors. And the role of the RECC also raises the point that it is in large part the regional bureaux, not the regional environmental agencies that are foreseen as implementers. Hence, a RECC or something similar has to be in place to ensure that environmental concerns are integrated into all sectoral activities and not just implemented as narrow environment sector actions by a regional environmental agency becoming operational. Without a RECC or similar, the chances of getting bureau heads to support the RCS process will be reduced and the possibilities of co-ordination and integration reduced.

#### e) Technical Support, Dependence and Sustainability

The question of whether to provide high levels of technical and financial support in a project such as this are raised by the issue of sustainability. This Project, despite the complaints about lack of support for the regions, has caused a level of technical dependence by the regions, which is a concern. This is seen especially in Addis Ababa where the highest level of support appears to have been provided by the Project and SCSE, but is also likely in the other regions where several workshops have been run by the Project and visits by project staff have been used to push the process along. The need for continued technical support for the regions has been expressed in a recent project review (Kifle Lemma, 2000, p.20) but it is doubtful if the EPA will be able to continue such support and the result is likely to be much reduced levels of activity at the regional level.

#### f) Beyond Top Downism – the Pros and Cons of the Process Approach

The problem of delays and lack of political attention for the RCS process raises the question of how much the RCSs should be left to develop at the pace the region wants, and how much should they be pushed to prevent them always being at the bottom of the priority list. Should the Project have imposed a timetable or an institution? A timetable means continual pressure. Is it better to impose the institution and then leave this and the region to decide for themselves what to do?

In so far as the RCS formulation was prompted from the federal level one can say there was an element of a top-down approach. This may be seen continuing in the way Addis Ababa's EPB prompted the wereda level stakeholders to establish the WECCS. However, the fact that the WECCS have developed their own initiative indicates that such initiatives can perhaps stimulate local initiative and ownership. Clearly this may be easier at lower levels where people are dealing with issues which are close to their heart, i.e.- finding solution to the everyday problems they face, than at the regional level.

#### g) Action Plans and Implementation

The actions plans in the RCSs, where they exist, appear to be just government bureau "wish-lists" built up in the offices without any consultation with communities. In fact to some extent

they are lists of what already are in the plans of the bureaus. In this respect, it may be argued that the RCSs stifled public initiatives and failed to set RCS ideas running amongst the public, NGOs and the private sector so that they could decide what sort of things should be done. If RCS activities are to be meaningful and sustainable, they need to be coming from as far down as the kebeles and the communities, not from the government offices.

### **8.7 Conclusions**

The many questions, which are raised by the RCS process, are not a criticism per se of the process. In some instances this is the case, but in other cases the questions are more ideas, which have been stimulated by the process. This is indeed the critical point; this was an entirely new process in Ethiopia, indeed probably in the world, to decentralise and create new regional versions of a national environmental strategy, the CSE. This was done under unique conditions as the new regions were being established in Ethiopia and as such it was very much a learning process. The fact that it got as far as it did is a credit to the CSE III, as are the questions, which this experience has stimulated.

## CHAPTER 9

### WEREDA PILOT PROJECT

#### 9.1 Aims of the Wereda Pilot Project

The Wereda Pilot Project (WPP) was the third of the four main elements identified in the project document (Section 3.3). The document states that the first objective of the Project's wereda level activities is:

“to assist in bringing about a participatory sustainable rural development process of planning and implementation.”

This is translated into the working documents of the Project as the aim of:

“testing the implementation of the CSE at community level with broad participation of communities and with local resources.”

The project document also goes on to state that in order “to promote such participation (identified in the CSE Action Plan as necessary for effective natural resource management) the first pilot project will be undertaken at the wereda level.” It then states that the CSE III Project “will, in partnership with local communities, assist in the development of the pilot wereda project, including ...the development of local environmental strategies and a management plan. External inputs will be kept to a minimum to facilitate local sustainability.” The project activities are identified as seeking to “provide technical advice and training assistance, train rural leaders and wereda staff in rapid and participatory rural appraisal techniques, help communities create a practical data and information base for development planning, assist wereda staff and communities in the development of environmental guidelines, support the development of community capacity to enforce local environmental guidelines.”

Clearly the project was meant to develop community-based, participatory sustainable natural resource management and to involve communities in developing guidelines for such management and ways to enforce this, relying as much as possible on local resources. It should be recalled that in developing this pilot project the CSE III was seeking to develop a model, or guidance for practices, to be disseminated across the country and so help translate the CSE document and its guidance into action on the ground.

#### 9.2 Process of Developing and Clarifying the WPP Activities

The WPP has been subject to unprecedented delays for various reasons. It was meant to be a three year activity running throughout the original Project period (1996-1998), but it was shelved until an April/May 1997 start because of the belief that it could only start and be effective once the CSE was approved. Then it slipped to 1998 due problems negotiating with Amhara Region for permission to work in Ankober Wereda, and the financial uncertainties, which affected the Project at that time. It finally began to move ahead with the appointment of a co-ordinator in November 1998 and a two-year implementation period was envisaged. Consultants to undertake the baseline assessment and planning were contracted in July 1999 for work of 1.5 months; their final output was only available in December 2000 just as the two years of field activities by the WPP terminated.

According to some staff consulted and also the Evaluation Team's assessment of the documentation available, one of the major reasons for the delay in the WPP was an uncertainty among the project staff about what the WPP should involve. This caused a lot of discussion in the Project about what was needed and where the WPP fitted into the overall Project, and three workshops were held in March 1996, April 1997 and September 1998 to discuss these issues (CSE, 1997, 1998b, 1999a).

In these discussions there seem to have been tension between project staff over different approaches which could be followed, with a debate about how much the approach should be top-down, i.e. technician led, or bottom-up, i.e. community led. There also seems to have been some disquiet about the CSE III getting involved in field implementation and a wish to avoid having to implement this activity. For instance there are statements such as "Is it realistic to expect an enthusiastic response from the wereda people?" and "Can a small core staff and limited inputs achieve the objective?" Nonetheless, the workshops did agree that there should be an emphasis upon community involvement and that ideas about natural resource management should come from the communities and not be imposed from outside. They also included recognition of the need to understand and work with community level institutions and to use "experts employed from among the community". Certainly the empowerment of the community, i.e. having control over the operations of the WPP, was seen as important, and is explained, along with ideas relating to local knowledge in the report of the April 1997 workshop on the WPP (CSE, 1997).

The role of NGOs in relation to this project was debated in all the workshops but it was never finally clarified. Having an NGO-implemented project accountable to the SCSE was seen in April 1997 as the best solution. However, in the end NGOs were not involved in the WPP and the baseline and planning activities were contracted to a consultancy company and the field / community support activities of the WPP were located within the existing government structure at the wereda level with a Project Co-ordinator employed and managed by the CSE III T.A. (Apparently NGOs are seen now in 2001 as useful, with an Italian NGO planning to undertake some follow-up work in Ankober with EU food security funds starting in late 2001 or 2002.)

While NGO direct involvement in the WPP was rejected, there was an attempt to learn lessons from NGOs, as they were involved in two of the WPP workshops. However, the major commissioned study to identify lessons from the five NGO case studies of community participation in natural resource management, was never formulated with a view to supporting the WPP in its design stage and was only produced in January 2000, well after the WPP was already set on its particular route.

The various workshops and discussions about the WPP came to a number of interesting conclusions. In March 1996 it was agreed that one pilot project would not be enough for learning lessons for use across the whole country and that several would be needed. In April 1997 it was envisaged that a major communications programme would be necessary to popularise the CSE in the wereda or weredas chosen for the pilot activities. Finally, there was an attempt in 1999 to make the late starting WPP a three-year project and extend its activities to the end of 2001. (This was not accepted by the executing agency (IUCN) presumably for project management reasons as the Project was expected to end in 2000.)

### 9.3 Activities Carried Out

Implementation of the WPP started in November 1998 when the agreement with the Amhara Region Bureau of Agriculture was signed. After this a co-ordinator was recruited and a PRA training workshop run for Zonal and Wereda staff who were to be involved with the project. Computer equipment was provided for the focal point in the Wereda Agricultural Department and the construction of an office for that department was begun.

The WPP co-ordinator recruited had been a Development Agent in Ankober Wereda and so was familiar with the area and the communities. His work involved raising awareness of environmental issues amongst the rural communities, the Wereda Council and the Agricultural Office, and organising related workshops and films shows. He was also concerned with supporting the Bio-dynamics company which in parallel with the project trained 10 farmers directly and another 100 indirectly in intensive organic farming of vegetable to help people raise production, income and nutrition in the area. While the co-ordinator undertook environmental awareness activities amongst both urban and rural communities, one respondent in the Wereda Council pointed out that most people were aware of such problems before the project started. It was also stressed by the same respondent that supervising the building of the project office took much of the co-ordinator's time, a fact he admitted indirectly when interviewed as this was the first activity reported. He was also involved in facilitating the consultants' work (see below).

The approach chosen by the CSE III's T.A., who was responsible for the WPP, was to contract a local consultancy company for developing "the practical data and information base" and "local environmental strategies and management plan". This contract started in July 1999, a delay of some seven or eight months after WPP implementation had begun. The consultants' work, which was scheduled to take 1.5 months, took very much longer with a draft of the contents of the report being discussed only in November 1999 and the first draft of report accepted in March 2000. However, this had a number of areas where the CSE III were dissatisfied and a workshop to discuss the report was held in September 2000 at Debre Birhan.

The report of this workshop (in Amharic) is a fairly damning criticism of the consultants' work and of the CSE III management of the consultants. Amongst other things it points to:

- A failure of community participation throughout this exercise, and not just in parts
- Heavy involvement of the consultants in selecting the priority problems, the ones for which they had solutions, rather than including all problems which the communities raised with them
- Proposal of "alien" solutions, rather than ones which come from within the local community and its expertise
- The high dependence on external inputs in the solutions proposed thereby undermining local community ownership
- The need for high levels of support from GOs and NGOs to implement the management plans, rather than relying on the local community, and
- A long list of points expected to be in the plans but which were absent such as:
  - Identification of the roots causes of local environmental problems
  - Solutions to problems as proposed by the communities
  - Possible local contributions to problem solving
  - Ways to increase community participation
  - Opportunities and constraints as seen by the local communities



- Local institutional arrangements and their role in improved resource management (CSE, 2000a).

As a result the consultants were required to go back to the field and “put the participation into their work”, a totally unacceptable way of trying to involve the communities and achieve meaningful participation. As a result the final reports with their plans for the communities were not produced until December 2000, the same month that the WPP closed.

The final document produced by the consultants involved a limited number of specific innovations in each area, which seemed to have come from external sources. The activities proposed for a three year period were costed at close to \$10m for the five sub-kebeles identified for action, and a high level of dependence of outside finance and technical assistance was consequently required.

## **9.4 Assessment of Achievements and Experience**

### a) Overall Assessment

As the above description suggests there have been major problems with the WPP. Opinions amongst CSE, EPA and EPU staff interviewed were fairly critical with a number of people suggesting that its only useful output was the construction of an office for the Wereda Agriculture Department. Others suggested that it has raised environmental awareness in the wereda amongst both communities and the wereda officials in agriculture and the council. This, it was suggested, could provide a basis for future work by the Italian NGO, which is expected to pick up some of the ideas in consultants’ plan. However, with the raised expectations, the current delay in the start-up of the NGOs activities threatens to undermine people’s interest and enthusiasm.

Whatever the achievements in terms of awareness and the training by the Bio dynamics company, it was clear to all respondents and to the Evaluation Team that the WPP has not tested the implementation of the CSE, which was its prime objective. In addition the WPP has not addressed thoroughly, if at all, a number of the key issues specified in the project document. These include:

- Community participation in developing sustainable rural development planning and implementation based on the CSE
- Participation in the development of local environmental strategies and management plans
- The use of these strategies and plans, and
- The production of a practical data and information base for use by communities.

Further what has been produced by way of a plan fails to meet the Project’s criteria for the WPP output of being primarily reliant upon local resources, as it is envisaged as being heavily dependent on external technical and financial support.

Overall the experience of the WPP raises a vast range of questions about why things were not done in different ways, which would probably have been more effective in achieving the goals of this activity as specified in the CSE. The end result was in no way a replicable model or pilot for implementing the CSE at wereda and community levels across the country.

### b) Delays

The delays in this project have partially been offset by the extension of the Project, so that despite starting in the last month of the original three-year project period a two year implementation period was still possible. However, it needs to be questioned whether the start of the WPP should have been delayed until the CSE was approved in 1997 because other project activities such as the RCS work went ahead using the draft /unapproved CSE documents. To follow the argument logically about waiting for the appropriate approval, the WPP should have waited until the Amhara Region RCS was approved before it started. In contrast, if the project preparation process had been started in 1996, when the area was first selected, assuming all other things were the same, the project would probably have started a year earlier, but still after the CSE was approved, and would have been able to complete its full three years and disseminate its lessons.

Secondly, it can be questioned whether 18 months is an acceptable period for obtaining permission from the Amhara Bureau of Agriculture once the go-ahead for the WPP was agreed in April 1997. This suggests that despite having senior local expertise in the CSE III Project management, they failed to cope with the government bureaucracy and speed up the process of approval.

Thirdly, the financial shortfall and uncertainty, which are cited as further reasons for the delay, appear rather dubious when the shortfall was less than 20 % and an alternative lower cost approach to the WPP could have been followed focusing just on village / kebele level awareness raising. Uncertainty about the CSE III's future in 1997/98 is a more valid reason for the delay, but that did not stop other project activities going on and raising expectations, such as the communications workshops and training. The financial problems and uncertainties appear to be more excuses for a lack of interest in this activity. Indeed, the various interviews with staff about the WPP, suggested a general lack of enthusiasm for this CSE III activity within the project management, which resulted in considerable "foot-dragging" in the early stages of the Project.

Other delays seem to have occurred through the poor performance of the CSE III project management. There was a seven-month delay in the appointment of the consultants to undertake the baseline and planning exercise, despite an 18 month lead time from when it was known they would be needed. There were further delays in getting comments on the outline report and draft report and in running the workshop to discuss the baseline and the plan. As a result the final report was not available until the final month of the WPP's operation and so was of no use to the WPP or CSE.

### c) Understanding the WPP and IUCN's Role

One of the probable reasons for "foot-dragging" at the start was the lack of clarity within the CSE III concerning the WPP. The reports of the various workshops confirm this (CSE, 1997, 1998b, 1999a). Such problems and the initial delays on the WPP should have rung alarm bells with the project's executing agency, IUCN. Maybe it did, but that cannot be confirmed, as the reports for backstopping visits in the first year and a half of the Project were not traced. However, what is clear from the available documentation within the Project is that there was no major input by IUCN to help the Project clarify what should be done and the nature of the field activities, which should have been part of the WPP. This is surprising as IUCN has a wealth of experience with community- based natural resource management projects and of participatory local level environmental planning in eastern and southern Africa, and in its various publications, which could have offered some guidance.

A further concern here is that IUCN should have had a greater input into the debate about the route for implementation of the WPP as this would probably have strengthened the view in support of using a community-based approach in co-operation with, or through, an experienced NGO. This would then have made it more difficult for the project management to overturn the original preference for this route as occurred in the end with the adoption of a government and consultancy company route. It appears that in this respect IUCN's backstopping was not clear or forceful enough to ensure that due cognisance was taken of its experience and advice, assuming it was offered.

#### d) Implementation Methods

As the preceding paragraphs explain, the original choice after much discussion, was in favour of working in some type of partnership with an NGO experienced in community-based natural resource assessment, management and planning. There are several NGOs of this sort with more than a decade of experience in Ethiopia and this would seem to have been a sound decision by the Project. It was also suitable as the project management did not want to become involved in direct management of a field project due to its shortage of administrative capacity. In the end an entirely different method or route for implementation was followed with a direct implementation project undertaken by the Project through the wereda agricultural office and using a consultancy company for the baseline assessment and planning. This appeared inappropriate to the evaluation team as it does not accord to the project document. How this came about is not clear from the information available to the team.

#### e) Multiple WPPs

Another question, to be asked about the WPP concept, concerns the failure to consider implementing a number of WPPs as proposed at the March 1996 meeting when the WPP was first discussed. Apparently the decision to focus on one WPP was due to the limited resources of the Project, financial and personnel. However, a way of overcoming this was agreed in early 1999 to explore collaboration with on-going NGO projects which were applying, or could be adjusted to apply, CSE principles. This initiative was pursued by the second CTA until he was required by MEDaC to focus solely on the planning document they required. Even after this redirection in May 1999 the need for further pilot projects was re-iterated by the SCSE, but by then this was seen to be the responsibility of EPA. This seems odd given that EPA's mandate is regulatory and does not involve implementation.

#### f) Communications and Sensitisation

A communication activity was envisaged in the early discussions about the WPP in order to help raise awareness and sensitise the communities for discussing the CSE and how it could be implemented at the wereda and kebele / community levels. However, it appears that there was no such co-ordinated programme within the WPP apart from the meeting with farmers, two workshops and three film shows. Given that the SCSE had a communication unit as part of the CSE III Project it is surprising that this was not used to help develop a major awareness-raising programme in the wereda. This surely should have been an essential activity as part of the sensitisation process at the start of the WPP, whatever approach or route was chosen. For a more grassroots approach sensitisation would have been a key part of the needs assessment activity prior to planning the WPP activities. Why this was never used could not be ascertained but it was perhaps because it was associated with the grassroots and NGO approach, which had been abandoned?

#### g) Use of a Consultancy Company

The use of a consultancy company in order to undertake the baseline study and the planning exercise has proved problematic. It seems that this was viewed by the CSE III as a manageable way of getting the job done, to the required standard and in the time available, rather than working with farming communities in a more complex and participatory way with more uncertain results. However, the work which was done by the company raises questions about whether the baseline data collection and especially the planning process should not have been done in another way which would have created a base of information and a plan which the communities could have used. Indeed it seems that the community, with support from a facilitator should have been responsible for these tasks, building on their local knowledge, and that an appropriate co-ordinator and assistants would have been a more appropriate approach for this and could have given more attention to the CSE than the consultants did.

#### h) Methods of the Consultancy Company

One of the main criticisms of the consultancy company is the way they used participatory methods. This appears to have been very superficial and of an extractive, rather than participatory, nature. While the community were eventually interviewed to build up lists of community needs this process seems to have involved only consultation and not anywhere near full participation which should have involved handing over the research and planning process to the communities. Certainly there is no evidence of community mapping, transect walks, wealth ranking and other methods which are now widely used amongst PRA practitioners in Ethiopia and are the basis for starting to involve communities in a more equal manner in such planning activities. Also the community do not seem to have been involved in any problem analysis, nor in designing solutions based on their resources, local knowledge and skills.

Surprisingly there seems to have been no learning of lessons from the wereda level integrated development planning being undertaken nearby in the same region, in South Wello, by the Amhara Bureau of Agriculture with Sida funds. Nor is there any evidence of learning from NGOs, not even the very experienced Farm Africa which was operating in an area adjoining the WPP, or from the local level activities in Tigray concerning community involvement in natural resource management with which the NPC was familiar.

#### i) Selection and Supervision of Consultancy Company

The conclusion that must be drawn from the consultants' final revised work is that the wrong company was appointed and they were not adequately supervised and kept up to the contract requirements. There are also a number of other faults on the Project's side. First, the letter of appointment by the Project does not clearly stress the need for a participatory approach as the *essential* characteristics of the work required. Secondly, the company's bid letter was accepted even though it was clearly inadequate in terms of specifying the range of PRA methods it would use and over-emphasised the collection of a mass of data which would hardly be a practical source of information for use by the communities. Further, the comments from the CTA on the type of management plans required were not responded to by the consultants in any way which can be identified. Finally the Project failed to keep the consultancy company to the contract which stated that their job was "to assist the communities in the preparation of plans for improved management of natural resources" and that they should focus on local institutions and community identified problems, solutions and actions, and on empowering the communities.

#### j) Nature of the WPP Plan

The content of the planning volume produced by the consultants is organised by community, which suggests that this is a community-based natural resource plan. However, when studied in more detail, this reveals that for each community only a series of three or four specific innovations, mainly from external sources, are proposed to address the environmental problems. Hence there is no overall community management plan. The recommendations made are purely additional activities to be added to current practices with no integration into existing activities explored or labour and other constraints considered. There is no evidence of any attempt to allow the community to do the planning and no spatial representation of the activities to show what is needed where in each sub-kebeles. This is despite requests for such revisions at the Debre Birhan Workshop. The whole plan is externally oriented, with dependence on G.O.s, NGOs and other external agencies to fund and assist the work. Hence the plan is not based, as the contract requires, on local resources and ignores the C.T.A.'s comments about the need for communities' own plans. In addition there is no effort to address local institutional issues and mechanisms for enforcement, or to give the communities ownership over the resource planning and management process.

A further key omission in the final plan documents from the consultants is Fig 1 which should be an organogram. Instead there is a map. The text, which goes with this missing organogram, suggests a very top-down managed process, not a community-based process. With all these problems during the WPP and remaining in the final report it is doubtful whether the consultants fulfilled their contract TORs and should have been paid.

#### k) Local Criticisms of the WPP Plan

The major criticisms from the local community of the baseline study and plan were that they had few income generating aspects in the first version and did not give farmers any options beyond conservation. Apparently the draft plan was not discussed with the farmers and so these types of criticisms are to be expected. At the wereda office there are also concerns about the plan which they reportedly had problems with in terms of interpreting it into action.

#### l) Costs of the WPP Plan

The final revised WPP plan, despite the comments of the Debre Birhan workshop, remains an expensive programme of activities, which is not replicable because of its heavy dependence upon external agencies for technical skills and funds. The result of this type of plan is that communities are looking to the outside for solutions and as such their confidence is undermined and they are dis-empowered.

### **9.5 Alternative Options**

From the above analysis of the WPP, it seems that it has followed the top-down approach, typical of the bureaucracies in Ethiopia and many other countries. In March 1996 Dr Tewolde, the NPC, foresaw this risk and warned about the danger of "planning for them" in the WPP. His words were not heeded. Further, the other point he raised then about there being no empowerment of communities if planning is left in the hands of the wereda and peasant association/kebele officials was also ignored (CSE 1997).

The experience with the WPP suggest very strongly that the CSE III might have done much better had it kept to its view in April 1997 that a project implemented by an NGO but under SCSE supervision would have been the desired option. Many NGOs in Ethiopia have over a

decade of experience in the sort of participatory methods, which were needed, not just for the planning but also for the baseline survey to create a practical data and information base which communities could use. Further the NGOs have experience of participatory problem analysis and solution development, which would have been the way to create community-owned local plans with technical innovations which were appropriate to the environmental situations and personal circumstances of different households. This would have avoided the problem of how the local community and agricultural office should interpret the plan which was prepared by the outside consultants and “parachuted” on to the community with little consultation, let alone participation.

Hence, an alternative set of steps for the WPP might have been to:

- Find out which NGOs have expertise in doing PRA and community based environmental planning – such as Action Aid / Farm Africa, etc.
- Employ one NGO to do the project focusing first on participatory methods for awareness raising and needs assessment in an interactive manner with theatre etc., and then undertaking community resource assessments using transect walks etc, followed by problem diagnosis and solution testing, etc.
- Ensure that the SCSE or CSE III monitor the NGO carefully
- Encourage the NGO to link into other experience such as wereda planning by Sida, local technology development and testing in Tigray, participatory land use planning by IUCN, and other organisations in the Ethiopia, such as Farm Africa and in the region, such as Association for Better Land Husbandry in Kenya
- Stress the need for diverse and integrated approaches, not just a few technical solutions for each community, and include an emphasis on income generation to make conservation attractive, and
- Give attention to local institutional arrangements at sub-kebele level to oversee the implementation of such innovations by households and the wereda council to control environment problems.

## **9.6 Conclusions**

It is extremely disappointing that the WPP, which was the major way of testing the validity of the CSE at the field level, has failed so completely to meet its objectives as specified in the Project. After five years of project operation this is an appalling indictment, which reflects badly on the project management, the implementing agencies and the executing agency.

## PART FOUR

### CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS

#### CHAPTER 10

##### ACHIEVEMENTS, SUSTAINABILITY AND FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

###### 10.1 Achievements – A Summary Assessment

The CSE/RCS process is complex. It involves changing individual and institutional attitudes. It requires bringing about changes to existing institutions and ways of doing things. One interviewee has aptly described the CSE Phase III Project as a “*soft-ware and not a hard-ware project*” whose impact may not be readily visible. To undertake such a process successfully is a great challenge and requires a long time span and persistence under stable circumstances. Despite the fact that conditions have not been stable throughout the Project a number of key achievements can be identified.

The first of these is the five volumes of the CSE and the summary document, the Environmental Policy of Ethiopia (EPE) (EG, 1997a&b). In the early part of the Project the CSE III management worked for several months at the federal level with the Council of Ministers to find the best way to have the CSE approved. In the end a summary document, EPE, was approved which provides guidance on environmental issues for all the government agencies and other actors involved in the country’s development. This and the CSE volumes together form a major resource and reference material, which many government agencies and several donors and NGOs are now using to guide their policy development and project design. Connected to this, the SCSE produced another major guidance document (CSE, 1998a), which advises all government agencies about how the CSE impacts upon their activities and where they have responsibilities for implementation. Further, advice is offered in the draft guidelines for integrating environment into development planning (CSE 2000d, 2000). The CSE is also seen as being in part responsible for the establishment of EPA and EPC, and for the continued government support for these institutions. Other federal level achievements are to be seen in the drafted legislation on environmental impact assessment.

At the regional level the CSE III has provided recognition to the new regions and support for their authority by assisting in the establishment of RECCs, the operation of the RCS Task Forces and the development of RCSs. Linking the RCS process to the Regional Councils has been a major initiative to support the development of environmental awareness at the highest level in these new political institutions. This has been linked to institutional development, with the establishment of two regional level environmental agencies and plans to develop two more in other regions. These will provide a base from which environmental issues can be addressed, presumably through a legislative approach following the EPA model but also by disseminating and stimulating the use of the RCSs.

At both the federal and regional level the CSE III has sought to ensure that environmental issues are integrated into all aspects of development planning. Rather than setting up an implementing environmental body, the approach has been to see environment as a cross-cutting issue in the activities of all government, NGO and private sector organisations. Hence

the environmental agencies developed and planned will have a monitoring and stimulating role, encouraging appropriate action by all other actors and ensuring that their actions meet legislative and other criteria, rather than the environmental agencies developing their own programmes of activities.

To support this cross-sectoral approach to environment, the CSE has also been involved in training and capacity development, communication and dissemination activities, and awareness raising, while some resources and equipment have also been provided (See Chapter 5). While this has primarily been directed to the government agencies, there have been a number of activities involving NGOs. There has also been a growing awareness in the CSE of the need for civil society to be involved in the CSE and RCS processes.

## **10.2 Outstanding Responsibilities**

Despite these achievements much remains to be done. In the interviews with stakeholders and project staff, the greatest concern of those involved with, or knowledgeable about, the CSE and RCS processes was the limited amount of implementation, which has been achieved. The delays in RCS approval, the lack of institutions responsible for environmental affairs and a feeling that environment is being sidelined worried stakeholders. As a result they identified a number of outstanding issues, which need to be addressed. These were:

- Taking the process down to the communities and the field
- Defining who has responsibility for taking the RCSs down to lower levels and clarifying linkages
- Strengthening co-ordination and lesson sharing
- Formulating various programmes and projects at the regional and sub-regional levels
- Reviewing strategies based on lessons learned.

While the delay in implementation is in part due to the absence of formal approval, it is in some cases due to problems encountered in the CSE and RCS processes, which need to be addressed. Four areas of concern need particular attention in the view of the Evaluation Team and will be discussed here.

### a) Translating the CSE into Action

The first concerns the difficulties in translating the CSE and RCS documents into actions. This problem is primarily due to the limited ownership of, and involvement in, the CSE and RCS processes by many of the potential actors in the government, NGOs and private sector. This is a result of the way in which these processes have operated, with the ideas and proposals being generated at a high technical level within government. There has been limited participation from the grassroots level by the people who are in daily contact with the environment and who should be using the outputs from the CSE and RCS processes to achieve improved environmental management. The best opportunity for learning lessons about implementing the CSE and for developing processes for community generation of implementation ideas and actions within the CSE framework, was the Wereda Pilot Project. However, this failed to make any meaningful progress. Hence translating the CSE and RCSs into action remains a major challenge.

### b) Dissemination and Awareness

The second concern, which also affects translation into action and implementation, is the format in which the CSE and RCS materials have been produced. The emphasis has been on



producing major reference works for planners rather than “handy guides” for practitioners. There are no simple documents in local languages, which present the CSE or RCS in a form, which will inform and enthuse the general public. (The only exceptions are some summary documents produced at the request of the Regional Councils in their approval processes.) All of the Project’s outputs in the communication area appear to have been targeted towards the informed and educated middle class and elite groups. Further the lessons from the analysis of the five NGO projects involved with sustainable natural resource management have only been documented in an internal report. This must be circulated amongst other similar agencies or made available in a form appropriate for the community-based groups and organisations who have to be involved in implementing the CSE and RCS along with government agencies.

#### c) Appropriate Procedures and Focal Points

The third major constraint to CSE and RCS implementation is the establishment of appropriate procedures, such as EIA and policy monitoring, to ensure that actions and policies are congruent with the EPE, CSE and RCSs. A key aspect of this, in addition to appropriate legislation and procedures, will be the development of focal environmental points in the federal ministries and regional bureaus and acceptance across the government, private and NGO sectors that environment has to be integrated through specific procedures and actions into their work. Developing this sense of environmental responsibility through the use of procedures and the actions of focal points remains a difficult area.

#### d) Institutional Development

This fourth concern relates to CSE and RCS implementation where there is a need to develop institutions to undertake the necessary monitoring and co-ordination. In seven of the regions the institutional arrangements for supporting RCS implementation through the establishment of some environmental agency remain to be worked out and become operational. The behaviour of these institutions is important as they must encourage support for the RCS processes and not build up resistance by concentrating on only monitoring and enforcement.

Clearly a lot remains to be done to achieve the goals of the CSE process and to have environment fully integrated into Ethiopia’s development process.

### **10.3 Project Sustainability Concerns**

A major question raised by these on-going responsibilities is whether the CSE and RCS processes are sustainable. This was discussed with stakeholders at the federal and regional levels and with staff in the partner agencies. Half of the staff and many of the stakeholders had concerns about the ability of the CSE III work to have a lasting impact. They believed that further support would be necessary to ensure that these processes continued and did not become fossilised at their present stage. All respondents were clearly concerned that something had to be done to translate the RCS and CSE documents into action on the ground and most also raised concerns about the need to address some of the other issues raised above. Six areas of concern relating to sustainability came out of these discussions.

#### a) Capacity and Resources at EPA and MEDaC

A major area of concern was whether EPA and the SCSE within it, have developed their capacity sufficiently during the project period and will have adequate resources from the government or donors to be able to continue those CSE III activities for which they are expected to take over responsibility. In some cases this is less of a problem – such as communications, where equipment and some staff are in place and sponsorship for the

bilingual magazine is likely. However, in other cases, such as the labour- and travel-intensive regional support, it is very doubtful whether adequate resources and staff are available. The positive views on resourcing given on several occasions by the General Manager of EPA (and the project's NPC) were firmly dismissed by several respondents who noted that many of the newly established posts were unfilled and operational funds were limited. The late integration of several CSE activities into EPA units and the relatively recent reorganisation of EPA, which has accommodated this, were noted with concern by many EPA staff, as was the lack of a Deputy General Manager in EPA, a major concern given the extended absences of the General Manager.

In MEDaC there are also concern about lack of staff in the EPU and also the problem of getting resources to continue the CSE work given the apparent lack of interest in much of this from the higher levels in that ministry.

#### b) Utility of the CSE and RCS Outputs and Maintaining Interest

A second area of concern expressed by staff respondents was the utility of the CSE and RCS outputs in order to ensure interest is maintained in these. It was pointed out that a lack of utility will quickly lead to a loss of appreciation of the CSE and RCSs. In particular respondents were worried that the CSE did not have sufficient technical recommendations and could not help to address the poverty and environment interface in a way, which would be attractive to many poor natural resource users. One person suggested that the CSE is full of "many nice words but not enough actions to try". In this situation it would see that the CSE III has not done enough to learn from other conservation strategy processes and translate the CSE into practices which are of use to communities and valued by them. Only in that way will the CSE remain of interest to the people it was designed to help.

#### c) Government Support and Commitment

A third area of concern about sustainability in the respondents eyes is whether there is sufficient high level support in federal and regional governments to complete the institutional and legal arrangements which are required for the implementation of the CSE and RCS (Kifle Lemma, 2000). The framework law for EPA has now been broken down into three separate proclamations, which some respondents believe weakens it, and this is still not approved six years after EPA was established. At the regional level respondents questioned whether the Regional Councils are fully committed to their RCSs and to the proposed institutions to implement these. In particular it was questioned whether the resources – funding and staff, will be available for these new institution to operate as dynamic units and not just become part of a deadening bureaucracy. One respondent questioned whether the regions could be expected to progress very far down the route to integrating environment into their development when the federal level had not managed this after the CSE launch and approval of the EPE by the highest body in the country, the Council of Ministers.

The Evaluation Team had three further concerns about the sustainability of the CSE and RCS processes and their outputs.

#### d) Institutional Rivalry

First the Team was concerned about the different views amongst EPA and MEDaC staff concerning the future of the CSE III activities. EPA staff stated that all activities will be in EPA, whilst MEDaC staff saw a number of specific CSE follow up roles for their unit. This suggests that the tension / rivalry between the two institutions will continue, an unhappy

heritage from this Project. The problem of institutional rivalry may also affect the attempts to get environmental focal points established in all ministries and for them to support the CSE.

#### e) Bureaucracy

The second concern of the Evaluation Team is whether the bureaucratic hurdles faced in following up the CSE along the government route (see below) will not lead to further delays. There is a danger that the processes could be strangled by the deadening hand of bureaucracy, which has certainly slowed progress on many occasions during the CSE III.

#### f) Funding

The final concern of the Team is about resources to actually apply the CSE and RCS ideas. While some government funds may be available for this in connection with the Five Year Plans, there are concerns about the CSE and RCSs not being implemented due to lack of funds from either government or donors. Neglect of the donors when disseminating information about the CSE and RCS is likely to have a serious impact upon donor support.

### **10.4 Potential Ways Ahead**

With these analyses of the outstanding issues to be addressed and the constraints faced, the Evaluation Team has drawn some conclusions about the way ahead (10.4), the key actions required (10.5) and some of the lessons learned from the CSE Project to date which are relevant to project activities (10.6) and for environmental planning in general (10.7).

It would seem that within the CSE and RCS processes as a whole there are two elements or groups of activities. These are mutually supportive and linked, but perhaps should not be seen as requiring joint and integrated support. One is what might be termed “the government element, or route”, which sees the basis of the CSE and RCS processes to be dominated by the actions of government agencies. This involves government agencies leading and managing the processes of developing the CSE and RCSs, as well as the processes of using these and achieving implementation.

The other is the “civil society element, or route” whereby the non-governmental groups in society are seen as the main implementers of the CSE and RCSs. In this route the ideas of the CSE are disseminated within communities and the NGOs, CBOs and other groups, such as churches, mosques and chambers of commerce, which support the public. These communities should be encouraged to design actions based on the CSE and RCSs and implement them. While this would not completely avoid the government planning and bureaucracies, it might be a way in which the ideas of RCSs can be set free from the constraints of the government system so that faster implementation can be achieved. Success on the part of the civil society actors would hopefully stimulate, rather than threaten, government agencies and would generate and test new ideas with which those agencies could also implement the CSE and RCSs. (Hence this route still recognises that government agencies are very much an important element in terms of development implementation in Ethiopian society.)

To take each of these routes forward a number of steps can be identified. These are outlined below as well as some actions, which are common to both routes.

### a) Government Route

The government route will need:

- *High-level political support*: building the constituency at the level of the Prime Minister and Regional Presidents, and among the political elite so that environment is included within the political programmes. This could include having the RCSs as a standing item on the agenda for the six monthly meetings of the Prime Minister and the Regional Presidents (as recommended in Kifle Lemma, 2000).
- *Approval of, and support for the RCSs*: by the Regional Councils, and clear directives to all government agencies and civil society organisations and individuals to use these to guide their actions.
- *Institutional development*: at the Regional level and below, with the regional environmental agencies set up in all regions and the REECs, ZECCs and WECCs made operational to stimulate use of the RCSs and to monitor implementation.
- *Legislative development*: approval of legislation and development of mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement of environmental aspects of development, including EIA procedures.
- *Finance and resources*: support for EPA, MEDaC and the regional environmental authorities, so that these agencies can operate with EPA providing the backstopping support for the regions previously provided by the CSE III.
- *Environmental focal points*: people and procedures in Ministries and Bureaus to ensure environmental considerations are incorporated into their decision making and ensure this is internally monitored through environmental focal persons, as well as externally monitored by MEDaC, or the regional equivalents of EPA or MEDaC, or the RECCs.
- *Policy analysis*: procedures to undertake environmental assessment of Ministry / Bureau policies to ensure that all government policies are environmentally sensitive.

While only the second and third of these are probably essential pre-conditions for formal government implementation of the CSE and RCSs, the others are part of the total package which needs to be in place to ensure the full implementation of the CSE and RCSs within the government structure. The concern is that because the government route generally requires formal approval before actions can occur, and is slow in institutional development, problems in achieving the RCS approval will result in the continuation of the present major delays in RCS use.

### b) Civil Society Route

The civil society route is looking at the non-government actors and those in society, but outside government, who can implement the CSE and RCSs. It could be argued that this is a much less bureaucratic route, which requires less formality and institutional development. While it may be criticised for being less co-ordinated, it would seem to have the advantage of more spontaneity in response to specific needs and in allowing those ideas, which are stimulated by the CSE and RCSs, to be applied quickly helping explore how best the guidance

from the strategy documents can be utilised. From this will come lessons for wider implementation, by other civil society and government actors.

This route does not really need any specific actions beyond the awareness raising which is common to both routes (see c. below). However if supported by some specific activities, this might involve the following:

- *Actor identification*: selection of civil society groups who are interested in using CSE / RCS ideas and competent to do so and have relevant expertise often from natural resource management and community land use planning work.
- *Support workshops*: workshops or similar based on simplified RCS / CSE documents to generate ideas and implementation options.
- *Appropriate technical assistance*: to assist these actors in interpreting and applying the CSE / RCS concepts and developing appropriate capacity.

This route will focus on the participatory, bottom-up planning principles enshrined in the CSE and the RCSs, which state that planing and implementation of environmental management projects should commence at the village or community levels. This questions the relevance of the action programmes developed during the CSE/RCS process and suggests that action planning should only indicate the types/areas of action and leave the rest for civil society groups to develop through participatory planning. Some NGOs already have a positive view of the CSE due to the training they have received. One way of supporting them further would be to establish an NGO desk within EPA, although, to really follow the civil society ethos, support for them would probably be better based outside government.

#### c) Common Elements - Awareness Raising, Information Needs and Funding

Both routes will need:

- *Awareness raising*: this will have to be in different ways to meet the interests of actors on the two routes who vary from political leaders and senior government staff to NGO staff and rural communities of natural resource users and urban dwellers.
- *Appropriate documentation*: summary versions of the documents for the CSE and RCSs are needed in simple forms, which can be understood by the respective users. These should be used as the basis for a dialogue and discussion with appropriate agencies and should include examples of turning principles into action.
- *A programme fund*: a fund should be established to support approved CSE / RCS trial implementation activities and encourage trial activities.

As discussed in Chapter 8 with respect to the regions, incentives are needed to encourage government bureaux and other actors to take the RCSs and also the CSE seriously. It is suggested that any future actions will require a programme type of approach with respect to funding, with several donors providing support for CSE / RCS specific field implementation activities through a single fund. This would provide funds for which any actor, government, NGO, CBO, or private, could apply. It would be managed by a multi-partner group, rather than just the relevant government agency. There would by certain divisions of responsibility and guidelines in terms of the activities expected of government and NGO actors, but beyond

that it would be up to actors to bid for funds. The multi-partner group would need careful thought as it would be essential that the decision making process is transparent and clearly accountable. The critical point about this approach is that if there is a source of funds available to people who are going to apply the CSE principles, then they will be more seriously interested in the CSE or RCS than would otherwise be the case!

*Monitoring and assessment procedures:* these must be instituted from the outset of any further support with an independent unit responsible for this outside the main actors.

*Appropriate co-ordination:* a mechanism to improve co-ordination amongst the various actors should be established, as this is a major issue. However care is needed to ensure that this facilitates, rather than holds up, action. There is no doubt that co-ordination is necessary in environmental management because of the cross-sectoral and systematic nature of the linkages. Uncoordinated implementation of the CSE will result in compartmentalisation / fragmentation, with the result that the advantages of synergy will be lost and maximum impact not achieved.

### **10.5 Feedback and Follow Up Activities for CSE / RCS work in Ethiopia**

A specific follow-up project is not proposed here because of the great range of possibilities, which exist and need discussion. Rather in the light of the points in the four preceding sections some key elements are identified and cautions pointed out. Obviously the key need at the present point in time is for progress to be made in terms of turning the CSE and RCS ideas into implementation or activities on the ground. This is easier said than done, as the CSE III has found out. Hence a first step must be to apply some creative, but also Ethiopia-sensitive, intellectual and practical input into analysing how the CSE and RCS ideas apply in the Ethiopian situation. Obviously this needs a participatory approach with field level inputs to ensure that the proposed actions are demand driven. However, participation in this identification process requires some guidance and management to ensure that useful and relevant ideas come from them, with some strategic structure, rather than a simple wish list of things.

Linked to this must be a process of raising sensitivity among the various potential actors, beyond the present level of documentation dissemination, so that a serious and informed debate is started. This should especially address the civil society actors who were neglected in the CSE III, such as the private sector, religious organisations, local communities and the lower levels of government. This process should also be linked to initiatives with the donors to raise awareness of the achievements of the CSE and RCS processes and to encourage interest in supporting implementation of these strategies, especially through financial support.

These two areas of action should produce a process, which identifies local environmental management problems and interrogates them with the guidance from the CSE and the appropriate RCS. This should also include identifying the ways in which different stakeholders can contribute to addressing these specific problems and how the actions of these various stakeholders can be co-ordinated. In the long term communities and interest groups must look for ways in which dependence upon external initiatives and support is minimised and local capacity is developed to manage environmental aspects of development.

While this capacity should be developed across the whole country and this process of problem identification and application of the CSE and RCS guidance should be generic, it will be necessary in the first instance to work in small areas. To try to address this at the wereda level is one possibility, trying to go beyond the ideas of the Wereda Pilot Project (WPP) under the

CSE III, and emphasise more on local action and ownership as well as the involvement of NGOs and CBOs. However, a key problem with the WPP was probably the lack of linkage to higher-level support from the Amhara Region CS. Hence it is suggested here that in a future project support might be applied in a region at various levels to make progress towards implementation. This could include some support to the regional headquarters in things such as the regional environmental agency, inter-sectoral co-ordination and integrating environment into development planning. This input would need to review and reform the RECC, as is being done for the EPC at the federal level, with wider membership and more participatory approaches used. Beyond this support could be provided for one zone and one wereda to explore the process of getting the link from the top to the field. However, at the same time community empowerment is necessary so that this is not just a one way, top-down process, but does include the rural communities on a basis, which is as equal as possible. Here the role of NGOs to support communities is essential and recognition of the potential contribution of CBOs and civil society vital.

The follow up to the CSE III should start with a discussion of selected lessons from this Final Evaluation Report through feedback workshops. These would be best undertaken in each region, rather than for the regions as a whole given their different levels of progress and interests. Even within a region there are contrasting interests so there is sufficient complexity to be addressed at that level without bringing all the regions together. Some feedback at the Federal level may be undertaken if further support for the CSE process, in terms of focal point development and legislation, is sought, but given the clear need to get action on the ground the priority must be with the regions. However, even at this decentralised level, there are dangers that the process can become solely a government route one and so serious efforts are needed to ensure civil society involvement.

In the light of the regional workshops, a number of regions may be selected for RCS implementation activities. The selection could be based purely on enthusiasm and the prospects for successful implementation. However, selection but could also include some criteria such as the nature of the region. If the latter is seen as appropriate it might be worth considering one of the two primarily urban regions, one of the well-established highland regions and one of the new peripheral / lowland regions. This would help develop lessons for all situations in the country.

Co-ordination and exchange of lessons is essential in any future work. This should be undertaken centrally in the country but in a way that is independent and freed from the government bureaucracy. Hence a project co-ordination unit focusing on lesson learning, rather than administration or fulfilling government responsibilities must be created with a clear mandate. Ideally this should be located where it can link into government environmental work, as in EPA or the EPU in MEDaC, but it must not become burdened with other responsibilities or become government focused. An alternative location would be with an NGO co-ordination unit, or an NGO with particular environmental responsibilities.

## **10.6 Lessons from the CSE III Project of Relevance for Future CSE Activities in Ethiopia**

One of the objectives of the mission was to identify best practice with respect to CSE type work in general. Such a task is rather mechanical and a large number of the specific items of best practice were identified. These are listed in Annex 7. The most important of these are summarised in the text below.

Conservation Strategy projects need to be developed following a participatory approach and be grounded in local realities and institutional arrangements. Single lead agencies for projects are probably better than joint agency leadership. The involvement of agencies and sectors (such as NGOs and the private sector) needs to be specified in the project document to ensure participation. Projects also need to strike a balance between being blueprint in nature with clear specifications of elements and targets, and following a process approach. Projects should regularly reflect on the project document and the underlying principles in their design to ensure they stay on track.

Projects need to strike a balance between being integrated into government structures and having independent management to ensure project priorities are met. Independent management is especially important in the case of projects with two lead agencies, and full-time staff should be responsible for project management. Use of seconded staff may help long-term integration but usually has serious negative aspects due to divided responsibilities. Transparency in project management and financial matters is essential and staff meetings involving all staff are desirable. Monitoring and assessment systems are essential and should ensure feedback into project development and fine-tuning. Backstopping should have continuity and be based on persons with appropriately qualifications and personalities.

Project resources should match the tasks. Excess resources can be as problematic as too few resources given the resource scarce-field situation. Security of funding is essential to ensure that projects do not suffer uncertainty. Technical staffing must be adequate, with specialists to meet particular needs – such as gender issues. T.A.s must have clear lines of responsibility as well as contract responsibilities. Misunderstandings between project partners must be addressed immediately and conflict resolution processes be in place and understood.

Projects must try to maintain momentum and enthusiasm, and address immediately any causes of delay. Multi-sectoral activities, such as conservation work, are especially prone to bottlenecks and so require special attention. Participation, rather than consultation, is essential for ensuring local ownership and interest in conservation strategy work. Use of local resources should be maximised so that responses to problems are appropriate and are ones, which can be sustained. This will also help ensure the relevance of project activities. Successful use of the national and regional conservation strategy ideas leading to implementation need to be disseminated. Careful design, monitoring and adjustment of activities is needed to ensure that benefits reach the target populations and that the grassroots communities area reached.

### **10.7 Reflections from Ethiopia for the Global NCS Experience**

Another separate report could be written on the issue of lessons which link from the CSE III to the environmental planning and management experience in the developing world, and especially the National Conservation Strategy processes which IUCN has supported. Four particular points are important to raise here as wider conclusions to this report.

The first concerns the approach, which has been pursued in Ethiopia through the two different government institutions, EPA and MEDaC. The EPA component has very much sought to support the development of a legislative and information framework for all actors in the country, while the MEDaC component has sought to provide a set of planning guidelines which will ensure that environmental considerations are incorporated into the government planning process across all the sectors and government Ministries. The key point in this



approach is that the environment has not been developed as a sector per se in Ethiopia. Environmental issues have not been parcelled up into a neat bundle and placed in a new ministry where all environmental issues have to be dealt with and everyone else can forget about them. There is no environmental “ghetto” where everyone focuses on the environment and speaks the same language but no one else outside understands them. Rather, Ethiopia, through the CSE process, and the regions, through their RCS processes, have tried to ensure that environment is integrated by all government bureaus into their planning and actions. In other words environment is seen as a cross cutting issue. This is the approach which offers the best prospect for sustainability and for success in the view of this Evaluation Team.

Secondly, the CSE process in Ethiopia, and especially the decentralisation process and RCS formulation, have shown very clearly that for appropriate actions and local ownership of the CSE and RCSs to be achieved a timetable cannot be imposed. Rather these processes must develop at the pace, which the locally responsible organisations find appropriate. In other words a blueprint / top-down type project is not appropriate. Instead a process approach is necessary where the schedule is driven by local needs and priorities and not by a project document. In particular, deviations from the project may be necessary, especially when it becomes clear that it is at lower levels, such as the wereda and sub-wereda, where the greatest concern with the environment exists and greatest ownership of the CSE and RCS processes could be achieved. This is also important for ensuring local ownership as well as maximising commitment.

Thirdly, the Ethiopian experience shows that it is possible to develop strong local ownership of a conservation strategy process provided care is taken by the executing and donor agencies not to interfere too much. The first two phases of the Ethiopian Conservation Strategy process had ensured local ownership and this continued through the CSE III. Local commitment and the quality of the work in Phase II especially ensured that the CSE was of a standard, which the World Bank had to accept as a NEAP equivalent. However, integrating the CSE process so thoroughly into the Ethiopian government system had its disadvantages as well as its advantages. In particular, the Ethiopia government bureaucracy’s view of Ethiopian society and how projects should be run tended to dominate the Project. This meant that a fairly top-down approach to many project activities was followed, and there was very limited involvement of the public and grassroots perspectives in the CSE and RCSs. Controlled consultation rather than open participation occurred. This shows clearly the need for the RCSs and CSE to be disseminated to the village communities, and for these ideas to be set free in society, to be picked up by the mass of the population and used, as appropriate, to improve their standard of living.

Finally, the limited involvement of the communities and public in the CSE and RCS processes, and the dominance of these by the government has led to concerns about sustainability. For the CSE to last it has to be wanted by the public and for that it must be known by them and of use to them. The limited development of field activities and implementation means that this is doubtful in the Ethiopian case. This situation also raises questions about the way in which a bureaucratic approach can influence the activities of the CSE and RCS processes to meet the needs of administrators rather than the needs of the people. While this may seem to give some benefits in terms of local ownership it does not guarantee the long-term public support of the process. There is a danger that neglecting the wider public benefits will lead to the decline and disappearance of the CSE and the RCSs.

In raising these four broader issues and the many specific ones earlier in the chapter, it is clear that the CSE in Ethiopia has been a major learning process for those involved and offer many lesson for people interested in environmental strategy development, planning and implementation. While there have been many problems with the most recent phase of this Project, a number of major impacts have been achieved in Ethiopian society at the federal and regional headquarters levels during its three phases. The CSE and the RCSs have certainly been elements, which over the last 12 years have begun to change attitudes in the Ethiopian government and amongst the more educated sections of Ethiopian society. The task now is to get the CSE and RCSs to the villages and to the urban dweller groups, so that they can have access to ideas, information and skills which will complement their indigenous capacities and so help improve the standards of living and environmental conditions for the current and future generations of Ethiopians.

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# ANNEX 1

## TERMS OF REFERENCE

### FINAL EVALUATION OF THE CONSERVATION STRATEGY OF ETHIOPIA PHASE III PROJECT (CSE)

#### **Background**

The Conservation Strategy of Ethiopia (CSE) Phase III Project is a three-year project that is being implemented jointly by the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) and Ministry of Economic Development and Co-operation (MEDaC) with technical and management assistance from IUCN-The World Conservation Union, Eastern Africa Regional Office (IUCN-EARO).

The CSE Phase III Project is a follow up and continuation of CSE Phases I and II projects. Phase I (1989-90) focused on developing the CSE process, identification of key environmental issues and formulation of a conceptual framework for the CSE. Phase II (1990-94) focused on the development of policy and institutional framework and national action plans for the CSE. The present phase III focuses on capacity building for interpretation and implementation of the CSE, with emphasis on regional and zonal levels in accordance to the decentralisation policy of Ethiopia.

The goal of the current project phase is:

*To carry out training, capacity building and action oriented planning at national, regional, zonal and wereda levels that will ensure the implementation of the environmental management projects and activities identified through the first two phases of the CSE process.*

The main objective of Phase III is to set up institutional arrangements and capacity building for implementing CSE at both Federal and Regional Levels. Specific objectives of Phase III are to:

- Facilitate and obtain Government approval for the CSE documents and the Environmental Policy which are the products of the preceding phases of the CSE process
- Institutionalise the CSE process within the Government structure at all levels
- Develop Regional Conservation Strategies and ensure their use at regional and sub- regional levels, including the development of Zonal and Wereda levels structures
- Apply the CSE and RCS principles through the development of tools such as EIA and other procedures that will ensure integration of environment into economic planning, budgeting and policies at all levels
- Undertake a wereda pilot project for testing implementation modalities with communities; and
- Raise awareness of the CSE process through improved communication techniques and capacity as well as dissemination of information about the strategy.

Due to various technical, political and management reasons, the CSE project overall progress has been slow. Thus, despite the fact that there is a substantial progress in implementing most of the planned activities, delays was experienced in realising/finalising some of the planned activities. This has also been affecting the overall expenditure of the project budget over the period. The current phase that was to end in 1999 was extended up to the end of 2000 in order to enable completion of the project activities.

As we approached the project termination date of 31 December 2000, initial assessment indicated that more time was needed beyond December 2000 for a proper winding up of project, reporting and

handing over process. Therefore, partners planned and are undertaking a phasing out period, January to June 2001 to facilitate completion and winding up of all activities.

### **Purpose of evaluations within IUCN**

Specifically there are two purposes of evaluations within IUCN.

#### **a) Learning and Improvement:**

The IUCN Evaluation Policy (still in draft form) indicates "evaluations are to be used as part of the *learning* environment for IUCN and its members. It involves the creation of an environment that engages staff and their partners in creative ways to learn how to improve IUCN's work. In this context, evaluations are instruments for making IUCN's projects, programmes and organisational units more effective through the provision of useful feedback and a commitment to act on that feedback. By doing so, evaluations are a way to understand why IUCN activities succeed or not. Furthermore, as learning tools, evaluations add to IUCN's body of knowledge with respect to best practices."

#### **b) Accountability:**

Second, evaluations are part of IUCN's overall *accountability* system. IUCN is answerable to its members, partners and donors for determining whether IUCN's policies, programmes, projects, and operations are working well, and showing that its resources are used in a responsible way. The evaluation process, together with the required documentation that accompanies each evaluation, holds staff and agents responsible for their performance.

### **Specific aims of the CSE III Evaluation**

The aim of the final evaluation of the third phase of the CSE project is to review and assess the project achievements, impacts, and lessons learned during phase III of project implementation. The review should also aim at assisting partners to assess sustainability of all activities, approaches, and structures initiated or supported by the project and to identify potential areas and opportunities for further work in CSE implementation.

The specific aims of the evaluation are to:

- Assess the effectiveness, efficiency and timeliness of the project implementation
- Evaluate the impact of the project activities and related outputs including their contribution to the overall goal of the project
- Determine the relevance of phase III of the project in relation to current environmental management needs of Ethiopia and to the core objectives of IUCN and NORAD
- Assess long-term sustainability of the actions initiated and now handed over to federal and regional institutions for implementation
- Identify lessons learned about project design, management and implementation, highlight issues that need attention for better implementation of any follow up project/ activities
- Identify potential areas and specific activities whenever is possible for future collaboration in further implementation of CSE/RCSs and supporting environmental/biodiversity management in Ethiopia.

Scope of the Evaluation:

Specific issues and key questions to be addressed under each aim are as follows:

**Effectiveness:**

The evaluation should assess the achievement of objectives at different levels and realization of the expected outputs as per the Project Document and annual work plans.

Key questions:

Were the intended impacts realized? In other words, were the contributions to the Overall Goal realized?

What outputs were achieved? To what extent did they contribute to the Overall Objective?

Was the project approach and structure effective in delivering the desired outputs?

Were the activities been implemented in accordance with the Project Document and work plans? If not, why?

Were the required inputs to complete the activities delivered? If not, why?; and

Did the partner organisations work together effectively? Was the partnership effective in achieving the desired outputs?

**Efficiency:**

The evaluation should assess the execution and administration of the project and how well the partners performed. It should also assess the cost effectiveness of the project implementation, whether costs were reasonable in relation to achievements (check conversion of inputs into outputs - in terms of quantity, quality and timeliness).

Key questions:

Were the activities carried out in a timely, cost effective manner and at all levels?

Were the technical and financial resources, skills, institutional arrangements, organisation and strategies available to the project adequate?

Were the project structure, staffing and equipment adequate to deliver the results expected?

Were the resources being used in an optimal manner, and funds spent in accordance with work plans and using the right procedures?

Were there any unforeseen problems, how well were they dealt with?

Were the capacities of the project partners adequate?

Was there a process built in to the project management structure for project self-monitoring and assessment as part of team meetings, reporting and reflection?

Did the project's internal monitoring and assessment framework operate efficiently for both compliance and assessment of performance?

**Relevance:**

The evaluation should establish whether or not the CSE Phase III has been successful in providing solutions to, supporting and ensuring the implementation of environmental management projects and activities? How can we tell?

The evaluation should also assess the extent to which the project contributes to the strategic direction of IUCN and that of its partners.

Key questions:

Outline the current situation in Ethiopia in terms of key issues and challenges facing people and environment and its management

Establish whether or not the CSE Phase III project design and approach is relevant in addressing the identified needs, issues and challenges facing people, the environment and its

management in Ethiopia identified during the design of the project and planning for phase III. Is it relevant to current needs and issues facing environment and human development in Ethiopia?

Recognizing the priorities of the country, is the programme doing the 'right things' and how can this be assessed?

Establish whether the impacts of the outputs of the project were relevant to ensuring the "implementation of the environmental management projects and activities identified through the third phase of the CSE process"

What have been the roles of NORAD, IUCN, and Project Partners in Ethiopia and project staff and were they appropriate?

To what extent does the project contribute to the strategic policies and programmes of IUCN and that of the project partners including the project donor?

### **Impact:**

The evaluation should assess whether the anticipated impacts (contributions to the overall Goal and objective) were realized and identify any unintended positive or negative impacts.

Key questions:

What specific impacts are attributable to particular outcomes?

Were there any unintended positive or negative impacts arising from particular outcomes?

Did the project bring about desired changes in the behavior of people and institutions?

Is there now greater awareness of environmental issues?

Is there now greater capacity for natural resource conservation and management and integration of environmental concerns into various sector plans and programmes at all levels – National, Regional, Zonal and Wereda level Authorities?

Longer-term changes – Have these changes resulted in an improvement in the lives of people and a more efficient use of resources upon which they depend?

What could have been the likely situation (of the environment and its management) without the project?

### **Lessons:**

Key questions include:

What lessons have been learnt by various partners and stakeholders at all levels?

Are these lessons useful to the CSE process and other conservation strategy initiatives in the region or elsewhere?

Are the lessons learned from this project being taken up (and how) by partners and influencing their policies, programmes and activities?

### **Sustainability:**

The evaluation should analyse the financial and institutional context of the project in terms of on-going costs and capacity required for a continued implementation of activities. The long-term sustainability of the actions initiated should be assessed in terms of whether there is evidence that there will be continued positive impacts as a result of the project. Some of the key questions are:

Was the approach used likely to ensure a continued benefit from the project (i.e. the contribution to the project overall goal and objective) after the end of the project?

Were all key stakeholders sufficiently involved? Were their expectations met and were they satisfied with their level of participation?



Have EPA/EPU/Regional authorities developed/enacted appropriate policies/ programmes/ laws institutionalising the implementation of CSE/RCSs ?

Do partners have the capacity to continue to implement all initiated activities? Are they able to raise adequate material and financial resources?

To what extent did the project teams at different levels address critical external factors that influence sustainability such as political support and financial availability issues in the regions, improving existing technical capacity, and short-term economic development activities?

Are alternative or additional measures needed and, if so, what is required to ensure continued sustainability and positive impact?

### **Future Collaboration:**

The evaluation should also identify potential areas and activities for future collaboration?

Key questions:

Identify potential areas for future work in CSE and RCSs implementation and general biodiversity management in Ethiopia

### **NORAD Aid Policy**

Is the project compatible with NORAD Aid policy?

### **Methodology**

The consultants should develop a methodology using a participatory approach, to include (and expand on) the set of key questions to address effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, impact and sustainability. The methodology should show the links between data collected and recommendations proposed so that the logic is clear and transparent.

Identify key partners and stakeholders in the CSE and a process to consult widely with them. Senior government staff and technical advisers should have the opportunity to present their views in confidence to the Team and to identify issues, opportunities, constraints and options for the future.

At minimum, this will involve:

- A desk review of Project Document, work plans and progress reports, other relevant documentation to review and assess achievements so far and especially performance of work plans
- Familiarity with the IUCN Eastern Africa Regional Component Programme (2001 to 2004)
- Consulting with project partners and staff to review and assess strengths, challenges and constraints and their impact on performance, efficiency and effectiveness in project activities implementations
- Making some initial recommendations for potential areas and activities for future collaboration

During the consultants' visit in Ethiopia, the project will provide transport, organise meetings with stakeholders and generally be available as required for discussions and supply of information. Full access will be allowed to project's documents and information sources.

Basic materials for presentations at the briefing meeting on the results of the evaluation will be made available.

### **Evaluation Team Composition**

The evaluation team will be composed of one international and one national consultant with Eastern Africa regional experience, preferably with knowledge of the CSE or similar projects. Team leader must have previous experience in project evaluation and/or monitoring. A good knowledge of conservation strategies and be acquainted with environment and development issues in developing countries. Knowledge of Ethiopia situation will be an added advantage. The team leader will have the overall responsibility for the implementation of the review, its output and the timely submission of the draft and final reports.

### **Reporting**

The team will discuss its interim findings with relevant partners and the draft report shall be prepared in sufficient copies and on a diskette for submission to IUCN-EARO, EPA and MEDaC.

### **Outputs**

In light of the information collected on the performance of the project and assessment made on its implications, a report will be produced on:

- **Project progress to cover, among others:**
- An assessment of the performance of the project based on the project workplans and expected results.
- Identification of key issues and lessons learned in implementing the project
  
- **Future collaboration**
- Tentative suggestions and recommendations for future activities

### **Time Schedule**

The evaluation exercise shall begin with a briefing of the consultants at IUCN-EARO at the end of the second week of May 2001. The team shall be in Ethiopia for a total of 20 calendar days in which to conduct the necessary consultations, regional visits and compilation and finalization of the report. The suggested timetable is as follows:

11 <sup>th</sup> May	Briefing and consultations at IUCN-EARO, Nairobi
12 <sup>th</sup> – 31 <sup>st</sup> May	Evaluation
1 <sup>st</sup> June	Presentation of the summary of the main findings to the project staff and partners
2 <sup>nd</sup> June	Departure

- 18<sup>th</sup> June Submission of draft report by team leader to IUCN-EARO. EARO will be responsible for distribution of the draft report to partners for review and comments
- 26<sup>th</sup> June Submission of comments on draft report to consultants
- 10<sup>th</sup> July Submission of final report by team leader incorporating comments made by partners

## ANNEX 2

### TERMS OF REFERENCE

#### **REGIONAL CONSERVATION STRATEGY EVALUATION SPECIALIST**

##### Context

The final evaluation of the Conservation Strategy of Ethiopia (CSE) is being undertaken during May and early June 2001. In order to address the Terms of Reference for this evaluation, to address the questions of efficiency, effectiveness, relevance, impact, sustainability and lessons, it is necessary to undertake work in four specific areas, namely:

- Project management and interaction amongst the partners – MEDaC and EPA
- Project stakeholders at the national level
- The wereda pilot project which has tested the implementation of the CSE, and
- The regional conservation strategies and their associated processes and use

##### Regional Conservation Strategy Processes

The experience of the regional conservation strategy (RCS) processes is critical to the utilisation and implementation of the conservation strategy approach in Ethiopia. Implementation on the ground and impact upon day-to-day activities is critical if the CSE and the RCSs are to have an impact in the regions of Ethiopia and upon the livelihoods and well being of the people in this country. Key questions, amongst others, to be asked about the RCS processes relate to:

- Local sensitivity of the RCS
- Local capacity building for the RCS process and the long term sustainability of this capacity,
- The process of empowerment development and local ownership of the RCS,
- Development of a constituency and support for the RCS
- Institutional development to ensure the use and implementation of the CSE
- The ability of the RCS process to move to implementation, and
- The sustainability of the RCS process

##### Additional Consultant

###### a) Details of employment

**IN ORDER TO SUPPORT THE TWO EXISTING CONSULTANTS IN THE WORK OF ANALYSING THE RCS EXPERIENCE IN DIFFERENT REGIONS, A THIRD CONSULTANT IS TO BE RECRUITED LOCALLY IN ETHIOPIA. THAT PERSON SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR A PERIOD OF 25 DAYS (INCLUDING SATURDAYS AND SUNDAYS) FROM 21<sup>ST</sup> MAY OR SHORTLY THEREAFTER. HE/SHE SHOULD BE ABLE TO TRAVEL TO ALL PARTS OF THE COUNTRY AS REQUIRED, EITHER BY PLANE OR BY VEHICLE, THE COSTS OF WHICH WILL BE COVERED BY THE PROJECT.**

###### b) Scope of the Work and Specific Tasks

The person is expected to work with the other consultants in developing a methodology, including checklists and interviews, for the evaluation of the RCS processes and to apply this both with the other consultants in one pilot RCS evaluation and then on their own in a number of other regions. Typically each regional visit will involve two days with travel to and from

the field and two days of work in the regional headquarters and possibly nearby zones and weredas. In each region the work will be undertaken in co-ordination with the focal point and the RECC chairperson, and will involve undertaking interviews with RCS Task Force members, RECC members, political leaders and representatives of other relevant groups and organisations, such as local NGOs, CBOs and the communities.

#### d) Expertise Required

The required consultant should have the following expertise:

- Expertise in local capacity building and training
- Experience of empowerment issues including gender sensitivity
- Participatory approaches to evaluations
- Institutional issues within the regional government situation in Ethiopia
- Understanding of sustainability issues for process type projects
- Awareness of the issues of project implementation at regional and lower levels
- Awareness of agricultural and environmental diversity in Ethiopia
- Ability to work with people of diverse socio-economic and ethnic characteristics
- Ability to produce good quality reports in English with appropriate word processing and tabulated data

#### Output

The consultant will produce a series of case studies, one for each of the regions he/she studies. While these will have some standard headings it is essential that the diversity of the different experience in the regions is drawn out and the contrasting as well a common elements highlighted in the analysis. Each case study will typically be 6 to 10 pages of A4 in 12 point single spacing with annexes. These will be provided I electronic (Word 98) and paper form to Gedion Asfaw to be passed to the other members of the evaluation team.

The consultant may be invited to attend the debriefing of the evaluation in Addis Ababa, even though his/her work will still be in progress.

SCSE, EPA, Addis Ababa,  
16<sup>th</sup> May 2001.

# ANNEX 3

## METHODS

### Annex 3a

#### A) Checklist for Federal Level Stakeholders

##### 1. Relevance

###### 1.1 *Relevance of the CSE to Ethiopia in terms of:*

- Appropriately identifying the problems / opportunities as regards the environment of the country
- Adequately involving stakeholders in the identification of the environmental problems / opportunities and the proposed approaches to tackle them
- Providing an appropriate framework for tackling the environmental problems the country is faced with and benefiting from the opportunities

###### 1.2 *Relevance of the SCE Phase III Project efforts at:*

- Integrating environment into development planning
- Capacity building for the formulation / implementation of the CSE
- Capacity building for the formulation / implementation of the RCSs at the regional levels
- Facilitating the implementation of environmental management projects
- Environmental awareness enhancement of individuals
- Achieving institutional attitudinal changes with respect to the environment
- Stakeholders involvement in Project Programme and activity implementation
- Integrating gender issues into environmental (Development) planning
- Designing communications strategies and action programmes for the CSE/ RCS process at national and regional levels

###### 1.3 **Relevance of the SCE and the CSE Phase III Project activities and outputs to your organization**

- Objectives of your organization
- Activities/ projects of your organization
- Changes or modifications to your organization's objectives as a result of the influence of the CSE
- Changes in your organization's capacity
- Changes in your organization's structure
- Other changes in your day to day planning and project formulation

##### 2. Impact

###### 2.1 *What is your:*

- Awareness about the CSE and CSE Phase III Project?
- Awareness about the CSE Phase III Project's outputs, i.e. Finalization of the five-volume CSE documents; Preparation of the Environmental Policy of Ethiopia, which summarizes the policy elements of the CSE, and its approval by the Council of Ministers in April 1997; Formulation

of 11 Regional Conservation Strategies (RCSs) for all the regional states and the city administrations of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa; Establishment and strengthening of 11 Regional Environmental Coordinating Committees; Organization of awareness workshops; Providing in-country and external training/study tours including gender study tour; publishing a quarterly news letter on environment; initiation of woreda (local) level project, formulation of communications strategy and action plan by 8 regions, formulation of draft gender strategy; initiation of collaboration with Addis Ababa University in environmental management training; support for local level initiatives for projects such as tree planting in schools and urban areas, watershed development and environmental awareness

**2.2 What do you think have been the impacts of the CSE Phase III Project in terms of:**

- Creating awareness about the environmental problems in Ethiopia
- Creating and enhancing awareness about the CSE and the CSE Process
- Creating and enhancing awareness about the RCSs
- Bringing about changes in policy, strategy and programmes to tackle the environmental problems at federal level
- Bringing about changes in policy, strategy and programmes to tackle specific regional problems at regional level
- Bringing about individual attitudinal changes in the perception of the environment;
- Bringing about attitudinal changes in perception in government institutions
- Streamlining existing government institutional structures (or creating new ones) as well as strengthening them, as appropriate, for environmental policy, strategy and action programme formulation and subsequent implementation
- Integration of environment into development planning, including the promotion of environmental economics and environmental accounting
- Enhancing human resources/ institutional capacity for the formulation and implementation of SCE through various training measures including study tours
- Enhancing human resources/ institutional capacity for the formulation and implementation of RCSs through various training measures including study tours
- Enhancing institutional capacity through the supply of equipment and materials at the federal level
- Enhancing institutional capacity through the supply of equipment and materials at the regional level?

**2.3 Can you rank some of the major impacts of the Project in order of importance in descending order from the most important to the least important?**

**3. Project Performance**

**3.1 To what degree are you satisfaction with the project and its progress to date in terms of:**

	<i>The quality of the outputs</i>	VS	S	N	UNS	VUNS
A	The timely undertaking of activities					
B	Involvement of beneficiaries					
C	Technical assistance					
D	Financial assistance					
E	Collaboration with stakeholders					
F	Other management aspects					

VS -Very Satisfactory; S – Satisfactory; N – Neutral; U –Unsatisfactory; VUNS – Very Unsatisfactory

## Annex 3b

### B) Checklist for Staff in Partner Agencies

This checklist is meant to explore primarily the project's operation in terms of especially its EFFECTIVENESS and EFFICIENCY. It will also look at OUTPUTs, IMPACTs and RELEVANCE in a general way as these need to be explored in order to talk about effectiveness and efficiency. However these three additional issues are looked at in more detail with the stakeholders outside the project who are the recipients of its activities and with the TA to get precise figures of outputs and his estimates of impact and relevance before the following checklist is used so that AW has the basis for informed discussion with the interviewees.

#### a) General Introduction for the Discussion

Want to have a discussion about a number of areas related to the CSE project, including:

- Was it designed properly?
- How did it operate?
- What major results is it seen to have produced?
- Did it operate in an efficient manner?
- Will it have lasting impacts and will its initiatives be sustained?

Point out to interviewees that this is a **confidential** questionnaire. It is asking for your personal opinions. Your views will be consolidated with those of 30 other people so that identification of your individual answers is prevented and confidentiality is assured.

#### b) Project Design and Structure

How well was the project planned and designed?  
(Strengths and weaknesses)

Was the design appropriate to the needs, issues and challenges facing Ethiopia in CSE type matters at the time it was designed? (1995) Timely and appropriate?

How clear were the relationships in the project document between the different partners in the project?

Were the capacities of the project partners adequate?

Did the project have clear outputs and indicators?

Was there a monitoring and assessment process included in the project design. Was it adequate? What was done to overcome any shortcomings.

Lessons learned for project design, (esp for clarity of objectives, output, indicators, operational linkages etc.)

#### c) Project Implementation / Management

##### Management

What has been the nature of the project implementation? (Smooth or not?)

What is the quality of management of the project? Strengths and weaknesses?



How adequate has been project management system in its different aspects:

Human resource management

Leadership

Supervision

Pushing matters along

Relations with partners

Relations with IUCN

Reporting

Monitoring

### **Approach**

What have been the main characteristics of the approach by the project?

(Rank in order of importance)

Was the project sensitive to the needs of the various stakeholders?

Were any stakeholders neglected? And why?

Were any stakeholders given better treatment? And why?

### **Operational Realities**

Were the activities carried out in a timely manner – and in accordance with the project document and workplans? (Reasons for deviations)

Were there any unforeseen problems? (If so, how well were they dealt with?)

Did implementation leading to new activities having to be undertaken which were unplanned?  
(Why?)

What Impacts on project?

Agreed with EARO and donor?)

Were the technical and financial resources, skills, institutional arrangements, organisation and strategies available to the project adequate?

### **Relationships**

Did the partner organisations work together effectively? What has been the nature of the relationships between the project and its partners (EPA and MEDAC)

What has been the nature of the relationship between the partners in the project (EPA and MEDAC).

What has been the nature of the relationships between the project and its various stakeholders?

- Central government agencies
- Regional government agencies
- NGOs
- Public
- Donors
- Others

What has been the relationship of IUCN with the project and project partners?

What has been the input from IUCN into the project? And were these appropriate?

What has been the relationship of NORAD with the project and project partners?

What has been the input from NORAD into the project? And were these appropriate?

### **Financial and Inputs Situation**

Were the required inputs to undertake the activities provided? If not, why?

Was there adequate finance for the project?

What is the quality of the financial management of the project? Were the resources being used in an optimal manner, and funds spent in accordance with work plans and using the right procedures?

What is the effectiveness of the project in obtaining value for money? (Cost – effectiveness)

Could project resources have been used more efficiently?

Was there a process built in to the project management structure for project self-monitoring and assessment as part of team meetings, reporting and reflection?

Did the project's internal monitoring and assessment framework operate efficiently for both compliance and assessment of performance?

### **d) Project Achievements / Outputs**

What outputs were achieved? Rank to what extent did they contribute to the Overall Objective?

As a result did the project achieve its planned impacts / objectives?

What capacity development was achieved?  
(Rank in order of perceived importance)

At what levels was capacity development provided?  
(Rank in order of perceived importance)

Any changes in environmental awareness achieved by the project amongst people and institutions?  
(Who? Where? What indicators?)

Any changes in environmental behaviour achieved by the project amongst people and institutions ?  
(Who? Where? What indicators?)

Any unplanned impacts of the project?  
Positive ones  
Negative ones

### **e) Sustainability**

What are expected to be the long-term benefits of the project?

Was the approach used by the project likely to ensure continued long term benefits from the project beyond its closure?

Do the project's partners (EPA and MEDAC) have the capacity to continue to implement all the initiated activities, which are relevant?

Do the project's stakeholders have the capacity to continue to implement all the initiated activities, which are relevant?

Have the necessary actions – policies and laws and institutions, been developed to ensure long-term implementation of the CSE at the national level?

Have the necessary actions – policies and laws and institutions, been developed to ensure long-term implementation of the CSE at the regional level?

**f) Lessons Learned**

What lessons can be learned from this project? (In terms of project design and operation and in the light of the project objectives?)

## Annex 3c

### c) Regional Conservation Strategy Process

Discussion Notes towards a Methodology in the Regions

#### 1. Introduction

Two of the specific objectives of the CSE Phase III were to:

- Institutionalise the CSE process within the government structure at all levels (including the regions and below), and
- Develop Regional Conservation Strategies and ensure their use at regional and sub-regional levels, including the development of zonal and wereda level structures.

These will be the two foci for the work at the regional levels.

In addition it is necessary to consider how other aspects of the mission's TOR are answered at the regional levels in terms of:

- Applying the CSE and RCS principles through the development of tools such as EIA and other procedures that will ensure the integration of environment into economic planning, budgeting and policies at all levels
- Raising awareness of the CSE process through improved communication techniques and capacity as well as dissemination of information about the strategy.

Further, the work should keep in mind the following specific measures for this evaluation, and assess them at the regional level, namely:

- Effectiveness, efficiency, relevance and timeliness of the CSE project activities
- The impact of project activities and related outputs
- Long-term sustainability of actions initiated and now handed over to federal and regional institutions for implementation
- Identify lessons learned about project design, management and implementation, and
- Identify potential areas and specific activities for future collaboration in further implementation of the CSE/RCSs and supporting environmental/biodiversity management in Ethiopia.

In the light of these points it is proposed that case studies of the RCS process and achievements in as many regions as possible are completed in this evaluation. While these will try to be systematic and cover the same aspects in each region, they will also need to try to bring out the distinctive aspects of the process and its achievements in each region. The missions needs to learn lessons about what is necessary for this process to run smoothly and to be effective and sustainable etc, as per the above criteria. It might be useful for the team to develop and keep in mind a model of an RCS process and to compare what is found against that model recognising that there will often be reasons for deviations. The reasons for these deviations need to be recorded and explained. An ideal RCS process should be locally owned, widely recognised and used in the Regional HQ and among the bureaus, NGOs, politicians and private sector organisations and disseminated down to the kebele levels so that people can apply them. It should involve an active use of the RCS guidance to improve conditions for people and their environments, and should be sensitive to different stakeholder groups. A key issue here is in what form the RCS ideas should be disseminated so that they are able to be of use to people. Principles are not much use by themselves and guidance about turning RCS guidance into specific actions is a major challenge.

## 2. Areas for Attention

In the light of the above the following foci for work in each region are proposed for consideration and for testing in the first regional case study.

a) Origins of the RCS process, contributions to Phase II, and response to 1997 approval of EP and de facto the CSE. How much local ownership is there over the process.

b) RCS documents and their adjustment to the local conditions with local priorities  
Use of the RCS document by government officials, political leaders, NGOs, private sector, public.

c) Administrative organisation of the RCS work, focal point person, focal point bureau (and how they were decided and how much continuity).

d) RECC, its membership (esp private sector and NGOs) and functioning, its role in development and approval of the RCS, its role and effectiveness in ensuring that the RCS is used, especially in the 5 year planning process and in other ways.

e) Degree of mainstreaming of the RCS – other bureaus using it and feedback.

f) Decentralising process to the regions and beyond to the zones and the wereda, actual and envisaged.

g) Capacity building in the RCS process and sustainability.

## 3. List of Persons to be interviewed

- Chair of the RECC (a political leader)
- Secretary to the RECC
- Focal point bureau Head (or knowledgeable senior person)
- Focal point person
- Bureaus of Agric, Planning, Water etc, Education, Women's Affairs, Industry
- DPPC or equivalent
- Investment Bureau
- NGOs especially local ones
- Private sector – chamber of commerce
- RCS Trainees
- Resource Centres

## 4. Schedule of Topics to be covered at Regions with all interviewees

It is likely that these will have to be applied more flexibly than the checklists being used in AA as there will probably be a greater diversity of situations. Some potential areas of questioning are:

### *INTRODUCTION*

Involvement of the person in the RCS process and RECC (if appropriate)

### ***RCS Process***

Aware of the whole RCS process? What does it involve? Why is it being done?

Strengths of the RCS process?

Weaknesses?

What should have been done differently to overcome weaknesses?

What opportunities are there for the RCS process? What should it do?

What skills and capacity been created? What level of awareness of the RCS process?  
What threats to the RCS? Is it sustainable? How well integrated is it?

### ***Project Support***

What benefits from the project have been received?  
Training, Equipment, Finance, T.A. support, etc  
What efficiency of operation of the project in its work?  
What impacts and result has the project achieved?  
What cost effectiveness of the project?

### ***Overall Assessment of RCS process***

Was it relevant at this time for this region? (Blanket approach by the project was followed for political / lack of info reasons?)  
Was it an efficient process?  
Did it produce impacts in the region?  
Was it a cost effective process?

### ***Also need to ask:***

How as the RCS developed?  
Is it sensitive to local needs?  
How often does the RECC meet?  
Does it have any impact?  
Degree of local ownership of the process?

## 5. Draft Outline for Regional Reports

In line with the above methodology, which seeks to explore the nature of the RCS process and identify issues which relate to it and then provide analysis of the underlying processes, it is proposed that the regional case study reports are structured into five sections:

RCS Process – a descriptive review of the process as it has occurred identifying origins, structures and decentralisation below the Region, stakeholder involvement, response to the 1997 EP approval, dissemination of the process, the nature and degree of local sensitivity of the RCS documents (Latter may be done centrally), the use made of the RCS.

Project's Specific Contribution – covering the areas where the project has made specific contributions to the RCS process and to the RECC and environmental awareness in the region, especially in capacity development and the development and use of tools which allow RCS principles to be applied in planning budgeting and policy development.

Assessment of Impacts and Identification of Issues Arising – this should review the factual progress against the criteria in the TORs for the overall mission in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, appropriateness, and timeliness. This section should also identify strengths and weaknesses which people identify with the process which arise from the various discussions, structured into groups which have some coherence and logic. Some key areas on which comment is sought are local ownership, use of RCS documents by stakeholders and in 5 year planning document, RCS mainstreaming, RECC functioning, awareness raising, sustainability.

Analysis – this should seek to identify and explore the underlying process and interactions which have led to the present level of progress with the RCSs and RECCs and the general awareness of the RCS process and environmental understanding in the Region. Sustainability.

Lessons and Recommendations – this should look at what lessons can be drawn from the process so far, also identify what is needed to get the RCS process fully grounded in the region, what is necessary to ensure that the RCS is used and helpful to the people of the region. Suggestions for future activity should be included here.

APW  
26<sup>th</sup> May 2001

## **Annex 3d**

### **OUTLINE FOR RCS PROCESS REPORT FOR EACH REGION**

**1. RCS Process** – a review of the process as it has occurred identifying origins, structures and decentralisation below the Region, stakeholder involvement, response to the 1997 EP approval, dissemination of the process, the nature and degree of local sensitivity of the RCS documents (latter may be done centrally), the use made of the RCS.

**2. Project's Specific Contribution** – recording the facts about the areas where the project has made specific contributions to the RCS process and to the RECC and environmental awareness in the region, especially in capacity building and the development and use of tools which allow RCS principles to be applied in planning budgeting and policy development.

**3. Assessment of Outputs, Impacts and Identification of Issues Arising** – this should review the factual progress against the criteria in the TORs for the overall mission in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, appropriateness, and timeliness. This section should also identify strengths and weaknesses, which people identify with the process which arise from the various discussions, structured into groups, which have some coherence and logic. Some key areas on which comment is sought are local ownership, use of RCS documents by stakeholders and in 5 year planning document, RCS mainstreaming, RECC functioning, awareness raising, etc.

#### **STRENGTHS OF PROCESS / PROJECT**

**Document**

**Process**

**Impacts on Awareness and Behaviour**

**Training and Capacity Building**

**Timeliness**

**Wider Impacts**

#### **WEAKNESSES OF PROCESS / PROJECT**

**Nature of Process**

**Length of Process**

**Dissemination and Awareness**

**Project Support**

**Decentralisation**

**Inclusiveness of Process**

**Additional**

**4. Analysis** – this should seek to identify and explore the underlying processes and interactions which have led to the present level of progress with the RCSs and RECCs and the general awareness of the RCS process and environmental understanding in the Region, as well as assess the sustainability. This reflects the views and interpretations of the situation by the evaluators.

**Relevance**

**Process**

**Impact, Effectiveness and Dissemination**

**Efficiency**

**Sustainability**

**Top Down**

**5. Lessons and Recommendations** – this should look at what lessons can be drawn from the process so far, also identify what is needed to get the RCS process fully grounded in the region, what is



necessary to ensure that the RCS is used and helpful to the people of the region. Suggestions for future activity should be included here.

## ANNEX 4

### PERSONS INTERVIEWED BY ORGANIZATION / REGION

#### I. Federal Government Institutions

##### **CSE III Project Staff (all based in EPA)**

Gedion Asfaw,  
Technical Advisor

Asmaret Kidane Mariam  
Acting Head, Communications Section, CSE III  
Gender Specialist, CSE III

Yigzaw Ayalew  
Environmental Planning Expert, seconded to CSE III from EPA

Melesse  
Finance Officer CSE III

Alemayehu  
Driver

##### **Environmental Protection Authority (EPA)**

Dr. Tewolde Brehan Gebre Egziabher  
General Manager

Dessalegn Mesfin  
Head, Environmental Policy and Legislation Department

Ms Tsedale Waktola,  
Head, Women's Affairs Department

Getachew Eshete  
Head, Ecosystem Department

Sitotaw Berhanu  
Head, Planning and Programming Service

Dr Kidane Abebe  
Head, Environmental Education Department

Gebre Selassie Gebre Amlak  
Head, Regional Affairs Co-ordination Service

Girma Mikru  
Head, Environmental Economics and Social Affairs Department

##### **Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation (MEDaC)**

Beyene Haile,  
Head, Dept of Agriculture (includes Natural Resources Team and EPU)

Worku Ayele

Head, Natural Resources Team

Ian Campbell,  
Formerly second CTA, now with World Bank

Ministry of Agriculture  
Million Bekele  
Team Leader, Forest & Wildlife Technology and Regulatory Team

Ministry of Water, Minerals and Energy  
Tamene Gosa  
Head of UNCIEF Water Supply Projects Co-ordination Office  
(Formerly of the Water Resources Policy Development Project)

**Ethiopian Investment Authority**

Tilahun Gelaw  
Head, Project Evaluation Department

**Ethiopian Wildlife Conservation Organisation**

Tesfaye Hundessa,  
Manager

Ethiopian Agricultural Research Organization  
Dr. Paulos Dubale  
Director of Soils and Water Resources

Addis Ababa University  
Ensermu Kelbessa  
Curator, National Herbarium  
Programme Manager of the Environmental Management Training Project

**II. Non-Governmental Organizations**

**Center for Human Environment (CHE)**

Dr. Teferra Wogdereseegn  
Head

**Christian Relief and Development Association (CRDA)**

Ato Akalewold Bantiyrgu  
Head, Networking and Information,

Ethiopian Wildlife and Natural History Society  
Ato Kinfe Abebe  
Executive Director

Mengistu Wondafrash

Biodiversity Conservation Team Leader

Farm Africa  
Ato Amare Beyene  
Manager

Ato Zelalem Temesgen  
Joint Forest Programme Division

Forum for Environment ( FfE)  
Ms Camille de Stoop  
Co-ordinator

**IUCN**  
Alejandro Imbach  
Consultant, Monitoring and Evaluation Programme

World Wildlife Fund (WWF)  
Dr Ermias Bekele  
Project Leader and Country Representative

### **III. Donors and International Agencies**

Canadian International Development Agency / Embassy of Canada  
Caroline Lavoie  
Second Secretary, Embassy of Canada

Tamene Tiruneh  
Environmental Advisor  
(Former EPU staff member and one time Acting Head of EPU)

European Union Delegation  
Jose Vivero  
Co-ordinator, Environmental Programme

Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD)  
Dr Inge Herman Rydland  
Counsellor, Development Cooperation and Deputy Head of Mission

Swedish International Development Agency  
Lars Leander  
First Secretary, Development

Aklog Laike  
Rural Development and Natural Resources Advisor

United Nations Development Programme  
Ato Girma Hailu  
Assistant Resident Representative for Environment  
(Formerly EPA staff member)

#### **IV. Regional Institutions**

##### *Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State*

##### **Bureau of Planning and Economic Development**

Teshome Tadesse, Acting Head  
Abebe Mengesha, RCS Focal Point  
Argawi Sima, Head Public Relations  
Endalkachew Assefa, Senior Expert, GIS team, Physical Planning Department  
Temesgen Workayehu, Expert, Landscape Team, Physical Planning Department  
**Mekonnen Batiso, Head, NGO Team (formerly Head of Bureau)**

##### **Bureau of Agriculture**

Daniel Dana, Team Leader, Forest Management Team, Regulatory Department  
Mersha Alemayehu, Expert, Forest Management Team, Regulatory Department

##### **Bureau of Women's Affairs**

W/o Assegedech Gessesse, Income Generating Programme Co-ordinator  
Mesfin Sahle, Disaster Prevention Programme Co-ordinator

##### **Bureau of Water, Mineral and Energy**

Ato Asfaw Dingamo, Head

##### **Bureau of Education**

Berhanu Bekelle, Head, Education Support Department  
Shanks Birramo,

##### **Bureau of Investment**

Ato Bekele G. Medhin Team Leader, Project Evaluation

##### **Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Office**

**DESSELEGN TESSEMMA, ACTING HEAD**  
Girmye Hailu, Expert, and RCS Task Force Member

##### **Institute of Agricultural Research**

Dr Daniel Dawro, Manager  
Tenaw Work-Agegnehu, Research-Extension Department

##### **Awassa Chamber of Commerce**

Balambaras Bashu Bushen, Temporary Secretary

##### **Commission for Sustainable Agriculture and Environmental Rehabilitation**

Abye, Acting Head and six experts

##### **Debut University**

Dr Zinabu Gebre Mariam, President  
Dr Tesfaye, Academic Vice President

Endalkachew Wolde Meskel, former Head of Research-Extension Department, Awassa College

SoS Sahel

Negusse Kebede, Finance and Administrative Officer

Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus

Dr Messeret Lejabo, Country Director, Joint Programmes Office

***Addis Ababa City Administration***

Ato Zewdu Tefera      Head, Legal Department, Addis Abeba Water and Sewerage Authority,  
Ato Zeleke Teferi      Water Quality Laboratory Chemist, Addis Abeba Water and Sewerage  
Authority,  
Ato Tesfaye Berhe      Head, Bureau of Education,  
Ato Tekle W/Gerima      Head, Natural Resources Utilization Monitoring Department,  
Dr. Tilahun Goshu      Head, Legal Department, Bureau of Education,  
Ato Gezu Konde      Social and Economic Development Department, Bureau of Planning

*Oromia National Regional State*

**Abate Fulas, Head, Project Appraisal Office, Bureau of Investment**

Ajema Kondo, Senior Expert, Health Education, Bureau of Education  
Benti Shemino, Expert, Environmental Pollution, Land Use Planning and  
Environmental Protection Dept, Bureau of Agriculture  
Dinku Gurmessa, Team Leader, Water, Mine and Energy Development, Bureau of  
Planning  
Yadessa Dinsa, Senior Expert and former Head, Land Use Planning and  
Environmental Protection Dept, Bureau of Agriculture  
Dr Karin Geising, GTZ Advisor, Land Use Planning Project, Bureau of Agriculture

*Amhara National Regional State*

Dr Belay Demisse      Head, Bureau of Agriculture; RECC Secretary  
Abebe Ayene      Representative/Head; Bureau of Water, Energy and Mines  
Yohannes Afework      Acting Team Leader, Environmental Protection Team, BoA; RCS Focal  
Person  
Mohamed Ibrahim      Wildlife Expert, BoA  
Abay Kinde      Acting Team Leader, Land use and Regulatory Team; BoA – and Board Member for  
the prospective Authority

*Benishangul-Gumuz National Regional State*

Dagnachew Anberber      Head, Bureau of Planning and Economic Development (BoPED)  
Yeshumneh Terefe      Head, Macro planning department, BoPED; Regional Focal Person  
Asamnew Damte      Expert, Projects approvals, M&E expert, Investment Office  
Shewa-Tatek Lidetu      Leader, Hygiene and Family Health Division, BoH  
Kinde Haile      Head, Bureau of Agriculture

*Somali National Regional State*

Abdulkadir Imam      Acting Bureau Head and Head of Production and Physical Planning  
Department; Bureau of Planning and Economic Development (BoPED); RCS Focal Person  
Ahmed Hassen Acting Head; Bureau of Education

Firehiwot Wolde      Acting Head; Planning Department, Bureau of Education  
Sonia Zekaria      Acting Head, Womens' Affairs Office  
Mohamed Esmael      Branch Manager; Hope the Horn (NGO)

*Tigray National Regional State*

Haile Yohannes Head, Bureau of Planning and Economic Development (BoPED); RECC Secretary  
Hailai Hadgu      RCS Focal Person; Tigray/BoPED  
Roman Moges      Expert, NR-gender; BoPED  
Yifter Nega      Leader; NR and Environmental Protection Team; BoANR  
Tsegay Mehretab      Former Focal Person; Bureau of Education; Current, REST staff  
Guesh Hadgu      Zonal Head; Bureau of Education

*DireDawa City Administration*

Aschalew Feleke      Acting Head, Bureau of Planning and Economic Development (BoPED); RCS  
Focal Person  
Wegayehu Gashaw      Head; Bureau of Agriculture (BoA)  
Gidey Gebre-Selassie      Acting Head, Bureau of Education and Culture  
Daniel Alemayehu      Head, Investment Office  
Ahmed Mohamed      Head; Trade, Industry, Transport and Tourism Bureau  
Gezahegn Hamza      Service Manager, Water Supply and Sewage Service  
Feisel Aliye      Head; Water, Mines and Energy Bureau

*Ankober Wereda*

Abebe Gizaw,      Expert, Wereda Agricultural Office  
Asku Haile Selassie      Member, Wereda Council  
Yalew      formerly Wereda Pilot Project Co-ordinator  
Kebede Bugale, farmer      Ankober Wereda

## ANNEX 5

### SCHEDULE FOR THE MISSION

10 <sup>th</sup> May	Departure from UK for Nairobi, Adrian Wood
11 <sup>th</sup> May	Preliminary meeting in Nairobi at IUCN-EARO
12 <sup>th</sup> May	Arrival in Addis Ababa and orientation meeting with Gedion Asfaw
13 <sup>th</sup> May	Preparatory reading
14 <sup>th</sup> May	Planning day to draft schedules
15 <sup>th</sup> May	Interviews of federal level stakeholders and project/EPA/MEDaC staff
16 <sup>th</sup> May	Interviews of federal level stakeholders and project/EPA/MEDaC staff
17 <sup>th</sup> May	Interviews of federal level stakeholders and project/EPA/MEDaC staff
18 <sup>th</sup> May	Wereda Pilot Project visit by Wood
19 <sup>th</sup> May	Interview with Gedion Asfaw (Wood) and writing notes
20 <sup>th</sup> May	Team review meeting
21 <sup>st</sup> May	Interviews of federal level stakeholders and project/EPA/MEDaC staff
22 <sup>nd</sup> May	Interviews of federal level stakeholders and project/EPA/MEDaC staff
23 <sup>rd</sup> May	Travel to Awassa for first RCS assessment (all three team members) and initial interviews
24 <sup>th</sup> May	Awassa, SPNNRS RCS assessment interviews and review of methodology
25 <sup>th</sup> May	Awassa, SPNNRS RCS assessment, travel back to Addis Ababa
26 <sup>th</sup> May	Drafting first RCS report and revising methodology
27 <sup>th</sup> May	Team meeting to review RCS method and report
28 <sup>th</sup> May	Addis Ababa Region RCS meetings Kifle Lemma Oromia Region RCS meetings Adrian Wood Dire Dawa Region RCS meetings Alemayehu Konde
29 <sup>th</sup> May	Addis Ababa Region RCS meetings Kifle Lemma Oromia Region RCS meetings Adrian Wood Dire Dawa Region RCS meetings Alemayehu Konde
30 <sup>th</sup> May	Report drafting Kifle Lemma and Adrian Wood Dire Dawa Region RCS meetings Alemayehu Konde
31 <sup>st</sup> May	Debriefing at EPA for Project, EPA and MEDaC staff Somali Region RCS meetings Alemayehu Konde
1 <sup>st</sup> June	Debriefing meeting in Nairobi (Adrian Wood and Kifle Lemma) Somali Region RCS meetings Alemayehu Konde
2 <sup>nd</sup> June	Travel home
to 19 <sup>th</sup> June	Further RCS assessments by Alemayehu Konde in Bahir Dar for Amhara Region, Gambella for Gambella Region, Mekele for Tigray Region, Assosa for Beni-Shangul Gumuz Region.



## ANNEX 6

### REGIONAL CONSERVATION STRATEGY PROCESS ASSESSMENT - FIELD NOTES

#### Annex 6a

#### REGIONAL CONSERVATION STRATEGY PROCESS: SOUTHERN NATIONS NATIONALITIES & PEOPLES REGIONAL STATE

##### 1. RCS Process

The RCS here has a long history going back to the pre-regionalisation zones left by the Derg. Most zones prepared a document on their natural resources in 92/93, last ones (for special weredas) completed in 95. As for most of the country this was done as part of a process of feeding up information to the CSE with the idea that the approved CSE should feed back down further ideas and guidance to be used in the RCS.

RECC set up in 1995 (before Phase III) (originally 16 persons – Chair, Head of Economic Sector in Regional Council, 15 Government Bureaus, but now 24 with addition of 5 Education Institutions, 2 churches and 1 development association.)

RCS Task Force also established in 1995 - 16 members (8 from Planning Bureau, 2 from Agriculture, 2 from Water, Minerals and Energy, and one from Education, Health, Culture and IAR)

RCS Conference in March 1997. 4 draft volumes distributed in advance for comment. Participants drawn widely from government, peasant representatives, development associations, NGOs and religious organisations (but not private commercial and industrial sector – Chamber of Commerce closed). (Full list not found as report of workshop missing in Awassa and in SCSE.)

March 1998 Communication Strategy and Action Plan – document exists but apparently no follow up, presumably because waiting for approval which expected soon at that point. Momentum with this seems to have been lost now.

RCS document finalised with CSE support and submitted to RECC for approval in March 1999. Then to Council in September 1999. This is in English and consists of 354 pp.

Subsequently submitted proposal for Environmental Protection Office / Regional Environmental Agency. This is an idea which comes from the SCSE but it is recognised to be the way ahead here as without a specialist institutions no one will push the RCS.

High level of support activities by CSE project in February 1999 with the Policy Implementation Workshops. Visit by NPC for CSE Project (G.M. of EPA) to raise the profile of the RCS again and try to get approval.

Regional Council discussed these both in March 2000 but not yet approved.

Support for the RCS process has been quite considerable at times with up to 6 visit per year, but also seems to have fluctuated from year to year. (Actual number of visits to come from Table from Project).

ZECCs established in 1996/97 in all zones but do not function. Nothing at the wereda level except some training which also done at zonal. (Note wereda is said to be the level at which the government administration does have an interest in the environment, above that there is little such interest.)

**No formal implementation has begun but some Depts do refer to RCS in their work plans – Forestry (a bit – Regional Forestry Action Plan (RFAP) – which CSE sees as a subset of it although the national EFAP predates it) and Water and Investment bureaus more (Environmental Monitoring Team in Water and project assessment checklist in Investment with environmental impacts). But none of these use the RCS in a systematic manner. Others fail to use it at all although they know about it and it could be relevant to their work e.g. DPPO was not been pushing NGOs to use RCS when they came under their responsibility.**

Regional Council's "Draft Evaluation of the Past 5 Years and Plan for the Next 5 Years" does have a section on environment. This stresses the need to strengthen the RCS process and issue policies about its implementation, including making organisational arrangements. It focuses on pollution, environmental health, forest, soil and water conservation, environmental education and monitoring of the growing pressures on the environment. However, this covers less than half a page in the plan out of 80 pages.

## **2. Project's Specific Contribution**

Project support has taken various forms:

Technical assistance – number of visits to come from Project

Financial assistance – details to come from project accountant

Equipment and books – 75

Training – courses in region, AA, and overseas including study tours - 61

Workshops in Region:

environmental awareness workshops

environmental communication training workshops

Also support to 2 sub regional agricultural dept workshops, plus some by the Women's Affairs Dept.

Skills used to varying degrees – even to develop projects and get external funds. Evidence of GIS being used. The % of trainees still in government employment was not clear although there have obviously been some losses. No tracking system is in place by the RCS focal point – nor by the project.

20 project profiles created through RCS process and lodged with the RECC secretariat in Awassa, some submitted to CSE for funding. Another project, on solid waste management, developed by one trainee and has obtained external funding from the Ethiopian Social Rehabilitation Development Fund (ESRDF).

## **3. Assessment of Outputs, Impacts and Identification of Issues Arising**

### **a. Strengths of Process / Project**

Document

RCS document produced (in English) – is an achievement and useful as a guide and reference document but needs to be updated and other type of document produced.

RCS is adapted to region in terms of content and themes, not just a copy of the national CSE.

Process

Participatory process – at conference with --- participants. But what is the nature of this participation – but what is possible given the situation in the country.

#### Impacts on Awareness and Behaviour

Awareness raising in a number of ways – evidence reported from several sources, not just RCS secretariat in terms of the way decision makers will now include environment in their considerations, and how it is seen as an aspect of development and therefore worthy of attention. Several initiatives on environmental proposals are now on-going or being developed, including one by an CSE trainee on solid waste in Awassa town now funded by the Ethiopian Social Rehabilitation Development Fund. But these are only a part of the total picture.

Project has helped introduce new concepts, such as polluter pays. Application of these new concepts and some environmental assessment tools by the Bureau of Investment, although they note investors often fail to complete the environment section of their applications.

Inclusion of environment in 5 year development programme of region, (although weak and had to be enforced by BOPED)

Linkages between regional investment policy and gender policy and RCS – signs of communication in government.

#### Training and Capacity Building

Training - skill and capacity development – some long term impact in government agencies. Also training of trainers courses by project which has had wider impacts in the region, this one on environmental awareness was repeated at wereda level with project support.

Views on CSE training support positive from recipients, although some courses better than others – AAU course version 1 had some problems, Project Planning one very good and interactive.

Equipment for shorter term impact.

Capacity building with equipment and training having short and longer-term impacts

#### Timeliness

RCS seen as very timely by some agencies, e.g by Water etc Bureau given the pollution problems they face which are inter-sectoral and require some coordination or cross sectoral actions as RCS is pushing.

#### Wider Impacts

Wider impacts of the project in terms of support to the newly formed Women's Affairs Bureau and helped them develop skills – although they are limited in what they do by their responsibilities in the government structure.

### **b. Weaknesses of Process / Project**

#### Nature of Process

RECC has no budget for operations and no legal status, as a result it seems to attract little attention now from its members and Bureau heads often send delegates. RECC holds irregular meetings, not twice a year as planned which also undermines its image. Seems to have little secretariat support these days. No one is driving it.

Some say one cannot get things moving in Ethiopia through co-ordination committees such as this, especially when the agencies are all roughly equal and competing for territory and issues of jealousy where one agency (Plan Bureau) controls the process. This leads to problems of getting agreement

among people on issues such as institutional arrangement for RCS implementation which took some time.

Staff continuity problem at various levels including BOPED now, (but not in past in BOPED when RCS process was running better.)

Low level of political support in the Region – required NPC’s visit in connection with the policy implementation workshops but this does not seem to have effected a change.

Nature of the political linkages of the RCS and need for Council approval means few will act before the green light is given (only Water etc Bureau it seems, although it is using RCS as part of its development of a regional Water Strategy to follow up new national policy.)

Proposed institution for implementation means situation is one of hiatus in BOPED as waiting to hand over once the proposal is approved, so not taking any initiative. Similarly waiting for the legislation to enforce principles in RCS.

Loading of the CSE onto a existing but busy agency without additional staff, so Secretariat at BOPED has a shortage of staff and time to cope with the peaks of work. BOPED’s over-zealous ownership of project perceived by some – could affect implementation stage.

Jealousy of agencies not included in Task Force (due to top ups?). General situation that bureaus are looking for resources and only interested in projects for what they bring to them, not what extra meeting they require. RCS does not offer much to many.

#### Length of Process

Delays in RCS approval creates uncertainty and loss of interest / momentum - documents filed away or shelved by RCS conference participants for some 4 + years waiting for approval and final version, so process seems to have stopped.

Competition of the RCS process for people’s time v other activities (prioritisation). This is especially true at the political level in the Regional Council.

Length of the process such that environment has gone off the agenda for political action and support? The initial enthusiasm has waned.

As a result of these delays still no co-ordination on environmental matters – piecemeal actions, some 6 years after RCS started which suggests this is an unimportant area.

#### Dissemination and Awareness

Weak process of dissemination within participating agencies of info re RCS beyond contact persons on Task Force and RECC. As a result agency-wide understanding of RCS process and RECCs is poor.

Some people in some agencies do understand these, mainly due to attending training or RCS conference, but others, probably the majority, have at best only heard about it.

Apart from conference participants, few have the RCS document. RCS is a large document in English which may impact through costs upon reproducing it for wider dissemination and through language on the process of political approval. A shorter and simpler document in local language is needed for the weredas in the view of the Water Bureau head, but maybe also for society as a whole. Dissemination strategy developed but never used, no newsletter even – presumably due to failure to get RCS approved.

#### Project Support

Variable intensity - lack of support from CSE III once RCS prepared (but lot of activity in 2000 and when the RCS being developed).

Project failed to spot the delay problem and provide additional support – its visits eased off then whereas political leverage was needed. (Was provided in the end by NPC's visit).

No follow up on training, tracking of staff and their use of things to feedback into courses or to support them in post to use the training.

#### Decentralisation

Training only for Regional level staff. Failure to get training and other activities to grass roots levels and little done at zone or wereda level. Diversity of problems not covered in all training and never got to Zone or below.

No active ZECCs and absence of communications between region and zone. This false start may lead to problems of re-envigorating ZECCs.

Only one course at Wereda level – women and environmental awareness, yet that is the level at which some people say the administration begins to protect the natural resources and has some sense of ownership.

#### Inclusiveness of Process

Only very select group of local NGOs / churches included. These and the University / higher education institutions brought in later in the process onto the RECC after the RCS finalised (as not named in that document but are in more recent ones.)

Some agencies such as IAR and the University believe they are not included in the RCS process as current heads never invited to RECC meetings. Maybe this is due to inactivity of RECC over several years or their very recent inclusion by the Secretariat to widen participation in face of criticisms of government dominance.

Failure to use NGO projects as possible pilot demonstrations of the RCS principles. No active involvement of Mekane Yesus church despite its potential – as now for HIV/Aids work.

#### Additional

Regional government unaware of environment in national investment policy.

Access to the books provided – not government only as wide range of public are said to use it, not clear if these environment books will move to the EPO when established.

## **4. Analysis**

### Relevance

While the process is felt to have been relevant by many of the stakeholders, the length of the process has almost caused it to become irrelevant as other issues dominate the agenda such as food security, investment and political debates and a new concept desertification is taking the limelight in environmental activities. New initiatives, such as the RCS/CSE must strike while the idea is popular and there is enthusiasm. In this case the momentum seems to have been lost twice, once after the RCS conference and now again after the Policy Implementation workshop and the revival effort made in 2000. One might wonder whether it can be resurrected a second time. Will further delays will kill it?

### Process

The first part of the CSE process was done well, with the document prepared in about a year by March 97. But why did it then take two years to finalise it? Was this due to CSE project finances problem and

lack of visits or what? Since 1999 it has been in the government process which takes time and over which there is no control from the SCSE or RCS Secretariat. Even visits by the NPC was not able to move the political part of this process.

Changes in staffing in agencies and also in Council leads to loss of ownership and interest. These are factors beyond the control of the project and risks which should have been considered in the project design.

Some of the problem faced in the RCS process are a result of the failure to be able to implement and waiting for political approval. Inertia creates its own problems and further undermines things.

#### Impact, Effectiveness and Dissemination

While there is some general raising of awareness, especially among those who took part in the RCS conference, the use of the RCS ideas is fairly limited and only seen in a couple of the government bureaus - water and investment. Further, there is limited spread of the ideas out of core government area, and little impact in the NGO and industrial community. (Note also the problem of recent widening of the RECC and apparent ignorance of this by some who have been added.)

Could not some use have been made of the regional communications strategy which was developed in 1998?

Some longer term impacts will hopefully remain as a result of the training and awareness raising, but both need follow up.

Even within the Regional Government, the way in which environment is treated in the Draft 5 Year Plan is not very encouraging as it is given very little space and is not very specific about its contribution.

A smaller document in local languages or the lingua franca (Amharic) should have been developed and used to disseminate the CSE/RCS ideas and principles to the kebele level. Can this still be done with any enthusiasm if the RCS is approved some 4+ years after the conference.

#### Efficiency

While there has been efficiency at the start, and probably in the project's provision of support and training, in general the impact for five years of work is rather small which must argue against efficiency.

#### Sustainability

This is said by some to be the wrong time to stop as nothing is yet set up in terms of an implementing agency and approval of the CSE. The Focal Person is not dynamic and the BOPED Secretariat is not much interested in this now it is going to be handed over to the agency to be set up once the CSE is approved. So is it a question of pulling out before anything has started! Hence there is a fear that the end of the project now will result in the collapse of the process despite its mention in the Draft Plan for the Next Five Years.

#### Top-Down Approach

Is the whole process still too top-down with the government departments designing what should be done in their action plans. The point is made that this is not the way to get participation in addressing environment issues. Rather the principles should be identified and these should be taken down to the lowest level from which needs driven activities can be requested and designed.

## **5. Lessons and Recommendations**

Was it correct to link the CSE/RCS to the political process. Other technical type activities of line bureaus do not need political approval - such as new seeds, water protection, soil conservation and vaccination campaigns. So why has the CSE decided to take this route which then faces serious delays. What are the returns and costs of this approach? Have they been discussed? Or was it just a bureaucratic fait accompli?

Even accepting the choice of the political route, must everything wait for the political approval; cannot some publicity be done and pilot project started. The CCD is running pilot projects in regions when it has only been ratified at the national political level and not by the regional council.

Staff turnover also raise the question of the use of seconded staff rather than a method which could ensure staff continuity. But that then faces problems of sustainability and handover and integration, but given that the new agency will pick it up maybe this is less significant than in other cases.

Is the RCS too big for people to get to grips with. (as a concept as well as in the document form). Should a different approach have been used.

Should the project have been more prescriptive and followed up more tightly on the process to ensure it moved along. But as a process project trying to engender local ownership that is not the way to go. There must be some recognition of the need to proceed at the pace the local institutions want and to not impose the programme on them if you want to stimulate local ownership.

Should the project have been more proactive in tracking trainees and pushing them to use their skills gained in order to build up a momentum in the application of environmental tools in planning?

The new agency (REA) to be set up will need resources and some support in order to get operational and build up its skills and awareness of what is likely to be a very tough task given the way the line Bureaus will defend their turf from others commenting on their activities. So a very sensitive politically aware role is needed to encourage the bureaus to take up and apply the RCS. It will also need for a system of monitoring and evaluation of progress (on RCS) to be put in place.

Is this REA where the future support should be placed. But is that again at too high a level. Should it be more on dissemination and stimulating civil society along the lines KL has suggested of principles down to the field to stimulate local initiatives and identification of activities.

## **REGIONAL CONSERVATION STRATEGY PROCESS: ADDIS ABABA CITY ADMINISTRATION**

### **1. RCS Process**

The RCS process in the Addis Ababa City Administration formally commenced in April 1996 when the CSE Project contacted the economic sector heads of the administration and the staff under him to provide a briefing. Before the Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) was established in July 1996 the BoPED was the contact point and this bureau had prepared an assessment of the environmental situation in the city before the RCS was even initiated. When the EPB was established the responsibility for the RCS was handed over to them.

In June 1996 the RECC and the Task Force were established. The RECC consisted of 13 members, including the Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce, representing the private sector. There were no other institutions from outside the city government members. The Task Force consisted of 26 individuals representing 12 institutions (i.e.- Environment, Culture & Information, Health, Fuelwood Project, Water, Education, Agriculture, Parks & Recreation, Labor & Social Affairs, Planning and Economic Development Bureau (PEDB), Addis Ababa Women's Affairs and Trade & Industry.

Immediately after establishment, a CSE assisted sensitization workshop was carried out for Task Force members and the RCS formulation commenced.

The RCS conference was held in June, 99 after a first draft was prepared. The draft was distributed to the participants. The participants were diverse including representatives of bureaus, federal ministries and zones as well as representatives from the AAU, professional societies, such as the biological and chemical societies, and the youth and women's associations. At the conference there were intensive discussions on the drafts. New ideas, changes and modifications were recommended.

Incorporation of the comments was then carried out and by, November 2000, editing and reviewing was completed though a consultancy service provided by the Project. The final draft was then submitted directly to the Executive Committee of the Council through the RECC chairperson. The RECC chairperson was supposed to convene the RECC for review of the final draft but failed to do so despite a request to him to do so from the EPB. Four volumes were submitted in English.

To date it has not been approved despite persistent pressure from the EPB. This is partially because the political rectification process which has occupied the political leadership of the city government since early 2001.

In 1998 and 1999 respectively a communication strategy and gender strategy for the RCS were developed with the assistance of the Project. Preceding that, training workshops had been carried out with support from the Project. Efforts to apply the communications strategy are demonstrated by the fact that the EPB publishes a "quarterly" magazine on environment, although they have had difficulty keeping to schedule due to a shortage of funds to pay the contributors. The EPB has also prepared brochures, leaflets and posters in effort to enhance awareness about the environment and the RCS process.

There have been frequent contacts by the Project to provide technical assistance and encouragement. These contacts have been both physical visits and telephone contacts. Visits were also not only one way. Members of EPB visited the CSE Project office often. The proximity of the two offices has certainly helped. There were contacts almost on a monthly basis.



The city has been able to establish WECCs in all woredas. The WECCs have been established after the purpose of their establishment was discussed and agreed upon at a workshop in which 5-7 people from each woreda participated (e.g. - Woreda chairpersons, woreda representatives of Economic Affairs, Urban & Public Works, Social Affairs and Health, Women's and Youth associations). EPB in applying the RCS ideas has ignored the zones because they are not formally recognized in the city's charter and are not operational. It was reported that the WECCs are functioning effectively. They are much more functional than the RECC. Although the frequency of meetings is variable from woreda to woreda, the meetings are relatively frequent; in some woredas there are weekly meetings. One WECC chairperson has visited Dire Dawa as a participant in a visit organized by the CSE Project for the purpose of exchanging experience. The main weakness of the WECCs is that they have not developed the habit of reporting. The activities they carry out at present include environmental sanitation, beautification and tree planting. Strengthening their capacity is required.

Although implementation of the RCS has not formally commenced, informal use of it is being made by the WECCs, NGOs and the city government's organs. Reportedly extensive use of the RCS has been made in the recent AA City Master Plan revision.

The EPB itself has ensured that environment is included in the city's Five-Year Development Program. Proposed action areas include:  
 measures to begin combating pollution;  
 protecting the ecological balance in the city;  
 establishing a monitoring and evaluation system;  
 enhancing public participation in the implementation of the RCS; and  
 capacity building in the EPB.

In the implementation of the environmental component of the city's Five-Year Plan, a bottom-up planning approach will be used. Woredas will identify activities and submit them to the EPB which will aggregate and consolidate the proposals from all woredas and in turn submit them to the BoPED for review and approval. Also need to take into account the Action Program in the RCS.

In preparation for the RCS implementation the EPB has also initiated, completed and submitted to the City Council draft regulations on:  
 Pollution control;  
 EIA;  
 Conservation of Green Areas;  
 Solid Waste Management; and  
 Upgrading the EPB into a semi-autonomous agency (reporting to a board rather than the regional council.)

There was a special Task Force established for this purpose only (mainly lawyers). The drafts have been discussed at workshops organized for this purpose with funding from the Hinerich Boll Foundation.

In the current year's budget for EPB the following budget lines can be observe:

Construction of Laboratory (out of expected 7 mil)	Birr	4,500,000
Preparation of environmental quality standards	Birr.	124,400
Environmental Awareness Enhancement	Birr	121,000
A new office for EPB	Birr	1,600,000

## **2. Project's Specific Contribution**

The Project's support included:  
 Technical assistance- frequent visits and assistance  
 Financial assistance- financing several workshops

Equipment and material assistance (computers, printers, a fax machine, a photo copier, an over head projector, a duplicator, a flip chart stand, binding machine, about 75 books on environment).

Training – in-country training workshops, training and study tours abroad. There was participation in all of the training and study tours provided by the Project. The EPB head and two women from the Women’s Affairs Bureau have participated in study tours. Reportedly almost all trained personnel are still in their original places. There is evidence that they are using their skills e.g. RCS formulation, project proposal preparation, EIA legislation preparation, communication activities).

In 2000, the EPB prepared seven projects for assistance by the CSE Project. Only one was accepted and funded – but this was support for the environmental laboratory.

There was great appreciation of the support provided by the Project and regret that it is being phased out at this time. A next phase would have given crucial support in integrating environment into the city’s development and the planning cycle properly, as well as assisting the establishment of on-the-ground RCS projects on a pilot basis.

### **3. Assessment of Impacts and Identification of Issues Arising**

#### **A. STRENGTHS OF PROCESS / PROJECT**

##### **DOCUMENT**

RCS documents produced (in English) and submitted to City Administration.

RCS issues prioritized in terms of importance to the city.

##### **PROCESS**

Wide stakeholder participation at RCS conference - included government representatives (federal, city and wereda levels) as well as representatives from AAU, professional societies such as the biological and chemical societies and youth and women’s associations

##### **INSTITUTIONAL SET-UP AND PERSONNEL**

Establishment of an Environmental Protection Bureau has created an organisation with ownership of the RCS process and responsibility for its continuity. Relative stability of staff in EPB and their enthusiasm helps the process.

*Approach that promoted understanding of the purpose of the RCS - Creation of enhanced environmental awareness*

Significant effort to apply the communications strategy observable e.g. - EPB publishes a “quarterly” magazine on environment, has also prepared brochures, leaflets and posters to enhance awareness about the environment and the RCS process.

*Relatively advanced in the integration of RCS activities in the planning cycle*

City’s 2<sup>nd</sup> Five Year Development Plan provides important consideration to environment/ RCS related programmes. Also city’s development budgeting has begun to ear-mark funds for RCS related activities.

*Capacity of EPB enhanced*

Expertise has been developed while participating in RCS formulation. Knowledge and skills also enhanced through training provided by the CSE Project. There is now relatively better skills for problem analysis and proposing solutions. Equipment and materials supplied by project satisfied needs.

##### **EFFECTIVE PROJECT SUPPORT**

Constant contacts and visits by the Project staff and the EPB to each other's offices have meant that more technical assistance has been available and frequent consultations have been carried out. Proximity of the EPB to the Project office has certainly brought advantages to the EPB.

#### DECENTRALIZATION

There are very active WECCs established in all woredas. This is indicative of the decentralizing the RCS activities. So too are the plans for the implementation of wereda upwards / grass-roots project identification and planning for the environment element of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Five Year Plan.

#### PARTICIPATION

The exercise in participatory approaches is evident not only in the RCS conference but in the WECCS which have as members not only woreda level city administration officers but also representatives of women's and youth associations.

### **B. WEAKNESSES OF PROCESS / PROJECT**

#### NATURE OF PROCESS

RECC ineffective - it has no legally binding status. As a result the whole responsibility was dumped onto the EPE.

RECC holds almost no meetings. The RECC has been by-passed in the RCS approval process. It is felt that there was no adequate sensitization of the politicians and that also City politicians have too many other preoccupations to give attention the RCS.

#### LENGTH OF PROCESS

Task Force members were not always available due to regular work in their respective bureaus. There was also no support for experts in the TF by their bureau heads. No incentives to TF members, although CSE provided some financing for transportation required for information collection. This has resulted in delays in the formulation of the RCS.

Approval of RCS delayed for about 1½ years, so far. EPB staff are starting to worry although they hope that after the completion of the ongoing political rectification programme things may move faster.

### **4. Analysis**

#### RELEVANCE

*The RCS is still relevant as far as the staff of EPB is concerned. It need to be approved without further delay. However, while the enthusiasm within the bureau is commendable, a question arises as to whether such enthusiasm also exists in the other bureaus and they see the relevance of this. Do they have any ownership of it and hence interest to use it?*

#### Process

*There appears to have been a tendency to consider the RCS formulation task as something extra from what is considered "regular work" by Task Force members. This attitude may have led to a feeling that some kind of extra remuneration was due to them in order to make it worthwhile for them to take it seriously. How could such a feeling have been avoided when there is a deep rooted conviction that Project work is something extra?*

#### Impact, Effectiveness and Dissemination

*The attempt to implement the RCS is encouraging particularly when one sees that there is some exercise of need identification and planning at the woreda level. There is a danger that the EPB may be becoming the sole promoter at the City administration level. The fact that the RECC has*

*been by passed during the RCS approval process may also be indicative of an inclination to take things into ones hands, disregarding the importance of coordination ensuring the implementation period as well.*

### **Sustainability**

The issue of sustainability is worrying to many. Although the EPB may continue its struggle to see to it that adequate funds are available for RCS implementation there are doubts that given the scarcity of resources adequate funds will be made available.

*In addition, although there is a feeling that the Project's support has been very satisfactory in building staff capacity, the need for continuous technical assistance during implementation still appears indispensable? Obviously, a lot is expected from EPA in this regard.*

### Bottom-up Planning

*In so far as the RCS formulation was prompted from the federal level one can say there was an element of a top-down approach. This may be seen in EPB's measures to prompt the woreda level stakeholders to establish the WECCS. However, the fact that the WECCS have their own initiative and are doing fine perhaps indicates that such coordination, planning and implementation initiatives can perhaps stimulate local initiative and ownership. Clearly important that people are dealing with issues which are close to their heart, i.e.- finding solution to the everyday problems they face.*

## **5. Lessons and Recommendations**

The case of the Addis Ababa City Administration may be illustrative of the possibility that the establishment of an institution solely responsible for environmental affairs improves the chances for implementation of the RCSs. However, such institutions must always keep in mind that their role is coordination of other line bureaus and avoid the temptation to take too many actions into their hands because of the frustrations that are faced in coordination. How much has the project appreciated this danger? How and by whom can such an inclination be corrected if it becomes a serious problem after Project phases out?

Again by-passing the RECC, as ineffective as it has been, may not have been the right thing to do. It increases the perception that the RECC is ineffective when its own chairperson, instead of calling a meeting, submits the final draft RCS directly to the Administration' Executive Council. How can the indispensability of co-ordination be instilled in all concerned - politicians, line bureaus etc.

Suggestion that, since City administration is accountable to the PM, not involving the administration by the EPB staff was a mistake.

The WECCs appear to be more viable and their membership relatively diversified, but presently depend on what little is made available to them by the City. It is essential that an appropriate reporting relationship that facilitates feedback to the higher City Administration level be developed. The reporting system must be simple and not cumbersome so that WECCs would understand and can easily do it without spending too much time and effort. This must be linked to access to funds for their activities.

There is disappointment that the CSE is phasing out at this stage. It is seen as being too soon. Unless there is continuous technical assistance from the CSE Project during implementation it is felt that integration of environmental concerns into development planning and the planning and implementation of RCS projects may suffer.

## **Annex 6c**

### **REGIONAL CONSERVATION STRATEGY PROCESS: OROMIA REGIONAL STATE**

#### **1. RCS Process**

RCS built upon the initial work undertaken by the Zones during the 1991 –1993 period. See Southern Regional State comment re the feedback nature of this process from grassroots to top and back down again.

Task force for preparing the RCS started work in 1996. It was seen as an urgent issue and some -- people from 10 different Bureaus were appointed. The Bureaus involved included BOPED, BoA, BoE, BoWA, BoIndustry, BoH, BoUrban Development, DPPO, and the mass media, but not Investment. Due to quick appointment of Task Force members some were not really appropriate.

Original focal point was the Bureau of Natural Resource Development and Environmental Protection, but this was merged to become BoA. Head of Dept for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, Kassa Moka, later deputy head of BoA, took the lead with the RCS.

Considerable confusion faced in 1996 when many experts resigned following the regionalisation process; this loss of TF members made it difficult to keep the RCS on track.

Nonetheless, the RCS workshop was held 23-25 December 1996. 4 volumes presented to major gathering of regional and zonal officials and experts, and also NGOs and consultants. Meeting agreed it was a useful set of documents, but stated that they needed revising and up-dating

In 1997 the RCS was read by the newly arrived T.A. staff in the GTZ-supported land use planning project (LUPO). The draft RCS was seen as unsatisfactory from the view of the BoA and GTZ funded its revision. This involved a team of three consultants, selected without tendering by Oromia government, to finalise the RCS. Team included the Head of the Agriculture Bureau (Wassim) and Berhanu Debele. It was presented at a smaller second RCS workshop and minor corrections identified in 1998? (Took about one year to do).

The final output was only 3 volumes, without any Action Plan volume and project proposals, but focusing on resources, problems / issues, and policies. It was different from the CSE by focusing more on issues, problems and policies. The volumes of the RCS were large as had to cope with the diversity in this region. RCS documents seen as resource documents, not to function as guides or fulfil a communication purpose.

86 copies were produced of these 3 volumes with GTZ funds and these were distributed primarily to the regional level bureaus and the zones.

RECC not active as it is a committee, no one takes responsibility – not legally established so not taken seriously by regional government / council.

Took a long time to get RCS approved as the regional government was too busy with elections amongst other things. Major staff changes after the elections. RCS was only approved in December 2000, after presented to Council in June and legal letter which was required (but overlooked) submitted in October.

RCS is not active yet as the prerequisite is to adjust structure of the BoA and create the new Natural Resources Development and Environmental Protection institution. This requires the proposal (included

in RCS?) to be approved by the Oromia Council I its own right. Can only implement the RCS once the institution is established. This involves the division of BoA into NR&EPA Authority, Ag Res and Ag Extn. This has been agreed, after a major fight, but problems remain over the ranking and salary of various jobs. Creation of the new authority is seen as implementation achieved.

RCS in final approved form has been issued to only 5 Bureaus, Water, Health, Education, Trade and Industry, Investment, and 2 authorities Rural Roads and Irrigation. Agric and BOPED already have copies as involved in approval. Most people only have the Task Force draft or the revised version (produced with GTZ support).

Further implementational problems are the high turnover of government staff, never get people around long enough to read it all, let alone use it.

Some NGOs are asking questions about RCS and want to use it.

Has been introduced to 3 zone, Arsi, Borana and Bale in Sept 2000 in connection with the gender and environment workshops funded by CSE. But this mainly government people, and few NGOs or public or wereda level staff. But no copies of the final document were left in the zone.

## **2. Project's Specific Contribution**

The region has had the usual set of support from the project.

Technical assistance-

Financial assistance

Equipment and material assistance (computers, printers, a fax machine, a photo copier, an over head projector, a duplicator, a flip chart stand, binding machine, about 75 books on environment);

Training

Specific mention was made of :

EIA training course – has been useful for one person in BOPED who uses it in his project appraisal work.

Yearly status meetings for the RCS process people / RECCs organised by EPA / Project. Done up to 1998 then stopped.

Support for 3 environmental awareness workshop in the region, at different locations to cope with diversity.

Trainee who went to Zimbabwe twice for DEAP and women in environment training, felt that the courses were helpful but has faced difficulties using his skills since return. Major problem is the agricultural production focus of the BoA so environment downgraded. He prepared a proposal and got funds from CSE for a study of water pollution from the Mojo tanneries. But Bureau head refused him permission to do that work and he reassigned to a laboratory. Need education of Bureau Heads so they see the value and utility of these courses and techniques.

There is concern that CSE support for this region has been inadequate and how it does not reflected the diversity and size of it. It should have had a larger budget.

Comments were that EPA/CSE Project just runs workshops, and does not achieve effective activities. There was seen to be too much theory in the courses, and not enough practice and technical support.

Concern is also expressed that EPA will not support the new regional environmental institutions after the project closes, yet this is vital. This problem stems from the degree of technical and financial support provided to the region by the project. Although EPA, like other federal agencies has

responsibilities to support the regions in its area of mandate, this support will certainly be less than that provided by the project. Further, there will be no financial support from EPA to the region.

### **3. Assessment of Outputs, Impacts and Identification of Issues Arising**

#### Signs of Impact

There are some signs of impact, despite the slow process and lack of activities on the ground. Task Force members use it and MoE has used it in their curriculum development. The five year plan uses the language of sustainability and refers to the RCS. In this document there is a specific section on the problems of sustainability and environmental degradation, also on the RCS and need for an Environmental Protection Agency for the region to coordinate actions.

However, the Oromia Investment Bureau uses environmental criteria when it assesses investment projects but these are one which they developed themselves when established in 1994 and are not from the RCS. This is of limited effect as most documents from investors do not have answers to these two questions on environmental impact and mitigation. The Investment Bureau does not have the capacity to appraise these questions when they are answered and so send it to BoA's Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Section for assessment. (Both BoE and investors need training).

A similar lack of capacity on environmental issues is reported from the Industry Bureau.

#### **A. Strengths of Process / Project**

##### Document

This is produced in a way which addresses the perceived needs of this region focusing on causal processes behind environmental problems and the appropriate policy responses. This is focused on the region and is a clear development away from the CSE.

##### Process

Again like Southern Region fairly effective process of getting the RCS draft produced and the conference run within a year. Also quite effective at getting it revised and finalised within another year. (But problems thereafter.)

Participatory process at the first RCS conference with --- participants with less at the second one.

##### Impacts on Awareness and Behaviour

There is some awareness created by the RCS process, especially within Agriculture, the focal point bureau, and also the Planning Bureau. Not clear how wide this awareness is outside these.

##### Training and Capacity Building

Trainees and their skills – one case seen. This training on gender and environment in Zimbabwe had had a positive / stimulating impact and the person had come back and developed a project proposal to look at the impact of tannery water pollution. However, while funding had been obtained from the CSE (B40,000+) the project activity had been prevented by the Head of the Agricultural Bureau for no clear reason – jealousy?

##### Timeliness

-

##### Wider Impacts

Use of RCS material in Education Bureau's work is reported. Seems to have been the result of having an educational specialist with interest in environment protection. (So does this use of the RCS prior to approval depend very much on personalities? )

## **B. Weaknesses of Process / Project**

### Nature of Process

**Two hiatuses in the process, getting to approval – presumably when fighting in BoAg re the new institutional structure and now in setting up the new structures. (No delay in revising document as work funded by GTZ).**

### Length of Process

Impact on momentum is not clear. (May be small once the new agency is set up and doing this as one of its major activities.)

### Dissemination and Awareness

There is a major need for a summary document which is attractive and is published in Oromiffa. There has been no awareness process. Issuing of the RCS once approved has been a disaster, only six copies have been produced and given to key Bureaus. No copying of the CSE launch concept and no use of the communications strategy which presumably they had developed like others. (Seems those communication workshops were a waste of time given that they were so long ago and not used in the interim as everyone waits for the official approval.)

No support for school environmental clubs from the CSE, although 1500 in this region. These tend to focus on trees and sanitation, both useful for homes and a means to spread CSE ideas more widely.

### Project Support

Seems to be average, although the GTZ input and fundinh of local consultants has given some independence.

### Decentralisation

**Little done in this respect beyond three zonal workshops to introduce the approved RCS.**

### Inclusiveness of Process

Limited. Seems to have been heavily owned by theBoAg. Non-use of RCS in Investment Bureau. Although copy sent to them once approved this has not yet got down to the Project Appraisal Section. In fact the people here having been using a form for appraisal since the Bureau was set up 7 years ago which includes a question on environmental impact and one on mitigating actions. On the other hand Education does use it. (Others may but not able to interview them).

### Additional

Very limited implementation – bar some in education and people using their own copies of drafts to help them in their work.

## **4. Analysis**

### Relevance

Yes it has been relevant to some needs of BoAg, especially Natural Resource Development and Environmental Protection Dept. But little done in terms of utilisation guidance.

### Process

Was highly dependent on one staff member who drove the process, Kassa Moka. His departure last year may account for recent delays as no one seems to own it any more. Or it may just be current political problems. However, this sort of situation raises questions about the focal point concept versus the need to keep a Multi-sectoral Task Force in operation – to act like a core group and keep the momentum.



Process here seems to have had two hiatuses / bottlenecks and pauses. One is as in Southern Region – after the finalisation it took time to get it into the political process to get the approval. The second one seems to be now while waiting for the legislation to create the agency to do environmental protection. How long will this take? One problem here is that Head of Agric Bureau is fighting against having his Natural Resource Devt and EP Dept removed and put into the new EPA. He has apparently lost that battle – which in fact was probably part of the delay in the political approval. But now there is no one driving the RCS process forward how long will it take for the legislation to put the new organisation in place and then how long to get it running.

All of this suggests that we have followed in Ethiopia a route for the RCS which has fallen foul of the Ethiopian bureaucratic system and that we need to learn lessons about alternative we might have taken.

Impact, Effectiveness and Dissemination

Limited in terms of dissemination – a serious problem with all RCSs so it seems.

Efficiency

-

Sustainability

Could be OK once the new organisation is set up but it will need lots of support and concern re the capacity of EPA to do this in the absence of the project.

## **5. Lessons and Recommendations**

Note different concept here of the EPA as it will take administrative, assessment and planning functions from the BoA's Environmental Protection and Natural Resource Development Section (which includes land use planning).

Problem is the lack of any communication strategy – at least being used and getting the message out to the different bureaus at regional HQ. Not even thinking about the regions yet.

Concern about the equal treatment of all regions in the CSE process, when there is a big difference between Harari and Oromia. Very diverse (12 zones), and large (22m) needs more resources.

Within Oromia staff involved with the RCS question about why the RCS needs political approval when it is only a local adjustment of a Federal government approved policy which is what federal government is responsible for and which the regions apply. Surely it is a technical matter to approve an RCS not a political one given this Federal CSE policy.

But some political process is needed at regions as there is no EPA to implement. Process would have been quicker and had more dynamism if set up the EPA like organisation at the regional level first. RCS has been delayed by having to be squeezed into the BoA's workplan and priorities. Focal points have their own job and this takes priority.

## **Annex 6d**

### **REGIONAL CONSERVATION STRATEGY PROCESS: SOMALI NATIONAL REGIONAL STATE**

#### **Introductory Remarks**

Getting senior government officials for interviews was difficult as they have already been tied up in series of meetings for over two weeks leaving their members of technical staff in their offices to act on their behalf. Two further scenarios made this review much difficult. One, most of the Acting Heads of the respective Bureaux and senior experts were not able giving some time (in some cases, even 5 minutes) for interviews, as they were too busy covering the job that their original posts require and also working on what they were respectively delegated. Second, those few who showed their willingness to sacrifice some time were by far unaware of or with quite limited (or confused) knowledge about the RCS, like few points about the EPA regardless of its' links with RCS/CSE.

#### **1. RCS Process**

Established RECC, the committee chaired by the Head of the Regional Administrative Council or by his delegate and comprised of representatives from relevant government bureaux/offices including – planning, agriculture, water, education, trade and industry<sup>1</sup>, investment and women's affairs. BoPED was selected for coordinating the RCS process and one of its' senior members of staff as a focal person.

Owing to a range of natural and man-made factors, the area currently known as Somali region is locally characterised as being the most backward regions of the country, which has been suffering from lack of trained staff and adequate baseline information. Hence, a consultant was hired to provide the regional experts with all possible assistances in developing the RCS and producing draft documents in English language.

Deliberate attempts were not made to involve NGOs and the private sector, except community chiefs - few elderly and influential members of the communities, in RCS process.

RECC, in turn, has played significant roles in the refinement process by reviewing the draft RCS documents based on local situations and ensuring that the comments are incorporated.

Assisted by the EPA, mainly by looking for appropriate consultants and facilitating their employments, summary of the RCS is finalised whereas the translation process is underway as at the review period. The delays in producing the Somali version RCS documents (including their summary) is indicated as one, but the major cause for not getting the strategy approved by the Regional Council.

In general terms, producing the summary of the three-volume RCS (English version) and translating the documents into Somali language are viewed by BoPED as the two most important activities that led towards what is currently known as the 'final stage of the RCS development process' – in fact, a success by themselves in Somali context.

#### **2. Project's Specific Contribution**

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<sup>1</sup> Structured as 'Trade, Industry, Transport and Tourism Bureau'. This holds true for Dire Dawa and other regions referred to as 'emerging regions', which include: Afar, Beni Shangul, Gambella and Harari

The project's contributions towards developing the regional capacity and capabilities are well acknowledged as creating a 'practical knowledge base', which could have hardly been given attention by the regional government during the last number of years.

Project support in general terms include:

Training and workshops on various issues

Office equipment (including computers-printers) and stationeries

Books: Following the past order, the region expects to get a collection of recent publications on environmental issues from the National Coordination office and EPA. So far unclear as to how, who, from where these books would in the future be utilised.

### **3. Assessment of Outputs, Impacts and Identification of Issues Arising**

Outputs and Signs of Impacts

Lessons learnt by members of technical staff of sector bureaux and institutions (like, WAO) and outputs-impacts of particular importance to the region include:

The importance of environment on both rural and urban livelihoods is highly recognised at most levels of the regional government structures.

Increased knowledge in devising conservation strategy based on local needs and situations and well beyond, on various long-term developmental initiatives

Shared experiences of other organisations on various environment related initiatives undertaken in different areas. For instances, WAO considers such forum as 'eye-openers'

Able to know the regional resource base - identification and detailed analysis on: "*what resources ... which/where ... which sectors contribute much towards environmental management and how ...*". In the light of the vastness of the area (estimated to cover 350,000 km<sup>2</sup>) and the corresponding cost, carrying resource inventory activities could have simply been impossible

### **A. STRENGTHS AND OPPORTUNITIES OF THE PROCESS/PROJECT**

#### **Participatory**

Participation of members from different sectors bureaux – variations in background and experience considered

#### **Capacity Enhancements**

Many trainings/workshops conducted – contributed to awareness creation and enhancements and to the overall process in developing the RCS

#### **Ownership Feelings**

Though the very idea of drawing the RCS came from CSE/EPA, at the federal level, it is felt that the final outcome (RCS) is owned by the region. Such ownership feelings are further explained in terms of the significant roles played by sector bureaux and institutions in the RCS process albeit external consultants' involvement

#### **Wider Impacts**

The RCS, although meant for dealing with environmental issues, it is believed to ultimately cover the broad aspects of the regional development

### **B. WEAKNESSES/LIMITATIONS/CHALLENGES OF THE PROCESS/PROJECT**

#### **Project Support**

Unbearable delays in translating the RCS document to the local language, the effects of which are implicated in getting the regional government's approvals and the subsequent lags in transforming the strategy into action.

While not undermining the assistance rendered in finding consultants for translation, lack of appropriate attention and follow-ups by the CSE/EPA in taking the translation process through are considered as major, apparently the central, cause for such series of lags.

### **Staff**

Lack of staff with adequate training and background on environment

High staff turn-over; Once the minimum level of experience in working under harsh conditions are acquired, members of staff at all (region, zone and Woreda) levels leave their low-paid governmental posts in favour of NGOs operating within or outside the region, with much better enabling work environment

### **Challenges Specific to Somali**

A number of specific factors affect past, current and future efforts along with the RCS development and implementations :

Backwardness – due to the hitherto lack of appropriate attention; numerous effects

Physical and socio-economic features

An area where a large size of refugees exist

Harsh environment – implicated in staff shortage, among many

The way Somalis are living scattered all along the vast areas of the region

## **4. Analysis**

### **Process and Dissemination**

The process that the region has undergone in drawing the RCS is best understood by a small number of staff of few government bureaus, mainly those who lie within the upper levels of the respective structures. In these organisations the RCS process is not only considered as a mechanism for drawing a strategy, but also a means for taking resource inventory, an exercise that might have been undertaken for the first time ever since the Somali Region was structured into its' current form. Carrying resource inventory activities could have simply been impossible without external assistance given the prevailing trained staff and budget constraints to cover such a vast area (estimated to cover 350,000 km<sup>2</sup>).

Also noted is that environment related initiatives being carried out in the region by and with UNICEF's support are better known by a number of organisations (eg: Education bureau; WAO; Hope for the Horn, an indigenous NGO) than the RCS or somehow aware that the RCS is being developed. In fact, there is a room for getting into apparent confusions on the roles, intended outcomes and prospects of UNICEF's initiatives and the RCS.

Of the members of government bureaus' staff who are said to have passed through the process with a relatively good level of awareness, those who lost track of the final product (RCS documents) and those with blurred views on the fate of the RCS are in considerable number.

Those (probably, most) who are well aware about the RCS might have moved out of the region by taking jobs in other organisations. But, their former organisations are yet in place operating within the region, and in some cases as nominal members of RECC.

### **Impact and Effectiveness**

Further to the notable attitudinal changes that were brought about within communities (mainly at Zone level) and professionals, the CSE/EPA/BoPED organised workshops and trainings helped in getting broader and multi-dimensional views of environment, triggering a further concern among technical experts and Bureau heads. In this area where environment and the related natural resources have long been 'sensitive and often conflicting', the currently observed attitudinal changes are considered as the

major outcome of the RCS process paving the way towards the successful implementation of the strategy.

### **Sustainability**

Combating the spread and effects of desertification, recovering the huge environmental costs that the region had been paying in the process of hosting series of refugee influxes, tackling the ever increasingly effects of urban pollution, generating alternative sources of energy (currently, fuel) and incorporating RCS in projects-sectoral interventions are few, among the diverse range of priority outputs that some regional bureaus intend achieving in short/long-run. The RCS lies at the centre of future efforts with which sustainable impacts are envisaged.

In Somali region context, however, availability of funds and technical assistances from external sources (even if much higher amount than the previous period is hoped to be allocated by the regional government) is by large perceived as factor crucial for ensuring the sustainable use and implementation of the RCS.

In fact, experts have already started expressing their worries as to whether extracts of RCS, which are included in the forthcoming 5-year plans, will be considered for implementation during the given period.

### **5. Lessons and Recommendations**

An issue of particular concern to this review is that of the prevailing paradoxes in views regarding the regional priorities; as to whether or not environmental problems are to be addressed with utmost priorities.

On one side, presumably including those who have taken part in the RCS process are concerned that donors, international NGOs and national government are not made aware of the magnitude of the problem that surrounds environment in Somali region; always treated similarly with other regions regardless of the intensity. This group calls for action before it is too late, though already late. Paradoxically, quite sizeable number of regional experts feel that environmental initiatives (RCS implied) cannot be taken as a priority in Somali region as compared with those of economic diversification, agriculture (focused on crops and livestock) and infrastructure development.

For the reasons mentioned earlier as ‘introductory remarks’ together with lack of informants from the regional council during the review period, it was not possible to get where the regional government stands.

Taking note of the overall progress, potentials and opportunities ahead with respect to the RCS, the following issues need appropriate considerations:

The regional government has not moved towards addressing environment related problems (neither shown a supportive stand) as much as it should, despite being aware of the consequences. It has apparently been trapped in dealing with other matters through series of meetings.

It is high time that the government allocates funds ensuring that extracts of the RCS included in the 5-year plans are implemented while approving and taking the RCS further into full motion. Immediately after acclimatisation, bureau heads and technical experts move out [NGO] EPA/CSE should be prepared to [put a system of M&E in place] to monitor the undoubted negative effects of the current nation wide trends/motto “move towards food security .. increased trends of depending on food crops’ production...”, mostly at the expense of (or with substantial pressure on) natural resource base; explain the outcome/results to the regional governments, convince and help them in designing better approaches that could lead towards improved agricultural production without compromising the NR base. Note that the M&E efforts are by large geared towards large-scale pollution issues and that of agriculture related though small-scale but of huge effects, are not give due considerations

## **Annex 6e**

### **REGIONAL CONSERVATION STRATEGY PROCESS: DIRE DAWA ADMINISTRATIVE REGION**

#### **1. RCS Process**

Although the scope and space wide environmental deterioration have long been among the major concerns within Dire Dawa administrative structures, for as far back to early eighties, it was since 1982 EC (1989/90 GC) that notable efforts were made towards finding ways of addressing the problem and related effects. Assessment of the natural resource base, identification and analysis of cause-effect relations of the problems that led towards the then state of deterioration were among key events partly carried out during this period. In fact, a conservation strategy was initially prepared in 1990, during when Dire Dawa was Autonomous Region comprising of six 'administrative areas', then referred to as 'Awrajas'. The needs for revising the document as per the newly drawn administrative areas has, however been considered as a task ahead, which led to initiating the current RCS.

The actual work of drawing the current RCS started in 1988 EC (1995/96 GC) immediately after REEC was established as an executive body to coordinate and lead the project and a Task Force, composed of 12 technical members drawn from different sector offices was formed. Subsequent attempts are made to strengthen the latter.

Formulation of the RCS in Dire Dawa Administrative Council was carried out in line with the experience gained from similar exercises undertaken elsewhere, both at Federal and Regional levels; and taking full account of and capitalising on the outcome of the surveys previously conducted in some parts of the Region. The RCS process has involved three major and interlinked steps: Building the task force's capacity; Reviewing past work; Assessing the natural resources available within the Council's jurisdiction and the process undergone in utilising them; Identification and causal chain analysis of past environmental problems and the future trends.

Based on the findings of the review, formulation of the strategy and relevant programmes that would alleviate the problems and ultimately improve the regional natural resource base. Setting priorities and preparing time bound action plans for implementing the programmes; finalising the RCS documents in 4 contextual volumes, pending the work on the fifth volume, investment programme, for some future possible dates; and creating enabling situations for taking the programmes into action.

In formulating the strategy, the task force has followed the following activity-based procedures:

Review of available literature

Preparation of questionnaire for data collection

Conducting field visits to assess the situation on the ground and discuss with the local people problems and opportunities

Data analysis and preparation of the draft document

Conducting a region-wide workshop involving people from rural and urban areas to discuss and comment the draft document, and the final approvals of the RCS

The strategy document, as designed with particular focus on embodying 10 sectoral and 10 cross-sectoral issues with prioritised programmes and projects, is prepared in four volumes each describing different issues:

- Volume I: The Regional Resource base and its utilisation
- Volume II: The Regional Conservation Strategy and Programmes
- Volume III: The Institutional Framework and Operational arrangements
- Volume IV: Action plan

Preparation of a detailed investment programme to implement the action plan has, however, not yet been finalised during the period.

Owing to the apparent lack of information about the most recent developments, it was hardly possible to get a consistent set of views on the process that followed the draft RCS document preparation and the current status. The following sets of circumstances were noted on the status and whereabouts of the RCS documents:

The RCS has not yet been formally approved by the regional council and none of the bureaux is given a formal go-ahead signal to incorporate the relevant aspects. If there are cases where some elements of the RCS documents are used, it could be on organisations' interest

The most refined version of the RCS documents are expected to be presented to the Council for approvals as soon as the editorial and summarisation process is completed (by external consultant/s) and the final comments given by some members of the task force are incorporated. It took quite long to get what would be the final version document to the region from the consultant/s.

RCS documents are 'virtually'<sup>2</sup> approved, but not sure whether all contents therein are accepted, like 'setting a separate institution'.

Although the RCS has received a wider level acceptance by members of the Council, it has not yet passed through the legal process in use for approving and moving into a full-scale implementation stage. As a result, no mention about the environmental unit, which has been proposed as key institutional set up for undertaking the RCS

## **2. Project's Specific Contribution**

In addition to rendering technical, financial and material assistances to the region, efforts are mentioned to have been made by the project in supporting the human resource development initiatives. To some details, these include:

Procurement and supply of office equipments for the use by the regional co-ordinating committee secretariat, which include: Computers-printers; Typewriter; Photocopier; Overhead Projector; Duplication Machine; and other stationary items

Designing of a programme to facilitate effective communication [completed]

Acquisition of 47 environment related books worth Birr 25,000 for the use by the regional experts  
28 experts represented from different Regional Offices have attended a workshop on Environment organised by the National Secretariat and 4 other experts have participated in study tours carried out in 3 countries.

A one-day workshop was organised for experts coming from the neighbouring regions to share the experiences of the region in the preparation of the strategy document.

## **3. Assessment of Outputs, Impacts and Identification of Issues Arising**

Outputs and Impacts [Signs of Impacts]

Upon completion of the preparation of the strategy, extensive promotional and capacity building activities were initiated. These were not only introducing the concept and objectives of the strategy to the people in region but also developing new projects. The following are some of the activities planned and/or accomplished - by large, reflections of impacts of the project:

A project on integration of environment, gender and development designed and is being implemented with funds obtained from the UNICEF. The project is believed to contribute to the overall capacity building, awareness creation and documentation efforts of the region. Also, indicated that so far, 60 experts and some 300 representatives of the rural-urban communities have undergone through the various awareness creation trainings-workshops.

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<sup>2</sup> Might mean: *almost, nearly, in effect, practically, close to* (MS-Word 2000 Thesaurus)

Three rural based and one urban focused, altogether 4 projects have been prepared by the regional experts and are submitted to different donors for funding. These projects are expected to cost Birr 28 million.

Environmental Clubs have been created in 18 different schools in the Region

Attempts are being made to undertake environmental impact assessments on projects designed and implemented by the private and public sectors

A project is being prepared to translate the strategy document into Oromifa and Somaligna languages, to publish a regional environmental newsletter, and to review and update the strategy document and finally translate it into Amharic language. The project is now ready for submission to the national secretariat for funding.

A project worth 3.3 million birr, is prepared by 13 rural Kebeles of the Eastern zone of the region and submitted to donors for possible funding.

A tree planting project for the Dire Dawa town and several schools in the Region is prepared, submitted to the National Secretariat (CSE/EPA) for support; about Bir 150,000 fund was obtained; being implemented with utmost success, as said by one expert

Request has been made to the CSE/EPA for supply of books worth 25,000 Birr [Unable to find out the response and current status]

Preliminary discussion has been made with the Dutch Government about possibilities of supporting a community based natural resources conservation programme in the Region.

Also proposed some environment related projects, which Dr. Tewolde (EPA) promised finding funds for – But nothing to date

## **A. STRENGTHS OF PROCESS / PROJECT**

### **Process**

Different level committees were organised and plans were accordingly drawn for undertaking the RCS. Involved lots of staff members, most of whom got motivated. The process involved good communication with decision makers and flow of information between the various organisations and regional administrative levels.

### **Capacity - awareness, attitudinal changes and collaboration**

Many trainings/workshops were organised.

Awareness creation; trained on environmental impact assessment – though not enough.

Farmers' have positively responded to the RCS.

The Regional Council has been collaborative with as much efforts of taking part in the RCS as time permitted.

## **B. LIMITATIONS/CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED IN PROJECT/PROCESS**

### **Process**

An endless process of keeping on updating the RCS documents.

### *Awareness-Participation-Integration*

***Lack of sufficient awareness to initiate community participation in environmental conservation activities and integration with the other development activities.***

### **Staff**

Shortage of trained-technical staff: No one in the region with adequate level of expertise on environment.

High turnover of staff, which has seriously affected the development and continuation of the preparation process.

### Challenges on Institution

**The needs for establishing an environmental unit as key institutional set up for undertaking the RCS and the challenges that underlie its approvals**



New unit means new structure; new budget line, cases which Office of the Prime Minister's should be aware of and convinced about.

### **Project Support**

CSE/EPA support (financial and technical follow-ups) biased in favour of Addis Ababa region; totally inadequate ...far less than what it did in case of drawing the CSE.

Supports have significantly been decreased as of the period when RCS was drawn and apparently stopped thereafter

## **4. Analysis**

### Relevance

Dire Dawa is currently facing a range of environmental problems like that of - ground water and industrial pollutions; deforestation-desertification and; above all, lack of all-level awareness (ignorance), among many others. The very idea of developing the RCS is thus 'extremely relevant' for most bureaus, the outputs of which could be used by most at almost equal levels; and 'crucially needed' by the Bureaus of Education, Agriculture, Tourism, Industry, Investment, both offices working on Water (supply-services and water-mines-energy).

### Process and Efficiency

The RCS process, given the way it is structured needs an institution linked with multiple sectors. BoPED was the sole regional candidate for taking the responsibilities of coordinating the project – which was felt that it has done it well.

The process of keeping on updating the RCS documents for indefinite period and undetermined levels of satisfaction has created a sort of RCS-fatigue tendency, together with time, resource and efficiency related concerns. The very idea of 'dynamism' are not undermined, though the needs for testing the strategy on the ground are emphasised.

### Impact, Effectiveness and Dissemination

The RCS document is structured in a way that could be effectively implemented on a bit-by-bit basis by different sectors.

All documents and publications related to the RCS have been duplicated and disseminated to the relevant institutions of the Region. However, information gap about the most recent developments between sectors and at different levels of the regional structures are repeatedly mentioned.

### Sustainability

Whichever is the case regarding its approvals it is great that RCS document produced - which are being used as source documents for drawing environment oriented sectoral strategies in much better way that before; and even further, projects (although few in number) with some elements of the RCS are being implemented.

However, the most frequently asked question is - "*can the strategy document by itself considered both as a means and end of the conservation*". The project is felt to have been terminated well before any signs of sustainable impacts are ensured.

## **5. Lessons and Recommendations**

Various factors mentioned to justify that this specific region could be used as a successful model of the RCS:

Its' manageable size (as compared to other regions)

Collaborative environment and openness to support the RCS by the regional Council

Good communication with decision makers and flow of information between the various organisations and regional administrative levels

As stressed by many, EPA, a nationally mandated specialised institution, needs to get down at grass-root level and work with technical staffs in designing projects and rendering assistance in initiating-implementing them.

Although RECC is meant to be a body responsible to coordinate, review, and facilitate the implementation of the strategy, this has not been the case during the RCS development process, except giving (limited to giving) some decisions, as all members were busy heading their respective bureaux. In fact, some said that the task force was set up not only to provide technical assistance in the process of developing the RCS, but also with an implicit motive of filling in the apparent gaps that conditions like REEC's inabilities might create.

The primary task ahead should therefore be to strengthen this committee in all respect. Several opportunities seem to exist to achieve this and ultimately bring about sustainable development. Some of these opportunities are the following:

There is comparatively better capacity and capability in the region in terms of trained manpower and institutional set up to implement development activities.

There is increased awareness of environmental protection and willingness to participate in implementing such programmes among the people in the region.

There are several environmental development projects on the shelves and ample database to initiate implementations. The opportunities are also much better to facilitate community participation in the preparation and implementation of development interventions.

Taking advantages of these opportunities and to bring about meaningful changes, the following actions have to be undertaken:

Strengthen the coordinating committee and extend similar structures to the lower levels.

Prepare periodic plan of operation for the committee and define regular meeting intervals

Encourage and support establishment of environmental clubs in the Region.

Produce a workable environmental protection guidelines

Conduct environmental impact assessment on public and private sector development projects.

Formulate sellable projects that are relevant to solving environmental problems

Organise donor conferences and solicit funding.

Establish a joint forum or a network with the neighbouring Regions and initiate discussions on joint efforts to tackle inter regional environmental problems.

Create Regional Forum to discuss issues such as environment and development problems, designation of environment day, community participation, tree planting, cleaning and other environmental activities.

EPA/CSE should be prepared to [put a system of M&E in place] to monitor the undoubted negative effects of the current nation wide trends/motto "move towards food security .. increased trends of depending on food crops' production....", mostly at the expense of (or with substantial pressure on) natural resource base; explain the outcome/results to the regional governments, convince and help them in designing better approaches that could lead towards improved agricultural production without compromising the NR base. Note that the M&E efforts are by large geared towards large-scale pollution issues and that of agriculture related though small-scale but of huge effects, are not give due considerations

## **Annex 6f**

### **REGIONAL CONSERVATION STRATEGY PROCESS: TIGRAY REGIONAL STATE**

#### **1. RCS Process<sup>3</sup>**

Initial steps marking the official launching of the RCS process in Tigray were that of RECC's establishment followed by the Regional Task Force formation. Both comprised of members representing the various governmental organisations, almost all sector bureaus/offices including – BoPED BoE; BoH; Water, Energy and Mining; Population; BoANR; Culture and Tourism, etc and institutions like REST and Mekelle University (formerly, College). The underlying difference, however, is that of composition: RECC is composed of the Heads and chaired by the Regional Council representative, whereas the Task Force is made of the technical members of staff of the respective organisations. RECC, as it was entrusted to lead and make important decisions about the project, it used to meet twice a year while members of the task force were engaged in series of meetings all the way along the RCS process.

The number of tasks involving the RCS development, which include resource inventory, policy and action program/plans preparation were then assigned to members of the Task Force, mainly based on the disciplinary background of their organisations. For instance, forestry and conservation parts were given to members from the BoANR and that of the BoE took part in drawing the RCS, particularly contributed on the subject of its speciality/mandate, “environmental education and communication”

Passing through a process of back and forth institutional and group/task force based meetings and consultations the very first draft of the RCS documents were produced.

The drafts were refined through subsequent reviews and incorporating comments and suggestions of the various institutions and knowledgeable individuals. Furthermore, a workshop was organised at region level and the draft RCS was presented in a simplified way in local (Tigrigna) language to participants drawn from all stakeholders and members of the communities. Proceedings of the workshop was produced.

The issue surrounding institutional set up for implementing the RCS has been a matter of debate, both during the workshop and later; Agency/Office or Unit were major options. The apparent decision, awaiting the final confirmations of the Regional Council is that of establishing an independent environmental unit within BoPED by drawing technical experts/professionals from the various relevant organisations/bureaux before setting a separate Environmental Agency/Office. The underlying rationale were:

Budgetary/fund shortage in near future – also, their request for office establishment funds didn't get favourable response from EPA;

To buy some time for learning from experiences of the institution set by the Amhara State.

#### **2. Project's Specific Contribution**

With funds obtained from EPA/CSE, workshops and trainings were organised by BoPED on various subjects, by large similar with other regions, like – communication (this, in collaboration with BoE), women and environment (experts and women groups at region/zone/woreda levels took part).

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<sup>3</sup> Attempts in getting the dates for major events of the RCS process were unsuccessful

In all training/workshops, experts and technical staffs were key players and participants were drawn from all levels: community, wereda, zone, region – as relevant depending upon the topic and perceived gaps.

As part of the EPA/CSE's support package to the project, computers-printers (2 sets), some office equipments and stationeries are mentioned to have been received by BoPED (RCS coordinator) whereas the books are expected to be received in a month period. Based in BoPED's library, the books will be used by all stakeholders and needy users.

### **3. Assessment of Outputs, Impacts and Identification of Issues Arising**

Outputs and Impacts [Signs of Impacts]

Given that communities in Tigray have long been engaged on various environmental rehabilitation exercises, the RCS and its' outputs are already in use in sizeable parts of the region by different organisation, while notable impacts were made by the BoE. Furthermore, some elements of the RCS are incorporated in the next 5-year plan of action and development plans.

Tsegay participated in various trainings and workshops representing (and focal person for) BoE and he, in turn organised other workshops for members of his organisation at region and zone levels. He also prepared a proposal entitled '*Greening School Compounds in Tigray*', the implementation of which is started with supports from the region (like - supplying planting materials and encouraging road side plantations. Tigray's initiatives are picked up by an international organisation working in Eastern Africa for a wider-scale application. It is noted that similar projects, like '*Greening school compounds in Eastern Africa*', were being written some years back.

As part of the efforts made towards delivering 'environmental education/science' as a subject in Tigray schools, the RCS documents were used as source materials for developing the curriculum.

Environmental clubs' establishments in schools are part of the success stories, for which the following factors have contributed:

The regional governments interest

Efforts made by the BoE in communicating with NGOs

NGOs' interested in formulating them (eg; Lem Ethiopia, UNDP and others)

Diverse ranges of views were reflected regarding the strengths and limitations/weaknesses of the RCS process/project while a more or less similar perspective were noted across most people interviewed as opportunities and the 'future possible impacts'.

Highlights of strengths, limitations/weaknesses (in some cases indicated as 'missed opportunities' or/and 'challenges') are listed below:

#### **A. STRENGTHS OF THE PROCESS/PROJECT**

##### **Capacity Building and Technical Assistance**

Capacity building events appreciated

Appreciable participation by Gedeon and G/Selassie from CSE/EPA in the 5-year plans planning workshop on environment issues

##### **The RCS Process and Output (Document)**

*The RCS process have helped in organising and channelling the widely dispersed views about environment into one direction; the RCS could also be considered as the first major region-based document ever produced on conservation strategies, which have in deed been (and could time and*

*again be) used as a reference material for preparing short/long-term plans. BUT, as being said by many, should that be all about the RCS....is that what CSE/EPA aimed at?*

The RCS document, although obtained through painful process, gives directions for undertaking conservation related initiatives in planned manner (Note that elements of RCS are incorporated into the respective sectors' second 5-year plans).

### **Ownership Feelings**

A sense of ownership on the outcome is felt mainly because the RCS is drawn with active involvements of regional offices and incorporated in the forthcoming plans

## **B. WEAKNESSES/LIMITATIONS/CHALLENGES OF THE PROCESS/PROJECT**

### **Staff Qualifications**

Shortage of staff adequately qualified on environment and related disciplines.

### **Levels of Concerns by RECC and Stakeholders**

Discrepancies of concerns by RECC members (some high, while others too low), except putting the burden on BoPED.

Lack or unbalanced attention by/between stakeholders in the RCS process.

### **Focal/Co-ordinating Bureau Selection and its Effects**

Whether the Focal Bureau selection process considered a range of workable criteria, a sort of minimum requirements, or just decided to appoint one using a single criterion are central to the doubts, which might have presumably been started to be raised later in the RCS process. It is argued that the Focal Bureaus' capacity and capabilities in relation to the ultimate motives behind the RCS and the practical links with the work in hand were not assessed.

A much stronger argument centres on the needs for taking appropriate considerations towards making the best uses of the available capacities to as much level as any project envisages enhancing local capacities.

Appropriateness of BoPED as an organisation for coordinating the RCS is questioned; in fact considered as one of the many dubious decisions taken by the project right at the beginning. Whereas as the name implies, the BoANR could have been the best possible organisation for not only its' abilities of handling the RCS process [well beyond organising workshops] through its' NR department, but also for ensuring the implementation using its staff that have a relatively appropriate training and experience – sustainability. The process and outcome of the Amhara region is a case in point.

### **Project Support - unexpectedly low and premature termination of the project**

Notwithstanding the positive contributions made by initiating the project, CSE/EPA is felt to have performed well below expectations in creating a high level awareness on policy makers and providing technical assistances to as much level as the RCS process needed.

According to most informants, CSE/EPA's supports unexpectedly halted despite the prevailing needs for completing lots of unfinished jobs: establishing an office/unit, running a pilot project, among many. Furthermore, capacity building efforts were far below the actual needs that most of the prospective implementers were not trained. *A mere motivation - but, not getting us through*, as said by an expert.

Even if decisions are made to terminate the project, prior efforts should have been made in getting regions prepared for it and advising them as to how the RCS could be continued towards and throughout the implementation period.

The needs for continual multi-faceted supports and long-term commitments, well beyond producing documents are stressed as a key option ahead.

Further views include:

Failed to take advantage of the high level of awareness and motivated spirits of political leaders, communities and experts

When thinking of drawing [or providing supports to draw] the RCS [such a huge programme], one should have some thoughts right from the beginning as to how to be implemented vis-à-vis the needs and availability of all sorts of resources.

The RCS is expressed as an apparently half-cooked work, with minimal thoughts about the future except producing some documents in a pre-determined format; mal-designed project that its ends/fates/vision [futures] are not defined with utmost certainty. It sounds as though the RCS development process is considered as mere research-academic exercise.

Given that environment related activities involve multiple institutions and needs strong commitments of huge resources, CSE and above all, EPA, should have put some efforts in explaining, convincing and pushing/pressuring policy makers rather than inertly waiting for local actions or leaving all for regions as a set of 'Do-It-Yourself' tasks.

#### **4. Analysis**

##### **Process and Efficiency**

###### *A lengthy process*

To start with, the RCS documents forwarded to the Regional Council for approvals in terms of 'policy'; later in time, as per the Council's request, reformulated and presented in the form of 'strategy'. The Tigrigna version was then produced [as required/requested] and passed through a subsequent amendment processes, following the comments that some discrepancies are found between the English and Tigrigna versions.

The issue surrounding institutional set up for implementing the RCS has been a matter of debate; Agency/Office or Unit were major options. Decision, apparently acceptable by Executive body was that of establishing an independent environmental unit within BoPED by drawing technical experts/professionals from the various relevant organisations/bureaux before setting a separate Environmental Agency/Office. The underlying rationale were:

Budgetary/fund shortage in near future – also, their request for office establishment funds didn't get favourable response from EPA;

To buy some time for learning from experiences of the institution set by the Amhara State

Ato Haile Yohannes, BoPED's Head and RECC's Secretary, however, feels that RCS process is not as such a delayed one, given the size and quality of work undertaken in all aspects of the regional development process.

##### **Impact, Effectiveness and Dissemination**

Although the region has been working on a range of environment related activities [not new for environmental issues], the EPA's initiatives appreciated: The RCS process brought various institutions and experts together, paving the ways for learning from each other and, above all, drawing a Regional Guideline.

Gap in the levels of awareness between stakeholders (by large line departments) about the whereabouts of the RCS are noted.

## **Sustainability**

Like many the Focal Person for instance started by questioning the needs for this evaluation in relation to the perceived aims of the project – that, as to them “*the aims of the project appears to be reaching up to RCS documents’ production stage, not more than that..*” One of the reasons for saying this is that –

Aware of budget/funds shortage, Tigray’s request for support towards piloting the RCS has been turned down for unconvincing reasons after keeping us motivated and in suspense for long period

*RCS drawn, then what!*” issues that lie at the heart of queries raised by all regions

Conservation is not new in Tigray context; in fact, ADLI, which is nationally [conventionally] in use as Agricultural Dvt Led Industrialisation is in Tigray applied as ‘Conservation based ADLI’. Farmers are engaged in conservation activities for 20 days per year free of any payments/charge way before the RCS came into scene in Tigray.

Regarding the future institutional settings for implementing the RCS, it is intended to closely follow the progress made by Amhara region in its’ recently established institution, ‘the Environmental protection, Land administration and use Authority’ under Proclamation No 47/2000 [see also the Amhara Region Report for some details on the settings). If proved successful, this would be adopted in Tigray, in part or as a whole

## **5. Lessons and Recommendations**

The project, from its makings, has not taken appropriate considerations on resource [and information] disparities between regions. In short, the project appears to have been planned with a sort of *equity based ... equal financial, technical and advisory support to all regions* principle in mind, regardless of their positions and conditions.

Issues that surround the ‘phasing-out vis-à-vis exit strategy’ are major concerns in Tigray as they are in other regions. The following illustrates Tigray’s position:

If there are views that – *the remaining tasks that surround the RCS should be taken over by the respective regions once the strategy is developed*, then they simply remain being rhetoric, given that: a) all regions are not equally capable; and b) regional capacities have not been adequately built, nor enabled them implement such a resource-demanding project ...even in cases of those with a relatively better capacities.

A similar trend mentioned was the case of the “Ethiopian Forestry Action Programme” (EFAP), which has also been developed with supports by an international organisation. Similar with the RCS are the features that EFAP:

is developed on region-based contexts

contains lots of project profiles, and

above all, nothing significant made towards moving EFAP into action, so is noted to be the case of the ‘RCS pack’

Notable failures are exhibited by the EPA/CSE in creating and building up common understanding between all regions and their governments on the urgency for taking the RCS further into implementation stage and hence, the needs for giving priorities towards approving the strategy. The role that CSE/EPA could have played in terms of lobbying/convincing decision makers to approve the RCS is largely considered not only as failure, but also as a regrettably missed opportunity of the RCS process.

All steps ahead (by the region as well as EPA/CSE) should gear towards making the best uses of Tigray's greater awareness in environmental protection and rehabilitation in mobilising community, local level administration [Baito] and sector offices at zone/Woreda for implementing the RCS and sustaining it.

Taking advantages of these opportunities and to bring about meaningful changes, the following actions have to be undertaken:

EPA/CSE ensures approvals of all RCSs and establishments of implementing institutions by putting efforts in convincing policy makers and by promoting regional capacities to enable them carry the work forward

Need to consider piloting the RCS in the regional settings – so requires funds

Additional efforts to be put by the EPA/CSE in building capacities, which can bring qualitative and quantitative changes/impacts in regional capacities

While organising/structuring/setting such projects and activities therein, appropriate considerations should be given to make the best uses of the available capacities to as much level as the needs for enhancing capacities and capabilities.

EPA/CSE should be prepared to [put a system of M&E in place] to monitor the undoubted negative effects of the current nation wide trends/motto “move towards food security .. increased trends of depending on food crops’ production....”, mostly at the expense of (or with substantial pressure on) natural resource base; explain the outcome/results to the regional governments, convince and help them in designing better approaches that could lead towards improved agricultural production without compromising the NR base. Note that the M&E efforts are by large geared towards large-scale pollution issues and that of agriculture related though small-scale but of huge effects, are not give due considerations

Could CSE/EPA play any role in taking the NR dept of the BoANR out of its’ currently non-working state – for unknown reasons paralysed for undefined period?



## Annex 6g

### **REGIONAL CONSERVATION STRATEGY PROCESS: AMHARA NATIONAL REGIONAL STATE**

#### **1. RCS Process**

Following the formulation of the National Conservation Strategy and in line with the government policies drawn at national level, the process of developing a Conservation Strategy for the Amhara National Regional State (ANRS) started by the first quarter of 1995.

The overall goal, which ANRS envisaged achieving out of the RCS reads as:

*“improving and enhancing the health and quality of life of all the people in the Region, and promoting sustainable social and economic development through sound management and use of natural, human and cultural resources and the environment as a whole so as to meet the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generation to meet their own need”*

A Regional Conservation Strategy Steering Committee (RCSSC) was set in April 1995 as an executive body for leading the RCS project/process and later re-named as Regional Environmental Coordinating Committee (RECC). Chaired by the Vice President of the Regional State, RECC is comprised of heads or representatives of the various regional institutions as members.

The regional Bureau of Agriculture has taken over the responsibilities for coordinating the RCS, as it was believed to hold the structures and expertise necessary and most appropriate for undertaking the RCS.

The RCS Task Force was subsequently formed with experts drawn from 28 different organisations and started its work by developing the terms of reference and devising the appropriate plans for the tasks ahead towards producing the RCS. Major decisions made right at this point in time were:

Reorganising and dividing the Task Force into six groups on the basis of specific areas of expertise; and

Establishing an Editorial Board comprising of five persons, who would be taking the responsibilities of reviewing the RCS document as released by the different groups of the Task Force

The groups of the Task Force then produced the draft RCS document. Documents on CSE and the Ethiopian Forest Action Program (EFAP) were used as appropriate for developing the regional strategy.

Subsequent efforts that were made in reviewing and refining the draft RCS include:

Reviews made by the Editorial Board

Reviewed by participants of a one-day workshop, which has been organised in collaboration with the regional EFAP

Further reviews made through a three-day ‘RCS workshop/conference’, where over 200 participants (including senior professionals) involved

Field based reviews and secondary data search for filling in the gaps and responding to comments

The final strategy document, as designed with particular focus on embodying 13 sectoral and 12 cross-sectoral issues with prioritised programmes and projects, is prepared in three volumes each describing different issues:

Volume I: Introduction and the Natural Resource Base

Volume II: Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation Policies and Organisational Framework

Volume III: The Natural Resource Action Plan and Regional Conservation Investment Programme [Investment Programme annexed]

It is now about a year (July 2000) since - the final document was approved by the Regional Executive Committee; a Proclamation<sup>4</sup> (No. 47/2000; August 2000) that allows establishing an authority issued.

The next step that the ANRS envisaged undertaking, as part of a pre-implementation process was that of creating a region wide awareness on and popularisation of the RCS through workshops. This process however had not yet been carried out waiting for adequate copies of documents, which has long been sent to the EPA/CSE for publication.

## **2. Project's Specific Contribution**

The ANRS has received the usual package of support from the project, which include; technical, financial, office equipments/materials (computers-printers, photocopier, binder, etc) and books on environment.

## **3. Assessment of Outputs, Impacts and Identification of Issues Arising**

### **A. STRENGTHS, OUTPUTS AND IMPACTS OF THE PROCESS/PROJECT**

The RCS process and project in ANRS appear to be full of strengths with significantly high impacts than that of its' limitations. The following illustrate this position:

Preparation of project proposals and implementing some based on the RCS document

Increased levels of awareness among technical staff and decision makers on environment

Getting the RCS documents and the policy approved by the Council;

Establishment of an independent body dealing with RCS and issues related with the wider environment is made official by proclamation and preparation began for bringing this into effect; the first of its' kind in the country.

As opposed to the views of all other regions, high level supports rendered by the EPA/CSE mainly by lobbying and influencing policy makers - played significantly high roles in getting the RCS approved and some towards establishing an independent authority.

Discrepancies in pre/post-EPRDF data:- although serious challenges to the process, they were verified and analysed through a more comprehensive and grounded methods.

Proud of the achievements (and strong ownership feelings) resulting from involvements of multiple stakeholders (local staff as members of Task Force, Editorial Board, workshop participants etc) in the RCS process and in producing the final document.

Regardless of the outcome, RCS piloted within the ANRS in Ankober, in close collaboration with EPA/CSA.

Forestry Action Programme drawn in much detailed form and incorporated in the next 5-year plans for implementation.

Produced a draft document on Combating Desertification Action Programme.

Devised an Integrated Watershed Management Programme, ready for implementation as soon as funds are released by Sida.

Agro-forestry and fuel wood project designed.

Behind all the strengths and impacts is the fact that the RCS coordination has been handled by the BoANR and tremendous supports obtained from the regional government at all levels.

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<sup>4</sup> Zikre Hig of The Council of The Amhara National Regional State; Proclamation No. 47/2000, *Environmental Protection, Land Administration and Use Authority Establishment Proclamation* – August 2000

## **B. WEAKNESSES/LIMITATIONS/CHALLENGES OF THE PROCESS/PROJECT**

Quite minimal and insufficient capacity building efforts made, given - the size of the region, the magnitude and diverseness of the problems, and in comparison with the number of years that the project had been operational

Staff turn-over

EPA/CSA took long to get documents published – creating substantial lags on the regional RCS plans

### **4. Analysis**

#### Relevance and Process

The RCS process/project is yet considered as relevant as ever. Ato Abebe, representing Bureau of Water, Mines and Energy – for instance, reflected a cause and effect relationships indicating the needs for projects with long-term visions – like the RCS. Key issues indicated as basic reasons for the Bureau's involvements so far, and the needs for future action relate with that of unwise utilisation of energy resources and the trends in ground water droughts:

Energy in Amhara region for household consumption is based on biomass – forests and bushes being destroyed

Given the current trends of high rate of population increase, more settlements are being established – all at the expense of natural resources; forest clearing in progress for both settlements and fuel wood

On the other hand, water resources in Amhara region is based on ground water

Given the current trends of erratic nature of the rainfall situation, which has also been implicated by loss of forests and bushes; ground water drought is serious threat

The process, so far undergone are by large considered as participative and educative; and accomplished within the shortest possible period.

#### Sustainability

Establishment of an independent Authority with experts from the various institutions is a great leap forward to ensuring accountability and sustaining the outcome - and hence, each programme contains environment element and accordingly implemented.

### **5. Lessons and Recommendations**

Key lesson learnt in the process is - not to rely upon a single and one-way support (all sorts of assistances) nor on government funds, should such type of resource demanding projects are sustained. Hence proposals [including environment related] submitted to various donors and private sectors have yielded positive responses. Major supporters include: UNDP (Global Investment); USAID (Integrated Watershed Management); Sida (Integrated Rural Development Programme); GTZ; Austrian Government, etc.

In the light of the huge gap that prevails in the region; vis-à-vis the problems in hand, resource availabilities and needs ... the following issues (partly suggested by the region) need appropriate considerations:

Need to consider piloting the RCS in other settings of the region; in different representative areas and at different agro-eco systems – so requires funds - CSE/EPA sought as potential supporter(s) in taking the RCS further

Human resource development, a key for success: Additional efforts to be put by the EPA/CSE in building capacities in a way that could bring about qualitative and quantitative changes/impacts in regional capacities. EPA/CSE and all other international organisations should focus on 'software development, rather than the hardware ones', Abebe stressed indicating the needs for investing in developing a workable mechanism geared towards changing peoples' minds.

With due consideration to the fact that environment/conservation are global issues, the needs for updating regional knowledge base by providing its' experts and community members access to international and national exposures seems appropriate and timely. Continued supports from the EPA/CSE in this respect is suggested

EPA/CSE should be prepared to [put a system of M&E in place] to monitor the undoubted negative effects of the current nation wide trends/motto "move towards food security .. increased trends of depending on food crops' production....", mostly at the expense of (or with substantial pressure on) natural resource base; explain the outcome/results to the regional governments, convince and help them in designing better approaches that could lead towards improved agricultural production without compromising the NR base. Note that the M&E efforts are by large geared towards large-scale pollution issues and that of agriculture related though small-scale but of huge effects, are not give due considerations

## Annex 6h

### **REGIONAL CONSERVATION STRATEGY PROCESS: BENISHANGUL-GUMZ NATIONAL REGIONAL STATE**

#### **1. RCS Process**

Following the process of restructuring administrative areas held during 1985-86 EC [1992/93 GC], BeniShangul-Gumz was established as a region, having Assosa, Metekel and Kamashi within its' jurisdiction.

Two years on since its establishments, in 1987 EC [1994 GC] people from the CSE/EPA came into the region with the very idea of initiating a project that aims at enabling the region develop its' own conservation strategy and implementing them. CSE/EPA's initiatives received warm welcome by the region. In fact, the offer came in during the period when the need for filling information gap on the natural resource base of the newly established region (having Kamashi as additional Zone) was under consideration. It is to be noted that surveys<sup>5</sup> were carried out in 1982 EC [89/90 GC] by the then Plan ministry and BoA, covering Assosa and Metekel.

The RCS process started in 1994 by establishing RECC as supreme decision-making body on issues that relate with the RCS development, a step considered crucial towards promoting the sustainable development of the regional state.

All government Bureaus are represented in RECC, though the compositions varied as changes were made in bureaux structures through time. President of the Regional State – Chair Person; Head, Bureau of Planning and Economic Development - Secretary<sup>6</sup>; and Members include Heads of organisations: Bureau of Agriculture (formerly known as Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Bureau); Bureau of Education and Culture; Bureau of Health, Bureau of Disaster Prevention, Labour and Social Affairs; Bureau of Water Resource; Bureau of Trade, Industry and Transport; Bureau of Public works, Urban Development, Mines and Energy; Population Office; Women Affairs Office; Investment Office and; NGO's Development Associations, elders people and religious leaders.

Assignments given to members of RECC to nominate one technical staff representing each organisation to form a Task Force, which would be taking the tasks of formulating the RCS. Hence, Task Force established and drew its' plans towards producing the RCS in five volumes.

Draft volume I document was produced in 1995, covering the resource inventory and utilisation aspects. Nothing significant was thereafter done in relation with RCS for a number of years, as the region was busy restructuring its' bureaux and departments therein and a large-scale staff reshuffling following the outcome of bureaux structuring process.

Subsequent measures were taken to strengthen the Task force, which was seriously affected by the high turnover of staff.

By the end of 1989, the task force was fully engaged developing the RCS with a prior agreements of reducing interference by the respective organisations. It took the Task Force's 25 intensive working days to produce the remaining four volumes (and updating volume I), all of which were based on CSE documents as a general framework. A panel commented each version.

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<sup>5</sup> Namely, *Natural Resource Survey of Assosa* and *A General Natural Resource Survey of Metekel Administrative Region*

<sup>6</sup> Initially RECC's Secretary was the Head of what was then called as Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Bureau

Institutional settings for implementing the RCS, however, remained being debatable issue. The very idea of establishing a new institution responsible for implementing the RCS that has been proposed by the task force was apparently disapproved by the panel (in conference containing admin officials and other relevant bodies and individuals) in favour of continued use of RECC in a more or less similar way to that applied in developing the RCS documents. Major exceptions were that RECC's powers are to be devolved down to Zone and Woreda levels, establishing ZECC and WECC respectively. Detailed structures are already drawn (copy available).

For various reasons, efforts made to get the RCS approved by the government were unsuccessful. Final draft of the RCS document handed over to the regional government in English language was sent back to the project for getting it translated to Amharic. By the time the translation process is finished, the Parliament came to a close for recess.

## **2. Project's Specific Contribution**

As part of the CSE/EPA's support pack, computer-printers (two sets, one of which is being processed), some office equipments and stationeries and 48 books – which one could hardly find them in the country, leave alone in the region, are delivered to the region through the coordinating organisation. Currently, they are the process of acquiring additional books from the CSE/EPA. A mechanism is being developed for accessing the books to regional users while ensuring that they are kept safe.

As an organisation that was held responsible for coordinating the RCS organisation, all materials were based in BoPED. The task force in developing the RCS used all materials, while the use by any other member of other sectors staff was not ruled out.

*All materials received are considered as regional properties regardless of where they are based.*

Supports were also extended by the CSE/EPA to the project for running workshops and trainings on environment related topics, more or less similar to those conducted in other regions. In cases when such capacity building events are organised by the CSE/EPA, invitations are mostly sent through the regional council and sometimes through BoPED. In all cases, responsibilities of selecting training/workshop participants were given to BoPED.

Although a one-time event, a 'travelling seminar' programme has been initiated sometime ago. It was believed to have given the regional experts a chance to share experiences with others, in deed learnt a lot.

4 people went for a 2-month training in AAU, though also remained being a one-shot exercise

## **3. Assessment of Outputs, Impacts and Identification of Issues Arising**

### **Outputs and Impacts [Signs of Impacts]**

Two projects were proposed based on lessons learnt through the RCS process [and related outputs] – on Enzi mountain conservation and recreation establishments and; on rehabilitating Anbessa Chaka (through the BoA).

Environmental clubs organised in schools.

In the process where BoPED (in its' roles as a leading regional planners) was a key actor, some elements of the RCS are included in the next 5-year regional plans.

### **A. STRENGTHS OF THE PROCESS/PROJECT**

Trickling effects noticed: Levels of awareness increased through training events directly benefiting senior professionals and task force members, who in turn passed the newly acquired knowledge on to their colleagues within their organisation.

Senior professionals involved in the RCS with utmost commitments

Discussions regarding environmental problems initiated: each member of the task force, in turn, had thorough discussions on most issues with colleagues in the respective institution. Hence, increased awareness and understanding at institution level

Very useful exercise with which members gained new insights of analysing a cross-sectoral issues

Drafts presented in conference and substantial feed backs obtained

Institutional commitments: The steps taken by all sectors/organisations in exempting members from any other job that may relate with their organisations, during the period when each and every sector was suffering from staff shortage, show the high level commitments the region entered towards the successful accomplishments of the RCS. The tendency of not approving establishment of independent institution is considered by experts as a contradictory measure taken by all involved. AK argues that we need to look into the driving force for making this decision, despite the levels of commitment they had, probably resource/fund?

Environmental issues are positively viewed by the regional president and efforts are encouraged

Surprisingly, staff turn-over has not been a problem in Benishangul-Gumuz during the last five years.

This might be due to the enabling working environment and freedom provided by the region – no serious pressure by the region

## B. WEAKNESSES/LIMITATIONS/CHALLENGES OF THE PROCESS/PROJECT

Good, but new exposures for BoPED, facing technical and by large, coordination challenges – like - difficulties of harnessing/harmonising the diversely varied needs and aspirations of different sectors/organisations often reflected through members of the task force, representing their organisations. Challenges of harmonising the differences on cross-sectoral issues was mentioned. Inadequate professional touring – sharing experiences of others, as the region and its' experts have lots to learn from others.

They do not have formal reporting system/mechanism, but presenting information about changes and some new events like training/workshop.

NGOs [the major, probably the only ones being CHISP and ZOA (Dutch-based working on refugees)] were not included in the RCS process – felt to be tiny with minimal roles; it could, however, be argued that they have been ignored or not given adequate attention, except being informed by Yeshumneh [Focal person] about the RCS and the progress made.

Internal problems affecting the process: series of organisational restructuring and staff reshuffling; political instability

## **4. Analysis**

### **Relevance**

The very fact that Benishangul-Gumuz's rich natural resources are increasingly being destroyed during the last few years (*on the verge of total destruction*, as said by an expert) due to a range of human made factors (caused by mere lack of knowledge and backwardness), together with and; the huge size of refugees that the region had to host – makes the RCS timely and in deed relevant.

### **Process and Efficiency**

In line with the decisions that were made to shift the RCS coordination from BoANR to BoPED, the latter assumed the responsibilities at early stages of the process.

In the light of the views forwarded from by the BoANR in Tigray highlighting the foregone potentials and on the other hand, the success that the ANRS felt to have achieved by taking advantages of the BoANR's potentials, the question that this review couldn't get answer about was:- The merits that were considered for selecting the BoANR then; and which ones proved the shift.

The way BoANR was restructured to take its current shape - as BoA could be one of the reasons for taking such move. But - it still contains a NR department.

This is not to question BoPED's performance in running and coordinating the project. In fact, it did well with utmost efficiency, although the success could by large be attributed to [dependant on] - the Focal Person (Yeshumneh) and few members of the task force.

### **Impact, Effectiveness and Dissemination**

Information dissemination is a matter of concern in BeniShangul-Gumz. Depending upon resource availabilities, ranges of methods are employed to transmit information on recent developments of various subjects (including those related with RCS) to offices and staffs at zone and Woreda levels.

Efforts made in passing RCS related developments on to zone/Woreda level staff were:

Sending copies of the RCS documents for comments

Sending copies of materials obtained from and back-to-office reports on workshops-conferences and trainings.

Isolated efforts made by the regional Focal Person (Yeshumneh), like – delivering speeches to students and members of environmental clubs across the region.

It is, however, noted that due to budget constraints as much knowledge and information on environment and in particular on RCS were not disseminated as the regional experts, BoPED and Task Force members would have liked.

### **Sustainability**

The project, although had a good and motivating start, it appears to have come at a halt so quickly. As to some experts, their region remained being passive while others were in a much better position, so they kept on listening others' success stories on radio. What follows are among the widely accepted views regarding the RCS reiterated by senior experts.

*All the work we so far did during the past ten years is simply paper work. It is now the time to stop this and start doing some work on the ground. We were encouraged by the EPA/CSE when the projects that we managed proposing [re: Anbessa Chaka and Enzo Terara] were taken further into drawing a management plan. That is all -nothing more done thereafter ensuring the implementation. The region needs adequate technical and financial support rather than bits and pieces, should the RCS be taken further in sustainable manner.....*

## **5. Lessons and Recommendations**

RCS documents and the related capacity building efforts are the first significant work undertaken in Benishangul-Gumz since region was restructured; but lots remain to be done.

Acceptable considerations to be made for possible bright long-term futures of the current outputs suggested were:

The needs for timely revisits on the strategy based on the current situation [flexibility, dynamism emphasised]; quickly revision on the current document and getting it approved as soon as possible.

Supports from the CSE/EPA is crucial – in this case, mainly technical and influencing policy makers

Decisions that seem to have been made to end the project is untimely and by any standard unjustifiable in Benishangul-Gumz's context, given the loads of work ahead and corresponding supports needed

With due considerations to the way supports were so far given [a sort of equal support for all regions regardless of their levels of developments], devise a sustainable system for supporting the region in taking the RCS process further into implementation stage;

Efforts should be made towards institutionalising the RCS within each and every sector and forge links across the board



Disparities between regions felt, minimal or far below to what Benishangul should have been supported

CSE/EPA gives priorities in rendering technical and financial supports to the region, but extending beyond Assosa

Particular emphasis should be given in building capacities – a long-term [5-year at the minimum] capacity building programme has to be drawn; Particular emphasis should be given to building a strong knowledge base on pre/post-environmental impact assessment techniques

Using Benishangul as a model for implementing the RCS [considering its size, potentials and levels of development]

Formulate sellable projects that are relevant to solving environmental problems

Organise donor conferences and solicit funding.

EPA/CSE should be prepared to [put a system of M&E in place] to monitor the undoubted negative effects of the current nation wide trends/motto “move towards food security .. increased trends of depending on food crops’ production...”, mostly at the expense of (or with substantial pressure on) natural resource base; explain the outcome/results to the regional governments, convince and help them in designing better approaches that could lead towards improved agricultural production without compromising the NR base. Note that the M&E efforts are by large geared towards large-scale pollution issues and that of agriculture related though small-scale but of huge effects, are not give due considerations

## ANNEX 7

### POINTERS FROM ETHIOPIA TOWARDS BEST PRACTICE IN CONSERVATION STRATEGIES

The following points come from the analysis in this and the previous chapters of this report. They reflect both positive and negative experiences with this project. They are listed simply as points for clarity and to save space. They are generally quite well known issues and so are only reminders based on this experience.

#### Project Design

More participatory project development with inputs from those who will be involved.

Project design grounded in local institutional realities, not the theory of co-operation.

With seconded staff in two implementing partners institutions independent management is necessary to avoid both internal conflicts of responsibility and inter agency conflicts.

Specified involvement in project document of all agencies involved in the project, government, private and NGO will help ensure their participation.

Project activities must have specific phase out or institutionalisation activities so that the project is not seen as always the source of support or training.

The political realities need to be understood in project design and in this case ways of ensuring greater high level political support and attention should have been sought.

Project document needs to be specific about the various activities or at least provide some indication of how issues should be explored. The WPP and the ways to translate CSE and RCS document into action (other than through government department activities) needed more explanation.

Over-optimistic planning should be avoided in process approach projects such as this.

#### Project Management

A full time National Project Manager should have been appointed along with professional managers in EPU and EPA.

These should have been free of other responsibilities and the project management should have been independent of partner institutions.

Staff meeting for all staff should be arranged as part of the management structure to ensure that staff remain informed and committed.

Conflict resolution mechanisms and training must be in place to deal with conflict between partners.

#### Finance

Project Financial management should always be transparent to all partners.

Use of the local procedures is best in general, as they are well known. However, where they cause unacceptable delays, as with tendering, alternative arrangements should be developed.

#### Monitoring and Assessment

Monitoring and assessment should be established at the time the project is set up.

It should include ways for assessing not just consultants bids but also their work in an independent manner.

#### Project Resources

The financial resources for a project should be matched to the tasks, otherwise surplus money leads to pressures on management.

Technical staff should do technical jobs and administrative staff should be employed to ensure that technical advisors do not spend their time on inappropriate administrative work.

Partners in a project must keep to their responsibilities in terms of staff provision and resources.

## Operations

All staff must be familiar with the project document and it must be clarified where necessary to ensure it is not subject to personal interpretation.

Flexibility is needed to work at rates of field partners so local ownership is ensured.

Uncertainty over project continuation should be avoided

Misunderstandings amongst project partners, as in MEDaC concerning the impact of the CSE upon rates of development, should be addressed immediately at the highest level

Donors must not be neglected as they may have a role in future activities in this area.

## Partnership

Differing rights and responsibilities of partners in a project need to be specified.

The role of IUCN as an executing agency needs clarification.

The position of IUCN's T.A.s and their contract responsibilities should be clearer.

Continuity in backstopping is essential and maintaining a constructive rapport is vital, even where policing type missions are needed.

Sensitivity to donor criteria is essential, as was achieved here.

## Regional Conservation Strategy Work

Beware of over lengthy processes as momentum is lost.

Potential delay points need to be identified in project planning and solutions identified.

Multi-sectoral co-operation and co-ordination need exploring so that as key elements in the process they do not become bottlenecks.

Ways of coping with staff turnover and ensuring a critical mass or core group need to be developed

Participation does not have to wait until there is a document to discuss.

Ways of ensuring active participation of important actors needs to be explored in planning and not left as reactions to problem situations.

Methods of encouraging local ownership of the RCS processes at different levels need to be developed.

## Wereda Pilot Project

A critical aspect of the project, such as this, should have been addressed more vigorously and successfully in the design and planning stages

WPP in Project document should have been clarified by project management, or if that was not successful by IUCN or by an external consultant – whoever designed it in the project document.

When staff are unhappy with an element of a project, such as the WPP either the project should have been revised or the staff changed if the element is confirmed as essential.

Use of local resources and experience should be maximised where appropriate, for instance drawing on neighbouring experience in this case. Projects should learn from other actors and not become islands by themselves.

Consultants must be managed carefully with respect to their TORs, time schedule, and checking of their field skills capacity in the selection procedure.

Consultants should not be paid when the required work has not been done.

## Relevance and Awareness

Wider interpretation of project relevance should be sought and publicised.

Publicity of project achievements is vital for support.

Ways in which CSE and RCSs are being used should be shared amongst other potential users.

## Achievement and Impact

Skills and gender aspects have long term impact and need monitoring.

Trickle down to villages or weredas should not be assumed and should be monitored.

Sharing lessons from local level projects can multiply benefits.

## Sustainability

The issue of sustainability must be explored in the project document and appropriate arrangements for institutionalisation made from the start, not just in the last year.

Environmental Protection Authority and Ministry of Economic Development and Co-operation


## CONSERVATION STRATEGY OF ETHIOPIA

### PHASE III PROJECT

**(1996-2001)**

## FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

VOLUME TWO – Annexes



by  
Adrian Wood and Kifle Lemma  
with  
Alemayehu Konde

**October 2001**

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## ABBREVIATIONS

AAU	Addis Ababa University
ADLI	Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation
BoA	Bureau of Agriculture (region)
BoPED	Bureau of Planning and Economic Development (region)
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CSE	Conservation Strategy of Ethiopia
CSE III	Conservation Strategy of Ethiopia, Phase III Project
CTA	Chief Technical Advisor
EARO	Eastern Africa Regional Office, IUCN
EG	Ethiopian Government
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EIS	Environmental information system
EPA	Environmental Protection Authority
EPB	Environmental Protection Bureau (region)
EPC	Environmental Protection Council
EPE	Environment Policy for Ethiopia
EPRDF	Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front
EPU	Environmental Planning Unit (in MEDaC)
IUCN	The World Conservation Union
M&A	Monitoring and assessment
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MEDaC	Ministry of Economic Development and Co-operation
MoNRDEP Protection	Ministry of Natural Resource Development and Environmental Protection
MoPED	Ministry of Planning and Economic Development
NCS	National Conservation Strategy
NEAP	National Environmental Action Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation
NPC	National Project Co-ordinator
ODA	Overseas Development Administration (UK government)
ONCCP	Office of the National Committee for Central Planning
PA	Peasant Association
RCS	Regional Conservation Strategy
RECC	Regional Environmental Co-ordinating Committee
SCSE	Secretariat for the Conservation Strategy of Ethiopia
SIDA	Swedish International Development Authority
SNNPRS	Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State
TA	Technical Advisor
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNSO	United Nations Sudano-Sahelian Office
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
VAP	Village Action Plan
WB	The World Bank
WECC	Wereda Environmental Co-ordinating Committee
WPP	Wereda Pilot Project
WSDP	Wereda Sustainable Development Strategies
ZECC	Zonal Environmental Co-ordinating Committee

## ANNEX 1

### TERMS OF REFERENCE

#### FINAL EVALUATION OF THE CONSERVATION STRATEGY OF ETHIOPIA PHASE III PROJECT (CSE)

##### Background

The Conservation Strategy of Ethiopia (CSE) Phase III Project is a three year project that is being implemented jointly by the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) and Ministry of Economic Development and Co-operation (MEDaC) with technical and management assistance from IUCN-The World Conservation Union, Eastern Africa Regional Office (IUCN-EARO).

The CSE Phase III Project is a follow up and continuation of CSE Phases I and II projects. Phase I (1989-90) focused on developing the CSE process, identification of key environmental issues and formulation of a conceptual framework for the CSE. Phase II (1990-94) focused on the development of policy and institutional framework and national action plans for the CSE. The present phase III focuses on capacity building for interpretation and implementation of the CSE, with emphasis on regional and zonal levels in accordance to the decentralisation policy of Ethiopia.

The goal of the current project phase is:

***To carry out training, capacity building and action oriented planning at national, regional, zonal and wereda levels that will ensure the implementation of the environmental management projects and activities identified through the first two phases of the CSE process.***

The main objective of Phase III is to set up institutional arrangements and capacity building for implementing CSE at both Federal and Regional Levels. Specific objectives of Phase III are to:

- Facilitate and obtain Government approval for the CSE documents and the Environmental Policy which are the products of the preceding phases of the CSE process;
- Institutionalise the CSE process within the Government structure at all levels;
- Develop Regional Conservation Strategies and ensure their use at regional and sub- regional levels, including the development of Zonal and Wereda levels structures;
- Apply the CSE and RCS principles through the development of tools such as EIA and other procedures that will ensure integration of environment into economic planning, budgeting and policies at all levels;
- Undertake a wereda pilot project for testing implementation modalities with communities; and
- Raise awareness of the CSE process through improved communication techniques and capacity as well as dissemination of information about the strategy.

Due to various technical, political and management reasons, the CSE project overall progress has been slow. Thus, despite the fact that there is a substantial progress in implementing most of the planned activities, delays was experienced in realising/finalising some of the planned activities. This has also been affecting the overall expenditure of the project budget over the period. The current phase that was to end in 1999 was extended up to the end of 2000 in order to enable completion of the project activities.

As we approached the project termination date of 31 December 2000, initial assessment indicated that more time was needed beyond December 2000 for a proper winding up of project, reporting and handing over process. Therefore, partners planned and are undertaking a phasing out period, January to June 2001 to facilitate completion and winding up of all activities.



purpose of evaluations WITHin iucn

Specifically there are two purposes of evaluations within IUCN.

**Learning and Improvement:**

The IUCN Evaluation Policy (still in draft form) indicates that "evaluations are to be used as part of the *learning* environment for IUCN and its members. It involves the creation of an environment that engages staff and their partners in creative ways to learn how to improve IUCN's work. In this context, evaluations are instruments for making IUCN's projects, programmes and organisational units more effective through the provision of useful feedback and a commitment to act on that feedback. By doing so, evaluations are a way to understand why IUCN activities succeed or not. Furthermore, as learning tools, evaluations add to IUCN's body of knowledge with respect to best practices."

**b) Accountability:**

Second, evaluations are part of IUCN's overall *accountability* system. IUCN is answerable to its members, partners and donors for determining whether IUCN's policies, programmes, projects, and operations are working well, and showing that its resources are used in a responsible way. The evaluation process, together with the required documentation that accompanies each evaluation, holds staff and agents responsible for their performance.

Specific aims of the CSE III Evaluation

The aim of the final evaluation of the third phase of the CSE project is to review and assess the project achievements, impacts, and lessons learned during phase III of project implementation. The review should also aim at assisting partners to assess sustainability of all activities, approaches, and structures initiated or supported by the project and to identify potential areas and opportunities for further work in CSE implementation.

The specific aims of the evaluation are to:

Assess the effectiveness, efficiency and timeliness of the project implementation.

Evaluate the impact of the project activities and related outputs including their contribution to the overall goal of the project.

Determine the relevance of phase III of the project in relation to current environmental management needs of Ethiopia and to the core objectives of IUCN and NORAD.

Assess long term sustainability of the actions initiated and now handed over to federal and regional institutions for implementation

Identify lessons learned about project design, management and implementation, highlight issues that need attention for better implementation of any follow up project/ activities

Identify potential areas and specific activities whenever is possible for future collaboration in further implementation of CSE/RCSs and supporting environmental/biodiversity management in Ethiopia.

Scope of the Evaluation:

Specific issues and key questions to be addressed under each aim are as follows:

Effectiveness:

The evaluation should assess the achievement of objectives at different levels and realization of the expected outputs as per the Project Document and annual work plans.

Key questions:

Were the intended impacts realized? In other words, were the contributions to the Overall Goal realized?

What outputs were achieved? To what extent did they contribute to the Overall Objective?

Was the project approach and structure effective in delivering the desired outputs?

Were the activities been implemented in accordance with the Project Document and work plans? If not, why?

Were the required inputs to complete the activities delivered? If not, why?; and

Did the partner organisations work together effectively? Was the partnership effective in achieving the desired outputs?

Efficiency:

The evaluation should assess the execution and administration of the project and how well the partners performed. It should also assess the cost effectiveness of the project implementation, whether costs were reasonable in relation to achievements (check conversion of inputs into outputs - in terms of quantity, quality and timeliness).

Key questions:

Were the activities carried out in a timely, cost effective manner and at all levels?

Were the technical and financial resources, skills, institutional arrangements, organisation and strategies available to the project adequate?

Were the project structure, staffing and equipment adequate to deliver the results expected?

Were the resources being used in an optimal manner, and funds spent in accordance with work plans and using the right procedures?

Were there any unforeseen problems, how well were they dealt with?

Were the capacities of the project partners adequate?

Was there a process built in to the project management structure for project self-monitoring and assessment as part of team meetings, reporting and reflection?

Did the project's internal monitoring and assessment framework operate efficiently for both compliance and assessment of performance?

Relevance:

The evaluation should establish whether or not the CSE Phase III has been successful in providing solutions to, supporting and ensuring the implementation of environmental management projects and activities? How can we tell?

The evaluation should also assess the extent to which the project contributes to the strategic direction of IUCN and that of its partners.

Key questions:

Outline the current situation in Ethiopia in terms of key issues and challenges facing people and environment and its management

Establish whether or not the CSE Phase III project design and approach is relevant in addressing the identified needs, issues and challenges facing people, the environment and its management in Ethiopia identified during the design of the project and planning for phase III. Is it relevant to current needs and issues facing environment and human development in Ethiopia?

Recognizing the priorities of the country, is the programme doing the 'right things' and how can this be assessed?

Establish whether the impacts of the outputs of the project were relevant to ensuring the "implementation of the environmental management projects and activities identified through the third phase of the CSE process"

What have been the roles of NORAD, IUCN, and Project Partners in Ethiopia and project staff and were they appropriate?

To what extent does the project contribute to the strategic policies and programmes of IUCN and that of the project partners including the project donor?

#### Impact:

The evaluation should assess whether the anticipated impacts (contributions to the overall Goal and objective) were realized and identify any unintended positive or negative impacts.

#### Key questions:

What specific impacts are attributable to particular outcomes?

Were there any unintended positive or negative impacts arising from particular outcomes?

Did the project bring about desired changes in the behavior of people and institutions?

Is there now greater awareness of environmental issues?

Is there now greater capacity for natural resource conservation and management and integration of environmental concerns into various sector plans and programmes at all levels – National, Regional, Zonal and Wereda level Authorities?

Longer-term changes – Have these changes resulted in an improvement in the lives of people and a more efficient use of resources upon which they depend?

What could have been the likely situation (of the environment and its management) without the project?

#### Lessons :

##### Key questions include:

What lessons have been learnt by various partners and stakeholders at all levels?

Are these lessons useful to the CSE process and other conservation strategy initiatives in the region or elsewhere?

Are the lessons learned from this project being taken up (and how) by partners and influencing their policies, programmes and activities?

#### Sustainability :

The evaluation should analyse the financial and institutional context of the project in terms of on-going costs and capacity required for a continued implementation of activities. The long-term sustainability of the actions initiated should be assessed in terms of whether there is evidence that there will be continued positive impacts as a result of the project. Some of the key questions are:

Was the approach used likely to ensure a continued benefit from the project (i.e. the contribution to the project overall goal and objective) after the end of the project?

Were all key stakeholders sufficiently involved? Were their expectations met and were they satisfied with their level of participation?

Have EPA/EPU/Regional authorities developed/enacted appropriate policies/ programmes/ laws institutionalising the implementation of CSE/RCSs ?

Do partners have the capacity to continue to implement all initiated activities? Are they able to raise adequate material and financial resources?

To what extent did the project teams at different levels address critical external factors that influence sustainability such as political support and financial availability issues in the regions, improving existing technical capacity, and short-term economic development activities?

Are alternative or additional measures needed and, if so, what is required to ensure continued sustainability and positive impact?

#### Future Collaboration :

The evaluation should also identify potential areas and activities for future collaboration?

#### Key questions:

Identify potential areas for future work in CSE and RCSs implementation and general biodiversity management in Ethiopia

#### 8. NORAD aID POLICY :

Is the project compatible with NORAD Aid policy?

## Methodology

The consultants should develop a methodology using a participatory approach, to include (and expand on) the set of key questions to address effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, impact and sustainability. The methodology should show the links between data collected and recommendations proposed so that the logic is clear and transparent.

Identify key partners and stakeholders in the CSE and a process to consult widely with them. Senior government staff and technical advisers should have the opportunity to present their views in confidence to the Team and to identify issues, opportunities, constraints and options for the future.

At minimum, this will involve:

A desk review of Project Document, work plans and progress reports, other relevant documentation to review and assess achievements so far and especially performance of work plans.

Familiarity with the IUCN Eastern Africa Regional Component Programme (2001 to 2004)

Consulting with project partners and staff to review and assess strengths, challenges and constraints and their impact on performance, efficiency and effectiveness in project activities implementations.

Making some initial recommendations for potential areas and activities for future collaboration

During the consultants' visit in Ethiopia, the project will provide transport, organise meetings with stakeholders and generally be available as required for discussions and supply of information. Full access will be allowed to project's documents and information sources. Basic materials for presentations at the briefing meeting on the results of the evaluation will be made available.

## Evaluation Team Composition

The evaluation team will be composed of one international and one national consultant with Eastern Africa regional experience, preferably with knowledge of the CSE or similar projects.

Team leader must have previous experience in project evaluation and/or monitoring. A good knowledge of conservation strategies and be acquainted with environment and development issues in developing countries. Knowledge of Ethiopia situation will be an added advantage. The team leader will have the overall responsibility for the implementation of the review, its output and the timely submission of the draft and final reports.

## Reporting

The team will discuss its interim findings with relevant partners and the draft report shall be prepared in sufficient copies and on a diskette for submission to IUCN-EARO, EPA and MEDaC.

## Outputs

In light of the information collected on the performance of the project and assessment made on its implications, a report will be produced on:

### **Project progress to cover, among others:**

An assessment of the performance of the project based on the project workplans and expected results. Identification of key issues and lessons learned in implementing the project

## **Future collaboration**

Tentative suggestions and recommendations for future activities

### Time Schedule

The evaluation exercise shall begin with a briefing of the consultants at IUCN-EARO at the end of the second week of May 2001. The team shall be in Ethiopia for a total of 20 calendar days in which to conduct the necessary consultations, regional visits and compilation and finalization of the report. The suggested timetable is as follows:

11<sup>th</sup> May                      Briefing and consultations at IUCN-EARO, Nairobi

12<sup>th</sup> – 31<sup>st</sup> May              Evaluation

1<sup>st</sup> June Presentation of the summary of the main findings to the project staff and partners

2<sup>nd</sup> June Departure

18<sup>th</sup> June                      Submission of draft report by team leader to IUCN-EARO. EARO will be responsible for distribution of the draft report to partners for review and comments

26<sup>th</sup> June                      Submission of comments on draft report to consultants

10<sup>th</sup> July                      Submission of final report by team leader incorporating comments made by partners.

## ANNEX 2

### TERMS OF REFERENCE

#### **REGIONAL CONSERVATION STRATEGY EVALUATION SPECIALIST**

##### Context

The final evaluation of the Conservation Strategy of Ethiopia (CSE) is being undertaken during May and early June 2001. In order to address the Terms of Reference for this evaluation, to address the questions of efficiency, effectiveness, relevance, impact, sustainability and lessons, it is necessary to undertake work in four specific areas, namely:

Project management and interaction amongst the partners – MEDaC and EPA,

Project stakeholders at the national level,

The wereda pilot project which has tested the implementation of the CSE, and

The regional conservation strategies and their associated processes and use.

##### Regional Conservation Strategy Processes

The experience of the regional conservation strategy (RCS) processes is critical to the utilisation and implementation of the conservation strategy approach in Ethiopia. Implementation on the ground and impact upon day to day activities is critical if the CSE and the RCSs are to have an impact in the regions of Ethiopia and upon the livelihoods and well-being of the people in this country. Key questions, amongst others, to be asked about the RCS processes relate to:

local sensitivity of the RCS,

local capacity building for the RCS process and the long term sustainability of this capacity,

the process of empowerment development and local ownership of the RCSs,

development of a constituency and support for the RCS,

institutional development to ensure the use and implementation of the CSE,

the ability of the RCS process to move to implementation, and

the sustainability of the RCS process.

##### Additional Consultant

###### A) DETAILS OF EMPLOYMENT

**IN ORDER TO SUPPORT THE TWO EXISTING CONSULTANTS IN THE WORK OF ANALYSING THE RCS EXPERIENCE IN DIFFERENT REGIONS, A THIRD CONSULTANT IS TO BE RECRUITED LOCALLY IN ETHIOPIA. THAT PERSON SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR A PERIOD OF 25 DAYS (INCLUDING SATURDAYS AND SUNDAYS) FROM 21<sup>ST</sup> MAY OR SHORTLY THEREAFTER. HE/SHE SHOULD BE ABLE TO TRAVEL TO ALL PARTS OF THE COUNTRY AS REQUIRED, EITHER BY PLANE OR BY VEHICLE, THE COSTS OF WHICH WILL BE COVERED BY THE PROJECT.**

###### b) Scope of the Work and Specific Tasks

The person is expected to work with the other consultants in developing a methodology, including checklists and interviews, for the evaluation of the RCS processes and to apply this both with the other consultants in one pilot RCS evaluation and then on their own in a number of other regions. Typically each regional visit will involve two days with travel to and from the field and two days of work in the regional headquarters and possibly nearby zones and weredas. In each region the work will be undertaken in co-ordination with the focal point and the RECC chairperson, and will involve undertaking interviews with RCS Task Force members, RECC members, political leaders and representatives of other relevant groups and organisations, such as local NGOs, CBOs and the communities.

### c) Expertise Required

The required consultant should have the following expertise:  
expertise in local capacity building and training,  
experience of empowerment issues including gender sensitivity,  
participatory approaches to evaluations,  
institutional issues within the regional government situation in Ethiopia,  
understanding of sustainability issues for process type projects,  
awareness of the issues of project implementation at regional and lower levels,  
awareness of agricultural and environmental diversity in Ethiopia,  
ability to work with people of diverse socio-economic and ethnic characteristics  
ability to produce good quality reports in English with appropriate word processing and tabulated data.

### Output

The consultant will produce a series of case studies, one for each of the regions he/she studies. While these will have some standard headings it is essential that the diversity of the different experience in the regions is drawn out and the contrasting as well a common elements highlighted in the analysis. Each case study will typically be 6 to 10 pages of A4 in 12 point single spacing with annexes. These will be provided I electronic (Word 98) and paper form to Gedion Asfaw to be passed to the other members of the evaluation team.

The consultant may be invited to attend the debriefing of the evaluation in Addis Ababa, even though his/her work will still be in progress.

SCSE, EPA, Addis Ababa,  
16<sup>th</sup> May 2001.

## ANNEX 3 METHODS

### Annex 3a

#### CHECKLIST FOR FEDERAL LEVEL STAKEHOLDERS

##### 1. Relevance

###### *1.1 Relevance of the CSE to Ethiopia in terms of:*

- a. appropriately identifying the problems / opportunities as regards the environment of the country;  
adequately involving stakeholders in the identification of the environmental problems / opportunities and the proposed approaches to tackle them;  
providing an appropriate framework for tackling the environmental problems the country is faced with and benefiting from the opportunities.

###### *Relevance of the SCE Phase III Project efforts at:*

- integrating environment into development planning;
- capacity building for the formulation / implementation of the CSE;
- capacity building for the formulation / implementation of the RCSs at the regional levels;
- facilitating the implementation of environmental management projects
- environmental awareness enhancement of individuals;
- achieving institutional attitudinal changes with respect to the environment;
- stakeholders involvement in Project Programme and activity implementation;
- integrating gender issues into environmental ( Development) planning;
- Designing communications strategies and action programmes for the CSE/ RCS process at national and regional levels.

###### **1.3 Relevance of the SCE and the CSE Phase III Project activities and outputs to your organization.**

- objectives of your organization;
- activities/ projects of your organization;
- changes or modifications to your organization's objectives as a result of the influence of the CSE;
- changes in your organization's capacity;
- changes in your organization's structure
- other changes in your day to day planning and project formulation;

###### **Impact**

###### *What is your:*

Awareness about the CSE and CSE Phase III Project;

###### **B. AWARENESS ABOUT THE CSE PHASE III PROJECT'S OUTPUTS; I.E.-**

- Finalization of the five-volume CSE documents;
- Preparation of the Environmental Policy of Ethiopia, which summarizes the policy elements of the CSE, and its approval by the Council of Ministers in April 1997;
- Formulation of 11 Regional Conservation Strategies (RCSs) for all the regional states and the city administrations of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa;
- Establishment and strengthening of 11 Regional Environmental Coordinating Committees;
- Organization of awareness workshops ;
- Providing in-country and external training/study tours including gender study tour;
- Publishing a quarterly news letter on environment;
- Initiation of woreda (local) level project,
- formulation of communications strategy and action plan by 8 regions,



formulation of draft gender strategy;  
 initiation of collaboration with Addis Ababa University in environmental management training;  
 Support for local level initiatives for projects such as tree planting in schools and urban areas,  
 watershed development and environmental awareness.

**2.2 What do you think have been the impacts of the CSE Phase III Project in terms of:**

- creating awareness about the environmental problems in Ethiopia;
- creating and enhancing awareness about the CSE and the CSE Process;
- creating and enhancing awareness about the RCSs;
- bringing about changes in policy, strategy and programmes to tackle the environmental problems at federal level;
- bringing about changes in policy, strategy and programmes to tackle specific regional problems at regional level;
- bringing about individual attitudinal changes in the perception of the environment;
- bringing about attitudinal changes in perception in government institutions;
- streamlining existing government institutional structures (or creating new ones) as well as strengthening them, as appropriate, for environmental policy, strategy and action programme formulation and subsequent implementation;
- integration of environment into development planning, including the promotion of environmental economics and environmental accounting;
- enhancing human resources/ institutional capacity for the formulation and implementation of SCE through various training measures including study tours;
- enhancing human resources/ institutional capacity for the formulation and implementation of RCSs through various training measures including study tours;
- enhancing institutional capacity through the supply of equipment and materials at the federal level;
- enhancing institutional capacity through the supply of equipment and materials at the regional level;

Can you rank some of the major impacts of the Project in order of importance in descending order from the most important to the least important?

**3. Project Performance**

*To what degree are you satisfaction with the project and its progress to date in terms of:*

A	<i>the quality of the outputs</i>	VS	S	N	UNS	VUNS
B	The timely undertaking of activities					
c	Involvement of beneficiaries					
d	Technical assistance					
e	Financial assistance					
f	Collaboration with stakeholders					
g	Other management aspects					

VS - Very Satisfactory  
 U - Unsatisfactory

S - Satisfactory  
 VUNS- Very Unsatisfactory

N - Neutral

## CHECKLIST FOR STAFF IN PARTNER AGENCIES

This checklist is meant to explore primarily the project's operation in terms of especially its **EFFECTIVENESS** and **EFFICIENCY**. It will also look at **OUTPUTS**, **IMPACTS** and **RELEVANCE** in a general way as these need to be explored in order to talk about effectiveness and efficiency. However these three additional issues are looked at in more detail with the stakeholders outside the project who are the recipients of its activities and with the TA to get precise figures of outputs and his estimates of impact and relevance before the following checklist is used so that AW has the basis for informed discussion with the interviewees.

### **a) General Introduction for the Discussion**

Want to have a discussion about a number of areas related to the CSE project, including:

Was it designed properly?

How did it operate?

What major results is it seen to have produced?

Did it operate in an efficient manner?

Will it have lasting impacts and will its initiatives be sustained?

Point out to interviewees that this is a **confidential** questionnaire. It is asking for your personal opinions. Your views will be consolidated with those of 30 other people so that identification of your individual answers is prevented and confidentiality is assured.

### **b) Project Design and Structure**

How well was the project planned and designed?

(Strengths and weaknesses)

Was the design appropriate to the needs, issues and challenges facing Ethiopia in CSE type matters at the time it was designed? (1995) Timely and appropriate?

How clear were the relationships in the project document between the different partners in the project?

Were the capacities of the project partners adequate?

Did the project have clear outputs and indicators?

Was there a monitoring and assessment process included in the project design. Was it adequate? What was done to overcome any shortcomings.

Lessons learned for project design, (esp for clarity of objectives, output, indicators, operational linkages etc.)

### **b) Project Implementation / Management**

#### **Management**

What has been the nature of the project implementation? (Smooth or not?)

What is the quality of management of the project? Strengths and weaknesses?

How adequate has been project management system in its different aspects:

Human resource management  
Leadership  
Supervision  
Pushing matters along  
Relations with partners  
Relations with IUCN  
Reporting  
Monitoring

### **Approach**

What have been the main characteristics of the approach by the project?  
(Rank in order of importance)

Was the project sensitive to the needs of the various stakeholders?

Were any stakeholders neglected? And why?

Were any stakeholders given better treatment? And why?

### **Operational Realities**

Were the activities carried out in a timely manner – and in accordance with the project document and workplans? (Reasons for deviations)

Were there any unforeseen problems? (If so, how well were they dealt with?)

Did implementation leading to new activities having to be undertaken which were unplanned?  
(Why?)

What Impacts on project?

Agreed with EARO and donor?)

Were the technical and financial resources, skills, institutional arrangements, organisation and strategies available to the project adequate?

### **Relationships**

Did the partner organisations work together effectively? What has been the nature of the relationships between the project and its partners (EPA and MEDAC)

What has been the nature of the relationship between the partners in the project (EPA and MEDAC).

What has been the nature of the relationships between the project and its various stakeholders?  
central government agencies,  
regional government agencies,  
NGOs,  
public,  
donors,  
others.

What has been the relationship of IUCN with the project and project partners?

What has been the input from IUCN into the project? And were these appropriate?

What has been the relationship of NORAD with the project and project partners?

What has been the input from NORAD into the project? And were these appropriate?

### **Financial and Inputs Situation**

Were the required inputs to undertake the activities provided? If not, why?

Was there adequate finance for the project?

What is the quality of the financial management of the project? Were the resources being used in an optimal manner, and funds spent in accordance with work plans and using the right procedures?

What is the effectiveness of the project in obtaining value for money? (Cost – effectiveness)

Could project resources have been used more efficiently?

Was there a process built in to the project management structure for project self-monitoring and assessment as part of team meetings, reporting and reflection?

Did the project's internal monitoring and assessment framework operate efficiently for both compliance and assessment of performance?

#### **c) Project Achievements / Outputs**

What outputs were achieved? Rank To what extent did they contribute to the Overall Objective?

As a result did the project achieve its planned impacts / objectives?

What capacity development was achieved?  
(Rank in order of perceived importance)

At what levels was capacity development provided?  
(Rank in order of perceived importance)

Any changes in environmental awareness achieved by the project amongst people and institutions?  
(Who? Where? What indicators?)

Any changes in environmental behaviour achieved by the project amongst people and institutions ?  
(Who? Where? What indicators?)

Any unplanned impacts of the project?

Positive ones

Negative ones

#### **d) Sustainability**

What are expected to be the long-term benefits of the project?

Was the approach used by the project likely to ensure continued long term benefits from the project beyond its closure?

Do the project's partners (EPA and MEDAC) have the capacity to continue to implement all the initiated activities which are relevant?

Do the project's stakeholders have the capacity to continue to implement all the initiated activities which are relevant?

Have the necessary actions – policies and laws and institutions, been developed to ensure long term implementation of the CSE at the national level?

Have the necessary actions – policies and laws and institutions, been developed to ensure long term implementation of the CSE at the regional level?

**e) Lessons Learned**

What lessons can be learned from this project? (In terms of project design and operation and in the light of the project objectives?)

## REGIONAL CONSERVATION STRATEGY PROCESS

### Discussion Notes towards a Methodology in the Regions

#### 1. Introduction

Two of the specific objectives of the CSE Phase III were to: institutionalise the CSE process within the government structure at all levels (including the regions and below), and develop Regional Conservation Strategies and ensure their use at regional and sub-regional levels, including the development of zonal and wereda level structures. These will be the two foci for the work at the regional levels.

In addition it is necessary to consider how other aspects of the mission's TOR are answered at the regional levels in terms of: applying the CSE and RCS principles through the development of tools such as EIA and other procedures that will ensure the integration of environment into economic planning, budgeting and policies at all levels, raising awareness of the CSE process through improved communication techniques and capacity as well as dissemination of information about the strategy.

Further, the work should keep in mind the following specific measures for this evaluation, and assess them at the regional level, namely: effectiveness, efficiency, relevance and timeliness of the CSE project activities, the impact of project activities and related outputs, long-term sustainability of actions initiated and now handed over to federal and regional institutions for implementation, identify lessons learned about project design, management and implementation, and identify potential areas and specific activities for future collaboration in further implementation of the CSE/RCSs and supporting environmental/biodiversity management in Ethiopia.

In the light of these points it is proposed that case studies of the RCS process and achievements in as many regions as possible are completed in this evaluation. While these will try to be systematic and cover the same aspects in each region, they will also need to try to bring out the distinctive aspects of the process and its achievements in each region. The missions needs to learn lessons about what is necessary for this process to run smoothly and to be effective and sustainable etc, as per the above criteria. It might be useful for the team to develop and keep in mind a model of an RCS process and to compare what is found against that model recognising that there will often be reasons for deviations. The reasons for these deviations need to be recorded and explained. An ideal RCS process should be locally owned, widely recognised and used in the Regional HQ and among the bureaus, NGOs, politicians and private sector organisations and disseminated down to the kebele levels so that people can apply them. It should involve an active use of the RCS guidance to improve conditions for people and their environments, and should be sensitive to different stakeholder groups. A key issue here is in what form the RCS ideas should be disseminated so that they are able to be of use to people. Principles are not much use by themselves and guidance about turning RCS guidance into specific actions is a major challenge.

#### 2. Areas for Attention

In the light of the above the following foci for work in each region are proposed for consideration and for testing in the first regional case study.

- a) Origins of the RCS process, contributions to Phase II, and response to 1997 approval of EP and de facto the CSE. How much local ownership is there over the process.
- b) RCS documents and their adjustment to the local conditions with local priorities  
Use of the RCS document by government officials, political leaders, NGOs, private sector, public.
- c) Administrative organisation of the RCS work, focal point person, focal point bureau (and how they were decided and how much continuity),
- d) RECC, its membership (esp private sector and NGOs) and functioning, its role in development and approval of the RCS, its role and effectiveness in ensuring that the RCS is used, especially in the 5 year planning process and in other ways.
- e) Degree of mainstreaming of the RCS – other bureaus using it and feedback
- f) Decentralising process to the regions and beyond to the zones and the wereda, actual and envisaged.
- g) Capacity building in the RCS process and sustainability.

### 3. List of Persons to be Interviewed

Chair of the RECC (a political leader)  
 Secretary to the RECC  
 Focal point bureau Head (or knowledgeable senior person)  
 Focal point person  
 Bureaus of Agric, Planning, Water etc, Education, Women's Affairs, Industry  
 DPPC or equivalent  
 Investment Bureau  
 NGOs especially local ones  
 Private sector – chamber of commerce  
 RCS Trainees  
 Resource Centres

### 4. Schedule of Topics to be covered at Regions with all interviewees

It is likely that these will have to be applied more flexibly than the checklists being used in AA as there will probably be a greater diversity of situations. Some potential areas of questioning are:

#### *INTRODUCTION*

Involvement of the person in the RCS process and RECC (if appropriate)

#### *RCS Process*

Aware of the whole RCS process? What does it involve? Why is it being done?

Strengths of the RCS process?

Weaknesses?

What should have been done differently to overcome weaknesses?

What opportunities are there for the RCS process? What should it do?

What skills and capacity been created? What level of awareness of the RCS process?

What threats to the RCS? Is it sustainable? How well integrated is it?

#### *Project Support*

What benefits from the project have been received?

Training, Equipment, Finance, T.A. support, etc

What efficiency of operation of the project in its work?

What impacts and result has the project achieved?  
What cost effectiveness of the project?

***Overall Assessment of RCS process***

Was it relevant at this time for this region? (Blanket approach by the project was followed for political / lack of info reasons?)

Was it an efficient process?

Did it produce impacts in the region?

Was it a cost effective process?

*Also need to ask:*

How as the RCS developed?

Is it sensitive to local needs?

How often does the RECC meet?

Does it have any impact?

Degree of local ownership of the process?

**5. Draft Outline for Regional Reports**

In line with the above methodology which seeks to explore the nature of the RCS process and identify issues which relate to it and then provide analysis of the underlying processes, it is proposed that the regional case study reports are structured into five sections:

**RCS Process** – a descriptive review of the process as it has occurred identifying origins, structures and decentralisation below the Region, stakeholder involvement, response to the 1997 EP approval, dissemination of the process, the nature and degree of local sensitivity of the RCS documents (Latter may be done centrally), the use made of the RCS.

**Project's Specific Contribution** – covering the areas where the project has made specific contributions to the RCS process and to the RECC and environmental awareness in the region, especially in capacity development and the development and use of tools which allow RCS principles to be applied in planning budgeting and policy development.

**Assessment of Impacts and Identification of Issues Arising** – this should review the factual progress against the criteria in the TORs for the overall mission in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, appropriateness, and timeliness. This section should also identify strengths and weaknesses which people identify with the process which arise from the various discussions, structured into groups which have some coherence and logic. Some key areas on which comment is sought are local ownership, use of RCS documents by stakeholders and in 5 year planning document, RCS mainstreaming, RECC functioning, awareness raising, sustainability.

**Analysis** – this should seek to identify and explore the underlying process and interactions which have led to the present level of progress with the RCSs and RECCs and the general awareness of the RCS process and environmental understanding in the Region. Sustainability.

**Lessons and Recommendations** – this should look at what lessons can be drawn from the process so far, also identify what is needed to get the RCS process fully grounded in the region, what is necessary to ensure that the RCS is used and helpful to the people of the region. Suggestions for future activity should be included here.

APW

26<sup>th</sup> May 2001



## **Annex 3d**

### **OUTLINE FOR RCS PROCESS REPORT FOR EACH REGION**

**1. RCS Process** – a review of the process as it has occurred identifying origins, structures and decentralisation below the Region, stakeholder involvement, response to the 1997 EP approval, dissemination of the process, the nature and degree of local sensitivity of the RCS documents (latter may be done centrally), the use made of the RCS.

**2. Project's Specific Contribution** – recording the facts about the areas where the project has made specific contributions to the RCS process and to the RECC and environmental awareness in the region, especially in capacity building and the development and use of tools which allow RCS principles to be applied in planning budgeting and policy development.

**3. Assessment of Outputs, Impacts and Identification of Issues Arising** – this should review the factual progress against the criteria in the TORs for the overall mission in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, appropriateness, and timeliness. This section should also identify strengths and weaknesses which people identify with the process which arise from the various discussions, structured into groups which have some coherence and logic. Some key areas on which comment is sought are local ownership, use of RCS documents by stakeholders and in 5 year planning document, RCS mainstreaming, RECC functioning, awareness raising, etc.

#### **STRENGTHS OF PROCESS / PROJECT**

**Document**

**Process**

**Impacts on Awareness and Behaviour**

**Training and Capacity Building**

**Timeliness**

**Wider Impacts**

#### **WEAKNESSES OF PROCESS / PROJECT**

**Nature of Process**

**Length of Process**

**Dissemination and Awareness**

**Project Support**

**Decentralisation**

**Inclusiveness of Process**

**Additional**

**4. Analysis** – this should seek to identify and explore the underlying processes and interactions which have led to the present level of progress with the RCSs and RECCs and the general awareness of the RCS process and environmental understanding in the Region, as well as assess the sustainability. This reflects the views and interpretations of the situation by the evaluators.

**Relevance**

**Process**

**Impact, Effectiveness and Dissemination**

**Efficiency**

**Sustainability**

**Top Down**

**5. Lessons and Recommendations** – this should look at what lessons can be drawn from the process so far, also identify what is needed to get the RCS process fully grounded in the region, what is

necessary to ensure that the RCS is used and helpful to the people of the region. Suggestions for future activity should be included here.

ANNEX 4

PERSONS INTERVIEWED BY ORGANIZATION / REGION

I. Federal Government Institutions

**CSE III Project Staff (all based in EPA)**

Gedion Asfaw,  
Technical Advisor

Asmaret Kidane Mariam  
Acting Head, Communications Section, CSE III  
Gender Specialist, CSE III

Yigzaw Ayalew  
Environmental Planning Expert, seconded to CSE III from EPA

Melesse  
Finance Officer CSE III

Alemayehu  
Driver

**Environmental Protection Authority (EPA)**

Dr. Tewolde Brehan Gebre Egziabher  
General Manager

Dessalegn Mesfin  
Head, Environmental Policy and Legislation Department

Ms Tsedale Waktola,  
Head, Women's Affairs Department

Getachew Eshete  
Head, Ecosystem Department

Sitotaw Berhanu  
Head, Planning and Programming Service

Dr Kidane Abebe  
Head, Environmental Education Department

Gebre Selassie Gebre Amlak  
Head, Regional Affairs Co-ordination Service

Girma Mikru  
Head, Environmental Economics and Social Affairs Department

**Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation (MEDaC)**

Beyene Haile,  
Head, Dept of Agriculture (includes Natural Resources Team and EPU)

Worku Ayele  
Head, Natural Resources Team

Ian Campbell,  
Formerly second CTA, now with World Bank

Ministry of Agriculture  
Million Bekele  
Team Leader, Forest & Wildlife Technology and Regulatory Team

Ministry of Water, Minerals and Energy  
Tamene Gosa  
Head of UNCIEF Water Supply Projects Co-ordination Office  
(Formerly of the Water Resources Policy Development Project)

**Ethiopian Investment Authority**

Tilahun Gelaw  
Head, Project Evaluation Department

**Ethiopian Wildlife Conservation Organisation**

Tesfaye Hundessa,  
Manager

Ethiopian Agricultural Research Organization  
Dr. Paulos Dubale  
Director of Soils and Water Resources

Addis Ababa University  
Ensermu Kelbessa  
Curator, National Herbarium  
Programme Manager of the Environmental Management Training Project

**II. Non-Governmental Organizations**

**Center for Human Environment (CHE)**

Dr. Teferra Wogdereseegn  
Head

**Christian Relief and Development Association (CRDA)**

Ato Akalewold Bantiyrgu  
Head, Networking and Information,

Ethiopian Wildlife and Natural History Society  
Ato Kinfe Abebe  
Executive Director

Mengistu Wondafrash  
Biodiversity Conservation Team Leader

Farm Africa  
Ato Amare Beyene  
Manager

Ato Zelalem Temesgen  
Joint Forest Programme Division

Forum for Environment ( FfE)  
Ms Camille de Stoop  
Co-ordinator

**IUCN**  
Alejandro Imbach  
Consultant, Monitoring and Evaluation Programme

World Wildlife Fund (WWF)  
Dr Ermias Bekele  
Project Leader and Country Representative

### **III. Donors and International Agencies**

Canadian International Development Agency / Embassy of Canada  
Caroline Lavoie  
Second Secretary, Embassy of Canada

Tamene Tiruneh  
Environmental Advisor  
(Former EPU staff member and one time Acting Head of EPU)

European Union Delegation  
Jose Vivero  
Co-ordinator, Environmental Programme

Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD)

Dr Inge Herman Rydland  
Counsellor, Development Cooperation and Deputy Head of Mission

Swedish International Development Agency  
Lars Leander  
First Secretary, Development

Aklog Laike  
Rural Development and Natural Resources Advisor

United Nations Development Programme  
Ato Girma Hailu  
Assistant Resident Representative for Environment  
(Formerly EPA staff member)

#### IV. Regional Institutions

##### *Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State*

##### **Bureau of Planning and Economic Development**

Teshome Tadesse, Acting Head  
Abebe Mengesha, RCS Focal Point  
Argawi Sima, Head Public Relations  
Endalkachew Assefa, Senior Expert, GIS team, Physical Planning Department  
Temesgen Workayehu, Expert, Landscape Team, Physical Planning Department  
**Mekonnen Batiso, Head, NGO Team (formerly Head of Bureau)**

##### **Bureau of Agriculture**

Daniel Dana, Team Leader, Forest Management Team, Regulatory Department  
Mersha Alemayehu, Expert, Forest Management Team, Regulatory Department

##### **Bureau of Women's Affairs**

W/o Assegedech Gessesse, Income Generating Programme Co-ordinator  
Mesfin Sahle, Disaster Prevention Programme Co-ordinator

##### **Bureau of Water, Mineral and Energy**

Ato Asfaw Dingamo, Head

##### **Bureau of Education**

Berhanu Bekelle, Head, Education Support Department  
Shanks Birramo,

##### **Bureau of Investment**

Ato Bekele G. Medhin Team Leader, Project Evaluation

##### **Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Office**

**DESSELEGN TESSEMMA, ACTING HEAD**  
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##### **Institute of Agricultural Research**

Dr Daniel Dawro, Manager  
Tenaw Work-Agegnehu, Research-Extension Department

Awassa Chamber of Commerce  
Balambaras Bashu Bushen, Temporary Secretary

**Commission for Sustainable Agriculture and Environmental Rehabilitation**  
Abye, Acting Head and six experts

**Debu University**

Dr Zinabu Gebre Mariam, President  
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Ato Zeleke Teferi      Water Quality Laboratory Chemist, Addis Abeba Water and Sewerage Authority,  
Ato Tesfaye Berhe      Head, Bureau of Education,  
Ato Tekle W/Gerima      Head, Natural Resources Utilization Monitoring Department,  
Dr. Tilahun Goshu      Head, Legal Department, Bureau of Education,  
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***Oromia National Regional State***

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Benti Shemino, Expert, Environmental Pollution, Land Use Planning and Environmental Protection Dept, Bureau of Agriculture  
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Dr Karin Geising, GTZ Advisor, Land Use Planning Project, Bureau of Agriculture

***Amhara National Regional State***

Dr Belay Demisse      Head, Bureau of Agriculture; RECC Secretary  
Abebe Ayene      Representative/Head; Bureau of Water, Energy and Mines  
Yohannes Afework      Acting Team Leader, Environmental Protection Team, BoA; RCS Focal Person  
Mohamed Ibrahim      Wildlife Expert, BoA

Abay Kinde Acting Team Leader, Land use and Regulatory Team; BoA – and Board Member for the prospective Authority

*Benishangul-Gumuz National Regional State*

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Asamnew Damte Expert, Projects approvals, M&E expert, Investment Office  
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*Somali National Regional State*

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*Tigray National Regional State*

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Gezahegn Hamza Service Manager, Water Supply and Sewage Service  
Feisel Aliye Head; Water, Mines and Energy Bureau

*Ankober Wereda*

Abebe Gizaw, Expert, Wereda Agricultural Office  
Asku Haile Selassie Member, Wereda Council  
Yalew formerly Wereda Pilot Project Co-ordinator  
Kebede Bugale, farmer Ankober Wereda



## ANNEX 5

### SCHEDULE FOR THE MISSION

10 <sup>th</sup> May	Departure from UK for Nairobi, Adrian Wood
11 <sup>th</sup> May	Preliminary meeting in Nairobi at IUCN-EARO
12 <sup>th</sup> May	Arrival in Addis Ababa and orientation meeting with Gedion Asfaw
13 <sup>th</sup> May	Preparatory reading
14 <sup>th</sup> May	Planning day to draft schedules
15 <sup>th</sup> May	Interviews of federal level stakeholders and project/EPA/MEDaC staff
16 <sup>th</sup> May	Interviews of federal level stakeholders and project/EPA/MEDaC staff
17 <sup>th</sup> May	Interviews of federal level stakeholders and project/EPA/MEDaC staff
18 <sup>th</sup> May	Wereda Pilot Project visit by Wood
19 <sup>th</sup> May	Interview with Gedion Asfaw (Wood) and writing notes
20 <sup>th</sup> May	Team review meeting
21 <sup>st</sup> May	Interviews of federal level stakeholders and project/EPA/MEDaC staff
22 <sup>nd</sup> May	Interviews of federal level stakeholders and project/EPA/MEDaC staff
23 <sup>rd</sup> May	Travel to Awassa for first RCS assessment (all three team members) and initial interviews
24 <sup>th</sup> May	Awassa, SPNNRS RCS assessment interviews and review of methodology
25 <sup>th</sup> May	Awassa, SPNNRS RCS assessment, travel back to Addis Ababa
26 <sup>th</sup> May	Drafting first RCS report and revising methodology
27 <sup>th</sup> May	Team meeting to review RCS method and report
28 <sup>th</sup> May	Addis Ababa Region RCS meetings Kifle Lemma Oromia Region RCS meetings Adrian Wood Dire Dawa Region RCS meetings Alemayehu Konde
29 <sup>th</sup> May	Addis Ababa Region RCS meetings Kifle Lemma Oromia Region RCS meetings Adrian Wood Dire Dawa Region RCS meetings Alemayehu Konde
30 <sup>th</sup> May	Report drafting Kifle Lemma and Adrian Wood Dire Dawa Region RCS meetings Alemayehu Konde
31 <sup>st</sup> May	Debriefing at EPA for Project, EPA and MEDaC staff Somali Region RCS meetings Alemayehu Konde
1 <sup>st</sup> June	Debriefing meeting in Nairobi (Adrian Wood and Kifle Lemma) Somali Region RCS meetings Alemayehu Konde
2 <sup>nd</sup> June	Travel home
to 19 <sup>th</sup> June	Further RCS assessments by Alemayehu Konde in Bahir Dar for Amhara Region, Gambella for Gambella Region, Mekele for Tigray Region, Assosa for Beni-Shangul Gumuz Region.

## **ANNEX 6**

### **REGIONAL CONSERVATION STRATEGY PROCESS ASSESSMENT - FIELD NOTES**

#### **Annex 6a**

#### **REGIONAL CONSERVATION STRATEGY PROCESS: SOUTHERN NATIONS NATIONALITIES & PEOPLES REGIONAL STATE**

##### **1. RCS Process**

The RCS here has a long history going back to the pre-regionalisation zones left by the Derg. Most zones prepared a document on their natural resources in 92/93, last ones (for special weredas) completed in 95. As for most of the country this was done as part of a process of feeding up information to the CSE with the idea that the approved CSE should feed back down further ideas and guidance to be used in the RCS.

RECC set up in 1995 (before Phase III) (originally 16 persons – Chair, Head of Economic Sector in Regional Council, 15 Government Bureaus, but now 24 with addition of 5 Education Institutions, 2 churches and 1 development association.)

RCS Task Force also established in 1995 - 16 members (8 from Planning Bureau, 2 from Agriculture, 2 from Water, Minerals and Energy, and one from Education, Health, Culture and IAR)

RCS Conference in March 1997. 4 draft volumes distributed in advance for comment. Participants drawn widely from government, peasant representatives, development associations, NGOs and religious organisations (but not private commercial and industrial sector – Chamber of Commerce closed). (Full list not found as report of workshop missing in Awassa and in SCSE.)

March 1998 Communication Strategy and Action Plan – document exists but apparently no follow up, presumably because waiting for approval which expected soon at that point. Momentum with this seems to have been lost now.

RCS document finalised with CSE support and submitted to RECC for approval in March 1999. Then to Council in September 1999. This is in English and consists of 354 pp.

Subsequently submitted proposal for Environmental Protection Office / Regional Environmental Agency. This is an idea which comes from the SCSE but it is recognised to be the way ahead here as without a specialist institutions no one will push the RCS.

High level of support activities by CSE project in February 1999 with the Policy Implementation Workshops. Visit by NPC for CSE Project (G.M. of EPA) to raise the profile of the RCS again and try to get approval.

Regional Council discussed these both in March 2000 but not yet approved.

Support for the RCS process has been quite considerable at times with up to 6 visit per year, but also seems to have fluctuated from year to year. (Actual number of visits to come from Table from Project).

ZECCs established in 1996/97 in all zones but do not function. Nothing at the wereda level except some training which also done at zonal. (Note wereda is said to be the level at which the government administration does have an interest in the environment, above that there is little such interest.)

**No formal implementation has begun but some Depts do refer to RCS in their work plans – Forestry (a bit – Regional Forestry Action Plan (RFAP) – which CSE sees as a subset of it although the national EFAP predates it) and Water and Investment bureaus more (Environmental Monitoring Team in Water and project assessment checklist in Investment with environmental impacts). But none of these use the RCS in a systematic manner. Others fail to use it at all although they know about it and it could be relevant to their work e.g. DPPO was not been pushing NGOs to use RCS when they came under their responsibility.**

Regional Council’s “Draft Evaluation of the Past 5 Years and Plan for the Next 5 Years” does have a section on environment. This stresses the need to strengthen the RCS process and issue policies about its implementation, including making organisational arrangements. It focuses on pollution, environmental health, forest, soil and water conservation, environmental education and monitoring of the growing pressures on the environment. However, this covers less than half a page in the plan out of 80 pages.

## **2. Project’s Specific Contribution**

Project support has taken various forms:

Technical assistance – number of visits to come from Project

Financial assistance – details to come from project accountant

Equipment and books – 75

Training – courses in region, AA, and overseas including study tours - 61

Workshops in Region:

environmental awareness workshops

environmental communication training workshops

Also support to 2 sub regional agricultural dept workshops, plus some by the Women’s Affairs Dept.

Skills used to varying degrees – even to develop projects and get external funds. Evidence of GIS being used. The % of trainees still in government employment was not clear although there have obviously been some losses. No tracking system is in place by the RCS focal point – nor by the project.

20 project profiles created through RCS process and lodged with the RECC secretariat in Awassa, some submitted to CSE for funding. Another project, on solid waste management, developed by one trainee and has obtained external funding from the Ethiopian Social Rehabilitation Development Fund (ESRDF).

## **3. Assessment of Outputs, Impacts and Identification of Issues Arising**

### **a. Strengths of Process / Project**

Document

RCS document produced (in English) – is an achievement and useful as a guide and reference document but needs to be updated and other type of document produced.

RCS is adapted to region in terms of content and themes, not just a copy of the national CSE.

## Process

Participatory process – at conference with --- participants. But what is the nature of this participation – but what is possible given the situation in the country.

## Impacts on Awareness and Behaviour

Awareness raising in a number of ways – evidence reported from several sources, not just RCS secretariat in terms of the way decision makers will now include environment in their considerations, and how it is seen as an aspect of development and therefore worthy of attention. Several initiatives on environmental proposals are now on-going or being developed, including one by an CSE trainee on solid waste in Awassa town now funded by the Ethiopian Social Rehabilitation Development Fund. But these are only a part of the total picture.

Project has helped introduce new concepts, such as polluter pays. Application of these new concepts and some environmental assessment tools by the Bureau of Investment, although they note investors often fail to complete the environment section of their applications.

Inclusion of environment in 5 year development programme of region, (although weak and had to be enforced by BOPED)

Linkages between regional investment policy and gender policy and RCS – signs of communication in government.

## Training and Capacity Building

Training - skill and capacity development – some long term impact in government agencies. Also training of trainers courses by project which has had wider impacts in the region, this one on environmental awareness was repeated at wereda level with project support.

Views on CSE training support positive from recipients, although some courses better than others – AAU course version 1 had some problems, Project Planning one very good and interactive.

Equipment for shorter term impact.

Capacity building with equipment and training having short and longer-term impacts

## Timeliness

RCS seen as very timely by some agencies, e.g by Water etc Bureau given the pollution problems they face which are inter-sectoral and require some coordination or cross sectoral actions as RCS is pushing.

## Wider Impacts

Wider impacts of the project in terms of support to the newly formed Women's Affairs Bureau and helped them develop skills – although they are limited in what they do by their responsibilities in the government structure.

## **b. Weaknesses of Process / Project**

### Nature of Process

RECC has no budget for operations and no legal status, as a result it seems to attract little attention now from its members and Bureau heads often send delegates. RECC holds irregular meetings, not twice a year as planned which also undermines its image. Seems to have little secretariat support these days. No one is driving it.

Some say one cannot get things moving in Ethiopia through co-ordination committees such as this, especially when the agencies are all roughly equal and competing for territory and issues of jealousy where one agency (Plan Bureau) controls the process. This leads to problems of getting agreement among people on issues such as institutional arrangement for RCS implementation which took some time.

Staff continuity problem at various levels including BOPED now, (but not in past in BOPED when RCS process was running better.)

Low level of political support in the Region – required NPC’s visit in connection with the policy implementation workshops but this does not seem to have effected a change.

Nature of the political linkages of the RCS and need for Council approval means few will act before the green light is given (only Water etc Bureau it seems, although it is using RCS as part of its development of a regional Water Strategy to follow up new national policy.)

Proposed institution for implementation means situation is one of hiatus in BOPED as waiting to hand over once the proposal is approved, so not taking any initiative. Similarly waiting for the legislation to enforce principles in RCS.

Loading of the CSE onto a existing but busy agency without additional staff, so Secretariat at BOPED has a shortage of staff and time to cope with the peaks of work. BOPED’s over-zealous ownership of project perceived by some – could affect implementation stage.

Jealousy of agencies not included in Task Force (due to top ups?). General situation that bureaus are looking for resources and only interested in projects for what they bring to them, not what extra meeting they require. RCS does not offer much to many.

#### Length of Process

Delays in RCS approval creates uncertainty and loss of interest / momentum - documents filed away or shelved by RCS conference participants for some 4 + years waiting for approval and final version, so process seems to have stopped.

Competition of the RCS process for people’s time v other activities (prioritisation). This is especially true at the political level in the Regional Council.

Length of the process such that environment has gone off the agenda for political action and support? The initial enthusiasm has waned.

As a result of these delays still no co-ordination on environmental matters – piecemeal actions, some 6 years after RCS started which suggests this is an unimportant area.

#### Dissemination and Awareness

Weak process of dissemination within participating agencies of info re RCS beyond contact persons on Task Force and RECC. As a result agency-wide understanding of RCS process and RECCs is poor.

Some people in some agencies do understand these, mainly due to attending training or RCS conference, but others, probably the majority, have at best only heard about it.

Apart from conference participants, few have the RCS document. RCS is a large document in English which may impact through costs upon reproducing it for wider dissemination and through language on the process of political approval. A shorter and simpler document in local language is needed for the weredas in the view of the Water Bureau head, but maybe

also for society as a whole. Dissemination strategy developed but never used, no newsletter even – presumably due to failure to get RCS approved.

#### Project Support

Variable intensity - lack of support from CSE III once RCS prepared (but lot of activity in 2000 and when the RCS being developed).

Project failed to spot the delay problem and provide additional support – its visits eased off then whereas political leverage was needed. (Was provided in the end by NPC's visit).

No follow up on training, tracking of staff and their use of things to feedback into courses or to support them in post to use the training.

#### Decentralisation

Training only for Regional level staff. Failure to get training and other activities to grass roots levels and little done at zone or wereda level. Diversity of problems not covered in all training and never got to Zone or below.

No active ZECCs and absence of communications between region and zone. This false start may lead to problems of re-energizing ZECCs.

Only one course at Wereda level – women and environmental awareness, yet that is the level at which some people say the administration begins to protect the natural resources and has some sense of ownership.

#### Inclusiveness of Process

Only very select group of local NGOs / churches included. These and the University / higher education institutions brought in later in the process onto the RECC after the RCS finalised (as not named in that document but are in more recent ones.)

Some agencies such as IAR and the University believe they are not included in the RCS process as current heads never invited to RECC meetings. Maybe this is due to inactivity of RECC over several years or their very recent inclusion by the Secretariat to widen participation in face of criticisms of government dominance.

Failure to use NGO projects as possible pilot demonstrations of the RCS principles. No active involvement of Mekane Yesus church despite its potential – as now for HIV/Aids work.

#### Additional

Regional government unaware of environmental element in national investment policy.

Access to the books provided – not government only as wide range of public are said to use it, not clear if these environment books will move to the EPO when established.

### **4. Analysis**

#### Relevance

While the process is felt to have been relevant by many of the stakeholders, the length of the process has almost caused it to become irrelevant as other issues dominate the agenda such as food security, investment and political debates and a new concept desertification is taking the limelight in environmental activities. New initiatives, such as the RCS/CSE must strike while the idea is popular and there is enthusiasm. In this case the momentum seems to have been lost twice, once after the RCS conference and now again after the Policy Implementation

workshop and the revival effort made in 2000. One might wonder whether it can be resurrected a second time. Will further delays will kill it?

#### Process

The first part of the CSE process was done well, with the document prepared in about a year by March 97. But why did it then take two years to finalise it? Was this due to CSE project finances problem and lack of visits or what? Since 1999 it has been in the government process which takes time and over which there is no control from the SCSE or RCS Secretariat. Even visits by the NPC was not able to move the political part of this process.

Changes in staffing in agencies and also in Council leads to loss of ownership and interest. These are factors beyond the control of the project and risks which should have been considered in the project design.

Some of the problem faced in the RCS process are a result of the failure to be able to implement and waiting for political approval. Inertia creates its own problems and further undermines things.

#### Impact, Effectiveness and Dissemination

While there is some general raising of awareness, especially among those who took part in the RCS conference, the use of the RCS ideas is fairly limited and only seen in a couple of the government bureaus - water and investment. Further, there is limited spread of the ideas out of core government area, and little impact in the NGO and industrial community. (Note also the problem of recent widening of the RECC and apparent ignorance of this by some who have been added.)

Could not some use have been made of the regional communications strategy which was developed in 1998?

Some longer term impacts will hopefully remain as a result of the training and awareness raising, but both need follow up.

Even within the Regional Government, the way in which environment is treated in the Draft 5 Year Plan is not very encouraging as it is given very little space and is not very specific about its contribution.

A smaller document in local languages or the lingua franca (Amharic) should have been developed and used to disseminate the CSE/RCS ideas and principles to the kebele level. Can this still be done with any enthusiasm if the RCS is approved some 4+ years after the conference.

#### Efficiency

While there has been efficiency at the start, and probably in the project's provision of support and training, in general the impact for five years of work is rather small which must argue against efficiency.

#### Sustainability

This is said by some to be the wrong time to stop as nothing is yet set up in terms of an implementing agency and approval of the CSE. The Focal Person is not dynamic and the BOPED Secretariat is not much interested in this now it is going to be handed over to the agency to be set up once the CSE is approved. So is it a question of pulling out before anything has started! Hence there is a fear that the end of the project now will result in the collapse of the process despite its mention in the Draft Plan for the Next Five Years.

#### Top-Down Approach

Is the whole process still too top-down with the government departments designing what should be done in their action plans. The point is made that this is not the way to get participation in addressing environment issues. Rather the principles should be identified and these should be taken down to the lowest level from which needs driven activities can be requested and designed.

## **5. Lessons and Recommendations**

Was it correct to link the CSE/RCS to the political process. Other technical type activities of line bureaus do not need political approval - such as new seeds, water protection, soil conservation and vaccination campaigns. So why has the CSE decided to take this route which then faces serious delays. What are the returns and costs of this approach? Have they been discussed? Or was it just a bureaucratic fait accompli?

Even accepting the choice of the political route, must everything wait for the political approval; cannot some publicity be done and pilot project started. The CCD is running pilot projects in regions when it has only been ratified at the national political level and not by the regional council.

Staff turnover also raise the question of the use of seconded staff rather than a method which could ensure staff continuity. But that then faces problems of sustainability and handover and integration, but given that the new agency will pick it up maybe this is less significant than in other cases.

Is the RCS too big for people to get to grips with. (as a concept as well as in the document form). Should a different approach have been used.

Should the project have been more prescriptive and followed up more tightly on the process to ensure it moved along. But as a process project trying to engender local ownership that is not the way to go. There must be some recognition of the need to proceed at the pace the local institutions want and to not impose the programme on them if you want to stimulate local ownership.

Should the project have been more proactive in tracking trainees and pushing them to use their skills gained in order to build up a momentum in the application of environmental tools in planning?

The new agency (REA) to be set up will need resources and some support in order to get operational and build up its skills and awareness of what is likely to be a very tough task given the way the line Bureaus will defend their turf from others commenting on their activities. So a very sensitive politically aware role is needed to encourage the bureaus to take up and apply the RCS. It will also need for a system of monitoring and evaluation of progress (on RCS) to be put in place.

Is this REA where the future support should be placed. But is that again at too high a level. Should it be more on dissemination and stimulating civil society along the lines KL has suggested of principles down to the field to stimulate local initiatives and identification of activities.



**REGIONAL CONSERVATION STRATEGY PROCESS:  
ADDIS ABABA CITY ADMINISTRATION**

**1. RCS Process**

The RCS process in the Addis Ababa City Administration formally commenced in April 1996 when the CSE Project contacted the economic sector heads of the administration and the staff under him to provide a briefing. Before the Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) was established in July 1996 the BoPED was the contact point and this bureau had prepared an assessment of the environmental situation in the city before the RCS was even initiated. When the EPB was established the responsibility for the RCS was handed over to them.

In June 1996 the RECC and the Task Force were established. The RECC consisted of 13 members, including the Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce, representing the private sector. There were no other institutions from outside the city government members. The Task Force consisted of 26 individuals representing 12 institutions (i.e.- Environment, Culture & Information, Health, Fuelwood Project, Water, Education, Agriculture, Parks & Recreation, Labor & Social Affairs, Planning and Economic Development Bureau (PEDB), Addis Ababa Women's Affairs and Trade & Industry.

Immediately after establishment, a CSE assisted sensitization workshop was carried out for Task Force members and the RCS formulation commenced.

The RCS conference was held in June, 99 after a first draft was prepared. The draft was distributed to the participants. The participants were diverse including representatives of bureaus, federal ministries and zones as well as representatives from the AAU, professional societies, such as the biological and chemical societies, and the youth and women's associations. At the conference there were intensive discussions on the drafts. New ideas, changes and modifications were recommended.

Incorporation of the comments was then carried out and by, November 2000, editing and reviewing was completed though a consultancy service provided by the Project. The final draft was then submitted directly to the Executive Committee of the Council through the RECC chairperson. The RECC chairperson was supposed to convene the RECC for review of the final draft but failed to do so despite a request to him to do so from the EPB. Four volumes were submitted in English.

To date it has not been approved despite persistent pressure from the EPB. This is partially because the political rectification process which has occupied the political leadership of the city government since early 2001.

In 1998 and 1999 respectively a communication strategy and gender strategy for the RCS were developed with the assistance of the Project. Preceding that, training workshops had been carried out with support from the Project. Efforts to apply the communications strategy are demonstrated by the fact that the EPB publishes a "quarterly" magazine on environment, although they have had difficulty keeping to schedule due to a shortage of funds to pay the contributors. The EPB has also prepared brochures, leaflets and posters in effort to enhance awareness about the environment and the RCS process.

There have been frequent contacts by the Project to provide technical assistance and encouragement. These contacts have been both physical visits and telephone contacts. Visits were also not only one way. Members of EPB visited the CSE Project office often. The

proximity of the two offices has certainly helped. There were contacts almost on a monthly basis.

The city has been able to establish WECCs in all woredas. The WECCs have been established after the purpose of their establishment was discussed and agreed upon at a workshop in which 5-7 people from each woreda participated (e.g. - Woreda chairpersons, woreda representatives of Economic Affairs, Urban & Public Works, Social Affairs and Health, Women's and Youth associations). EPB in applying the RCS ideas has ignored the zones because they are not formally recognized in the city's charter and are not operational. It was reported that the WECCs are functioning effectively. They are much more functional than the RECC. Although the frequency of meetings is variable from woreda to woreda, the meetings are relatively frequent; in some woredas there are weekly meetings. One WECC chairperson has visited Dire Dawa as a participant in a visit organized by the CSE Project for the purpose of exchanging experience. The main weakness of the WECCs is that they have not developed the habit of reporting. The activities they carry out at present include environmental sanitation, beautification and tree planting. Strengthening their capacity is required.

Although implementation of the RCS has not formally commenced, informal use of it is being made by the WECCs, NGOs and the city government's organs. Reportedly extensive use of the RCS has been made in the recent AA City Master Plan revision.

The EPB it self has ensured that environment is included in the city's Five-Year Development Program. Proposed action areas include:  
measures to begin combating pollution;  
protecting the ecological balance in the city;  
establishing a monitoring and evaluation system;  
enhancing public participation in the implementation of the RCS; and  
capacity building in the EPB.

In the implementation of the environmental component of the city's Five-Year Plan, a bottom-up planning approach will be used. Woredas will identify activities and submit them to the EPB which will aggregated and consolidate the proposals from all woredas and in turn submit them to the BoPED for review and approval. Also need to take into account the Action Program in the RCS.

In preparation for the RCS implementation the EPB has also initiated, completed and submitted to the City Council draft regulations on:  
Pollution control;  
EIA;  
Conservation of Green Areas;  
Solid Waste Management; and  
Upgrading the EPB into a semi-autonomous agency (reporting to a board rather than the regional council.)

There was a special Task Force established for this purpose only (mainly lawyers). The drafts have been discussed at workshops organized for this purpose with funding from the Hinerich Boll Foundation.

In the current year's budget for EPB the following budget lines can be observe:

Construction of Laboratory (out of expected 7 mil)	Birr	4,500,000
Preparation of environmental quality standards	Birr.	124,400
Environmental Awareness Enhancement	Birr	121,000
A new office for EPB	Birr	1,600,000

## **2. Project's Specific Contribution**

The Project's support included:

Technical assistance- frequent visits and assistance

Financial assistance- financing several workshops

Equipment and material assistance (computers, printers, a fax machine, a photo copier, an over head projector, a duplicator, a flip chart stand, binding machine, about 75 books on environment).

Training – in-country training workshops, training and study tours abroad. There was participation in all of the training and study tours provided by the Project. The EPB head and two women from the Women's Affairs Bureau have participated in study tours. Reportedly almost all trained personnel are still in their original places. There is evidence that they are using their skills e.g. RCS formulation, project proposal preparation, EIA legislation preparation, communication activities).

In 2000, the EPB prepared seven projects for assistance by the CSE Project. Only one was accepted and funded – but this was support for the environmental laboratory.

There was great appreciation of the support provided by the Project and regret that it is being phased out at this time. A next phase would have given crucial support in integrating environment into the city's development and the planning cycle properly, as well as assisting the establishment of on-the-ground RCS projects on a pilot basis.

## **3. Assessment of Impacts and Identification of Issues Arising**

### **A. STRENGTHS OF PROCESS / PROJECT**

#### **DOCUMENT**

RCS documents produced (in English) and submitted to City Administration.

RCS issues prioritized in terms of importance to the city.

#### **PROCESS**

Wide stakeholder participation at RCS conference - included government representatives (federal, city and wereda levels) as well as representatives from AAU, professional societies such as the biological and chemical societies and youth and women's associations

#### **INSTITUTIONAL SET-UP AND PERSONNEL**

Establishment of an Environmental Protection Bureau has created an organisation with ownership of the RCS process and responsibility for its continuity. Relative stability of staff in EPB and their enthusiasm helps the process.

*Approach that promoted understanding of the purpose of the RCS - Creation of enhanced environmental awareness*

Significant effort to apply the communications strategy observable e.g. - EPB publishes a "quarterly" magazine on environment, has also prepared brochures, leaflets and posters to enhance awareness about the environment and the RCS process.

*Relatively advanced in the integration of RCS activities in the planning cycle*

City's 2<sup>nd</sup> Five Year Development Plan provides important consideration to environment/ RCS related programmes. Also city's development budgeting has begun to ear-mark funds for RCS related activities.

*Capacity of EPB enhanced*

Expertise has been developed while participating in RCS formulation. Knowledge and skills also enhanced through training provided by the CSE Project. There is now relatively better skills for problem analysis and proposing solutions. Equipment and materials supplied by project satisfied needs.

#### EFFECTIVE PROJECT SUPPORT

Constant contacts and visits by the Project staff and the EPB to each other's offices have meant that more technical assistance has been available and frequent consultations have been carried out. Proximity of the EPB to the Project office has certainly brought advantages to the EPB.

#### DECENTRALIZATION

There are very active WECCs established in all woredas. This is indicative of the decentralizing the RCS activities. So too are the plans for the implementation of wereda upwards / grass-roots project identification and planning for the environment element of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Five Year Plan.

#### PARTICIPATION

The exercise in participatory approaches is evident not only in the RCS conference but in the WECCS which have as members not only woreda level city administration officers but also representatives of women's and youth associations.

### **B. WEAKNESSES OF PROCESS / PROJECT**

#### NATURE OF PROCESS

RECC ineffective - it has no legally binding status. As a result the whole responsibility was dumped onto the EPE.

RECC holds almost no meetings. The RECC has been by-passed in the RCS approval process. It is felt that there was no adequate sensitization of the politicians and that also City politicians have too many other preoccupations to give attention the RCS.

#### LENGTH OF PROCESS

Task Force members were not always available due to regular work in their respective bureaus. There was also no support for experts in the TF by their bureau heads. No incentives to TF members, although CSE provided some financing for transportation required for information collection. This has resulted in delays in the formulation of the RCS.

Approval of RCS delayed for about 1½ years, so far. EPB staff are starting to worry although they hope that after the completion of the ongoing political rectification programme things may move faster.

### **4. Analysis**

#### RELEVANCE

*The RCS is still relevant as far as the staff of EPB is concerned. It need to be approved without further delay. However, while the enthusiasm within the bureau is commendable, a question arises as to whether such enthusiasm also exists in the other bureaus and they see the relevance of this. Do they have any ownership of it and hence interest to use it?*

#### Process

*There appears to have been a tendency to consider the RCS formulation task as something extra from what is considered “regular work” by Task Force members. This attitude may have led to a feeling that some kind of extra remuneration was due to them in order to make it worthwhile for them to take it seriously. How could such a feeling have been avoided when there is a deep rooted conviction that Project work is something extra?*

#### **Impact, Effectiveness and Dissemination**

*The attempt to implement the RCS is encouraging particularly when one sees that there is some exercise of need identification and planning at the woreda level. There is a danger that the EPB may be becoming the sole promoter at the City administration level. The fact that the RECC has been by passed during the RCS approval process may also be indicative of an inclination to take things into ones hands, disregarding the importance of coordination ensuring the implementation period as well.*

#### **Sustainability**

The issue of sustainability is worrying to many. Although the EPB may continue its struggle to see to it that adequate funds are available for RCS implementation there are doubts that given the scarcity of resources adequate funds will be made available.

*In addition, although there is a feeling that the Project’s support has been very satisfactory in building staff capacity, the need for continuous technical assistance during implementation still appears indispensable? Obviously, a lot is expected from EPA in this regard.*

#### **Bottom-up Planning**

*In so far as the RCS formulation was prompted from the federal level one can say there was an element of a top-down approach. This may be seen in EPB’s measures to prompt the woreda level stakeholders to establish the WECCS. However, the fact that the WECCS have their own initiative and are doing fine perhaps indicates that such coordination, planning and implementation initiatives can perhaps stimulate local initiative and ownership. Clearly important that people are dealing with issues which are close to their heart, i.e.- finding solution to the everyday problems they face.*

### **5. Lessons and Recommendations**

The case of the Addis Ababa City Administration may be illustrative of the possibility that the establishment of an institution solely responsible for environmental affairs improves the chances for implementation of the RCSs. However, such institutions must always keep in mind that their role is coordination of other line bureaus and avoid the temptation to take too many actions into their hands because of the frustrations that are faced in coordination. How much has the project appreciated this danger? How and by whom can such an inclination be corrected if it becomes a serious problem after Project phases out?

Again by-passing the RECC, as ineffective as it has been, may not have been the right thing to do. It increases the perception that the RECC is ineffective when its own chairperson, instead of calling a meeting, submits the final draft RCS directly to the Administration’ Executive Council. How can the indispensability of co-ordination be instilled in all concerned - politicians, line bureaus etc.

Suggestion that, since City administration is accountable to the PM, not involving the administration by the EPB staff was a mistake.

The WECCs appear to be more viable and their membership relatively diversified, but presently depend on what little is made available to them by the City. It is essential that an appropriate reporting relationship that facilitates feedback to the higher City Administration level be developed. The reporting system must be simple and not cumbersome so that WECCs would understand and can easily do it without spending too much time and effort. This must be linked to access to funds for their activities.

There is disappointment that the CSE is phasing out at this stage. It is seen as being too soon. Unless there is continuous technical assistance from the CSE Project during implementation it is felt that integration of environmental concerns into development planning and the planning and implementation of RCS projects may suffer.

## **Annex 6c**

### **REGIONAL CONSERVATION STRATEGY PROCESS: OROMIA REGIONAL STATE**

#### **1. RCS Process**

RCS built upon the initial work undertaken by the Zones during the 1991 –1993 period. See Southern Regional State comment re the feedback nature of this process from grassroots to top and back down again.

Task force for preparing the RCS started work in 1996. It was seen as an urgent issue and some -- people from 10 different Bureaus were appointed. The Bureaus involved included BOPED, BoA, BoE, BoWA, BoIndustry, BoH, BoUrban Development, DPPO, and the mass media, but not Investment. Due to quick appointment of Task Force members some were not really appropriate.

Original focal point was the Bureau of Natural Resource Development and Environmental Protection, but this was merged to become BoA. Head of Dept for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, Kassa Moka, later deputy head of BoA, took the lead with the RCS.

Considerable confusion faced in 1996 when many experts resigned following the regionalisation process; this loss of TF members made it difficult to keep the RCS on track.

Nonetheless, the RCS workshop was held 23-25 December 1996. 4 volumes presented to major gathering of regional and zonal officials and experts, and also NGOs and consultants. Meeting agreed it was a useful set of documents, but stated that they needed revising and updating

In 1997 the RCS was read by the newly arrived T.A. staff in the GTZ-supported land use planning project (LUPO). The draft RCS was seen as unsatisfactory from the view of the BoA and GTZ funded its revision. This involved a team of three consultants, selected without tendering by Oromia government, to finalise the RCS. Team included the Head of the Agriculture Bureau (Wassim) and Berhanu Debele. It was presented at a smaller second RCS workshop and minor corrections identified in 1998? (Took about one year to do).

The final output was only 3 volumes, without any Action Plan volume and project proposals, but focusing on resources, problems / issues, and policies. It was different from the CSE by focusing more on issues, problems and policies. The volumes of the RCS were large as had to cope with the diversity in this region. RCS documents seen as resource documents, not to function as guides or fulfil a communication purpose.

86 copies were produced of these 3 volumes with GTZ funds and these were distributed primarily to the regional level bureaus and the zones.

RECC not active as it is a committee, no one takes responsibility – not legally established so not taken seriously by regional government / council.

Took a long time to get RCS approved as the regional government was too busy with elections amongst other things. Major staff changes after the elections. RCS was only approved in December 2000, after presented to Council in June and legal letter which was required (but overlooked) submitted in October.

RCS is not active yet as the prerequisite is to adjust structure of the BoA and create the new Natural Resources Development and Environmental Protection institution. This requires the proposal (included in RCS?) to be approved by the Oromia Council I its own right. Can only implement the RCS once the institution is established. This involves the division of BoA into NR&EPA Authority, Ag Res and Ag Extn. This has been agreed, after a major fight, but problems remain over the ranking and salary of various jobs. Creation of the new authority is seen as implementation achieved.

RCS in final approved form has been issued to only 5 Bureaus, Water, Health, Education, Trade and Industry, Investment, and 2 authorities Rural Roads and Irrigation. Agric and BOPED already have copies as involved in approval. Most people only have the Task Force draft or the revised version (produced with GTZ support).

Further implementational problems are the high turnover of government staff, never get people around long enough to read it all, let alone use it.

Some NGOs are asking questions about RCS and want to use it.

Has been introduced to 3 zone, Arsi, Borana and Bale in Sept 2000 in connection with the gender and environment workshops funded by CSE. But this mainly government people, and few NGOs or public or wereda level staff. But no copies of the final document were left in the zone.

## **2. Project's Specific Contribution**

The region has had the usual set of support from the project.

Technical assistance-

Financial assistance

Equipment and material assistance (computers, printers, a fax machine, a photo copier, an over head projector, a duplicator, a flip chart stand, binding machine, about 75 books on environment);

Training

Specific mention was made of :

EIA training course – has been useful for one person in BOPED who uses it in his project appraisal work.

Yearly status meetings for the RCS process people / RECCs organised by EPA / Project.

Done up to 1998 then stopped.

Support for 3 environmental awareness workshop in the region, at different locations to cope with diversity.

Trainee who went to Zimbabwe twice for DEAP and women in environment training, felt that the courses were helpful but has faced difficulties using his skills since return. Major problem is the agricultural production focus of the BoA so environment downgraded. He prepared a proposal and got funds from CSE for a study of water pollution from the Mojo tanneries. But Bureau head refused him permission to do that work and he reassigned to a laboratory. Need education of Bureau Heads so they see the value and utility of these courses and techniques.

There is concern that CSE support for this region has been inadequate and how it does not reflected the diversity and size of it. It should have had a larger budget.



Comments were that EPA/CSE Project just runs workshops, and does not achieve effective activities. There was seen to be too much theory in the courses, and not enough practice and technical support.

Concern is also expressed that EPA will not support the new regional environmental institutions after the project closes, yet this is vital. This problem stems from the degree of technical and financial support provided to the region by the project. Although EPA, like other federal agencies has responsibilities to support the regions in its area of mandate, this support will certainly be less than that provided by the project. Further, there will be no financial support from EPA to the region.

### **3. Assessment of Outputs, Impacts and Identification of Issues Arising**

#### Signs of Impact

There are some signs of impact, despite the slow process and lack of activities on the ground. Task Force members use it and MoE has used it in their curriculum development. The five year plan uses the language of sustainability and refers to the RCS. In this document there is a specific section on the problems of sustainability and environmental degradation, also on the RCS and need for an Environmental Protection Agency for the region to coordinate actions.

However, the Oromia Investment Bureau uses environmental criteria when it assesses investment projects but these are one which they developed themselves when established in 1994 and are not from the RCS. This is of limited effect as most documents from investors do not have answers to these two questions on environmental impact and mitigation. The Investment Bureau does not have the capacity to appraise these questions when they are answered and so send it to BoA's Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Section for assessment. (Both BoE and investors need training).

A similar lack of capacity on environmental issues is reported from the Industry Bureau.

#### **A. Strengths of Process / Project**

##### Document

This is produced in a way which addresses the perceived needs of this region focusing on causal processes behind environmental problems and the appropriate policy responses. This is focused on the region and is a clear development away from the CSE.

##### Process

Again like Southern Region fairly effective process of getting the RCS draft produced and the conference run within a year. Also quite effective at getting it revised and finalised within another year. (But problems thereafter.)

Participatory process at the first RCS conference with --- participants with less at the second one.

##### Impacts on Awareness and Behaviour

There is some awareness created by the RCS process, especially within Agriculture, the focal point bureau, and also the Planning Bureau. Not clear how wide this awareness is outside these.

##### Training and Capacity Building

Trainees and their skills – one case seen. This training on gender and environment in Zimbabwe had had a positive / stimulating impact and the person had come back and developed a project proposal to look at the impact of tannery water pollution. However,

while funding had been obtained from the CSE (B40,000+) the project activity had been prevented by the Head of the Agricultural Bureau for no clear reason – jealousy?

Timeliness

-

Wider Impacts

Use of RCS material in Education Bureau's work is reported. Seems to have been the result of having an educational specialist with interest in environment protection. (So does this use of the RCS prior to approval depend very much on personalities? )

## **B. Weaknesses of Process / Project**

Nature of Process

**Two hiatuses in the process, getting to approval – presumably when fighting in BoAg re the new institutional structure and now in setting up the new structures. (No delay in revising document as work funded by GTZ).**

Length of Process

Impact on momentum is not clear. (May be small once the new agency is set up and doing this as one of its major activities.)

Dissemination and Awareness

There is a major need for a summary document which is attractive and is published in Oromiffa. There has been no awareness process . Issuing of the RCS once approved has been a disaster, only six copies have been produced and given to key Bureaus. No copying of the CSE launch concept and no use of the communications strategy which presumably they had developed like others. (Seems those communication workshops were a waste of time given that they were so long ago and not used in the interim as everyone waits for the official approval.)

No support for school environmental clubs from the CSE, although 1500 in this region. These tend to focus on trees and sanitation, both useful for homes and a means to spread CSE ideas more widely.

Project Support

Seems to be average, although the GTZ input and fundinh of local consultants has given some independence.

Decentralisation

**Little done in this respect beyond three zonal workshops to introduce the approved RCS.**

Inclusiveness of Process

Limited. Seems to have been heavily owned by theBoAg. Non-use of RCS in Investment Bureau. Although copy sent to them once approved this has not yet got down to the Project Appraisal Section. In fact the people here having been using a form for appraisal since the Bureau was set up 7 years ago which includes a question on environmental impact and one on mitigating actions. On the other hand Education does use it. (Others may but not able to interview them).

Additional

Very limited implementation – bar some in education and people using their own copies of drafts to help them in their work.

#### **4. Analysis**

##### Relevance

Yes it has been relevant to some needs of BoAg, especially Natural Resource Development and Environmental Protection Dept. But little done in terms of utilitional guidance.

##### Process

Was highly dependent on one staff member who drove the process, Kassa Moka. His departure last year may account for recent delays as no one seems to own it any more. Or it may just be current political problems. However, this sort of situation raises questions about the focal point concept versus the need to keep a Multi-sectoral Task Force in operation – to act like a core group and keep the momentum.

Process here seems to have had two hiatuses / bottlenecks and pauses. One is as in Southern Region – after the finalisation it took time to get it into the political process to get the approval. The second one seems to be now while waiting for the legislation to create the agency to do environmental protection. How long will this take? One problem here is that Head of Agric Bureau is fighting against having his Natural Resource Devt and EP Dept removed and put into the new EPA. He has apparently lost that battle – which in fact was probably part of the delay in the political approval. But now there is no one driving the RCS process forward how long will it take for the legislation to put the new organisation in place and then how long to get it running.

All of this suggests that we have followed in Ethiopia a route for the RCS which has fallen foul of the Ethiopian bureaucratic system and that we need to learn lessons about alternative we might have taken.

##### Impact, Effectiveness and Dissemination

Limited in terms of dissemination – a serious problem with all RCSs so it seems.

##### Efficiency

-

##### Sustainability

Could be OK once the new organisation is set up but it will need lots of support and concern re the capacity of EPA to do this in the absence of the project.

#### **5. Lessons and Recommendations**

Note different concept here of the EPA as it will take administrative, assessment and planning functions from the BoA's Environmental Protection and Natural Resource Development Section (which includes land use planning).

Problem is the lack of any communication strategy – at least being used and getting the message out to the different bureaus at regional HQ. Not even thinking about the regions yet.

Concern about the equal treatment of all regions in the CSE process, when there is a big difference between Harari and Oromia. Very diverse (12 zones), and large (22m) needs more resources.

Within Oromia staff involved with the RCS question about why the RCS needs political approval when it is only a local adjustment of a Federal government approved policy which is

what federal government is responsible for and which the regions apply. Surely it is a technical matter to approve an RCS not a political one given this Federal CSE policy.

But some political process is needed at regions as there is no EPA to implement. Process would have been quicker and had more dynamism if set up the EPA like organisation at the regional level first. RCS has been delayed by having to be squeezed into the BoA's workplan and priorities. Focal points have their own job and this takes priority.

## **Anne x 6d**

### **REGIONAL CONSERVATION STRATEGY PROCESS: SOMALI NATIONAL REGIONAL STATE**

#### **Introductory Remarks**

Getting senior government officials for interviews was difficult as they have already been tied up in series of meetings for over two weeks leaving their members of technical staff in their offices to act on their behalf. Two further scenarios made this review much difficult. One, most of the Acting Heads of the respective Bureaux and senior experts were not able giving some time (in some cases, even 5 minutes) for interviews, as they were too busy covering the job that their original posts require and also working on what they were respectively delegated. Second, those few who showed their willingness to sacrifice some time were by far unaware of or with quite limited (or confused) knowledge about the RCS, like few points about the EPA regardless of its' links with RCS/CSE.

#### **1. RCS Process**

Established RECC, the committee chaired by the Head of the Regional Administrative Council or by his delegate and comprised of representatives from relevant government bureaux/offices including – planning, agriculture, water, education, trade and industry<sup>7</sup>, investment and women's affairs. BoPED was selected for coordinating the RCS process and one of its' senior members of staff as a focal person.

Owing to a range of natural and man-made factors, the area currently known as Somali region is locally characterised as being the most backward regions of the country, which has been suffering from lack of trained staff and adequate baseline information. Hence, a consultant was hired to provide the regional experts with all possible assistances in developing the RCS and producing draft documents in English language.

Deliberate attempts were not made to involve NGOs and the private sector, except community chiefs - few elderly and influential members of the communities, in RCS process.

RECC, in turn, has played significant roles in the refinement process by reviewing the draft RCS documents based on local situations and ensuring that the comments are incorporated.

Assisted by the EPA, mainly by looking for appropriate consultants and facilitating their employments, summary of the RCS is finalised whereas the translation process is underway as at the review period. The delays in producing the Somali version RCS documents (including their summary) is indicated as one, but the major cause for not getting the strategy approved by the Regional Council.

In general terms, producing the summary of the three-volume RCS (English version) and translating the documents into Somali language are viewed by BoPED as the two most important activities that led towards what is currently known as the 'final stage of the RCS development process' – in fact, a success by themselves in Somali context.

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<sup>7</sup> Structured as 'Trade, Industry, Transport and Tourism Bureau'. This holds true for Dire Dawa and other regions referred to as 'emerging regions', which include: Afar, Beni Shangul, Gambella and Harari

## **2. Project's Specific Contribution**

The project's contributions towards developing the regional capacity and capabilities are well acknowledged as creating a 'practical knowledge base', which could have hardly been given attention by the regional government during the last number of years.

Project support in general terms include:

Training and workshops on various issues

Office equipment (including computers-printers) and stationeries

Books: Following the past order, the region expects to get a collection of recent publications on environmental issues from the National Coordination office and EPA. So far unclear as to how, who, from where these books would in the future be utilised.

## **3. Assessment of Outputs, Impacts and Identification of Issues Arising**

Outputs and Signs of Impacts

Lessons learnt by members of technical staff of sector bureaux and institutions (like, WAO) and outputs-impacts of particular importance to the region include:

The importance of environment on both rural and urban livelihoods is highly recognised at most levels of the regional government structures.

Increased knowledge in devising conservation strategy based on local needs and situations and well beyond, on various long-term developmental initiatives

Shared experiences of other organisations on various environment related initiatives

undertook in different areas. For instances, WAO considers such forum as 'eye-openers'

Able to know the regional resource base - identification and detailed analysis on: "*what resources ... which/where ... which sectors contribute much towards environmental management and how ...*". In the light of the vastness of the area (estimated to cover 350,000 km<sup>2</sup>) and the corresponding cost, carrying resource inventory activities could have simply been impossible

## **A. STRENGTHS AND OPPORTUNITIES OF THE PROCESS/PROJECT**

### **Participatory**

Participation of members from different sectors bureaux – variations in background and experience considered

### **Capacity Enhancements**

Many trainings/workshops conducted – contributed to awareness creation and enhancements and to the overall process in developing the RCS

### **Ownership Feelings**

Though the very idea of drawing the RCS came from CSE/EPA, at the federal level, it is felt that the final outcome (RCS) is owned by the region. Such ownership feelings are further explained in terms of the significant roles played by sector bureaux and institutions in the RCS process albeit external consultants' involvement

### **Wider Impacts**

The RCS, although meant for dealing with environmental issues, it is believed to ultimately cover the broad aspects of the regional development

## **B. WEAKNESSES/LIMITATIONS/CHALLENGES OF THE PROCESS/PROJECT**

### **Project Support**

Unbearable delays in translating the RCS document to the local language, the effects of which are implicated in getting the regional government's approvals and the subsequent lags in transforming the strategy into action.

While not undermining the assistance rendered in finding consultants for translation, lack of appropriate attention and follow-ups by the CSE/EPA in taking the translation process through are considered as major, apparently the central, cause for such series of lags.

### **Staff**

Lack of staff with adequate training and background on environment

High staff turn-over; Once the minimum level of experience in working under harsh conditions are acquired, members of staff at all (region, zone and Woreda) levels leave their low-paid governmental posts in favour of NGOs operating within or outside the region, with much better enabling work environment

### **Challenges Specific to Somali**

A number of specific factors affect past, current and future efforts along with the RCS development and implementations :

Backwardness – due to the hitherto lack of appropriate attention; numerous effects

Physical and socio-economic features

An area where a large size of refugees exist

Harsh environment – implicated in staff shortage, among many

The way Somalis are living scattered all along the vast areas of the region

## **4. Analysis**

### **Process and Dissemination**

The process that the region has undergone in drawing the RCS is best understood by a small number of staff of few government bureaus, mainly those who lie within the upper levels of the respective structures. In these organisations the RCS process is not only considered as a mechanism for drawing a strategy, but also a means for taking resource inventory, an exercise that might have been undertaken for the first time ever since the Somali Region was structured into its' current form. Carrying resource inventory activities could have simply been impossible without external assistance given the prevailing trained staff and budget constraints to cover such a vast area (estimated to cover 350,000 km<sup>2</sup>).

Also noted is that environment related initiatives being carried out in the region by and with UNICEF's support are better known by a number of organisations (eg: Education bureau; WAO; Hope for the Horn, an indigenous NGO) than the RCS or somehow aware that the RCS is being developed. In fact, there is a room for getting into apparent confusions on the roles, intended outcomes and prospects of UNICEF's initiatives and the RCS.

Of the members of government bureaus' staff who are said to have passed through the process with a relatively good level of awareness, those who lost track of the final product (RCS documents) and those with blurred views on the fate of the RCS are in considerable number.

Those (probably, most) who are well aware about the RCS might have moved out of the region by taking jobs in other organisations. But, their former organisations are yet in place operating within the region, and in some cases as nominal members of RECC.

### **Impact and Effectiveness**

Further to the notable attitudinal changes that were brought about within communities (mainly at Zone levels) and professionals, the CSE/EPA/BoPED organised workshops and

trainings helped in getting broader and multi-dimensional views of environment, triggering a further concern among technical experts and Bureau heads. In this area where environment and the related natural resources have long been 'sensitive and often conflicting', the currently observed attitudinal changes are considered as the major outcome of the RCS process paving the way towards the successful implementation of the strategy.

### **Sustainability**

Combating the spread and effects of desertification, recovering the huge environmental costs that the region had been paying in the process of hosting series of refugee influxes, tackling the ever increasingly effects of urban pollution, generating alternative sources of energy (currently, fuel) and incorporating RCS in projects-sectoral interventions are few, among the diverse range of priority outputs that some regional bureaus intend achieving in short/long-run. The RCS lies at the centre of future efforts with which sustainable impacts are envisaged.

In Somali region context, however, availability of funds and technical assistances from external sources (even if much higher amount than the previous period is hoped to be allocated by the regional government) is by large perceived as factor crucial for ensuring the sustainable use and implementation of the RCS.

In fact, experts have already started expressing their worries as to whether extracts of RCS, which are included in the forthcoming 5-year plans, will be considered for implementation during the given period.

### **5. Lessons and Recommendations**

An issue of particular concern to this review is that of the prevailing paradoxes in views regarding the regional priorities; as to whether or not environmental problems are to be addressed with utmost priorities.

On one side, presumably including those who have taken part in the RCS process are concerned that donors, international NGOs and national government are not made aware of the magnitude of the problem that surrounds environment in Somali region; always treated similarly with other regions regardless of the intensity. This group calls for action before it is too late, though already late. Paradoxically, quite sizeable number of regional experts feel that environmental initiatives (RCS implied) cannot be taken as a priority in Somali region as compared with those of economic diversification, agriculture (focused on crops and livestock) and infrastructure development.

For the reasons mentioned earlier as 'introductory remarks' together with lack of informants from the regional council during the review period, it was not possible to get where the regional government stands.

Taking note of the overall progress, potentials and opportunities ahead with respect to the RCS, the following issues need appropriate considerations:

The regional government has not moved towards addressing environment related problems (neither shown a supportive stand) as much as it should, despite being aware of the consequences. It has apparently been trapped in dealing with other matters through series of meetings.

It is high time that the government allocates funds ensuring that extracts of the RCS included in the 5-year plans are implemented while approving and taking the RCS further into full motion

Immediately after acclimatisation, bureau heads and technical experts move out [NGO] EPA/CSE should be prepared to [put a system of M&E in place] to monitor the undoubted negative effects of the current nation wide trends/motto "move towards food security ..



increased trends of depending on food crops' production...”, mostly at the expense of (or with substantial pressure on) natural resource base; explain the outcome/results to the regional governments, convince and help them in designing better approaches that could lead towards improved agricultural production without compromising the NR base. Note that the M&E efforts are by large geared towards large-scale pollution issues and that of agriculture related though small-scale but of huge effects, are not give due considerations

## **Annex 6e**

### **REGIONAL CONSERVATION STRATEGY PROCESS: DIRE DAWA ADMINISTRATIVE REGION**

#### **1. RCS Process**

Although the scope and space wide environmental deterioration have long been among the major concerns within Dire Dawa administrative structures, for as far back to early eighties, it was since 1982 EC (1989/90 GC) that notable efforts were made towards finding ways of addressing the problem and related effects. Assessment of the natural resource base, identification and analysis of cause-effect relations of the problems that led towards the then state of deterioration were among key events partly carried out during this period. In fact, a conservation strategy was initially prepared in 1990, during when Dire Dawa was Autonomous Region comprising of six 'administrative areas', then referred to as 'Awrajas'. The needs for revising the document as per the newly drawn administrative areas has, however been considered as a task ahead, which led to initiating the current RCS.

The actual work of drawing the current RCS started in 1988 EC (1995/96 GC) immediately after REEC was established as an executive body to coordinate and lead the project and a Task Force, composed of 12 technical members drawn from different sector offices was formed. Subsequent attempts are made to strengthen the latter.

Formulation of the RCS in Dire Dawa Administrative Council was carried out in line with the experience gained from similar exercises undertaken elsewhere, both at Federal and Regional levels; and taking full account of and capitalising on the outcome of the surveys previously conducted in some parts of the Region. The RCS process has involved three major and interlinked steps: Building the task force's capacity; Reviewing past work; Assessing the natural resources available within the Council's jurisdiction and the process undergone in utilising them; Identification and causal chain analysis of past environmental problems and the future trends.

Based on the findings of the review, formulation of the strategy and relevant programmes that would alleviate the problems and ultimately improve the regional natural resource base. Setting priorities and preparing time bound action plans for implementing the programmes; finalising the RCS documents in 4 contextual volumes, pending the work on the fifth volume, investment programme, for some future possible dates; and creating enabling situations for taking the programmes into action.

In formulating the strategy, the task force has followed the following activity-based procedures:

Review of available literature

Preparation of questionnaire for data collection

Conducting field visits to assess the situation on the ground and discuss with the local people problems and opportunities

Data analysis and preparation of the draft document

Conducting a region-wide workshop involving people from rural and urban areas to discuss and comment the draft document, and the final approvals of the RCS

The strategy document, as designed with particular focus on embodying 10 sectoral and 10 cross-sectoral issues with prioritised programmes and projects, is prepared in four volumes each describing different issues:

Volume I: The Regional Resource base and its utilisation

- Volume II: The Regional Conservation Strategy and Programmes
- Volume III: The Institutional Framework and Operational arrangements
- Volume IV: Action plan

Preparation of a detailed investment programme to implement the action plan has, however, not yet been finalised during the period.

Owing to the apparent lack of information about the most recent developments, it was hardly possible to get a consistent set of views on the process that followed the draft RCS document preparation and the current status. The following sets of circumstances were noted on the status and whereabouts of the RCS documents:

The RCS has not yet been formally approved by the regional council and none of the bureaux is given a formal go-ahead signal to incorporate the relevant aspects. If there are cases where some elements of the RCS documents are used, it could be on organisations' interest

The most refined version of the RCS documents are expected to be presented to the Council for approvals as soon as the editorial and summarisation process is completed (by external consultant/s) and the final comments given by some members of the task force are incorporated. It took quite long to get what would be the final version document to the region from the consultant/s.

RCS documents are 'virtually'<sup>8</sup> approved, but not sure whether all contents therein are accepted, like 'setting a separate institution'.

Although the RCS has received a wider level acceptance by members of the Council, it has not yet passed through the legal process in use for approving and moving into a full-scale implementation stage. As a result, no mention about the environmental unit, which has been proposed as key institutional set up for undertaking the RCS

## **2. Project's Specific Contribution**

In addition to rendering technical, financial and material assistances to the region, efforts are mentioned to have been made by the project in supporting the human resource development initiatives. To some details, these include:

Procurement and supply of office equipments for the use by the regional co-ordinating committee secretariat, which include: Computers-printers; Typewriter; Photocopier; Overhead Projector; Duplication Machine; and other stationary items

Designing of a programme to facilitate effective communication [completed]

Acquisition of 47 environment related books worth Birr 25,000 for the use by the regional experts

28 experts represented from different Regional Offices have attended a workshop on Environment organised by the National Secretariat and 4 other experts have participated in study tours carried out in 3 countries.

A one-day workshop was organised for experts coming from the neighbouring regions to share the experiences of the region in the preparation of the strategy document.

## **3. Assessment of Outputs, Impacts and Identification of Issues Arising**

Outputs and Impacts [Signs of Impacts]

Upon completion of the preparation of the strategy, extensive promotional and capacity building activities were initiated. These were not only introducing the concept and objectives of the strategy to the people in region but also developing new projects. The following are

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<sup>8</sup> Might mean: *almost, nearly, in effect, practically, close to* (MS-Word 2000 Thesaurus)

some of the activities planned and/or accomplished - by large, reflections of impacts of the project:

A project on integration of environment, gender and development designed and is being implemented with funds obtained from the UNICEF. The project is believed to contribute to the overall capacity building, awareness creation and documentation efforts of the region. Also, indicated that so far, 60 experts and some 300 representatives of the rural-urban communities have undergone through the various awareness creation trainings-workshops. Three rural based and one urban focused, altogether 4 projects have been prepared by the regional experts and are submitted to different donors for funding. These projects are expected to cost Birr 28 million.

Environmental Clubs have been created in 18 different schools in the Region  
Attempts are being made to undertake environmental impact assessments on projects designed and implemented by the private and public sectors

A project is being prepared to translate the strategy document into Oromifa and Somaligna languages, to publish a regional environmental newsletter, and to review and update the strategy document and finally translate it into Amharic language. The project is now ready for submission to the national secretariat for funding.

A project worth 3.3 million birr, is prepared by 13 rural Kebeles of the Eastern zone of the region and submitted to donors for possible funding.

A tree planting project for the Dire Dawa town and several schools in the Region is prepared, submitted to the National Secretariat (CSE/EPA) for support; about Bir 150,000 fund was obtained; being implemented with utmost success, as said by one expert

Request has been made to the CSE/EPA for supply of books worth 25,000 Birr [Unable to find out the response and current status]

Preliminary discussion has been made with the Dutch Government about possibilities of supporting a community based natural resources conservation programme in the Region. Also proposed some environment related projects, which Dr. Tewolde (EPA) promised finding funds for – But nothing to date

## **A. STRENGTHS OF PROCESS / PROJECT**

### **Process**

Different level committees were organised and plans were accordingly drawn for undertaking the RCS. Involved lots of staff members, most of whom got motivated. The process involved good communication with decision makers and flow of information between the various organisations and regional administrative levels.

### **Capacity - awareness, attitudinal changes and collaboration**

Many trainings/workshops were organised.

Awareness creation; trained on environmental impact assessment – though not enough.

Farmers' have positively responded to the RCS.

The Regional Council has been collaborative with as much efforts of taking part in the RCS as time permitted.

## **B. LIMITATIONS/CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED IN PROJECT/PROCESS**

### **Process**

An endless process of keeping on updating the RCS documents.

### *Awareness-Participation-Integration*

***Lack of sufficient awareness to initiate community participation in environmental conservation activities and integration with the other development activities.***

### **Staff**

Shortage of trained-technical staff: No one in the region with adequate level of expertise on environment.

High turnover of staff, which has seriously affected the development and continuation of the preparation process.

Challenges on Institution

**The needs for establishing an environmental unit as key institutional set up for undertaking the RCS and the challenges that underlie its approvals**

New unit means new structure; new budget line, cases which Office of the Prime Minister's should be aware of and convinced about.

**Project Support**

CSE/EPA support (financial and technical follow-ups) biased in favour of Addis Ababa region; totally inadequate ...far less than what it did in case of drawing the CSE.

Supports have significantly been decreased as of the period when RCS was drawn and apparently stopped thereafter

#### **4. Analysis**

Relevance

Dire Dawa is currently facing a range of environmental problems like that of - ground water and industrial pollutions; deforestation-desertification and; above all, lack of all-level awareness (ignorance), among many others. The very idea of developing the RCS is thus 'extremely relevant' for most bureaus, the outputs of which could be used by most at almost equal levels; and 'crucially needed' by the Bureaus of Education, Agriculture, Tourism, Industry, Investment, both offices working on Water (supply-services and water-mines-energy).

Process and Efficiency

The RCS process, given the way it is structured needs an institution linked with multiple sectors. BoPED was the sole regional candidate for taking the responsibilities of coordinating the project – which was felt that it has done it well.

The process of keeping on updating the RCS documents for indefinite period and undetermined levels of satisfaction has created a sort of RCS-fatigue tendency, together with time, resource and efficiency related concerns. The very idea of 'dynamism' are not undermined, though the needs for testing the strategy on the ground are emphasised.

Impact, Effectiveness and Dissemination

The RCS document is structured in a way that could be effectively implemented on a bit-by-bit basis by different sectors.

All documents and publications related to the RCS have been duplicated and disseminated to the relevant institutions of the Region. However, information gap about the most recent developments between sectors and at different levels of the regional structures are repeatedly mentioned.

Sustainability

Whichever is the case regarding its approvals it is great that RCS document produced - which are being used as source documents for drawing environment oriented sectoral strategies in much better way than before; and even further, projects (although few in number) with some elements of the RCS are being implemented.

However, the most frequently asked question is - *“can the strategy document by itself considered both as a means and end of the conservation”*. The project is felt to have been terminated well before any signs of sustainable impacts are ensured.

## **5. Lessons and Recommendations**

Various factors mentioned to justify that this specific region could be used as a successful model of the RCS:

Its' manageable size (as compared to other regions)

Collaborative environment and openness to support the RCS by the regional Council

Good communication with decision makers and flow of information between the various organisations and regional administrative levels

As stressed by many, EPA, a nationally mandated specialised institution, needs to get down at grass-root level and work with technical staffs in designing projects and rendering assistance in initiating-implementing them.

Although RECC is meant to be a body responsible to coordinate, review, and facilitate the implementation of the strategy, this has not been the case during the RCS development process, except giving (limited to giving) some decisions, as all members were busy heading their respective bureaux. In fact, some said that the task force was set up not only to provide technical assistance in the process of developing the RCS, but also with an implicit motive of filling in the apparent gaps that conditions like REEC's inabilities might create.

The primary task ahead should therefore be to strengthen this committee in all respect. Several opportunities seem to exist to achieve this and ultimately bring about sustainable development. Some of these opportunities are the following:

There is comparatively better capacity and capability in the region in terms of trained manpower and institutional set up to implement development activities.

There is increased awareness of environmental protection and willingness to participate in implementing such programmes among the people in the region.

There are several environmental development projects on the shelves and ample database to initiate implementations. The opportunities are also much better to facilitate community participation in the preparation and implementation of development interventions.

Taking advantages of these opportunities and to bring about meaningful changes, the following actions have to be undertaken:

Strengthen the coordinating committee and extend similar structures to the lower levels.

Prepare periodic plan of operation for the committee and define regular meeting intervals

Encourage and support establishment of environmental clubs in the Region.

Produce a workable environmental protection guidelines

Conduct environmental impact assessment on public and private sector development projects.

Formulate sellable projects that are relevant to solving environmental problems

Organise donor conferences and solicit funding.

Establish a joint forum or a network with the neighbouring Regions and initiate discussions on joint efforts to tackle inter regional environmental problems.

Create Regional Forum to discuss issues such as environment and development problems, designation of environment day, community participation, tree planting, cleaning and other environmental activities.

EPA/CSE should be prepared to [put a system of M&E in place] to monitor the undoubted negative effects of the current nation wide trends/motto “move towards food security .. increased trends of depending on food crops' production...”, mostly at the expense of (or

with substantial pressure on) natural resource base; explain the outcome/results to the regional governments, convince and help them in designing better approaches that could lead towards improved agricultural production without compromising the NR base. Note that the M&E efforts are by large geared towards large-scale pollution issues and that of agriculture related though small-scale but of huge effects, are not give due considerations

## **Annex 6f**

### **REGIONAL CONSERVATION STRATEGY PROCESS: TIGRAY REGIONAL STATE**

#### **1. RCS Process<sup>9</sup>**

Initial steps marking the official launching of the RCS process in Tigray were that of RECC's establishment followed by the Regional Task Force formation. Both comprised of members representing the various governmental organisations, almost all sector bureaus/offices including – BoPED BoE; BoH; Water, Energy and Mining; Population; BoANR; Culture and Tourism, etc and institutions like REST and Mekelle University (formerly, College). The underlying difference, however, is that of composition: RECC is composed of the Heads and chaired by the Regional Council representative, whereas the Task Force is made of the technical members of staff of the respective organisations. RECC, as it was entrusted to lead and make important decisions about the project, it used to meet twice a year while members of the task force were engaged in series of meetings all the way along the RCS process.

The number of tasks involving the RCS development, which include resource inventory, policy and action program/plans preparation were then assigned to members of the Task Force, mainly based on the disciplinary background of their organisations. For instance, forestry and conservation parts were given to members from the BoANR and that of the BoE took part in drawing the RCS, particularly contributed on the subject of its speciality/mandate, “environmental education and communication”

Passing through a process of back and forth institutional and group/task force based meetings and consultations the very first draft of the RCS documents were produced.

The drafts were refined through subsequent reviews and incorporating comments and suggestions of the various institutions and knowledgeable individuals. Furthermore, a workshop was organised at region level and the draft RCS was presented in a simplified way in local (Tigrigna) language to participants drawn from all stakeholders and members of the communities. Proceedings of the workshop was produced.

The issue surrounding institutional set up for implementing the RCS has been a matter of debate, both during the workshop and later; Agency/Office or Unit were major options. The apparent decision, awaiting the final confirmations of the Regional Council is that of establishing an independent environmental unit within BoPED by drawing technical experts/professionals from the various relevant organisations/bureaux before setting a separate Environmental Agency/Office. The underlying rationale were:

Budgetary/fund shortage in near future – also, their request for office establishment funds didn't get favourable response from EPA;

To buy some time for learning from experiences of the institution set by the Amhara State.

#### **2. Project's Specific Contribution**

With funds obtained from EPA/CSE, workshops and trainings were organised by BoPED on various subjects, by large similar with other regions, like – communication (this, in collaboration with BoE), women and environment (experts and women groups at region/zone/woreda levels took part).

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<sup>9</sup> Attempts in getting the dates for major events of the RCS process were unsuccessful



In all training/workshops, experts and technical staffs were key players and participants were drawn from all levels: community, wereda, zone, region – as relevant depending upon the topic and perceived gaps.

As part of the EPA/CSE's support package to the project, computers-printers (2 sets), some office equipments and stationeries are mentioned to have been received by BoPED (RCS coordinator) whereas the books are expected to be received in a month period. Based in BoPED's library, the books will be used by all stakeholders and needy users.

### **3. Assessment of Outputs, Impacts and Identification of Issues Arising**

Outputs and Impacts [Signs of Impacts]

Given that communities in Tigray have long been engaged on various environmental rehabilitation exercises, the RCS and its' outputs are already in use in sizeable parts of the region by different organisation, while notable impacts were made by the BoE. Furthermore, some elements of the RCS are incorporated in the next 5-year plan of action and development plans.

Tsegay participated in various trainings and workshops representing (and focal person for) BoE and he, in turn organised other workshops for members of his organisation at region and zone levels. He also prepared a proposal entitled '*Greening School Compounds in Tigray*', the implementation of which is started with supports from the region (like - supplying planting materials and encouraging road side plantations. Tigray's initiatives are picked up by an international organisation working in Eastern Africa for a wider-scale application. It is noted that similar projects, like '*Greening school compounds in Eastern Africa*', were being written some years back.

As part of the efforts made towards delivering 'environmental education/science' as a subject in Tigray schools, the RCS documents were used as source materials for developing the curriculum.

Environmental clubs' establishments in schools are part of the success stories, for which the following factors have contributed:

The regional governments interest

Efforts made by the BoE in communicating with NGOs

NGOs' interested in formulating them (eg; Lem Ethiopia, UNDP and others)

Diverse ranges of views were reflected regarding the strengths and limitations/weaknesses of the RCS process/project while a more or less similar perspective were noted across most people interviewed as opportunities and the 'future possible impacts'.

Highlights of strengths, limitations/weaknesses (in some cases indicated as 'missed opportunities' or/and 'challenges') are listed below:

#### **A. STRENGTHS OF THE PROCESS/PROJECT**

##### **Capacity Building and Technical Assistance**

Capacity building events appreciated

Appreciable participation by Gedeon and G/Selassie from CSE/EPA in the 5-year plans planning workshop on environment issues

##### **The RCS Process and Output (Document)**

*The RCS process have helped in organising and channelling the widely dispersed views about environment into one direction; the RCS could also be considered as the first major region-based document ever produced on conservation strategies, which have in deed been (and could time and again be) used as a reference material for preparing short/long-term plans. BUT, as being said by many, should that be all about the RCS....is that what CSE/EPA aimed at?*

The RCS document, although obtained through painful process, gives directions for undertaking conservation related initiatives in planned manner (Note that elements of RCS are incorporated into the respective sectors' second 5-year plans).

#### **Ownership Feelings**

A sense of ownership on the outcome is felt mainly because the RCS is drawn with active involvements of regional offices and incorporated in the forthcoming plans

### **B. WEAKNESSES/LIMITATIONS/CHALLENGES OF THE PROCESS/PROJECT**

#### **Staff Qualifications**

Shortage of staff adequately qualified on environment and related disciplines.

#### **Levels of Concerns by RECC and Stakeholders**

Discrepancies of concerns by RECC members (some high, while others too low), except putting the burden on BoPED.

Lack or unbalanced attention by/between stakeholders in the RCS process.

#### **Focal/Co-ordinating Bureau Selection and its Effects**

Whether the Focal Bureau selection process considered a range of workable criteria, a sort of minimum requirements, or just decided to appoint one using a single criterion are central to the doubts, which might have presumably been started to be raised later in the RCS process. It is argued that the Focal Bureaus' capacity and capabilities in relation to the ultimate motives behind the RCS and the practical links with the work in hand were not assessed.

A much stronger argument centres on the needs for taking appropriate considerations towards making the best uses of the available capacities to as much level as any project envisages enhancing local capacities.

Appropriateness of BoPED as an organisation for coordinating the RCS is questioned; in fact considered as one of the many dubious decisions taken by the project right a the beginning. Whereas as the name implies, the BoANR could have been the best possible organisation for not only its' abilities of handling the RCS process [well beyond organising workshops] through its' NR department, but also for ensuring the implementation using its staff that have a relatively appropriate training and experience – sustainability. The process and outcome of the Amhara region is a case in point.

#### **Project Support - unexpectedly low and premature termination of the project**

Notwithstanding the positive contributions made by initiating the project, CSE/EPA is felt to have performed well below expectations in creating a high level awareness on policy makers and providing technical assistances to as much level as the RCS process needed.

According to most informants, CSE/EPA's supports unexpectedly halted despite the prevailing needs for completing lots of unfinished jobs: establishing an office/unit, running a pilot project, among many. Furthermore, capacity building efforts were far below the actual

needs that most of the prospective implementers were not trained. *A mere motivation - but, not getting us through*, as said by an expert.

Even if decisions are made to terminate the project, prior efforts should have been made in getting regions prepared for it and advising them as to how the RCS could be continued towards and throughout the implementation period.

The needs for continual multi-faceted supports and long-term commitments, well beyond producing documents are stressed as a key option ahead.

Further views include:

Failed to take advantage of the high level of awareness and motivated spirits of political leaders, communities and experts

When thinking of drawing [or providing supports to draw] the RCS [such a huge programme], one should have some thoughts right from the beginning as to how to be implemented vis-à-vis the needs and availability of all sorts of resources.

The RCS is expressed as an apparently half-cooked work, with minimal thoughts about the future except producing some documents in a pre-determined format; mal-designed project that its ends/fates/vision [futures] are not defined with utmost certainty. It sounds as though the RCS development process is considered as mere research-academic exercise.

Given that environment related activities involve multiple institutions and needs strong commitments of huge resources, CSE and above all, EPA, should have put some efforts in explaining, convincing and pushing/pressuring policy makers rather than inertly waiting for local actions or leaving all for regions as a set of 'Do-It-Yourself' tasks.

#### **4. Analysis**

##### **Process and Efficiency**

###### *A lengthy process*

To start with, the RCS documents forwarded to the Regional Council for approvals in terms of 'policy'; later in time, as per the Council's request, reformulated and presented in the form of 'strategy'. The Tigrigna version was then produced [as required/requested] and passed through a subsequent amendment processes, following the comments that some discrepancies are found between the English and Tigrigna versions.

The issue surrounding institutional set up for implementing the RCS has been a matter of debate; Agency/Office or Unit were major options. Decision, apparently acceptable by Executive body was that of establishing an independent environmental unit within BoPED by drawing technical experts/professionals from the various relevant organisations/bureaux before setting a separate Environmental Agency/Office. The underlying rationale were: Budgetary/fund shortage in near future – also, their request for office establishment funds didn't get favourable response from EPA;

To buy some time for learning from experiences of the institution set by the Amhara State

Ato Haile Yohannes, BoPED's Head and RECC's Secretary, however, feels that RCS process is not as such a delayed one, given the size and quality of work undertaken in all aspects of the regional development process.

##### **Impact, Effectiveness and Dissemination**

Although the region has been working on a range of environment related activities [not new for environmental issues], the EPA's initiatives appreciated: The RCS process brought

various institutions and experts together, paving the ways for learning from each other and, above all, drawing a Regional Guideline.

Gap in the levels of awareness between stakeholders (by large line departments) about the whereabouts of the RCS are noted.

### **Sustainability**

Like many the Focal Person for instance started by questioning the needs for this evaluation in relation to the perceived aims of the project – that, as to them “*the aims of the project appears to be reaching up to RCS documents’ production stage, not more than that..*” One of the reasons for saying this is that –

Aware of budget/funds shortage, Tigray’s request for support towards piloting the RCS has been turned down for unconvincing reasons after keeping us motivated and in suspense for long period

*RCS drawn, then what!*” issues that lie at the heart of queries raised by all regions

Conservation is not new in Tigray context; in fact, ADLI, which is nationally [conventionally] in use as Agricultural Dvt Led Industrialisation is in Tigray applied as ‘Conservation based ADLI’. Farmers are engaged in conservation activities for 20 days per year free of any payments/charge way before the RCS came into scene in Tigray.

Regarding the future institutional settings for implementing the RCS, it is intended to closely follow the progress made by Amhara region in its’ recently established institution, ‘the Environmental protection, Land administration and use Authority’ under Proclamation No 47/2000 [see also the Amhara Region Report for some details on the settings). If proved successful, this would be adopted in Tigray, in part or as a whole

## **5. Lessons and Recommendations**

The project, from its makings, has not taken appropriate considerations on resource [and information] disparities between regions. In short, the project appears to have been planned with a sort of *equity based ... equal financial, technical and advisory support to all regions* principle in mind, regardless of their positions and conditions.

Issues that surround the ‘phasing-out vis-à-vis exit strategy’ are major concerns in Tigray as they are in other regions. The following illustrates Tigray’s position:

If there are views that – *the remaining tasks that surround the RCS should be taken over by the respective regions once the strategy is developed*, then they simply remain being rhetoric, given that: a) all regions are not equally capable; and b) regional capacities have not been adequately built, nor enabled them implement such a resource-demanding project ...even in cases of those with a relatively better capacities.

A similar trend mentioned was the case of the “Ethiopian Forestry Action Programme” (EFAP), which has also been developed with supports by an international organisation.

Similar with the RCS are the features that EFAP:

is developed on region-based contexts

contains lots of project profiles, and

above all, nothing significant made towards moving EFAP into action, so is noted to be the case of the ‘RCS pack’

Notable failures are exhibited by the EPA/CSE in creating and building up common understanding between all regions and their governments on the urgency for taking the RCS further into implementation stage and hence, the needs for giving priorities towards approving the strategy. The role that CSE/EPA could have played in terms of lobbying/convincing decision makers to approve the RCS is largely considered not only as failure, but also as a regrettably missed opportunity of the RCS process.

All steps ahead (by the region as well as EPA/CSE) should gear towards making the best uses of Tigray's greater awareness in environmental protection and rehabilitation in mobilising community, local level administration [Baito] and sector offices at zone/Woreda for implementing the RCS and sustaining it.

Taking advantages of these opportunities and to bring about meaningful changes, the following actions have to be undertaken:

EPA/CSE ensures approvals of all RCSs and establishments of implementing institutions by putting efforts in convincing policy makers and by promoting regional capacities to enable them carry the work forward

Need to consider piloting the RCS in the regional settings – so requires funds

Additional efforts to be put by the EPA/CSE in building capacities, which can bring qualitative and quantitative changes/impacts in regional capacities

While organising/structuring/setting such projects and activities therein, appropriate considerations should be given to make the best uses of the available capacities to as much level as the needs for enhancing capacities and capabilities.

EPA/CSE should be prepared to [put a system of M&E in place] to monitor the undoubted negative effects of the current nation wide trends/motto “move towards food security .. increased trends of depending on food crops’ production....”, mostly at the expense of (or with substantial pressure on) natural resource base; explain the outcome/results to the regional governments, convince and help them in designing better approaches that could lead towards improved agricultural production without compromising the NR base. Note that the M&E efforts are by large geared towards large-scale pollution issues and that of agriculture related though small-scale but of huge effects, are not give due considerations

Could CSE/EPA play any role in taking the NR dept of the BoANR out of its’ currently non-working state – for unknown reasons paralysed for undefined period?

## Annex 6g

### **REGIONAL CONSERVATION STRATEGY PROCESS: AMHARA NATIONAL REGIONAL STATE**

#### **1. RCS Process**

Following the formulation of the National Conservation Strategy and in line with the government policies drawn at national level, the process of developing a Conservation Strategy for the Amhara National Regional State (ANRS) started by the first quarter of 1995.

The overall goal, which ANRS envisaged achieving out of the RCS reads as:  
*“improving and enhancing the health and quality of life of all the people in the Region, and promoting sustainable social and economic development through sound management and use of natural, human and cultural resources and the environment as a whole so as to meet the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generation to meet their own need”*

A Regional Conservation Strategy Steering Committee (RCSSC) was set in April 1995 as an executive body for leading the RCS project/process and later re-named as Regional Environmental Coordinating Committee (RECC). Chaired by the Vice President of the Regional State, RECC is comprised of heads or representatives of the various regional institutions as members.

The regional Bureau of Agriculture has taken over the responsibilities for coordinating the RCS, as it was believed to hold the structures and expertise necessary and most appropriate for undertaking the RCS.

The RCS Task Force was subsequently formed with experts drawn from 28 different organisations and started its work by developing the terms of reference and devising the appropriate plans for the tasks ahead towards producing the RCS. Major decisions made right at this point in time were:

Reorganising and dividing the Task Force into six groups on the basis of specific areas of expertise; and

Establishing an Editorial Board comprising of five persons, who would be taking the responsibilities of reviewing the RCS document as released by the different groups of the Task Force

The groups of the Task Force then produced the draft RCS document. Documents on CSE and the Ethiopian Forest Action Program (EFAP) were used as appropriate for developing the regional strategy.

Subsequent efforts that were made in reviewing and refining the draft RCS include:

Reviews made by the Editorial Board

Reviewed by participants of a one-day workshop, which has been organised in collaboration with the regional EFAP

Further reviews made through a three-day ‘RCS workshop/conference’, where over 200 participants (including senior professionals) involved

Field based reviews and secondary data search for filling in the gaps and responding to comments

The final strategy document, as designed with particular focus on embodying 13 sectoral and 12 cross-sectoral issues with prioritised programmes and projects, is prepared in three volumes each describing different issues:

Volume I: Introduction and the Natural Resource Base  
Volume II: Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation Policies and Organisational Framework  
Volume III: The Natural Resource Action Plan and Regional Conservation Investment Programme [Investment Programme annexed]

It is now about a year (July 2000) since - the final document was approved by the Regional Executive Committee; a Proclamation<sup>10</sup> (No. 47/2000; August 2000) that allows establishing an authority issued.

The next step that the ANRS envisaged undertaking, as part of a pre-implementation process was that of creating a region wide awareness on and popularisation of the RCS through workshops. This process however had not yet been carried out waiting for adequate copies of documents, which has long been sent to the EPA/CSE for publication.

## **2. Project's Specific Contribution**

The ANRS has received the usual package of support from the project, which include; technical, financial, office equipments/materials (computers-printers, photocopier, binder, etc) and books on environment.

## **3. Assessment of Outputs, Impacts and Identification of Issues Arising**

### **A. STRENGTHS, OUTPUTS AND IMPACTS OF THE PROCESS/PROJECT**

The RCS process and project in ANRS appear to be full of strengths with significantly high impacts than that of its' limitations. The following illustrate this position:

Preparation of project proposals and implementing some based on the RCS document

Increased levels of awareness among technical staff and decision makers on environment

Getting the RCS documents and the policy approved by the Council;

Establishment of an independent body dealing with RCS and issues related with the wider environment is made official by proclamation and preparation began for bringing this into effect; the first of its' kind in the country.

As opposed to the views of all other regions, high level supports rendered by the EPA/CSE mainly by lobbying and influencing policy makers - played significantly high roles in getting the RCS approved and some towards establishing an independent authority.

Discrepancies in pre/post-EPRDF data:- although serious challenges to the process, they were verified and analysed through a more comprehensive and grounded methods.

Proud of the achievements (and strong ownership feelings) resulting from involvements of multiple stakeholders (local staff as members of Task Force, Editorial Board, workshop participants etc) in the RCS process and in producing the final document.

Regardless of the outcome, RCS piloted within the ANRS in Ankober, in close collaboration with EPA/CSA.

Forestry Action Programme drawn in much detailed form and incorporated in the next 5-year plans for implementation.

Produced a draft document on Combating Desertification Action Programme.

Devised an Integrated Watershed Management Programme, ready for implementation as soon as funds are released by Sida.

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<sup>10</sup> Zikre Hig of The Council of The Amhara National Regional State; Proclamation No. 47/2000, *Environmental Protection, Land Administration and Use Authority Establishment Proclamation* – August 2000

Agro-forestry and fuel wood project designed.

Behind all the strengths and impacts is the fact that the RCS coordination has been handled by the BoANR and tremendous supports obtained from the regional government at all levels.

## **B. WEAKNESSES/LIMITATIONS/CHALLENGES OF THE PROCESS/PROJECT**

Quite minimal and insufficient capacity building efforts made, given - the size of the region, the magnitude and diverseness of the problems, and in comparison with the number of years that the project had been operational

Staff turn-over

EPA/CSA took long to get documents published – creating substantial lags on the regional RCS plans

### **4. Analysis**

#### Relevance and Process

The RCS process/project is yet considered as relevant as ever. Ato Abebe, representing Bureau of Water, Mines and Energy – for instance, reflected a cause and effect relationships indicating the needs for projects with long-term visions – like the RCS. Key issues indicated as basic reasons for the Bureau's involvements so far, and the needs for future action relate with that of unwise utilisation of energy resources and the trends in ground water droughts: Energy in Amhara region for household consumption is based on biomass – forests and bushes being destroyed

Given the current trends of high rate of population increase, more settlements are being established – all at the expense of natural resources; forest clearing in progress for both settlements and fuel wood

On the other hand, water resources in Amhara region is based on ground water

Given the current trends of erratic nature of the rainfall situation, which has also been implicated by loss of forests and bushes; ground water drought is serious threat

The process, so far undergone are by large considered as participative and educative; and accomplished within the shortest possible period.

#### Sustainability

Establishment of an independent Authority with experts from the various institutions is a great leap forward to ensuring accountability and sustaining the outcome - and hence, each programme contains environment element and accordingly implemented.

### **5. Lessons and Recommendations**

Key lesson learnt in the process is - not to rely upon a single and one-way support (all sorts of assistances) nor on government funds, should such type of resource demanding projects are sustained. Hence proposals [including environment related] submitted to various donors and private sectors have yielded positive responses. Major supporters include: UNDP (Global Investment); USAID (Integrated Watershed Management); Sida (Integrated Rural Development Programme); GTZ; Austrian Government, etc.

In the light of the huge gap that prevails in the region; vis-à-vis the problems in hand, resource availabilities and needs ... the following issues (partly suggested by the region) need appropriate considerations:



Need to consider piloting the RCS in other settings of the region; in different representative areas and at different agro-eco systems – so requires funds - CSE/EPA sought as potential supporter(s) in taking the RCS further

Human resource development, a key for success: Additional efforts to be put by the EPA/CSE in building capacities in a way that could bring about qualitative and quantitative changes/impacts in regional capacities. EPA/CSE and all other international organisations should focus on ‘software development, rather than the hardware ones’, Abebe stressed indicating the needs for investing in developing a workable mechanism geared towards changing peoples’ minds.

With due consideration to the fact that environment/conservation are global issues, the needs for updating regional knowledge base by providing its’ experts and community members access to international and national exposures seems appropriate and timely. Continued supports from the EPA/CSE in this respect is suggested

EPA/CSE should be prepared to [put a system of M&E in place] to monitor the undoubted negative effects of the current nation wide trends/motto “move towards food security .. increased trends of depending on food crops’ production....”, mostly at the expense of (or with substantial pressure on) natural resource base; explain the outcome/results to the regional governments, convince and help them in designing better approaches that could lead towards improved agricultural production without compromising the NR base. Note that the M&E efforts are by large geared towards large-scale pollution issues and that of agriculture related though small-scale but of huge effects, are not give due considerations

## **Annex 6h**

### **REGIONAL CONSERVATION STRATEGY PROCESS: BENISHANGUL-GUMZ NATIONAL REGIONAL STATE**

#### **1. RCS Process**

Following the process of restructuring administrative areas held during 1985-86 EC [1992/93 GC], BeniShangul-Gumz was established as a region, having Assosa, Metekel and Kamashi within its' jurisdiction.

Two years on since its establishments, in 1987 EC [1994 GC] people from the CSE/EPA came into the region with the very idea of initiating a project that aims at enabling the region develop its' own conservation strategy and implementing them. CSE/EPA's initiatives received warm welcome by the region. In fact, the offer came in during the period when the need for filling information gap on the natural resource base of the newly established region (having Kamashi as additional Zone) was under consideration. It is to be noted that surveys<sup>11</sup> were carried out in 1982 EC [89/90 GC] by the then Plan ministry and BoA, covering Assosa and Metekel.

The RCS process started in 1994 by establishing RECC as supreme decision-making body on issues that relate with the RCS development, a step considered crucial towards promoting the sustainable development of the regional state.

All government Bureaus are represented in RECC, though the compositions varied as changes were made in bureaux structures through time. President of the Regional State – Chair Person; Head, Bureau of Planning and Economic Development - Secretary<sup>12</sup>; and Members include Heads of organisations: Bureau of Agriculture (formerly known as Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Bureau); Bureau of Education and Culture; Bureau of Health, Bureau of Disaster Prevention, Labour and Social Affairs; Bureau of Water Resource; Bureau of Trade, Industry and Transport; Bureau of Public works, Urban Development, Mines and Energy; Population Office; Women Affairs Office; Investment Office and; NGO's Development Associations, elders people and religious leaders.

Assignments given to members of RECC to nominate one technical staff representing each organisation to form a Task Force, which would be taking the tasks of formulating the RCS. Hence, Task Force established and drew its' plans towards producing the RCS in five volumes.

Draft volume I document was produced in 1995, covering the resource inventory and utilisation aspects. Nothing significant was thereafter done in relation with RCS for a number of years, as the region was busy restructuring its' bureaux and departments therein and a large-scale staff reshuffling following the outcome of bureaux structuring process.

Subsequent measures were taken to strengthen the Task force, which was seriously affected by the high turnover of staff.

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<sup>11</sup> Namely, *Natural Resource Survey of Assosa and A General Natural Resource Survey of Metekel Administrative Region*

<sup>12</sup> Initially RECC's Secretary was the Head of what was then called as Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Bureau

By the end of 1989, the task force was fully engaged developing the RCS with a prior agreements of reducing interference by the respective organisations. It took the Task Force's 25 intensive working days to produce the remaining four volumes (and updating volume I), all of which were based on CSE documents as a general framework. A panel commented each version.

Institutional settings for implementing the RCS, however, remained being debatable issue. The very idea of establishing a new institution responsible for implementing the RCS that has been proposed by the task force was apparently disapproved by the panel (in conference containing admin officials and other relevant bodies and individuals) in favour of continued use of RECC in a more or less similar way to that applied in developing the RCS documents. Major exceptions were that RECC's powers are to be devolved down to Zone and Woreda levels, establishing ZECC and WECC respectively. Detailed structures are already drawn (copy available).

For various reasons, efforts made to get the RCS approved by the government were unsuccessful. Final draft of the RCS document handed over to the regional government in English language was sent back to the project for getting it translated to Amharic. By the time the translation process is finished, the Parliament came to a close for recess.

## **2. Project's Specific Contribution**

As part of the CSE/EPA's support pack, computer-printers (two sets, one of which is being processed), some office equipments and stationeries and 48 books – which one could hardly find them in the country, leave alone in the region, are delivered to the region through the coordinating organisation. Currently, they are the process of acquiring additional books from the CSE/EPA. A mechanism is being developed for accessing the books to regional users while ensuring that they are kept safe.

As an organisation that was held responsible for coordinating the RCS organisation, all materials were based in BoPED. The task force in developing the RCS used all materials, while the use by any other member of other sectors staff was not ruled out.

***All materials received are considered as regional properties regardless of where they are based.***

Supports were also extended by the CSE/EPA to the project for running workshops and trainings on environment related topics, more or less similar to those conducted in other regions. In cases when such capacity building events are organised by the CSE/EPA, invitations are mostly sent through the regional council and sometimes through BoPED. In all cases, responsibilities of selecting training/workshop participants were given to BoPED.

Although a one-time event, a 'travelling seminar' programme has been initiated sometime ago. It was believed to have given the regional experts a chance to share experiences with others, in deed learnt a lot.

4 people went for a 2-month training in AAU, though also remained being a one-shot exercise

## **3. Assessment of Outputs, Impacts and Identification of Issues Arising**

### **Outputs and Impacts [Signs of Impacts]**

Two projects were proposed based on lessons learnt through the RCS process [and related outputs] – on Enzi mountain conservation and recreation establishments and; on rehabilitating Anbessa Chaka (through the BoA).

Environmental clubs organised in schools.

In the process where BoPED (in its' roles as a leading regional planners) was a key actor, some elements of the RCS are included in the next 5-year regional plans.

#### A. STRENGTHS OF THE PROCESS/PROJECT

Trickling effects noticed: Levels of awareness increased through training events directly benefiting senior professionals and task force members, who in turn passed the newly acquired knowledge on to their colleagues within their organisation.

Senior professionals involved in the RCS with utmost commitments

Discussions regarding environmental problems initiated: each member of the task force, in turn, had thorough discussions on most issues with colleagues in the respective institution.

Hence, increased awareness and understanding at institution level

Very useful exercise with which members gained new insights of analysing a cross-sectoral issues

Drafts presented in conference and substantial feed backs obtained

Institutional commitments: The steps taken by all sectors/organisations in exempting members from any other job that may relate with their organisations, during the period when each and every sector was suffering from staff shortage, show the high level commitments the region entered towards the successful accomplishments of the RCS. The tendency of not approving establishment of independent institution is considered by experts as a contradictory measure taken by all involved. AK argues that we need to look into the driving force for making this decision, despite the levels of commitment they had, probably resource/fund?

Environmental issues are positively viewed by the regional president and efforts are encouraged

Surprisingly, staff turn-over has not been a problem in Benishangul-Gumz during the last five years. This might be due to the enabling working environment and freedom provided by the region – no serious pressure by the region

#### B. WEAKNESSES/LIMITATIONS/CHALLENGES OF THE PROCESS/PROJECT

Good, but new exposures for BoPED, facing technical and by large, coordination challenges – like - difficulties of harnessing/harmonising the diversely varied needs and aspirations of different sectors/organisations often reflected through members of the task force, representing their organisations. Challenges of harmonising the differences on cross-sectoral issues was mentioned.

Inadequate professional touring – sharing experiences of others, as the region and its' experts have lots to learn from others.

They do not have formal reporting system/mechanism, but presenting information about changes and some new events like training/workshop.

NGOs [the major, probably the only ones being CHISP and ZOA (Dutch-based working on refugees)] were not included in the RCS process – felt to be tiny with minimal roles; it could, however, be argued that they have been ignored or not given adequate attention, except being informed by Yeshumneh [Focal person] about the RCS and the progress made.

Internal problems affecting the process: series of organisational restructuring and staff reshuffling; political instability

### 4. Analysis

#### **Relevance**

The very fact that Benishangul-Gumuz's rich natural resources are increasingly being destroyed during the last few years (*on the verge of total destruction*, as said by an expert) due to a range of human made factors (caused by mere lack of knowledge and backwardness), together with and; the huge size of refugees that the region had to host – makes the RCS timely and in deed relevant.

### **Process and Efficiency**

In line with the decisions that were made to shift the RCS coordination from BoANR to BoPED, the latter assumed the responsibilities at early stages of the process.

In the light of the views forwarded from by the BoANR in Tigray highlighting the foregone potentials and on the other hand, the success that the ANRS felt to have achieved by taking advantages of the BoANR's potentials, the question that this review couldn't get answer about was:- The merits that were considered for selecting the BoANR then; and which ones proved the shift.

The way BoANR was restructured to take its current shape - as BoA could be one of the reasons for taking such move. But - it still contains a NR department.

This is not to question BoPED's performance in running and coordinating the project. In fact, it did well with utmost efficiency, although the success could by large be attributed to [dependant on] - the Focal Person (Yeshumneh) and few members of the task force.

### **Impact, Effectiveness and Dissemination**

Information dissemination is a matter of concern in BeniShangul-Gumuz. Depending upon resource availabilities, ranges of methods are employed to transmit information on recent developments of various subjects (including those related with RCS) to offices and staffs at zone and Woreda levels.

Efforts made in passing RCS related developments on to zone/Woreda level staff were:  
Sending copies of the RCS documents for comments  
Sending copies of materials obtained from and back-to-office reports on workshops-conferences and trainings.

Isolated efforts made by the regional Focal Person (Yeshumneh), like – delivering speeches to students and members of environmental clubs across the region.

It is, however, noted that due to budget constraints as much knowledge and information on environment and in particular on RCS were not disseminated as the regional experts, BoPED and Task Force members would have liked.

### **Sustainability**

The project, although had a good and motivating start, it appears to have come at a halt so quickly. As to some experts, their region remained being passive while others were in a much better position, so they kept on listening others' success stories on radio. What follows are among the widely accepted views regarding the RCS reiterated by senior experts.

*All the work we so far did during the past ten years is simply paper work. It is now the time to stop this and start doing some work on the ground. We were encouraged by the EPA/CSE when the projects that we managed proposing [re: Anbessa Chaka and Enzo Terara] were taken further into drawing a management plan. That is all -nothing more done thereafter ensuring the implementation. The region needs adequate technical and financial support rather than bits and pieces, should the RCS be taken further in sustainable manner.....*

## **5. Lessons and Recommendations**

RCS documents and the related capacity building efforts are the first significant work undertaken in Benishangul-Gumuz since region was restructured; but lots remain to be done.

Acceptable considerations to be made for possible bright long-term futures of the current outputs suggested were:

The needs for timely revisits on the strategy based on the current situation [flexibility, dynamism emphasised]; quickly revision on the current document and getting it approved as soon as possible. Supports from the CSE/EPA is crucial – in this case, mainly technical and influencing policy makers

Decisions that seem to have been made to end the project is untimely and by any standard unjustifiable in Benishangul-Gumuz's context, given the loads of work ahead and corresponding supports needed

With due considerations to the way supports were so far given [a sort of equal support for all regions regardless of their levels of developments], devise a sustainable system for supporting the region in taking the RCS process further into implementation stage;

Efforts should be made towards institutionalising the RCS within each and every sector and forge links across the board

Disparities between regions felt, minimal or far below to what Benishangul should have been supported

CSE/EPA gives priorities in rendering technical and financial supports to the region, but extending beyond Assosa

Particular emphasis should be given in building capacities – a long-term [5-year at the minimum] capacity building programme has to be drawn; Particular emphasis should be given to building a strong knowledge base on pre/post-environmental impact assessment techniques

Using Benishangul as a model for implementing the RCS [considering its size, potentials and levels of development]

Formulate sellable projects that are relevant to solving environmental problems

Organise donor conferences and solicit funding.

EPA/CSE should be prepared to [put a system of M&E in place] to monitor the undoubted negative effects of the current nation wide trends/motto “move towards food security .. increased trends of depending on food crops' production...”, mostly at the expense of (or with substantial pressure on) natural resource base; explain the outcome/results to the regional governments, convince and help them in designing better approaches that could lead towards improved agricultural production without compromising the NR base. Note that the M&E efforts are by large geared towards large-scale pollution issues and that of agriculture related though small-scale but of huge effects, are not give due considerations

## ANNEX 7

### POINTERS FROM ETHIOPIA TOWARDS BEST PRACTICE IN CONSERVATION STRATEGIES

The following points come from the analysis in this and the previous chapters of this report. They reflect both positive and negative experiences with this project. They are listed simply as points for clarity and to save space. They are generally quite well known issues and so are only reminders based on this experience.

#### Project Design

More participatory project development with inputs from those who will be involved.  
Project design grounded in local institutional realities, not the theory of co-operation.  
With seconded staff in two implementing partners institutions independent management is necessary to avoid both internal conflicts of responsibility and inter agency conflicts.  
Specified involvement in project document of all agencies involved in the project, government, private and NGO will help ensure their participation.  
Project activities must have specific phase out or institutionalisation activities so that the project is not seen as always the source of support or training.  
The political realities need to be understood in project design and in this case ways of ensuring greater high level political support and attention should have been sought.  
Project document needs to be specific about the various activities or at least provide some indication of how issues should be explored. The WPP and the ways to translate CSE and RCS document into action (other than through government department activities) needed more explanation.  
Over-optimistic planning should be avoided in process approach projects such as this.

#### Project Management

A full time National Project Manager should have been appointed along with professional managers in EPU and EPA.  
These should have been free of other responsibilities and the project management should have been independent of partner institutions.  
Staff meeting for all staff should be arranged as part of the management structure to ensure that staff remain informed and committed.  
Conflict resolution mechanisms and training must be in place to deal with conflict between partners.

#### Finance

Project Financial management should always be transparent to all partners.  
Use of the local procedures is best in general, as they are well known. However, where they cause unacceptable delays, as with tendering, alternative arrangements should be developed.

#### Monitoring and Assessment

Monitoring and assessment should be established at the time the project is set up.  
It should include ways for assessing not just consultants bids but also their work in an independent manner.

#### Project Resources

The financial resources for a project should be matched to the tasks, otherwise surplus money leads to pressures on management.  
Technical staff should do technical jobs and administrative staff should be employed to ensure that technical advisors do not spend their time on inappropriate administrative work.

Partners in a project must keep to their responsibilities in terms of staff provision and resources.

#### Operations

All staff must be familiar with the project document and it must be clarified where necessary to ensure it is not subject to personal interpretation.

Flexibility is needed to work at rates of field partners so local ownership is ensured.

Uncertainty over project continuation should be avoided

Misunderstandings amongst project partners, as in MEDaC concerning the impact of the CSE upon rates of development, should be addressed immediately at the highest level.

Donors must not be neglected as they may have a role in future activities in this area.

#### **Partnership**

Differing rights and responsibilities of partners in a project need to be specified.

The role of IUCN as an executing agency needs clarification.

The position of IUCN's T.A.s and their contract responsibilities should be clearer.

Continuity in backstopping is essential and maintaining a constructive rapport is vital, even where policing type missions are needed.

Sensitivity to donor criteria is essential, as was achieved here.

#### **Regional Conservation Strategy Work**

Beware of over lengthy processes as momentum is lost.

Potential delay points need to be identified in project planning and solutions identified.

Multi-sectoral co-operation and co-ordination need exploring so that as key elements in the process they do not become bottlenecks.

Ways of coping with staff turnover and ensuring a critical mass or core group need to be developed

Participation does not have to wait until there is a document to discuss.

Ways of ensuring active participation of important actors needs to be explored in planning and not left as reactions to problem situations.

Methods of encouraging local ownership of the RCS processes at different levels need to be developed.

#### Wereda Pilot Project

A critical aspect of the project, such as this, should have been addressed more vigorously and successfully in the design and planning stages

WPP in Project document should have been clarified by project management, or if that was not successful by IUCN or by an external consultant – whoever designed it in the project document.

When staff are unhappy with an element of a project, such as the WPP either the project should have been revised or the staff changed if the element is confirmed as essential.

Use of local resources and experience should be maximised where appropriate, for instance drawing on neighbouring experience in this case. Projects should learn from other actors and not become islands by themselves.

Consultants must be managed carefully with respect to their TORs, time schedule, and checking of their field skills capacity in the selection procedure.

Consultants should not be paid when the required work has not been done.

#### **Relevance and Awareness**

Wider interpretation of project relevance should be sought and publicised.

Publicity of project achievements is vital for support.

Ways in which CSE and RCSs are being used should be shared amongst other potential users.

#### Achievement and Impact

Skills and gender aspects have long term impact and need monitoring.



Trickle down to villages or weredas should not be assumed and should be monitored. Sharing lessons from local level projects can multiply benefits.

#### Sustainability

The issue of sustainability must be explored in the project document and appropriate arrangements for institutionalisation made from the start, not just in the last year.