The Future of Sustainability: Have Your Say!

Background Document - “The Future of Sustainability: Rethinking Environment and Development in the Twenty-First century”
Comment / Comentario / Commentaire

John Manoochehri

Moderating team: John Manoochehri comments on Professor William Adams background document: The Future of Sustainability: Rethinking Environment and Development in the Twenty-First Century, drawing attention to: developments in sustainability science; a critique of the three pillars of sustainability; the need to differentiate between impact management from demand management; the dynamics of institutional change.  

He emphasises that changing the world for the better needs to start with a massive regalvanisation of the sustainability movement itself. The movement needs to criticise itself before it complains that not enough being done by others. This criticism needs to be pungent enough to actual break through the rhythms of 'permanent reform' that such as the UN and others are already totally inured to, and requires passion, directness, and risk-taking. Diplomacy has its limits.

John Manoochehri comenta el documento base del Profesor Willian Adams y resalta algunos puntos: los avances en las ciencias de la sostenibilidad, una crítica a los tres pilares de la sostenibilidad, la necesidad de diferenciar entre manejo de impacto y manejo de demanda, la dinámica de cambio institucional.

Es enfático en afirmar que el mundo cambiante necesita comenzar con un repensamiento del movimiento ambiental. El movimiento necesita ser autocrítico antes de criticar a los otros. Este criticismo necesita ser tan agudo que permita romper los ritmos de la “permanente reforma” que promulgan las Naciones Unidas y otros organismos. Requiere pasión, franqueza y abordaje de riesgos. La diplomacia tiene sus límites.

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(1) Sustainability science as new underpinning to sustainable development (SD).
I think the summary of the SD history is good, but I think behind the SD rhetoric and policy framing, there has been the rise of 'sustainability' science, which I take to be essentially systems ecology, industrial ecology and ecological economics, with support from 'new, green' bits of classical disciplines, e.g. political ecology, and indeed increasing background support from systems science and such. One of the problems of SD has been insufficient connection to an actual 'normative science' that can really enable the transformations required: falling back to old-skool economics and engineering has not been very effective: I think it’s now time to articulate that SD has at least a partial, but specially-developed science base on which to rest. Key ideas (which the report mentions) such as 'critical natural capital' (essentially ecological economics) and resilience (the backbone of much systems ecology work) come from this new sustainability science agenda, not from the classical disciplines. It's obviously not a done deal (sooner or later, these three 'new' disciplines will probably merge, around a shared meta-agenda which has yet to be articulated, at least to the extent of mathematics or physics), but there are key questions clearly being gnawed at.

(2) Trade-offs/'pillar equivalence'/means vs. ends
I think the reports critique of trade-offs is perfectly placed. It is an obvious nonsense to have 'pillar equivalence' (and indeed its technical corollary, total capital substitution) between social, environmental, economic aspects of SD. So obviously a hierarchy, or concentric circle, version of the three-fold structure is required, which is promoted here. I think this point can be reinforced however it we clarify that the economy is not an end in itself, nor is the extraction of environmental resources: to consider the economy as a 'pillar' implies that it has some substantive nature beyond providing welfare, and this is not the case. The reification of abstract institutions (markets) and indices (money/GDP growth) has clearly got out of hand, and correcting this is a more profound job than merely sequencing the 'pillars'. 

(3) Resource limits and demand
It is good that Bill Adams presents the latest version of resource limits thinking. However, I don't think he captures two key insights that I have become really preoccupied with. Firstly, when we talk about limits, I find it helpful to distinguish three classical 'impact' related aspects of environmentalism: preservation of species and landscapes (for amenity/science); natural resource conservation (e.g. scientific forestry/farming/fishery); and pollution reduction (e.g. flue scrubbers, resource substitution, e.g. propane coolants for CFCs, waste management) - from the demand question proper. Of course, we can deal with impacts by reducing demand, but normally a managed solution is encouraged for given demand.

In talking about demand, I think it is helpful to say that we now know that there is a fourth environmental challenge on top of preservation, conservation and pollution reduction (which together we may call impact management) which is demand reduction, or 'demand management'. The demand approach works slightly differently from impact management in that rather than starting with the symptom, it starts with the cause: obviously, they can meet in the middle, but the implication is different. Why are people travelling (rather than how can we make transport 'less impactful')? Why are they using energy? etc. The second insight is the difference between systemic demand and consumer demand. It's time now to look at the demand question, and Bill Adams promotes this, but I think he didn’t distinguish between consumer demand proper, and what I call 'systemic demand' which is simply inefficiency in the resource consuming system. The two most obvious aspects of this are industry inefficiency (that fact that industries do not capture the Factor X efficiencies available to them is nothing to do with consumer demand), and what I call 'distributive inefficiency' or 'organisational inefficiency' i.e. whether produced goods are actually used intensively (e.g. cars, washing machines, boats, holiday homes, power tools, etc), to increase which (by shifting from product to service-sales) is again not fully in the gift of consumers. Anyway, yes it's time to talk turkey  on demand, but I think we get this straight by a) systematically differentiating classical impact management from upstream demand management (however much they may overlap) and b) demonstrating that consumer demand is not responsible for all systemic demand, and thus we cannot simply focus narrowly on consumerism to reduce resource demand.

(4) Markets
The report talks about markets as efficient, and I have two problems with this. Firstly, it is not a scientific statement, even though it is presented as such. It is not scientific because it is not falsifiable: what serious control tests can we perform in assessing whether markets are efficient? The historical command economy 'test' is not a very credible control, and there is no real theory (alas - I wish there were) giving us an abstract set of models of resource use allocation/planning, by which we might be able to say 'markets are efficient to X extent in Y, Z contexts'. This anti-science critique is the most general way of saying that economics works on the basis of a rather ad-hoc concept and method set. I think the rhetoric of 'markets: efficient'  is okay, since, as far as we /can/ use abstract modelling we can probably work out that markets are a limited exemplification of a distributed information-exchange solution to a tricky many-agent problem, with limited information pathways and information processing constraints, when compared with a centralised, command-economy alternative. But if we present it too strongly, we not only depart from real science, we give a huge rhetorical victory to those who don't care about resource limits and, if pressed, will try to 'Kuznets Curve' us out of incipient catastrophe.

The second problem with it is simply that markets are efficient in a localised way only. Talking in terms of systems phase diagrams, they don't naturally create global optima, only local ones, and the determining feature is the socio-economics of how markets are set up, something outside the market itself. In financial, environmental and social terms, it would be better for automakers to sell auto-services (car hire, share) rather than individual autos; but the market is locked onto a product-sales model. It cannot, without external intervention 'optimise' its way out of the 'phase trough' it has found itself in. I think this is another, quite specific, critique of the 'efficiency' of markets: if we set markets up wrong, they will optimise for the wrong thing. We have very cheap cars, but very costly mobility.

For example, Bill Adams’ rightly says: "One aspect of this is an economy of services rather than objects, that generates value without generating waste or unnecessary physical or energetic throughput", but I wonder how you would a) model this transition scientifically rather than pragmatically, and b) present the economics of the service alternative. (This is a trick question, because my research and analysis suggests this very proposal demonstrates a) the problem of conceptual limits of economics (because to get at the service concept we need to concretise a theory of value beyond mere exchange-price, which economics refuses to do, and thereby demonstrate that in a product-sales context value of private products is being 'under-consumed'), b) the problem of localised market optima, because when we have worked out why the shift to services is a good idea scientifically and economically, we can only ask why it isn't universally applied already.)

(5) Security
The background document says “disabling fears about security, cultural change and political threat are an issue in many countries" without implying that real 'environmental security' is subordinate to manic, and self-fulfilled 'terror/geopolitical security' fears. This is great, very responsible, and very subtly done.

(6). Change Dynamics: Here I have problems. 

a. The report quotes, "‘we are changing the earth more rapidly than we are understanding it", which is persuasive and powerful, but it has a huge implication that isn’t quite picked up. It is this: that counter-change initiatives must move faster than science. We have to make statements and initiate actions that the scientific data basis cannot completely endorse. We must use a 'compass' approach - 'this direction' - rather than 'map' approach - 'this pathway'. I don't however believe that IUCN and other justification/research/data-obsessed organisations are prepared to pursue. At the moment, environmental science is stupendously constipated: from resource flow and footprint studies (the new wave of impact data), to EEA-style DSPIR indicators, through to MEA mega-data-sets, we are fixated on 'how much impact' rather than the science and design and economics of optimal alternatives. We are, in effect, squinting at the speedometer while still driving towards the cliff. I think the science and advocacy community must learn a language of 'compass not map', and principles of overall optimisation (rather than specific impact fiddling), in order to really turn the vehicle around.

b. The report says: "as currently formulated [sustainability definitions] are too loose to drive effective change on the scale required" and that is spot on. I also agree, however, with the 'brand equity' that sustainability has, and with the hypothesis "That the most effective strategy is to adopt an incremental or evolutionary approach, re-orientating the concept of sustainability, re-emphasising what it means and moving forwards; a strategy of ‘keep it but fix it". It is not specifed what needs doing, however and my view here is that systematics are required on one level, and sheer salesmanship and presentation on another. I think that the current SD trends in the UK in particular fail on both these levels: systematics and panache are almost entirely absent from the Porritt-led vague green SD rhetoric. No wonder so little is being achieved in the UK, with the government progressively co-opting critique and yet not delivering (read: SD Commission).

c. The report proposes :"That the timing is right to develop a new strategic approach to global sustainability" and this runs the risk of being a truism, given the evidence both of increasing damage and lacklustre change dynamics. I think something a bit stronger is required, and this I think needs to talk up failings in the SD response, not just increasing global problems. The environmental movement is stuck with well-meaning but clapped-out leadership and we need to look in as well as out. 

d. The report proposes: "That IUCN should take a lead in developing new thinking about sustainability", and further say such things as "IUCN can do little alone, but it can empower and mobilise others", and "IUCN has a unique constitution (incorporating government and non-governmental organisations) and unique convening power. IUCN therefore is therefore in a position to start to broker new forms of coalition, alliances [and innovation]".  All of this is problematic, in my view. IUCN was once already at the forefront, with WCS in '80, of developing sustainable thinking, so that's not new per se. The problem is, why has it not been continuing to do this? The problem is really the need for a new type of organisation that can aggressively lobby for alternative patterns of development, without being seen as an 'interest group', and yet using only partial information and evidence for the optimality of alternatives. IUCN seems to me a classical example of an organisation which simply refuses to lobby for alternatives because it hasn’t got the evidence for them: so it publishes Red Lists dutifully, and protects areas, and contributes to MEAs. But it needs a cultural shift to take the risk in talking up a future that doesn’t exist, rather than railing against failings of the world that does.

The recently departed head of IUCN, who has a non-environmentalist technocrat/diplomat background, is well placed to step away from the self-denying culture of environmental science, but I don't think he has done or will do that. In my opinion he fudges the issues behind 'governance' solutions, which are never very inspiring, however well-intentioned, and are in any case pretty schooled to the rhythms of governing structures already dominating the status quo (e.g. World Bank). Indeed, the other layer of problem for IUCN is indeed both the 'governmental' structure - annoy member states and say good-bye to core funding, a story as old as government itself - and 'distributed' structure - if you lead too strong on one approach, you don't take the Commissions and individual Members with you. Governmental backing and mega-consensus strike me as limiting.

e. The report proposes: "imagination, vision, passion and emotion", and say "the solution to the dilemma of creating change which the rich and powerful mistrust has to be in terms of presenting opportunities and not threats" and "the challenges ahead demand vision and boldness". And this is all true. But how? This is the great unanswered question. My work for the UN Environment Programme over four years was to produce their strategic policy in the sustainable production and consumption area (google 'Consumption Opportunities'), which tried to promote, indeed embody, all these points. But the difficulty I had even trying to get the UNEP structure to buy into their own product was immense. There are lots of utter idiots who co-opt language of opportunities while promoting action (if acting at all, which is itself a problem) of mincing impact measurement and salami-slicing reduction, with a negative tone.

What Bill Adams points to, to my mind, is the need for individuals and institutions to take risks. I just don't see it happening, and this I think is where the environmental movement has largely gone wrong. There is security in a) micro-measuring impact, b) accepting governmental mandates and funding, c) working in massive coalitions, but all of these militate against real visionary work, self-and-other critique, and radical innovation. It is not an accident that Amory Lovins is a total outsider to any recognised mainstream environmental institution, however much we all may love him: he just won't accept mediocre uninspiring ideas that come out of the mainstream! So the conclusion to this point seems to be: if we want 'vision, passion, innovation' and whatnot, we need people and institutions to take big risks. I think that needs articulating, otherwise we get those with strong vested interests in the environmental advocacy/policy/science status quo just capturing this language and continuing their business as usual environmental agenda. I would say this critique is correct for most of the current leading environmental science things in the UK - e.g. UEA - talking 'opportunities' but doing 'impact and risk'.

And it goes all the way up. Take current UNEP leadership. In the recent recruitment of the new Executive Director, there should have been one message to governments in joining UNEP: 'back me or fire me'. UNEP has a core budget, separate from project/trust funds, of roughly US$50 million per annum. Compare this to the Johnny Depp film which, in less that four months, will have taken over a billion dollars in theatrical ticket sales worldwide. We are living in a dream world, and leaders need to hit hard - i.e. take a big risk. But UNEP leadership will not. There will be an attempt to nuance and finesse and 'angle' (e.g. development and environment linkage) the UNEP pig out of the hideous geopolitical poke it is now in: and in my view leaders will fail big time, and end up doing just what previous incumbents have done, which is panic-manage a thousand projects which UNEP has no resources to back, and no political capital with which to push.

f. Communications, technology, and creativity: Apart from anything internal, we now need to reach out massively to the technical and communications revolution - which is reinventing lifestyle before our eyes with nary a 'campaigner' and without much research in view! And the creative communities in general (as have the development/AIDS campaigners). I think this point needs to be stronger. 

I think we need the urgency and single-mindedness and risk-taking of the 1970s, with the new resources and institutional embededness and confidence and suavity of the 00's, in order to create the conditions of vision, innnovation, and to be able to bring in the real change magicians (technology, communications, creatives). I have serious doubts about whether IUCN, with its inherent conservatism and linkage to governments, will do this.

For now, this is mainly just a salute Bill Adams splendidly panoptic thinking: he decries the possibility of this in introduction to the second edition of 'Green Development' but I think he did a great job! I think more than anyone, with Green Development and Future Nature, he is able to meld the evidence base, with a map of the structure of current thought (which is often lost from view in wide literature reviews), and the radical, urgent dimension of change, better than anyone. I really hope this new thinking finds support. Count me - caveats and all - in.